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 SUMMARY 
 
The best interests of the child are paramount in every matter concerning the 
child. This applies in the case of adoption of a child as well. When an adoption is 
intercultural, culture is an issue to be taken into account. This study is undertaken 
to consider the role that culture should play in a decision whether an adoption is 
in the best interests of the child. In order to determine whether intercultural 
adoption is a viable option that serves the best interests of the child, interracial 
adoption also needs to be focused on, as intercultural adoption is often also 
interracial. The research for this thesis is done from a South African legal 
perspective, although some interdisciplinary and international research is 
necessary as well.  
 
A brief historical overview of adoption in South Africa is undertaken, as it is 
important to have some background knowledge about adoption in South Africa in 
order to understand why race and culture are relevant in the South African 
adoptive system. The role of the family in the life of the child is investigated. The 
difference between family care, parental care and alternative care is researched. 
Thereafter the role of emotional bonding for a child, also known as attachment, is 
focused on. An important question is whether race and culture is the same thing. 
This is researched, whereafter the role of race and culture in the adoption 
process is investigated. The relevant provisions of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, 
which regulates adoption in South Africa, are compared to the relevant provisions 
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which will regulate adoption in South Africa 
soon. Finally, some conclusions are drawn, shortcomings are highlighted and 
possible solutions are suggested. 
 
The outcome of this thesis should provide some guidance to those involved in the 
adoption process with regard to the factors that are important in determining the 
best interests of the child in an intercultural adoption. 
 
KEY TERMS 
 
Best interests of the child; children’s rights; parental rights and responsibilities; 
family care; parental care; alternative care; attachment; adoption; race; culture; 
intercultural adoption; interracial adoption 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 1 RESEARCH PROBLEM ............................................................................1 
 
1 2 RESEARCH METHOD ..............................................................................6 
 
1 3 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS.........................................................................8 
 
1 4 TERMINOLOGY ......................................................................................11 
 
 
How we treat our children, especially those who lack adequate parental care, is a 
measure of our community.1 
 
 
1 1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Adoption is one of the most researched areas in child welfare.2 The reason for 
this can be debated at length, but the drastic invasion into the life of a child 
caused by an adoption is reason enough — in South Africa only a formal 
adoption in terms of the Child Care Act3 can permanently terminate parental 
responsibilities and rights.4 Currently, the full implementation of the Children’s 
                                                 
1  NZLC Report 65 3. 
2  Katz in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 227. 
3  Act 74 of 1983. 
4  Louw 2006 De Jure 515, 518-519. 
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Act5 is awaited.6 When the latter Act is fully implemented, there will be major 
legislative changes as far as children and their adoption are concerned.  
 
There are mainly three situations where adoption occurs. These are where the 
biological parent(s) or guardian(s): 
 
• voluntarily make the child available for adoption; 
• are deceased, or they are not able to care for the child, or they have 
abandoned the child; 
• cannot be entrusted with the care of the child.7  
 
There are different kinds of adoption. I believe that there are four main kinds of 
adoption in South Africa that should be distinguished. They are: 
 
• Adoption by strangers: This kind of adoption is provided for in the Child 
Care Act, and happens when prospective adoptive parents apply to adopt 
the child of someone that is usually not known to them. 
• Customary adoption: This kind of adoption usually happens within a family 
and for different purposes than statutory adoption.8 
• Step-parent adoption: This happens where a child is adopted by the 
                                                 
5  Act 38 of 2005. 
6  For more about this Act, see “2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW” and “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT 
AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
7  This is according to Joubert 1983 De Jure 132. All these situations could lead to statutory 
adoption. 
8  Customary adoptions are explained briefly in “2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary 
law”. 
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spouse or civil union partner of a biological parent, as also provided for in 
the Child Care Act. 
• Intercountry adoption: This is the adoption by South African parents of a 
child from another country, and vice versa.  
 
This thesis cannot possibly analyse all the different adoption possibilities. The 
aim of my research is to investigate whether intercultural adoption is a viable 
option that serves the best interests of the child.9 Inevitably, interracial adoption 
also needs to be focussed on as an intercultural adoption is often also interracial. 
Although adoption of all children is investigated, the focus is on infant adoption, 
mainly because the influence on the child is then at its greatest,10 and also 
because of South Africa’s huge problem with AIDS orphans and the many 
abandoned babies. 
 
As adoption of a child by strangers in terms of statute is how intercultural 
adoption normally comes about, this thesis focuses on adoption by strangers. As 
I shall explain,11 customary adoption is very different from statutory adoption. 
Customary adoption does not form an integral part of my research as its purpose 
and structure are completely different to statutory adoption.12 Even those legal 
experts who are opposed to interracial/intercultural adoption, such as 
Mosikatsana, do not equate customary adoption with statutory adoption or rely 
                                                 
9  The best interests of the child are constitutionally protected in s 28(2), and will be discussed and 
analysed in detail under “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
10  See “3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?”. 
11  See below in this chapter and various references throughout this thesis. 
12  These differences are pointed out directly below and throughout the thesis in the text. 
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on any reference to customary adoption in their arguments against 
interracial/intercultural adoption.13 Although adoption is not unknown in 
customary law, it is not interracial.14 It is usually by relatives and it is informal.15 It 
is restricted to a part of the population that is of the same race (mostly) and the 
same culture (mostly) and is used to ensure the continuation of families and the 
provision of heirs.16  
 
The importance of customary law in general and of customary adoption in 
particular can, however, not be denied. Whereas indigenous races in most 
countries are in the minority, the situation in South Africa is very different. In 
South Africa the majority of the South African population is black, and thus 
customary law is extremely important in this country.17 As a result, customary 
adoption will be referred to throughout this thesis in order to point out significant 
concepts.  
 
Step-parent adoptions will not be investigated. This is because the issue here is 
different from adoption by strangers. If a parent marries someone, the child is 
automatically subjected to the culture, rules, lifestyle, etcetera, of the new parent. 
                                                 
13  See Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 606; Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 602; Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan 
Journal of Race & Law 341. In these articles customary adoption is not mentioned or discussed at 
all, as the focus and aim are completely different. This aspect is discussed in more detail under “5 
6 2 Arguments against intercultural adoption”. 
14  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 616 says interracial adoption is fairly new in South Africa. He gives 
figures since 1991. 
15  Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 609. People who are subject to customary law may also adopt in terms 
of the Child Care Act and such adoptions surely occur. 
16  See “2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary law”. 
17  In 2008, the population in South Africa was nearly 50 million people, of which roughly 38 731 
000 were black – StatsOnline at http://www.statssa.gov.za/timeseriesdata. 
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Furthermore, step-parent adoption can occur where the child has a biological 
parent who is still part of the child’s life.18 This kind of adoption thus implies the 
termination of an existing relationship, not necessarily for the right reasons.19 
There is a danger with step-parent adoption that the interests of the child are 
overlooked. The best interests of the child would probably be better served if, 
instead, the step-parent has guardianship over the child. 
 
Intercountry adoption also does not form part of the research in this thesis. 
Although children whose adoptive parents are from a different country often face 
similar issues to children who are adopted locally,20 the scope of this thesis is 
limited to intercultural adoption within South Africa because of restrictions relating 
to the length of the thesis.21 
 
It is important to mention that the circumstances and socio-economic 
environment in South Africa are different to many other countries. While the 
importance of contact between an adopted child and his/her biological family is 
recognised,22 there are millions of abandoned and/or orphaned children in South 
                                                 
18  The biological parents may have divorced, or may never have been married or entered into a civil 
union. 
19  A biological father who is not close to the child may agree to a step-parent adoption in order to 
avoid paying maintenance for the child. 
20  A child who is adopted by parents from another country usually grows up in a different culture 
and possibly also with a different race. 
21  As will be explained below under “1 2 RESEARCH METHOD”, some comparative research is 
necessary. 
22  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
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Africa.23 As a result, contact between the child and the biological family is not 
always possible. 
 
In this thesis, I shall try to establish whether it is in the best interests of the 
child,24 who has a right to grow up as part of a family,25 to be adopted by parents 
of a different culture than his/her biological culture.26 
 
 
1 2 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This thesis is mainly a literature study, based largely on legislation, books, 
journal articles and court decisions, but it is not restricted to this form of research.  
 
There is some focus on legal historical matters.27 Progress and growth are the 
focus of this method.28 This component is important not only to provide the 
background to the research, but also to put into perspective the relevance of this 
thesis. The historical component of this thesis makes it clear and understandable 
why intercultural adoption is such a contentious issue in this country and why this 
specific aspect deserves further research.  
 
                                                 
23  Possible reasons are poverty and the effects of HIV and AIDS.  
24  See “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
25  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY”. 
26  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
27  See “2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW”. 
28  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 71. 
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The legal positivist research method is used because this thesis relies on the 
understanding and analysis of knowledge.29 Comparative law is the reciprocal 
comparison of different legal systems and legal rules with a view to obtaining 
new critical insights.30 The legal comparative research method places into 
perspective corresponding aspects of different legal systems.31 It is utilised by 
the researcher to obtain new knowledge and insight.32 This is done by 
investigating the similarities and differences between respective legal systems.33  
 
Adoption in New Zealand was researched because, like South Africa, New 
Zealand is a multicultural society34 and because the socio-economic 
circumstances in New Zealand and South Africa are similar.35 Furthermore, when 
the first adoption legislation in South Africa was drafted,36 the Bill was modelled 
on the Infants Act37 of New Zealand.38 The role of customary law in New Zealand 
is also of great value. Customary adoptions in New Zealand are no longer 
recognised, and how New Zealand dealt with this issue can be of use to the 
South African legislature.39  
 
                                                 
29  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 63-66. 
30  Zwiegert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law 1-63, as quoted in Esser 2008 LLD 13. 
31  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 71. 
32  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 71. 
33  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 213. 
34  NZLC Preliminary Paper 38 5.  
35  Kruger 2005 CILSA 246.  
36  This was the Adoption of Children Act 25 of 1923. 
37  Act 86 of 1908.  
38  See “2 4 3 1 Introduction”. 
39  In the conclusion I shall make recommendations about the future of customary adoption in South 
Africa. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 8
Botswana has a dual legal system, which recognises the coexistence of both 
common law and customary law.40 Similar to South Africa, Botswana has a great 
variety of ethnic groups,41 and the indigenous people of that country are in the 
majority. Furthermore, the Adoption of Children Act42 is based on the Children’s 
Act43 of South Africa. Unlike New Zealand, but like South Africa, Botswana 
currently recognises both customary adoption and statutory adoption.44 The way 
in which these two systems operate together will be investigated in this thesis to 
establish if the South African legislature can learn from these systems and how 
they are applied in practice.  
 
Various research methods are thus employed in this thesis. The goal is to 
determine whether intercultural adoption in South Africa is in the best interests of 
the child, and to find practical, viable solutions where these are needed. 
 
 
1 3 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 2 investigates and analyses the history of adoption in South Africa. In 
order to understand the relevance of the choice of topic, a brief historical 
overview is necessary. This entails considering the history of adoption in Roman 
                                                 
40  Booi Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Botswana.htm. 
41  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana xxi. More is said about this under “8 1 
INTRODUCTION”. 
42  Adoption of Children Act 1952.  
43  Act 31 of 1937. 
44  Quansah Family Law in Botswana 138. 
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law and in Roman-Dutch law, and of customary adoption and statutory adoption 
in South Africa. The aim of this chapter is to explore the history of adoption in 
South Africa with regard to the topic of this thesis.45  
 
It is not possible to consider adoption and the importance thereof for the child 
without first considering the relevance and/or importance of a child being able to 
grow up as part of a family or in a family environment. Chapter 3 explores the 
importance of a child being raised as part of a family. Different forms of family are 
explored, as well as the impact on a child’s emotional security if he/she grows up 
either with or without a family. The conclusion that is reached in this chapter is 
important and sets the foundation for the rest of the thesis. 
 
The important shift in the parent-child relationship from the emphasis on the 
rights of the parents to the interests of the child, and from parental rights to 
parental responsibilities,46 confirms the paramountcy of the best interests of the 
child as provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.47 
The best interests of the child are analysed in chapter 4. Even though the 
protection of the best interests of the child cannot escape criticism,48 the 
importance of this constitutional standard remains undoubted. Although cultural 
issues and the best interests of the child are closely linked, these two concepts 
will be discussed separately. 
                                                 
45  See “1 1 RESEARCH PROBLEM” above. 
46  Van Heerden “Parental power” in Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 
657-658; Clark 2002 CILSA 216-219. 
47  See s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
48  See “4 2 5 Criticism of the best interests standard”. 
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Chapter 5 consists of an in-depth study of the pivot of this thesis – the influence 
of race and/or culture49 on the adoption process. Owing to South Africa’s race-
conscious history, the relevance of race and culture are crucial when determining 
whether intercultural adoption has a realistic future in this country. The exact 
meanings of the terms “race” and “culture” are investigated, and the 
constitutional influence on the meaning of these terms, the dilemma of competing 
rights and the arguments for and against intercultural adoption are considered. 
 
During September 1996 a conference, “Towards redrafting the Child Care Act”, 
was held at Gordon’s Bay at which a comprehensive review and redrafting of the 
Child Care Act and all other legislation affecting children was planned.50 The 
South African Law Reform Commission began researching and developing a 
new Children’s Act in 1997. Now, 12 years later, some sections of the Children’s 
Act have been implemented. Although the chapter dealing with adoption has not 
yet come into effect, its implementation is expected soon. Until then, the Child 
Care Act regulates adoption in South Africa. Chapter 6 analyses the two Acts 
and considers how the provisions of the Children’s Act will influence the concept 
of the best interests of the child and adoption in general, and specifically 
intercultural adoption, once it comes into effect.  
 
                                                 
49  Again, the focus of this thesis is culture, not race, but it is impossible to consider the relevance of 
culture without also considering race. 
50  SALC Issue Paper 13 26. 
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The following two chapters, chapters 7 and 8, compare the position with regard 
to intercultural adoption in South Africa to that of New Zealand and Botswana. In 
chapter 7 adoption in New Zealand in terms of customary law as well as adoption 
in terms of statute are researched. In that country, customary adoption happened 
long before legislation dealing with adoption was enacted.51 Customary adoption 
in New Zealand is no longer legal.52 In chapter 8, adoption in Botswana is 
discussed. Today, both customary adoption and statutory adoption are 
recognised in that country. Chapter 8 investigates how this dual system operates 
and whether it is in the best interests of the child. 
 
Finally, in chapter 9, a summary is provided and some conclusions are drawn 
about the research that was undertaken. Lastly, recommendations are made 
about intercultural adoption and the way forward. 
 
 
1 4 TERMINOLOGY 
 
In order to simplify the text, I shall try to use consistent terms throughout. Some 
of these terms need further explanation. 
 
• Adoption: Whenever I use the term “adoption”, it refers to statutory 
adoption, unless I specify otherwise.  
                                                 
51  See “7 2 1 Adoption of Children Act 9 of 1881”. 
52  See “7 2 4 Maori Land Act 15 of 1909 and the Maori Affairs Act 94 of 1953”. 
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• Biological parent: I use the term “biological parent” instead of “natural 
parent”. Natural parent implies that an adoptive relationship is unnatural, 
which is of course not true, while birth parent can only apply to the child’s 
mother. 
 
• Black: Whereas a black person is often referred to as an African, I believe 
everyone who lives in Africa is an African, irrespective of race or culture. I 
therefore prefer to use the term “black”. 
 
• Interracial and inracial: While there is no real difference between the 
terms, I use the term “interracial” and “inracial” as opposed to transracial 
and same race.  
 
 
2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
2 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 13 
 
2 2 ROMAN LAW ........................................................................................... 14 
 
2 3 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW ............................................................................. 18 
 
2 4 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW........................................................................... 19 
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 2 4 2 Customary law and adoption................................................... 20 
  2 4 2 1 Introduction......................................................................... 20 
  2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary law ....................... 21 
 2 4 3 Legislation ................................................................................. 23 
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  2 4 3 3 Children’s Act 31 of 1937 ................................................... 27 
  2 4 3 4 Children’s Act 33 of 1960 ................................................... 28 
  2 4 3 5 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 .................................................. 34 
  2 4 3 6 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 ................................................... 36 
 
 
2 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Adoption is by no means a twentieth century innovation. It is in fact a very old 
legal institution. Adoption has taken place through the ages, informally at first 
and later regulated by laws. References to informal adoption are found in the 
Bible and in mythology. In Exodus it is explained that Moses was rescued 
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from the reeds along the bank of the Nile and raised by Pharaoh’s daughter.1 
According to the Roman legend, Romulus and Remus, the twin sons of Mars, 
the God of War, and Rhea Silvia, the daughter of the king of Alba Longa, were 
saved from drowning and reared by a wolf.2  
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the history of adoption in South Africa in 
so far as it impacts on the topic of this thesis.3 Customary law has existed in 
South Africa longer than any other law or legislation, and is the law that was 
originally applicable in this country.4 Due to the colonisation of South Africa, 
Roman-Dutch principles became the basis of South African law. The 
discussion below starts with a summary of the regulation of adoption in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law. After that, the South African customary system 
and then the South African legislative history of adoption are discussed.  
 
 
2 2 ROMAN LAW 
 
The origins of Rome as well as the starting point of the development of the 
Roman people before 450 BC are unsure,5 but, according to Benet, it seems 
that adoption was always part of Roman law.6 In ancient Rome, there was 
                                                 
1  See Exodus 2:1-10. This book forms part of the Pentateuch (the first five books of the Old 
Testament), and was written approximately 1450-1410 BC. 
2  Benet Character of Adoption 22. According to tradition, the period of kings commenced in 
735 BC, when Romulus became king. This legend thus originates from the earliest 
development of Rome and the Roman people: Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman 
Private Law 3, 5.  
3  On the origin of adoption in South Africa see also Ferreira 2007 Fundamina 1. 
4  Van Niekerk in Bekker et al Legal Pluralism 5. 
5  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 3. 
6  Benet Character of Adoption 29.  
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dynastic adoption.7 The aim of dynastic adoption was to serve family and 
parental interests since it was vital to influential Roman families that they have 
heirs and that their names should be carried on by later generations.8 This 
type of adoption was a method whereby a person without an heir could 
acquire one,9 and thus adoption was aimed at serving the needs of the 
adoptive parent and family.10 Only later, by the time of the reign of Justinian, 
philanthropic adoption came to the fore, which took into account the interests 
of the children who were to be adopted.11  
 
Adoption could take place in one of two ways, which differed in both form and 
function. Adrogatio, an institution which dates back to the time before the 
Twelve Tables,12 was a procedure whereby a completely independent person 
(sui iuris) was adopted.13 The relationship of the adopted person (adrogatus) 
with his former family was totally terminated.14 The adrogatus and his family 
were placed in the power (potestas) of the adopter (adrogator).15 Initially, 
women16 and children below the age of puberty (impuberes)17 could not be 
                                                 
7  Adoption to provide an heir: Blom-Cooper 1956 Modern Law Review 202. This was a fairly 
common procedure in ancient Rome: Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 1. 
8  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 92. 
9  Van Warmelo Introduction to Roman Civil Law 47; Poste Gai Institutiones 1.103; Thomas 
Institutes 1.11.9: adoption took place only in the absence of natural children. 
10  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 92. This strong right was seen as being 
to the benefit of the parent: Sonnekus 1985 TRW 74. 
11  Adoption to give a child a family. An ancillary objective was the notion of the family being 
given a child for the amelioration of family life rather than due to any concept of the 
perpetuation of kinship: Blom-Cooper 1956 Modern Law Review 202. 
12  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 92. 
13  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.99. According to Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private 
Law 93 there had to be an extensive enquiry to establish whether adrogatio was in the interest 
of the child or not. This was because the entire estate of the child would fall under the power 
of the adoptive parent. 
14  Thomas Textbook 437-438; Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 92.  
15  As mentioned above, this was not to protect the child, but to benefit the head of the household. 
16  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.101. 
17  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.102. 
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adopted in this way.18 An important consequence of this was that a father 
could not adopt his illegitimate daughter.19 In classical law women were also 
incapable of adopting, as they did not even have patria potestas over their 
own children.20  
 
Adoptio was a later form of adoption than adrogatio and was directly related to 
certain principles of the Twelve Tables and the old ius civile.21 It was the 
process whereby a dependent person was adopted.22 The transaction had 
two parts. There was a preliminary sale, known as mancipatio, where a father 
(pater) mancipated or sold his son three times to the intending adoptive father 
or a third person (a confidant). The third mancipation finally terminated the 
patria potestas.23 Thereafter, there was the act of adoption, where the 
adopting father claimed the son from the original father.24 As in adrogatio, the 
adoptee passed fully from the potestas of one person into that of another,25 
unless adopted by a family member.26 The adoptee had no further relationship 
with his original family unit.  
 
Justinian abolished this form of adoption and replaced it with a far simpler 
procedure. He dispensed with the sales and considerably altered the 
                                                 
18  Schulz Classical Roman Law 146-147. According to Thomas Institutes 39, Antoninus Pius 
first allowed adrogation of an impubes, and women were first adrogated in the time of 
Diocletian.  
19  Schulz Classical Roman Law 147. 
20  Thomas Institutes 1.11.10; Poste Gai Institutiones 1.104; Thomas Textbook 440; Schulz 
Classical Roman Law 144. 
21  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 94. 
22  Thomas Institutes 1.11.1; Poste Gai Institutiones 1.99; Van Zyl History and Principles of 
Roman Private Law 92. 
23  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.132; Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 94; 
Dannenbring Roman Private Law 311-312. 
24  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.134. 
25  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.107. 
26  Thomas Textbook 441.  
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consequences of adoption. The two fathers and the alieni iuris who was to be 
adopted would appear before an official. The original father would then 
declare that he wished to give the child in adoption and this declaration would 
be recorded by such official in the court register.27 Justinian also introduced 
the rule that the pater adoptans was to be at least eighteen years older than 
the person to be adopted.28 If the adoption was not by a natural ascendant, 
the effect of the adoption was severely limited in order to protect the person 
who was adopted.29 The adoption was minus plena, which meant that the 
adopted person remained in the power of his original paterfamilias.30 He 
retained his rights of succession against his original paterfamilias and did not 
pass into the potestas of his adopter, but acquired the right of intestate 
succession from his adopter (but not from the latter’s relatives).31 Initially 
women, not having potestas, could not adopt,32 but Diocletian allowed a 
woman who had lost her own child to treat her stepson as though he had 
been born to her (thus basically conferring the right of intestate succession 
upon the stepson).33 By the reign of Justinian adrogatio of women was 
permitted,34 and he retained the provision of Diocletian allowing women to 
adopt.35 
 
 
                                                 
27  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 94; Dannenbring Roman Private Law 
312. 
28  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 94. 
29  Dannenbring Roman Private Law 312; Van Warmelo Introduction to Roman Civil Law 47. 
Adoption by a natural ascendant was called adoptio plena. Here we see the rights of the 
adopted child being protected. 
30  Thomas Institutes 1.11.2. 
31  Thomas Institutes 1.11.2; Thomas Textbook 441; Dannenbring Roman Private Law 312.  
32  Poste Gai Institutiones 1.104. 
33  Thomas Institutes 1.11.10; Thomas Institutes 39-40.  
34  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 93; Schulz Classical Roman Law 148. 
35  Thomas Textbook 440; Buckland Textbook of Roman Law 123-124. 
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2 3  ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
 
Roman law had no impact on adoption in Holland.36 As mentioned above, 
patria potestas was acquired by the Romans inter alia through adoption. 
Patria potestas was not recognised in Holland,37 and parental power in 
Roman-Dutch law could not be conferred by means of adoption.38 The 
adoption of children had fallen into disfavour.39 In fact, formal adoption was 
unknown in Holland.40 In Holland adopted children were not seen as children 
of the adoptive parents either in status or in wills, and there were no records 
of adoption procedures.41 Adoption did not enjoy official recognition in most 
Western European countries.42 There is no doubt that informal adoptions took 
place. In fact, adoption may have been effected by Deeds of Adoption,43 but 
as those adopted were not by law considered as children of the adoptive 
                                                 
36  Voet Commentarius 1.7.7; Gane Selective Voet 143. Also see Wessels Roman-Dutch Law 417.  
37  Grotius Inleydinge 1.6.3; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 33; Wessels Roman-Dutch 
Law 445. As adoption was not legally recognised, it did not create a bar to marriage in any 
way. 
38  Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 38; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek I.IV.II. 
39  Van der Westhuizen 1949 THRHR 126. 
40  Grotius Inleydinge 1.6.1; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek I.IV.II; De Blecourt Oud-
Vaderlands Burgerlijk Recht 88. In Robb v Mealey’s Executor (1899) 16 SC 133 at 135, 136 
Innes QC, for the defendant, stated that there was no machinery for adoption in Roman-Dutch 
law. See also Mosikatsana in Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 435 
n 2; Spiro Law of Parent and Child 4, 62. Although de facto adoption probably took place, 
there was no de jure adoption. A possible exception was Friesland. According to Voet 
Commentarius 1.7.7 there was a perception that adoption still existed in Friesland since 
Frisian statutes never abolished adoption. However, he believes this argument to be weak: 
Studiosus 1946 THRHR 45.  
41  Spiro 1983 CILSA 242. 
42  Benet Character of Adoption 54-55 looks at adoption through the ages and offers a possible 
explanation for the rebirth of adoption after the period where no formal adoption was 
practiced at all. She explains that the “dark ages of adoption” began around the collapse of the 
Roman Empire in 476. Practices like adoption gave way to the supremacy of blood ties and 
feudal bonds, and adoption was only reinstated in the English-speaking countries around the 
end of the nineteenth century. Obviously adoption may have occurred during this time, but 
because it was de facto rather than de jure, there is no way of knowing its extent. 
43  According to Judge of Appeal Morley in Ex parte Leask [2007] 4 All SA 1018 (D) at 1020. A 
common-law adoption in fact formed the basis of the application in Robb v Mealey’s Executor 
(1899) 16 SC 133 at 136. 
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parent, these children did not succeed in intestacy to the adoptive father.44 
Once adoption became regulated by statute, however, the position changed.45 
 
 
2 4 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
2 4 1  Introduction 
 
As was mentioned above,46 South African law is based on Roman-Dutch 
principles, although it has also been influenced by English legal principles. As 
Dutch law did not recognise adoption, it is not surprising that no record of 
adoption in South Africa could be found before adoption legislation came into 
effect in 1923. Although informal adoptions must have taken place, which of 
course would have included customary adoptions, adoption was not a 
recognised legal institution in South Africa until 1923, when the Adoption of 
Children Act47 came into effect. It was also confirmed in Robb v Mealey’s 
Executor48 that the law of the (then) Cape of Good Hope just before the turn 
of the twentieth century did not recognise adoption as a measure that created 
the legal relationship of parent and child.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44  Robb v Mealey’s Executor (1899) 16 SC 133 at 136. 
45  See Ex parte Hopwood and Savage 1943 SR 145. 
46  See “2 1 INTRODUCTION” above. 
47  Act 25 of 1923. 
48  (1899) 16 SC 133 at 135-136. 
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2 4 2 Customary law and adoption 
 
2 4 2 1 Introduction 
 
Customary law is an integral part of South African law.49 Until the Interim 
Constitution50 it had never been fully recognised as a basic component of the 
South African legal system,51 but the status of customary law in South Africa 
is now constitutionally entrenched.52 In terms of section 211(3) of the 
Constitution53 South African courts are now constitutionally obliged to apply 
customary law.54 This section elevates customary law to the same status as 
the common law.55  
 
Customary law is the legal system that is generally applicable to the majority 
of the black population of South Africa,56 but the Constitution brought about an 
important change in the underlying reason for applying customary law. What 
was previously perceived in strictly separatist racial terms, is now associated 
with African cultural traditions and is now based on a right to culture.57 
Customary law derives its legitimacy from tradition58 and social practices that 
                                                 
49  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 478. 
50  Act 200 of 1993. 
51  Bennett Customary Law in SA 34. 
52  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC) at 926. 
53  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
54  S 211(3): “The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.” 
55  Bennett in Bekker et al Legal Pluralism 17. 
56  Maithufi in Davel Child Law 137. 
57  Bennett in Bekker et al Legal Pluralism 18. More will be said about this in the chapter “5 
RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
58  Bennett Customary Law in SA 128. 
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the community concerned accepts as obligatory.59 Unlike statutory law, it is 
not a fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules.60 
 
2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary law 
 
Although Bennett says that adoption is not an established practice of 
customary law,61 there is evidence that the possibility of adoption of a child 
does exist in customary law. Customary adoption is completely different to 
statutory adoption. Even though the process has the same legal 
consequences as statutory adoption,62 there are significant differences in 
customary adoption and common-law adoption in South Africa.63 
 
Adoption in customary law is a private arrangement that involves only the 
families concerned. The relatives of the adopted child and of the adoptive 
parents are involved in the adoption process.64 The child’s biological father 
and the adoptive parents must enter into an agreement (in other words both 
families have to agree to the adoption)65 and they should notify their traditional 
ruler or chief of the adoption.66 Although the biological mother needs to be 
informed of the adoption, the decision about the adoption rests with the 
biological father and his family, who may ignore the wishes of the mother.67 
                                                 
59  Bennett Customary Law in SA 1. 
60  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 479. 
61  Bennett Human Rights 107. 
62  SALC Project 110 24; Maithufi 2001 De Jure 391, 394. 
63  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. 
64  Maithufi 2001 De Jure 391. 
65  Olivier et al Die Privaatreg van die SA Bantoetaalsprekendes 462. 
66  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 236. 
67  Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T) at 1147. I believe that the non-recognition of 
the views of the mother in an adoption is not acceptable and not in the best interests of the 
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The validity of an act of adoption in terms of customary law thus largely 
depends on the agreement between the two families.68 Once adopted, the 
child becomes, for all intents and purposes, the child of the adoptive 
parent(s).69 
 
For a long time there was uncertainty about whether the statutory provisions 
that govern the procedure and effect of adoption override customary law.70 In 
terms of section 18(1)(a) of the Child Care Act71 adoptions must be effected 
by an order of a children’s court. However, in Kewana v Santam Insurance Co 
Ltd72 the Court held that the previous Act, the Children’s Act,73 did not modify 
or replace adoption under customary law.74 In the earlier case of Zibi v Zibi75 it 
was held unnecessary to comply with the statutory provisions of the Adoption 
of Children Act. Thus, the customary system of adoption does not have to 
comply with the requirements of the Child Care Act to be valid.76 
 
Under customary law, adoption is the solution sought by a man who has no 
sons or no heir to inherit property and carry on the deceased’s family name.77 
Where a family head has no sons, he may adopt a boy for the express 
                                                                                                                                            
child. It would be preferable if both parents had to consent to the adoption, as is the case with 
statutory adoption. 
68  Maithufi 2001 De Jure 391-392; SALC Project 110 24. 
69  Maithufi 2001 De Jure 392. 
70  Bennett Customary Law in SA 320. 
71  Act 74 of 1983. 
72  1993 (4) SA 771 (TkA). 
73  Act 33 of 1960, which regulated adoption before the Child Care Act. 
74  At 776. In Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T) at 1150 Judge Bertelsmann held 
that a customary adoption was valid, even though there was a formal defect in the particular 
adoption. 
75  1952 (2) NAC 167 (S) at 170. 
76  Also see Maithufi 2001 De Jure 390, 394. In Flynn v Farr 2009 (1) SA 584 (C) an application 
was brought for the recognition of de facto adoption, but this application was quite correctly 
turned down by the court.  
77  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319; SALC Project 110 25; Bennett Human Rights 107; 
Maithufi 2001 De Jure 392. 
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purpose of making the child his heir. He will usually try to obtain the son of a 
closely related family head in his own family group.78 Bennett equates this 
custom with the Roman-law concept of adoptio, the purpose of which was 
simply to perpetuate the adopter’s bloodline.79 The child becomes a full 
member of the adoptive family and his/her ties with the biological family are 
terminated.80 Another reason may be to strengthen the adoptive family with 
more children, or to safeguard the interests of the child in the case where 
his/her biological parents cannot afford to maintain him/her.81 Both males and 
females may adopt a child in terms of customary law,82 and both boys and 
girls may be adopted.83 More will be said about the reasons for adopting in 
customary law in other chapters.84 
 
2 4 3  Legislation 
 
2 4 3 1 Introduction 
 
Van der Merwe and Rowland have suggested85 that the South African 
legislature was possibly influenced by English law when it enacted the first 
                                                 
78  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 284; Olivier et al Die Privaatreg van die SA 
Bantoetaalsprekendes 462. 
79  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. Also see “2 2 ROMAN LAW”. 
80  Olivier et al Die Privaatreg van die SA Bantoetaalsprekendes 462; Bekker in Robinson Law 
of Children and Young Persons 193. 
81  SALC Project 110 25. Even though the SALC provides this reason for adoption in terms of 
customary law, authors who refer to customary adoption maintain that adoption under 
customary law takes place to provide a man with an heir. It is thus my contention that 
customary adoption that protects the interests of the child probably does not take place very 
often. 
82  SALC Project 110 27; Maithufi 2001 De Jure 392. It is unusual for a single woman to adopt a 
child in customary law, but it was held in Kewana v Santam Insurance Company Limited 1993 
(4) SA 771 (TkA) at 774 that it is possible. 
83  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 236. 
84  See “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” and “5 RACE AND CULTURE”. 
85  See Van der Merwe & Rowland Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg 83. 
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adoption legislation. They based their view on the statement in Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law86 that the English legislation on adoption at 
the time87 was practically identical to ours. At first glance this seems to be a 
valid observation. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the 
South African legislature did not base its first adoption legislation on English 
law, for England’s Adoption of Children Act88 (the first adoption law in 
England) was enacted in 1926,89 whereas the South African Adoption of 
Children Act was already enacted in 1923.90 The Debates of the House of 
Assembly on South Africa’s adoption legislation indicate that, although it was 
not an exact copy, the Bill, which preceded the 1926 Act was, in fact, 
modelled on the Infants Act91 of New Zealand.92 
 
2 4 3 2 Adoption of Children Act 25 of 1923 
 
The sole aim of the Adoption of Children Act was to provide for the adoption 
of children, and it was the first piece of legislation in South Africa to regulate 
adoption. The Bill to provide for the adoption of children93 was first read on 30 
January 1923 in the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa by a Mr 
                                                 
86  Gibson Wille’s Principles of South African Law 80. 
87  Gibson refers to the “Adoption of Children Act, England, 1927”, but presumably this is a 
typing error, as this piece of legislation was enacted in 1926. 
88  16 & 17 Geo 5 c 29 (1926). 
89  According to Benet Character of Adoption 72, it was the First World War that pushed 
England into adoption legislation because there were so many war orphans. 
90  I believe that the statement in Wille’s Principles of South African Law might have suggested 
the complete opposite to Van der Merwe & Rowland’s interpretation. It is, in fact, quite 
possible that the English Act may have been modelled on the earlier South African legislation. 
This was not investigated. 
91  Act 86 of 1908. 
92  At the second reading of the Bill on 15 March 1923, Mr Feetham indicated that it was 
modelled on New Zealand’s Infants Act. 
93  The Adoption of Children Bill 25 of 1923. 
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R Feetham, a member of the House of Assembly.94 On the day of the second 
reading of the Adoption of Children Bill,95 Mr Feetham gave a lengthy 
presentation that explained the need to formalise adoption in South Africa, 
saying that this need arose because of the number of informal adoptions 
which took place.96 The rights of the natural parents remained unaffected, and 
any possible agreement that might have been entered into between the 
natural parents and the adoptive parents was not considered binding by the 
courts. He concluded that the adoptive parents had no legal rights over the 
children. He further explained that many people shied away from adoption 
because of the insecurity of their position, even though they might have been 
able to provide the children with a good home. He concluded that this 
situation resulted in a loss not only for the prospective parents and the 
children, but also for the state, because these children were brought up in 
institutions instead of family homes.97 The Bill was passed on 12 June 1923,98 
and on 21 June 1923 the Minister of Justice99 (on behalf of the Prime Minister) 
announced that the Governor-General, in the name and on behalf of His 
Majesty the King, assented to the Adoption of Children Act. The Act was 
                                                 
94  This was reported in the Cape Times on 31 January 1923, and reproduced in the “Debates of 
the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa as reported in the Cape Times 20th 
November, 1915 – 25th June, 1923” at 31. 
95  On 15 March 1923, as reported in the Cape Times on 16 March 1923 and reproduced in the 
“Debates of the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa as reported in the Cape 
Times 20th November, 1915 – 25th June, 1923” at 159. 
96  Contributions were also made by a number of other people. In this regard, it should be noted 
that informal adoptions still exist today and are still not recognised – see Flynn v Farr 2009 
(1) SA 584 (C).  
97  Mr Feetham acknowledged the great service that the State provided, but added that an 
institution could never take the place of a family home.  
98  The Dutch version was signed by the Governor-General. 
99  Senator, the Hon NJ de Wet KC.  
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promulgated in the Government Gazette,100 and it came into operation on 1 
January 1924.101  
 
The aim of the Adoption of Children Act was solely to provide for the adoption 
of children. According to Joubert102 the underlying object of the Act was to 
create an institution whereby the existing legal bonds between a child and its 
natural parents or guardians could be severed and a new legal bond created 
between the adoptive parents and the adopted child. 
 
In general, the South African legislature made every attempt to ensure the 
protection of adopted children. The adoption of a child103 was confirmed by a 
magistrate, but only if the welfare and interests of the child would be promoted 
by the adoption.104 For the purposes of the topic of this thesis, the most 
interesting thing is that this Act did not disallow interracial and/or intercultural 
adoption. There was no indication that race or culture105 had to be considered 
in any way before an adoption could take place. This meant that theoretically 
it was possible to have a legally binding interracial and/or intercultural 
adoption. Interracial adoptions, in particular, were unlikely to have occurred 
however. It has to be assumed that this aspect was not regulated because the 
                                                 
100  GG 1330 of 30 June 1923, Government Notice 1074.  
101  GG 1353 of 30 November 1923, Proclamation 244.  
102  1993 SALJ 726. 
103  A boy or girl who was, in the opinion of the court that exercised jurisdiction under this Act, 
under the age of sixteen years – s 1. If the child was over the age of ten years, he or she had to 
consent to the adoption – s 4(1)(d). 
104  S 4(1)(c) of the Act. 
105  It will be argued in “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE” that the concepts of race and culture are 
not the same. 
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legislature probably did not even consider the possibility of anybody wanting 
to adopt a child of a race or culture different to their own.106  
 
2 4 3 3 Children’s Act 31 of 1937 
 
When the Adoption of Children Act became outdated,107 it was replaced by 
the Children’s Act of 1937.108 The latter Act was assented to on 13 May 
1937109 and came into operation on 18 May 1937. The aim of the Act was 
much wider than that of the Adoption of Children Act. It addressed all issues 
relating to children, not just adoption. Chapter VII dealt with the adoption of 
children, who could now be adopted up to the age of nineteen years.110 An 
adoption was effected by an order of a children’s court of the district in which 
the adopted child resided,111 and the court could not grant such application 
unless it was satisfied inter alia that the proposed adoption would serve the 
interests and was conducive to the welfare of the child.112 Although the Act did 
stipulate that the court had to be satisfied that the applicant(s) were fit and 
proper to be entrusted with the custody of the child,113 it once again contained 
no reference to race or culture and thus did not prohibit interracial and/or 
                                                 
106  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 607 says that no such adoptions are known to have taken place. See 
also Joubert 1993 SALJ 726, where he says that no such adoptions were known, and adds that 
it can be accepted that such adoptions would have run counter to the accepted social views of 
the time. 
107  Verloren van Themaat 1939 THRHR 192.  
108  To prevent confusion, this Act will be referred to as the Children’s Act of 1937.  
109  The Afrikaans text was signed by the Governor-General on that day. 
110  In terms of s 1 of the Act, a child meant a person under the age of nineteen years and included 
an infant. In terms of s 69(2)(e) a child, if over the age of ten years, had to consent to an 
adoption.  
111  S 69(1). 
112  S 69(2)(c). 
113  S 69(2)(b). 
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intercultural adoption. Mosikatsana114 believes that this omission was 
because racism was already so firmly rooted in the national psyche that it was 
assumed that there was no need for legislative intervention in this regard. The 
Children’s Act of 1937 was in turn replaced by the Children’s Act of 1960. 
 
2 4 3 4  Children’s Act 33 of 1960 
 
This Act, which came into operation on 14 April 1960,115 was wide in its 
scope.116 A child was defined117 as any person, including an infant,118 who 
was under the age of eighteen years. Very importantly, in this Act the first 
reference since the legislative introduction of adoption legislation in South 
Africa was made to race. By this stage, various legislative interventions aimed 
at racial segregation had been introduced,119 but this Act was the first in which 
race was brought into the parent-child relationship. The Children’s 
Amendment Act120 brought about the insertion of a definition of a “black” 
(originally defined as “Bantu”) person,121 and specifically a definition of a 
“Black children’s court” (originally defined as a “Bantu children’s court”).122 
                                                 
114  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 607.  
115  The Act, of which the Afrikaans text was signed by the Governor-General, was assented to on 
7 April 1960. To avoid confusion, this Act will be referred to as the Children’s Act of 1960. 
116  It provided for various issues relating to children, including the appointment of commissioners 
of child welfare, the establishment of children’s courts, the protection and welfare of certain 
children, and the adoption of children. 
117  S 1. 
118  An infant was defined in s 1 as “a person under the age of seven years”. 
119  Immorality Act 5 of 1927 (later renamed the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957); Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949; Population Registration Act 30 of 1950. 
120  Act 74 of 1973. 
121  Defined in s 1 as “a person who is or is to be classified as a black under the Population 
Registration Act, 1950”. 
122  S 1(f) of this Act defined a “Bantu children’s court” as a “Bantu children’s court established 
by or under section 5 and includes a native children’s court so established”. In the Children’s 
Act of 1937 “children’s courts” was described in s 4(1). With regard to the children’s courts, 
no distinction based on race was made, even though a distinction was made between the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Native Affairs.  
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The Children’s Act of 1960 inter alia provided for the adoption of children in 
chapter VII, which contained general and supplementary issues. Nowhere in 
chapter VII was interracial adoption prohibited, but section 35(2) of this Act123 
set a pattern for interracial placement law in South Africa that has influenced 
adoption ever since.124 It first introduced the terms “culture” and “ethnological 
grouping” into South African adoption legislation. Section 35(2), later to 
become section 35(2)(a),125 read as follows: 
 
In selecting any person in whose custody a child is to be placed ... regard shall be 
had to the religious and cultural background and ethnological grouping of the 
child and, in selecting such a person, also to the nationality of the child and the 
relationship between him and such a person [my emphasis].  
 
It remained to be seen what was meant by the phrase “regard shall be had”.  
 
In 1964, section 35(2) was tested in a court case, Joffin v Commissioner of 
Child Welfare, Springs.126 An illegitimate child was born to a mother who was 
a member of the Dutch Reformed Church and she gave the baby up for 
adoption. She consented to the child’s adoption by a Jewish couple, but 
because of the vast religious differences, the Commissioner refused the 
                                                 
123  Read with s 71(1)(b). 
124  On 8 January 1960 clause 1(x)(j) of the Children’s Bill of 1960 was published in GG 6347. 
This clause would have made it possible for a child to be forcibly and permanently removed 
from its family purely upon the ground of a difference in race classification between the child 
and its parents or other guardian. It was however withdrawn before it could become law. Zaal 
1992 Journal of SA studies 390 emphasises the importance of this clause, by indicating that it 
provided strong evidence that ideological considerations (as opposed to considerations of the 
child’s interests) had influenced governmental thinking as far as child placement was 
concerned in the late 1950s. 
125  This was when subss 35(2)(b) and 35(2)(c) were added by the Children’s (Amendment) Act 
50 of 1965 (hereafter the Children’s Amendment Act of 1965). 
126  1964 (2) SA 506 (T). 
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adoption and the matter went to court. The first question to be answered was 
whether section 35(2) provided for a discretion or was mandatory.127 After 
referring to the English cases of Illingworth v Walmsey128 (in which the words 
“regard shall be had to” were held to mean “bear in mind” and to give a 
discretion) and Perry v Wright129 (in which similar words were said to be a 
guide, not a fetter), Ludorf J came to the conclusion that the words “have 
regard to” were not mandatory but simply meant “bear in mind” or “do not 
overlook” and thus gave the court adjudicating the adoption a discretion.130 
The adoption was granted. Joubert131 interpreted this decision to mean that 
the court could legally permit interracial adoptions.  
 
The Children’s Amendment Act of 1965 added two further subsections to 
section 35(2), namely subsections 35(2)(b) and 35(2)(c). The subsections 
read as follows: 
 
(b) Any illegitimate child whose classification in terms of the Population 
Registration Act, 1950 (Act 30 of 1950), is the same as that of his mother 
shall be deemed to have the same religious and cultural background and 
nationality as his mother and only relatives of the mother of any such child 
shall be regarded as being related to such child. 
(c) A child shall not be placed in the custody of any person whose classification 
in terms of the Population Registration Act, 1950, is not the same as that 
of the child except where such person is the parent or guardian of the child 
[my emphasis]. 
                                                 
127  At 508. 
128  (1900) 2 QBD 142. 
129  (1908) 1 KB 441. 
130  At 508. 
131  Joubert 1993 SALJ 727. 
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Thus, because of section 35(2)(c) a child would never have been placed in 
the custody of a person of a different race to the child even if the biological 
mother had given her consent to such a placement. Section 71(1)(b) of the 
Children’s Act of 1960 dealt with adoption requirements and also stipulated 
that “the court shall have regard to all the matters mentioned in subsection (2) 
of section thirty-five”, which included reference to the racial prohibitions in 
section 35(2)(c).  
 
In 1979 section 35(2)(c) and section 71(1)(b) came under scrutiny from the 
(then) Supreme Court in the matter of Ex parte Kommissaris van Kindersorg: 
In Re NL.132 The Supreme Court provided some guidance on the question of 
whether sections 35(2)(c) and 71(1)(b) of the Children’s Act of 1960 should be 
read together as entirely prohibiting interracial adoptions by applicants who 
were not biological parents.133  
 
In In Re NL a child, whose natural parents were both coloured, was placed 
with a couple (the husband was coloured and his legitimate wife, Mrs W, was 
black) for adoption. Subsequent to their marriage the wife had been 
redesignated “coloured” by virtue of section 12(1)(c)(ii) of the Group Areas 
Act.134 Before the adoption was finalised, however, the prospective adoptive 
                                                 
132  1979 (2) SA 432 (T) - hereafter referred to as “In Re NL”. 
133  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 392.  
134  Act 36 of 1966. In terms of this section any woman, to whichever race, tribe or class she may 
belong, who is married to or cohabits with a person who is not a member of the white group or 
of the Bantu group, belongs to a coloured group.  
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father died. The wife thus reverted back to African status,135 although she was 
allowed to stay on in the Coloured community after her husband died.136 The 
social worker approved of and supported the adoption because Mrs W had 
associated herself completely with the coloured community and regarded 
herself as coloured. Although he at first signed the consent form for the 
adoption, the Children’s Commissioner of Boksburg was of the opinion that 
the adoption would be illegal because section 35(2)(c) of the Children’s Act of 
1960 prohibited the adoption of a child by someone of a different race to the 
child. He referred the matter to the (then) Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court, as upper guardian of all minors, decided that section 71(1)(b) of the 
Children’s Act of 1960 meant that section 35(2)(c) could not be seen as a 
complete ban on interracial adoptions by applicants who were not biological 
parents.137 Judge Esselen said that it would not be in the interest of the child 
or anybody else to set aside the adoption just because the court did not 
consider section 35(2)(c), and that it has to be borne in mind that the welfare 
of the child is of the utmost (“allegrootste” (sic)) importance. He added that he 
was satisfied that the Commissioner of Child Welfare would not necessarily 
have made a different decision if he had indeed taken section 35(2)(c) into 
account.138 The Supreme Court confirmed the adoption order, but this did not 
mean that interracial placements were now acceptable. As Zaal subsequently 
indicated, interracial adoption would only be permissible in a situation where 
                                                 
135  The Group Areas Act did not provide for the occasion where a s 12(1)(c)(ii) marriage (see n 
134) is terminated, but it has to be presumed that she would revert to African status, as the 
wording “who is married” in s 12(1)(c)(ii) in my opinion indicates that the section only 
applies while such a marriage exists. This is also the opinion of Zaal 1992 Journal of SA 
Studies 393. 
136  At 433. 
137  At 434. A similar decision was reached in an unreported case, case H 19/79, decided in the 
Transvaal Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (now the North Gauteng High 
Court), as discussed in Coetzer 1979 The Magistrate 214. 
138  At 435. 
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“the prospective adoptive parent had committed cultural suicide and thus 
effectively belonged to a population group appropriate for the child”.139 
Furthermore, it is submitted that if the child had not been left with Mrs W “by 
mistake” after her husband’s death, the court would not have found that the 
adoption was in the interest of the child, and the adoption would never have 
been confirmed by the court.140 Regarding Joubert’s belief that interracial 
adoptions were possible,141 Mosikatsana,142 quite correctly I believe, argues 
that Joubert failed to take into account the practical implications of section 
35(2)(c), such as the child not being able to live with the adoptive parents or 
attend a school in the adoptive parents’ residential area without violating the 
Group Areas Act.  
 
According to Zaal the pattern of adoption did not change much after the In Re 
NL decision. He says143 that, throughout the 1980s, race-matching remained 
the norm in child placements, and where differences in race classification 
intervened between a child and a prospective caregiver, child welfare 
agencies were forced to resort to an application for the reclassification of one 
of the parties. This reclassification, Zaal says, was not easily achieved and 
even when it was achieved, it often created other problems like terminating an 
adult’s residential rights in the neighbourhood where he or she had a home, or 
in the case of a child, terminating his or her right to continue schooling 
amongst peers with whom the child had previously built up important 
relationships.  
                                                 
139  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 376-377. 
140  At 435. 
141  This is discussed under “2 4 3 4 Children’s Act 33 of 1960” above. 
142  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 609. 
143  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 376. 
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2 4 3 5  Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
 
The Child Care Act144 (which has the aim inter alia to provide for adoption) 
has for the past 26 years been the instrument that regulates adoption in South 
Africa,145 and chapter 4 (sections 17-27) currently sets out the legal 
framework for adoptions in South Africa. The replacement of the Children’s 
Act of 1960 by the Child Care Act unfortunately did not bring about much 
change in so far as interracial adoptions are concerned.146  
 
Sections 18(3), 18(4) and 40 of the Child Care Act are relevant to the topic of 
this thesis. Section 18(4) prescribes the requirements that have to be met 
before an adoption order may be granted. In terms of subsection 18(4)(c) the 
overriding factor that the children’s court must consider147 is whether the 
adoption will “serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child”. 
Section 18(3) provides that in considering an application for adoption the 
children’s court must have regard to the matters mentioned in section 40. At 
least the reference to “ethnological grouping”148 disappeared, but the main 
provision barring interracial placements in the Children’s Act of 1960, namely 
section 35(2)(c), was taken over verbatim as section 40(b) of the Child Care 
Act. The obvious conclusion is that this resulted in the status quo concerning 
                                                 
144  This Act came into operation on 1 February 1987. 
145  This will soon change, when the relevant sections of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 come into 
operation. 
146  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 395. 
147  According to Schäfer & Schäfer in Robinson Law of Children 78. 
148  See s 35(2)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
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interracial adoption being maintained. When it was originally enacted, section 
40 provided that: 
 
(a) regard shall be had to the religious and cultural background of the child 
concerned and of his parents as against that of the person in or to whose 
custody he is to be placed or transferred; and 
(b) a child shall not be placed in or transferred to the custody of any person 
whose classification in terms of the Population Registration Act, 1950 ..., 
is not the same as that of the child, except where such person is the parent 
or guardian of the child [my emphasis].  
 
Following the repeal of section 40(b) of the Child Care Act in 1991,149 
interracial adoptions became a reality in South Africa. Section 40(a), dealing 
with adoption across cultural or religious boundaries, was retained though and 
has led to much debate about the desirability of interracial adoption.150 
Section 40 currently reads as follows: 
 
... regard shall be had to the religious and cultural background of the child concerned 
and of his parents as against that of the person in or to whose custody he is to be 
placed or transferred. 
 
 
Chapter 6 of this thesis deals with adoption as it is presently regulated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
149  This was done by s 14 of the Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991. 
150  As will be seen, intercultural adoption is so closely related to interracial adoption, that the two 
concepts will be discussed together — see “5 3 RACE AND CULTURE – IS THERE A 
DIFFERENCE?”. 
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2 4 3 6 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
 
The Children’s Act of 2005151 was gazetted on 19 June 2006, and certain 
provisions came into effect on 1 July 2007. Although the sections dealing with 
adoption have not yet come into operation, the Child Care Act will eventually 
be replaced in totality by the Children’s Act of 2005. When this happens, 
some major changes will occur in the adoption process.  
 
Chapter 15 of the Children’s Act of 2005 (sections 228-253) deals with 
adoption. Whereas chapter 4 of the Child Care Act152 contains 11 sections, 
chapter 15 of the Children’s Act of 2005 contains 26 sections. This excludes 
intercountry adoption, which is covered by a further 20 sections in chapter 16 
of the Children’s Act. As far as adoption is concerned, the Children’s Act of 
2005 is thus far more comprehensive than the Child Care Act. 
 
In any matter concerning a child, the best interests of the child are of 
paramount importance.153 The best interests of the child are, correctly so, 
likewise regarded as paramount in the Children’s Act of 2005.154 The question 
that needs to be answered is whether the best interests of a prospective 
adopted child will be served by the new adoption legislation if the child and 
the prospective adoptive parents belong to different cultural groups. Section 
240(1)(a) of the Children’s Act of 2005 provides that the court considering the 
                                                 
151  This Act was gazetted in GG 28944 on 19 June 2006. To avoid confusion, this Act will be 
referred to as the Children’s Act of 2005. 
152  Chapter 4 deals with adoption. 
153  See s 28(2) of the Constitution; see also Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (A).  
154  S 9. 
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adoption of a child must take into account all relevant factors, including the 
religious and cultural background of the child, the child’s parents and the 
prospective adoptive parent. This reflects the reality (which is not evident in 
the Child Care Act) that there may be other relevant factors besides religion 
and culture which should be taken into account when an application for an 
adoption is considered. Adoption of a child by someone of a different racial 
classification to the child is not prohibited in terms of the Children’s Act of 
2005. The Act does not even list race as a factor in respect of adoption or the 
child’s best interests.  
 
In chapter 6155 attention will be given to the provisions of the Child Care Act 
and the Children’s Act of 2005 that relate to the topic of this thesis. 
 
                                                 
155  See “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
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3 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of children growing up in a stable family environment where they 
can form lasting psychological bonds with family members can hardly be over-
emphasised.1 It is parents and other family members who, in the first instance, 
have the duty to assist a child to develop into a rational adult.2 Section 28(1)(b) of 
the Constitution recognises this reality by giving every child the right “to family 
care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment”.3 This section acknowledges the importance for a child to 
grow up within a family environment4 and affects one of the most basic of private-
law relationships, namely the relationship between parent and child. As will be 
                                                 
1  Kruger 2006 THRHR 452. 
2  Kruger 2006 THRHR 452. 
3  S 28(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereafter referred to as “the 
Constitution”. 
4  Robinson 1998 Obiter 335. 
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seen below,5 it is in the best interests of a child to grow up as part of a family if at 
all possible. It is not always possible though for a child to be raised by his/her 
biological parents. This being so, it is appropriate to consider adoption, which 
offers a child the opportunity to experience “family care or parental care, or … 
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment”.6  
 
The word “care” in this context clearly acknowledges that children are vulnerable 
and need to be assisted to overcome their own vulnerability and lack of maturity 
relating to judgement and experience.7 What has to be determined is what 
“family care”, “parental care” and “appropriate alternative care” actually mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5  See “3 3 ATTACHMENT”. Also see “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
6  See “3 2 1 7 Family care and adoption”, “4 2 2 2 The Convention on the Rights of the Child” and 
“4 2 2 4 International instruments and adoption”. 
7  Robinson 1998 Obiter 333. 
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3 2 FAMILY CARE, PARENTAL CARE AND APPROPRIATE 
ALTERNATIVE CARE 
 
3 2 1 Family care 
 
3 2 1 1 Introduction 
 
The family is the central organising structure of society.8 In fact, an upbringing 
within a family is the optimum form of child care.9 The family is regarded as the 
primary institution within which the child must grow up.10 Today families can be 
defined in many ways. I shall attempt, in the following paragraphs, to establish 
what a family is in the South African context. 
 
3 2 1 2 What is a family? 
 
It is difficult to find a suitable definition for the word “family”. There is no 
consensus in South African society as to what constitutes a family.11 Bonthuys12 
explains that families can be defined in many ways, ranging from the western 
nuclear family to extended family groups13 and families where there is no genetic 
tie.14 Human explains that the description of family in a traditional African 
                                                 
8  Mosikatsana 1996 SAJHR 549. 
9  Eekelaar Family Law 190. 
10  Robinson 1998 Obiter 333. See also Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 51. 
11  Mosikatsana 1996 SAJHR 549; Van der Linde 2000 De Jure 3. 
12  Bonthuys 1997 SAJHR 633-634. 
13  Such as are found in customary law. 
14  An example would be an adoptive family. 
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community differs from the description of a family in a typical Western 
community. She says in a traditional African community it is usually the extended 
family that is referred to in this regard.15 Robinson16 believes the term “family” 
includes both the nuclear family and the extended family. 
 
In customary law, the idea of an extended family as an African tradition is firmly 
rooted in popular imagination.17 The most important unit is the family,18 which 
consists of the family head19 and his wife or wives and children.20 Each wife 
creates a house, which is a group distinct from any other house.21 In terms of the 
South African common law, the term “family” is restricted to an institution which 
comprises a union between a husband and a wife who are legally married and 
their offspring.22 This “narrow, more archaic definition” refers to spouses in a 
valid marriage.23 Van der Linde24 confirms that this traditional family is often 
considered to be the true family. However, the legislature has now recognised 
the changing nature of the traditional family. The Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act25 gave official recognition to customary marriages for the first time 
in South African legal history, and civil unions, which are now equivalent to civil 
                                                 
15  Human 2000 SAPL 380. 
16  Robinson 1998 Obiter 335. 
17  Bennett Customary Law in SA 180. 
18  The family is the essence of customary law, and family relationships are of fundamental 
importance as far as customary law is concerned – Jansen in Bekker et al Legal Pluralism 31. 
19  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law at 71 defines a family head as a Black male who has married 
one or more wives by customary rites. 
20  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 69. 
21  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 70. 
22  Robinson 1998 Obiter 332. Robinson makes the submission that the exclusivity relates not only to 
marriage as defined in the common law (see “3 2 1 3 Types of family”), but also to the family 
concept. 
23  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 3. 
24  Van der Linde 2000 De Jure 4. 
25  Act 120 of 1998, as discussed under “3 2 1 3 Types of family”. 
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marriage, have also been legalised.26 I will refer to these families as the nuclear 
family. 
 
Used in a wide sense, the family includes all people who are blood relations or 
have become related through adoption or marriage, as well as the family unit 
which is created by people who have entered into a marriage-like relationship.27 I 
will refer to these families as the extended family. The Oxford Student’s 
Dictionary defines family as “parents and their children, sometimes including 
grandchildren and other relatives”.28 This definition is in line with the modern view 
of the extended family.  
 
Van der Linde is of the view that a revision of the definition of a family is essential 
to include the diverse families that exist in practice, and that the term “family” 
means different things for different people.29 Our courts have also recognised the 
changing nature of the modern family. In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; 
Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs30 the court 
held that the family is the natural and fundamental unit of our society, but that 
the definition of family also changes as social practices and traditions change, 
and that we must take care not to entrench particular forms of family at the 
expense of other forms.31 In National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v 
                                                 
26  Civil unions are discussed under “3 2 1 3 Types of family”. 
27  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 3. 
28  Allen & Delahunty Oxford Student’s Dictionary 367. 
29  Van der Linde 2000 De Jure 5. 
30  2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
31  At 960. 
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Minister of Home Affairs32 the court emphasised that an important process of 
transformation had taken place in family relationships, as well as in societal and 
legal concepts regarding the family and what it comprises.33 Van der Linde34 
sums it up well when he explains that the concept of a family is difficult to define 
because it has a dynamic core.  
 
As already mentioned, the use of the word “family” could refer to either the 
nuclear family or the extended family, and there are different opinions about the 
exact meaning of the word.35 In Afrikaans this problem does not exist, as the 
word “familie” is used to refer to the extended family, while “gesin” refers to the 
nuclear family. Unfortunately there is no English equivalent for the term “gesin”, 
which is why family is used both when referring to the nuclear and the extended 
family. In my opinion, there is a way to get around this problem, at least to some 
extent. Although the word “parent” only refers to the adult in the nuclear family 
and does not include the child, I believe that when confusion might exist in so far 
as adoption is concerned, the term “family” could be used when referring to the 
extended family of the child,36 and the term “parent” could be used when referring 
to the nuclear family of the child.37 In the rest of this thesis, I shall use the terms 
“family” and “parent” in this way. 
 
                                                 
32  2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
33  At 30. 
34  Van der Linde 2000 De Jure 18. 
35  Also see “3 2 1 4 Family care and the Constitution” below. 
36  See n 28 and the accompanying text above. 
37  See n 24 and the accompanying text above. Also see my remarks under “3 2 1 8 Family care and 
adoption” as well as “3 2 2 2 Family care versus parental care”. 
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3 2 1 3 Types of family 
 
As we have already established, the family in South Africa has changed over the 
years and is still changing.38 Clark refers to family life in South Africa as fluid.39 
As far as the nuclear family is concerned, three types of marriages are currently 
recognised by our law, namely, civil marriages, customary marriages, and civil 
unions.40 
 
“Marriage” is traditionally defined as the legally recognised lifelong voluntary 
union between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all other persons.41 
Although the Marriage Act42 does not define marriage, a civil marriage is one 
concluded in terms of the common law as amended by the Marriage Act.43 
Mosikatsana44 says the common law of marriage is based on Roman-Dutch law 
which is influenced by Christianity, and that the exclusive nature of the common 
law definition of marriage does not reflect social reality as it is restricted to civil 
marriages.45  
 
                                                 
38  See “3 2 1 2 What is a family?”. 
39  Clark in Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 262. 
40  Provided that they are solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, Jewish and Christian 
marriages are recognised by South African law as they are monogamous,. However, as also 
discussed below, Muslim and Hindu marriages receive only limited protection in our law as they 
are potentially polygamous and are usually not solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act. In this 
regard reference can be made to Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A); Kalla v The Master 1995 
(1) SA 261 (T) and Singh v Ramparsad 2007 (3) SA 445 (D) – see also Cronjé & Heaton Family 
Law 215 n 2. 
41  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 17. A similar definition is used in Seedat’s Executors v The Master 
(Natal) 1917 AD 302 at 309. 
42  Act 25 of 1961. This Act came into effect on 1 January 1962. 
43  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 191. 
44  Mosikatsana 1996 SAJHR 555. 
45  Mosikatsana 1996 SAJHR 552. 
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Customary marriages,46 which permit polygyny,47 gained full legal recognition, 
regardless of when they were concluded and regardless of how many customary 
wives a husband has,48 when the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act49 
came into operation.50 A spouse in a customary marriage is not legally allowed to 
enter into a civil marriage in terms of the Marriage Act during the existence of 
such customary marriage, unless the parties to the customary marriage enter into 
a civil marriage with each other.51 
 
A civil union is defined in the Civil Union Act52 as “the voluntary union of two 
persons who are both 18 years of age or older, which is solemnised or registered 
by way of either a marriage or a civil partnership, in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed in this Act, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others”.53 
This Act allows both same-sex and heterosexual couples to enter into either a 
civil partnership or a marriage in terms of the Act. The partners can choose 
whether they wish to call the union a marriage or a civil partnership.54 The 
consequences of the union are the same as those for a civil marriage concluded 
in terms of the Marriage Act.55 I find it interesting that while a traditional civil 
                                                 
46  S 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act defines a customary marriage as a marriage 
concluded in accordance with customary law. 
47  Polygyny means that a man may marry as many wives as he can afford – see Bennett Customary 
Law in SA 243. 
48  S 2. 
49  This Act came into operation on 15 November 2000. 
50  S 4. 
51  S 10(1). 
52  Act 17 of 2006. This Act came into operation on 30 November 2006. 
53  S 1. 
54  S 11(1). 
55  S 13(1). 
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marriage is a lifelong voluntary union,56 the definition of a civil union makes 
mention of the fact that this union is a voluntary union to the exclusion of all 
others while it lasts.57 The legislature has obviously taken into account the 
reality that, today, marriages and now also civil unions often do not last for a 
lifetime. 
 
Although Muslim and Hindu marriages do not yet have full legal recognition in 
South Africa, the South African Law Reform Commission has drafted the Muslim 
Marriages Bill which, if enacted, will mean that if the provisions of the legislation 
apply to a Muslim marriage, the marriage will be recognised as a valid marriage 
in terms of South African law if it meets all the requirements set by the proposed 
legislation.58 Currently though, Muslim marriages do have limited legal 
recognition in South Africa.59 The court in Ryland v Edros60 held that the 
contractual obligations flowing from a Muslim marriage can be enforced.61 This 
decision did not grant full legal recognition to the marriage. A few years later the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening)62 held that a dependant who was 
not legally married to a deceased could have an action for compensation for loss 
                                                 
56  See Cronjé & Heaton’s definition under “3 2 1 3 Types of family” above. 
57  As defined in the Act. 
58  This Bill is attached to SALRC Project 106. It is hoped that the Law Reform Commission will 
soon also investigate Hindu marriages. 
59  As explained by Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 217, recognising certain contractual obligations 
which flow from a Muslim marriage does not mean that the marriage is legally recognised for all 
purposes. 
60  1997 (2) SA 690 (C) (also reported in [1996] 4 All SA 557 (C) and 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C)). 
61  At 707. 
62  1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) (also reported in [1999] 4 All SA 421 (SCA)). 
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of support if certain requirements were met,63 and concluded that the contractual 
duty of support which flows from a Muslim marriage should be recognised and 
legally enforceable.64 In Daniels v Campbell65 the Constitutional Court held that, 
for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act66 and the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act,67 a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage is a “spouse”.68 Judge 
Sachs held that the word “spouse” has to be given a broad and inclusive 
construction69 which is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word,70 and 
that the Acts should be interpreted so as to include a party to a monogamous 
Muslim marriage as a spouse.71 In all these cases, though, the marriages were 
de facto monogamous. In contrast, the Muslim marriage in Khan v Khan72 was 
polygamous. The Transvaal Provincial Division (now the North Gauteng High 
Court) held that it will be blatant discrimination to grant a Muslim wife in a 
monogamous Muslim marriage a right to maintenance but to deny a Muslim wife 
married in terms of the same Islamic rites, which are inherently polygamous, a 
right to maintenance.73 Therefore, partners in a polygamous Muslim marriage 
were entitled to maintenance after divorce as they fell within the ambit of the 
Maintenance Act.74 In a recent case, Hassam v Jacobs NO,75 the Cape 
                                                 
63  At 1331. 
64  At 1327, 1331-1332. 
65  2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) (also reported in 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC)). 
66  Act 81 of 1987. 
67  Act 27 of 1990. 
68  At 750.  
69  Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) at 744 (also reported in 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC)). 
70  At 746. 
71  At 750. In a minority judgement, Judge Moseneke at 758 held that the word “spouse” could not 
have a meaning other than a partner in a legally enforceable marriage. 
72  2005 (2) SA 272 (T). 
73  At 283. 
74  Act 99 of 1998. 
75  [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C). 
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Provincial Division (now the Western Cape High Court) held that the word 
“survivor” in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act includes a surviving 
spouse in a polygamous Muslim marriage, and that the word “spouse” in the 
Intestate Succession Act includes a surviving spouse in a polygamous Muslim 
marriage. This case therefore extends the recognition afforded to monogamous 
Muslim marriages in Daniels v Campbell to polygamous Muslim marriages. 
 
Even though the situation with regard to polygamous marriages has not yet been 
tested in the Constitutional Court, I am of the opinion that the Constitutional 
Court, if approached, will come to a similar conclusion. The reality is that there 
are various forms of marriage in our country which all deserve equal recognition. 
To illustrate, customary marriages, which permit polygyny, are legally recognised 
in South African law.76 There is thus no reason why the same should not happen 
with regard to Muslim marriages. 
 
3 2 1 4 Family care and the Constitution 
 
Besides knowing what the word “family” means, it is also important to look at the 
meaning of the term “family care”. Before I discuss family care, attention should 
be directed at the fact that the Constitution makes no reference to the family in its 
Preamble, and the right to family life is not entrenched in the Constitution. 
Although there is an argument that the omission of a right to family life from the 
                                                 
76  See the discussion under “3 2 1 3 Types of family” above. 
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Bill of Rights was intentional,77 Robinson says that this omission falls short of the 
prescriptions of the Convention which, in article 5, orders States Parties to 
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the 
members of the extended family to provide appropriate direction and guidance in 
the exercise by the child of the rights recognised in the Convention.78 Bekink & 
Brand submit that a right to family life could be read to be one of the implied 
entitlements of the right to family or parental care.79 Kruger is of the view that a 
constitutionally protected right to family life may be inferred from the fact that 
section 39(3) of the Constitution does not deny the existence of any other rights 
or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by, inter alia, the common law.80 
The Constitutional Court brought some clarity when it ruled that the right to 
dignity81 includes the right to family life.82 
 
Mosikatsana believes the right to family care includes the right to be cared for by 
the extended family.83 Robinson agrees with this view when he says that the 
child’s right to family care is aimed at the extended family,84 where the 
philosophy is that the family must take care of its own.85 He says that this 
recognition will serve the best interests of the child.86 He illustrates his view by 
                                                 
77  Cockrell in Bill of Rights Compendium 3E-21-22. 
78  Robinson 1998 Obiter 334-335.  
79  Bekink & Brand in Davel Child Law 186-187. 
80  Kruger 2007 THRHR 254. 
81  S 10 of the Constitution. 
82  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at 963. 
83  Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 375. 
84  Robinson 1998 Obiter 332. 
85  Robinson 1998 Obiter 335. 
86  Robinson 1998 Obiter 335. 
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reference to the Family Group Conference in New Zealand in terms of which the 
family of the child, including the extended family, is primarily responsible for the 
well-being of the child, with the result that matters which can be resolved within 
the family environment are not referred to the State. He then adds that the 
financial burden on the State would be alleviated if the extended family became 
more involved with protecting the best interests of a child.87 Human, however, 
says this view of family care does not allow for rights on the part of the child.88 
 
The question that has to be answered in the context of this research, is what the 
makers of the Constitution envisioned when they included family care in section 
28(1)(b). The Interim Constitution89 only provided for parental care, but section 
28(1)(b) of the Constitution provides for family care. In my view this clearly shows 
that family care is aimed at the extended family, whereas parental care is aimed 
at the nuclear family, or the immediate family. A child has the right to care 
against his/her family, including the extended family. This right of the child thus 
now operates against the family, including the extended family, not just against 
the parents.90 Robinson believes this view is supported by section 15(3)(i) of the 
Constitution, which states that it does not prevent legislation recognising 
“marriages concluded under any tradition”, and that these words convey that the 
child’s right to family care applies not only to the nuclear family, but also to the 
                                                 
87  Robinson 1998 Obiter 335-336. 
88  Human 2000 SAPL 380. 
89  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, hereafter referred to as “the 
Interim Constitution”. 
90  Bekink & Brand in Davel Child Law 183 n 85. 
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extended family.91 He further argues that the Constitution attaches more weight 
to family care than to parental care, because it places the right to family care 
before the right to parental care and links the two concepts with an or.92 I do not 
believe that that was necessarily the intention, but rather that the legislature 
simply wanted to include both forms of care. 
 
3 2 1 5 Family care and international instruments 
 
The relationship between child and family is contextualised in the Preamble of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,93 which states that the 
family is the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the 
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children.94 It further 
recognises that a child should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere 
of happiness, love and understanding. Children are primarily dependent on those 
closest to them: their family. The Convention recognises that the primary 
responsibility for the child rests with the family.95 The family therefore has the 
primary responsibility to provide for the rights of their own children, and States 
                                                 
91  Robinson 1998 Obiter 332-333. 
92  Robinson 1998 Obiter 333. 
93  Adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1989, it entered into force on 2 September 
1990. Hereafter referred to as “the Convention”. 
94  Art 1 defines a child for the purposes of the Convention as every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. In South 
Africa majority is attained at the age of eighteen (s 17 of the Children’s Act of 2005), except if 
majority is attained earlier through marriage or emancipation (Heaton Law of Persons 114-115). 
95  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 404-405. 
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Parties have to respect the rights of children to preserve family relations as 
recognised by law without unlawful interference.96  
 
The Convention does not define the concept “family”. Sloth-Nielsen says the 
absence of a definition of the concept of family opens the possibility for a wider 
interpretation of family, and points out that article 5 of the Convention97 supports 
this view.98 I believe that the Convention is purposely vague about the exact 
interpretation of family because of the many different forms that a family can 
take, such as the common-law form or the customary-law form,99 but it is very 
clear about the importance of family. 
 
Criticism against the Convention has been that parents and other adults in 
authority have historically been responsible for deciding what is in the best 
interests of a child and that by granting participation rights to children the 
Convention was “anti-family”.100 Sloth-Nielsen, however, says the Convention 
cannot be said to be supportive of an anti-family stance, but should rather be 
seen to be striking a balance between establishing children as independent 
                                                 
96  Art 8(1). 
97  Art 5: “State Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, 
legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights recognised in the present Convention”. 
98  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 406. 
99  See “3 2 1 2 What is a family?” above. 
100  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 404. 
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bearers of rights yet at the same time acknowledging the importance of 
families.101 I agree with her view. 
 
The Preamble of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child102 
also recognises that a child103 should grow up in a family environment in an 
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding for the full and harmonious 
development of his/her personality. Similar to the Convention, the Charter does 
not define the family, but it does acknowledge the role of the family as the basis 
of society.104 Here, my argument is the same as in respect of the Convention 
above,105 namely that it is a good thing that “family” is not defined in the Charter, 
but rather left open to change as society and the concept of the family change, 
especially since Western culture and African culture are sometimes worlds 
apart.106 The Charter does not focus much on the family but instead places much 
more emphasis on parental care.107 This, to my mind, confirms the primary 
importance of parental care, with family care being an additional right of the child. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 406. 
102  Hereafter referred to as “the Charter”. 
103  Defined in art 2 as every human being below the age of eighteen years.  
104  In terms of art 18(1) the family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall enjoy the 
protection and support of the state for its establishment and development. 
105  Also see “4 2 2 3 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child”. 
106  In this regard, see “3 2 1 2 What is a family?” above. 
107  Only art 18 of the Charter deals with family care. See the discussion under “3 2 2 4 Parental care 
and international instruments”. 
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3 2 1 6 Family care and the Child Care Act 
 
Even though the child has the right to family care in terms of the Constitution, 
there is no reference in the Child Care Act to family care. In terms of the 
Constitution and, now, the Children’s Act, the child has a right to family care and 
to grow up in a stable family environment or, where this is not possible, an 
environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment. The 
right to family care thus applies within the context of the Child Care Act too.108 
 
 
3 2 1 7 Family care and the Children’s Act 
 
Although the Children’s Act of 2005 does not define “family”, it does define 
“family member” which, in relation to a child, means a parent of the child; any 
other person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; a 
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt or cousin of the child; or any other 
person with whom the child has developed a significant relationship, based on 
psychological or emotional attachment, which resembles a family relationship.109 
The definition given to “family member” in this Act is so wide that it encompasses 
all possible forms of family, obviously including the extended family that is part of 
customary law. The Children’s Act of 2005 makes provision for a child to be 
cared for by his/her parents or family. The Preamble states that a child, for the 
                                                 
108  For a complete discussion of this topic, see “6 2 2 The Child Care Act and growing up in a family 
environment” below. 
109  S 1(1) of the Children’s Act of 2005. 
Chapter 3: The child and the family 
 57
full and harmonious development of his/her personality, should grow up in a 
family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.110 
Section 7(1)(f)(i) of the Children’s Act of 2005 acknowledges the need for the 
child “to remain in the care of his/her parent, family and extended family”, while 
section 7(1)(k) confirms the need for a child to grow up within a stable family 
environment.111 What is interesting and, I believe, an indication that the 
legislature recognises that there is an important difference, is that the Act 
distinguishes between the family (“gesin”) and the extended family (“familie”). 
Furthermore, section 7(1)(f)(i) clearly shows that the legislature acknowledges 
the importance of customary law in the South African legal system.112  
 
3 2 1 8  Family care and adoption 
 
The right of a child to “family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative 
care when removed from the family environment” includes care by adoptive 
parents.113 In Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development114 
Acting Judge Skweyiya referred to the reality of the vast number of parentless 
children in our country.115 He said that family care, which is an important feature 
of South African family life, includes care by the extended family of the child.116 
                                                 
110  The Preamble is discussed in “6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family environment”. 
111  In terms of s 7(1)(k) the best interests of the child requires that a child be brought up within a 
stable family environment and, where this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely 
as possible a caring family environment.  
112  More will be said about this under “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
113  Clark 2000 Stell LR 11. 
114  2003 (2) SA 198 (CC). 
115  At 208. 
116  At 206. 
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The court further indicated that family life as contemplated in the Constitution can 
be provided in different ways and that legal conceptions of the family and what 
constitutes family life should change as social practices and traditions change.117 
Although the court here seems to equate “family life” with “family care”, I firmly 
agree with the gist of the judge’s view. However, in my view the court confused 
family care with parental care. It held that adoption is a valuable way of affording 
children the benefits of family life which might not otherwise be available to 
them,118 and also stated that the applicants were suitable to adopt the children 
and provide them with family care.119 In this context the reference by the court 
should rather have been to parental care.120  
 
3 2 2 Parental care 
 
3 2 2 1 Introduction 
 
At the outset, reference must again be made to the Interim Constitution, and the 
fact that it protected “parental care” but not “family care”.121 This is in contrast to 
the Constitution which protects both these notions. Also important is the use of 
the word “care”, which shows that both the Interim Constitution and the 
                                                 
117  At 206-207. 
118  At 206. Note that family care is not the same as parental care. 
119  At 208. 
120  Also see the discussion above about the difference between the use of the term family in the 
narrow sense and the use of family in the wide sense and my discussion below under “3 2 2 2 
Family care versus parental care” about the difference between family care and parental care. 
121  In terms of s 30(b) of the Interim Constitution, which was repealed by s 242 of the Constitution, 
every child had the right to parental care. 
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Constitution radically deviate from the parental authority notion of the common 
law.122 
 
3 2 2 2 Family care versus parental care 
 
In terms of the common law, parental authority comprises the complex of rights, 
powers, duties and responsibilities vested in or imposed upon parents in respect 
of their minor child.123 The right to parental care, on the other hand, is the child’s 
right to be cared for by both biological parents.124  
 
The terms “family care” and “parental care” are often confused in our law.125 
Providing the child with love and support by more people than the child’s parents 
is obviously positive, but — although the importance of the extended family in the 
life of a child is not in any way denied — there is an important difference between 
care by the family in the wide sense126 and care by parents. I say this because 
the legal relationship that exists between the child and his/her parents differs 
from the legal relationship between the child and his/her extended family. When, 
for instance, a child is put up for adoption, section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 
specifies whose consent needs to be given. The consent required is that of the 
                                                 
122  Robinson 1998 Obiter 333. 
123  Van Heerden “Parental power” in Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 
313. 
124  Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 376; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 
Handbook 605, 607; Du Plessis & Corder Understanding SA’s Transitional Bill of Rights 186; 
Heaton in Bill of Rights Compendium 3C-54; Kruger 2007 THRHR 251, 253. 
125  This is illustrated further in the discussion under “3 2 1 2 What is a family?” above as well as the 
discussion under “3 2 1 7 Family care and adoption” where I refer to the Constitutional Court’s 
decision in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC). 
126  As discussed under “3 2 1 2 What is a family?” above.  
Chapter 3: The child and the family 
 60
parent or guardian of the child, not that of any member of the extended 
family.127 
 
According to Bennett, in the African system of kinship and family relations 
parental care might include care by more remote kinfolk.128 I do not support this 
interpretation of “parental care”. What Bennett is referring to is “family care”. 
Family care, in the sense of care by the extended family, is an important part of a 
child’s life, but it is a right quite separate from parental care. I believe that it will 
be much less confusing and much clearer if the term “family care” were used 
consistently to refer to care by the extended family, and the term ”parental care” 
for care by the nuclear family or the parents or legal guardians of the child. 
 
3 2 2 3 Parental care and the Constitution  
 
The right to parental care is not confined to care by biological parents, but 
extends to step-parents, adoptive parents and foster parents.129 Adoption is thus 
one of the ways in which a child can be afforded parental care. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127  This is also the position in terms of s 233(1) of the Children’s Act of 2005, which deals with 
consent to adoption. 
128  Bennett Human Rights 101. 
129 “Parent” in the Children’s Act of 2005 is interpreted to include the adoptive parent of a child — s 
1. Also see Heystek v Heystek [2002] 2 All SA 401 (T) at 404. 
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The right to “parental care” is formulated as a constitutional right of the child.130 It 
does not refer to a constitutional right on the part of the parents to exercise care 
and control over the child.131  
 
The Constitutional Court is of the view that the rights in section 28(1)(b) of the 
Constitution impose a duty which rests primarily on parents (and, in the case of 
family care, on other family members).132 The Constitutional Court takes this duty 
a step further in M v S133 by saying that parents have a moral obligation towards 
their children to teach them how to deal with problems and difficult situations.134  
 
3 2 2 4 Parental care and international instruments 
 
The Convention refers to the right of the child to be cared for by his/her parents 
at first instance.135 Separation from parents should only happen where this is 
necessary for the best interests of the child,136 and, if separation cannot be 
avoided, contact with both parents should be maintained, except if it is contrary 
                                                 
130  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 605, 607; Kruger 2007 THRHR 251, 253; Heaton in 
Bill of Rights Compendium 3C-54; Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 376; Du 
Plessis & Corder Understanding SA’s Transitional Bill of Rights 186. 
131  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
RSA, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 808; SW v F 1997 (1) SA 796 (O) at 803; P v P 2002 (6) SA 
105 (N) at 107; Cockrell in Bill of Rights Compendium 3E-14. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of 
Rights Handbook 605.  
132  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 82 (also 
reported in 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC)); Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender 
Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) at 375-376 (also reported in 2003 2 BCLR 111 
(CC)). 
133 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC). 
134  At 1328. 
135  Art 7(1). 
136  Art 9(1). This would be necessary, for example, in the case of abuse or neglect, or where the 
parents are living separately and a decision has to be made as to the child’s place of residence. 
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to the child’s best interests.137 States Parties have to render appropriate 
assistance to parents in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities.138  
 
The Convention confirms the principle that parents and legal guardians have the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child, and that 
the best interests of the child must be their basic concern.139 Sloth-Nielsen140 
believes that there could be a possible conflict here – by including both of these 
statements, the Convention underscores the potential for conflict between the 
best interests of the child and the interests of the adult members of the family in 
being responsible for the upbringing and development of the child.141 In my 
opinion this article is a necessary one, as it confirms that parental authority has 
been replaced by parental responsibility, namely, the duty to provide parental 
care.  
 
In terms of the Charter every child is entitled to the enjoyment of parental care 
and protection and has the right to reside with his/her parents where possible.142 
Parents and other persons responsible for the child have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child and have the duty 
to ensure that the best interests of the child are their basic concern at all times.143 
A child may only be separated from his/her parents against his/her will if such 
                                                 
137  Art 9(3). 
138  Art 18(2). 
139  Art 18(1). 
140  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 401. 
141  At 405. 
142  Art 19(1). 
143  Art 20(1)(a). 
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separation is in the best interest of the child,144 and if separated from his/her 
parents, he/she has the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact 
with parents on a regular basis.145 Where it concerns guidance and direction to a 
child with regard to religion, conscience and freedom of thought, this duty falls on 
parents or legal guardians.146 
 
Both the Convention and the Charter therefore make it clear that parents are 
obliged to provide parental care and that the child is entitled to parental care, 
unless parental care is not in his/her best interests. 
 
3 2 2 5 Parental care and the Child Care Act 
 
Parental care is not expressly mentioned in the Child Care Act, but as this right of 
the child is provided for in section 28 of the Constitution the child also enjoys it in 
the context of the Child Care Act.  
 
3 2 2 6 Parental care and the Children’s Act 
 
The Children’s Act of 2005 uses the term “parental responsibilities and rights” 
instead of the traditional term “parental authority”,147 and thus shifts the emphasis 
                                                 
144  Art 19(1). 
145  Art 19(2). Although art 19(1) allows for the removal of a child from his/her parents if such 
separation is in the best interests of the child, art 19(2) does not take into account the possibility 
that contact with parents might not be in the best interests of the child. 
146  Art 9(2). 
147  Parental responsibilities and rights are covered by s 18 of the Act. 
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with regard to the relationship between parents and children and places the 
emphasis on the rights of the child.148 The shift in emphasis as well as the 
definition of parental responsibilities and rights emphasise that parents have 
responsibilities as well as rights with regard to children, which include the 
responsibility and the right to care for the child, to maintain contact with the child, 
to act as guardian of the child, and to contribute to the maintenance of the 
child.149  
 
3 2 2 7 Parental care and adoption  
 
As discussed above,150 I believe that it is important to distinguish between family 
care and parental care. Unfortunately, the term “family” is used in English to 
refer to both the nuclear family and the extended family. I argue that it will be far 
more clear if the term “family care” is used to refer to the extended family, while 
the term “parental care” should be reserved for the nuclear family. With reference 
to adoption, the distinction is important because adoption provides a child with 
the opportunity to experience parental care. 
 
3 2 3 Appropriate alternative care 
 
3 2 3 1 Introduction 
                                                 
148  Also see the discussion under “6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family 
environment”. 
149  S 18(2). 
150  See “3 2 1 8 Family care and adoption”. 
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Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution imposes an obligation on the State to respect 
existing parental or family care and limits State interference in family or parental 
care to cases where such interference is justified.151 The duty to provide care to 
the child passes to the State only if the child’s parents or family members fail, or 
are unable, to care for the child.152 The State’s role is thus largely confined to 
situations where something has gone wrong, and the parents are unable to 
provide as they are obliged.153 
 
3 2 3 2 The role of the State and the Constitution 
 
 [T]he family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the 
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the 
necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within 
the community.154 
 
This passage clarifies the relationship between the State and the family with 
regard to children. There is a positive duty on the State to provide alternative 
care when a child does not have family care or parental care155 and also to 
create the environment for parents and family members to provide children with 
                                                 
151  Bekink & Brand in Davel Child Law 185. 
152  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 82 (also 
reported in 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC)); Van der Vyver in Robinson Law of Children 306. See also 
the Convention, art 20(1) and (3), which stipulates that a child in whose best interests it cannot be 
to remain in its family environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided 
by the state, and that such care could include adoption.  
153  Boshier World Congress at http://www.childjustice.org/docs/boshier2005.pdf. 
154  This is a quote from the Preamble of the Convention. 
155  Kruger 2007 THRHR 254. 
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proper care.156 There is, however, much uncertainty about the State’s exact role 
in the child’s life. The Interim Constitution157 granted children the right to parental 
care only. The inclusion of “appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment” in the Constitution158 emphasises the duty that rests on the 
State to provide for alternative care under certain circumstances.  
 
Human believes that the nature of the State’s role with regard to the family and 
parents is mainly supervisory and supportive.159 Bekink & Brand seem to agree 
as they are of the opinion that there is a preference for care in the context of a 
family, and that the State has to respect the institution of the family as the context 
within which such care should be provided.160 Schoeman says the family161 is 
entitled to certain rights of privacy and autonomy, and that the right to privacy 
“entitles the adults of the family to exclude others from scrutinizing obtrusions 
into family occurrences”.162  
 
According to Boshoff the categorisation of family law as part of private law has 
been criticised extensively. She submits that this debate has an important 
influence on the perception of the parental role in family law. If child care is a 
                                                 
156  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 82 (also 
reported in 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC)). 
157  S 30(1)(b). 
158  S 28(1)(b). 
159  Human 2000 SAPL 381. 
160  Bekink & Brand in Davel Child Law 186. 
161  For purposes of his article, he defines “family” at 9-10 as an intense continuing and intimate 
organisation of at least one adult and child, wherein the child is extensively and profoundly 
dependent on the adult, in which the adult supplies the child with its emotional and material needs, 
and in which the parent is dependent on the child for a certain kind of intimacy. 
162  Schoeman 1980 Ethics 10. 
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private matter, then State intervention should be restricted to a minimum, but if 
the norms of child care are fundamentally community-based, the State will be 
very involved with the upbringing of the child.163 Kruger, though, points out that if 
the constitutional protection of parental rights or the right to family life is too 
strong, it becomes difficult for the State to remove children from families. She  
argues that the omission of the right to family life from the Bill of Rights, together 
with the wider formulation of section 28(1)(b), could lead to the conclusion that a 
more active role for the State in family life is favoured.164 She submits that State 
intervention should be somewhere between the extremes of maximum coercive 
intervention and minimum intervention, bearing in mind the best interest of the 
child.165  
 
Boshoff argues that the user’s assumptions regarding the true nature of the role 
of the parent will influence the interpretation of the best interests of the child,166 
which is certainly true. However, ultimately, I believe, there can be no absolute 
answer here. The permissible degree of State involvement in a child’s life is to be 
determined in accordance with the Constitution. Section 28(1)(b) imposes an 
obligation on the State to respect existing family or parental care, and limits its 
interference in such care to cases where it is justified.167 In terms of section 28(2) 
of the Constitution, the best interests of the child must determine whether 
                                                 
163  Boshoff 1999 TSAR 277-278. 
164  Kruger 2007 THRHR 253-254. 
165  Kruger 2006 THRHR 453. 
166  Boshoff 1999 TSAR 278. 
167  These circumstances are, inter alia, described in the Child Care Act and the Children’s Act of 
2005. 
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interference is required as those interests must be paramount.168 Thus, in every 
case the role of the State has to be determined with the best interests of the child 
as the criterion, and those interests will determine what the State’s role in the 
particular case should be. 
 
The right to alternative care includes the right to adoptive care,169 which needs to 
be in the best interests of the child.170 Adoptive care provides a child the 
opportunity to be part of a “gesin” and experience parental care. If the State is to 
consider adoption as a form of alternative care for a child, it is important to know 
when a child is in need of appropriate alternative care such as adoption.171 This 
need has to be determined by ascertaining what the best interests of the child 
are. 
 
3 2 3 3  Alternative care and international instruments 
 
The Convention confirms the child’s right to alternative care in article 20, which 
states that a child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment, or who in his/her best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that 
environment, is entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the 
                                                 
168  See “4 2 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD”. 
169  Clark 2000 Stell LR 11. Art 20(2) and (3) of the Convention supports this statement. In SW v F 
1997 (1) SA 796 (O) at 802 the child’s constitutional right to parental care was interpreted to 
include adoption. The court confirmed that the Child Care Act specifically protects the right to 
care of children in need of care by making provision for adoption in cases where the care of 
natural persons was lacking or inadequate. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
608.  
170  S 28(2) of the Constitution; Joubert 1993 SALJ 731. 
171  Once again, the factors that determine the best interests of a child in s 7(1) of the Children’s Act of 
2005 are important here. 
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State.172 In accordance with their means and national conditions, States Parties 
have to take all appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible 
for the child and, in case of need, to provide material assistance.173 
 
The relevance of article 12 must not be overlooked. This article gives children the 
right to express their views in all matters affecting them.174 These views are to be 
weighted in relation to the age and maturity of the child.175 This is an important 
article in the context of alternative care, as the views of the child who is of an age 
and maturity to express such, have to be considered in the case of alternative 
care. This means that should an adoption be considered, a child might be able to 
express a view with regard to the adoption. This article, according to Sloth-
Nielsen, does not on the face of it give children the right to a say that outweighs 
that of parents or family, but simply affords children the opportunity to express 
themselves when matters affecting them are discussed.176 Children are afforded 
a much greater role in deciding what is in their best interest than was the position 
under the traditional approach,177 but Anderson & Spijker warn that the right to 
speak has to be distinguished from the right to be heard, and that the first is of no 
                                                 
172  Art 20(1). 
173  Art 27(3). Such assistance could include clothing, housing, and food. In South Africa, financial 
constraints will play an important role, but as will be discussed in “9 CONCLUSION” there are 
ways to overcome this difficulty. 
174  In terms of art 12(1) State Parties have to ensure that a child who is capable of forming his/her 
own views has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting him/her, and to have 
those views given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. Freeman 
“Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 300 says this is perhaps the most 
important provision in the Convention. 
175  Art 12(1). 
176  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 406. 
177  Bekink & Bekink 2004 De Jure 27. 
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value if the second is not taken seriously.178 This point is important because it 
emphasises the need to allow children to participate in any decisions affecting 
them where they are able to do so and to attach weight to their participation. 
 
The Charter instructs the State to provide protection and support for the 
establishment and development of the family.179 In terms of the Charter, States 
Parties have to ensure that a child who is parentless or who in his/her best 
interests cannot be brought up by his/her parents shall be provided with 
alternative family care.180 Similar to article 12 of the Convention, the Charter in 
article 7 protects the right of a child to form and express views regarding his/her 
welfare and interests.181  
 
3 2 3 4 Alternative care and the Child Care Act 
 
The right to alternative care includes the right to adoptive care.182 Section 17 of 
the Child Care Act, read with Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development,183 provides that a child may be adopted by a husband and his wife 
jointly; same-sex life partners jointly; a widow, widower, unmarried or divorced 
person; a married person whose spouse is the parent of the child; a person who 
                                                 
178  Anderson & Spijker 2002 Obiter 369. 
179  Art 18(1). The Charter uses the terms “parents” and “family” loosely, and in my opinion “family” 
in the articles referred to in this paragraph really refers to “parents”. 
180  Art 25(2). 
181  In terms of art 7, every child who is capable of forming his/her own views is assured the right to 
express his/her opinions freely in all matters and to disseminate his/her opinion subject to such 
restrictions as are prescribed by law. 
182  SW v F 1997 (1) SA 796 (O) at 802. 
183  2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at 213, as read with the order handed down in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare 
and Population Development 2001 12 BCLR 1225 (T). 
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is the child’s parent’s same-sex life partner; or the natural father of a child born 
out of wedlock.184 Although this section has been altered over time to reflect a 
more liberal approach to the persons who may adopt, there are still sections of 
the South African community who are excluded from statutory adoption.185 
 
3 2 3 5 Alternative care and the Children’s Act 
 
The Children’s Act of 2005 greatly extends the position as far as the categories 
of persons who may adopt, are concerned. 186 Partners in a permanent domestic 
life partnership may adopt jointly in terms of the Children’s Act of 2005.187 The 
Children’s Act of 2005 also provides for other persons sharing a common 
household and forming a permanent family unit188 to adopt jointly. This 
subsection was included to allow for joint adoption by, for instance, a husband 
and all his wives (the kraal) in a customary-law setting.189 Clearly, the legislature 
has taken account of the changing format of the nuclear family and has opened 
up the restrictions with regard to the parties who are able to adopt quite 
dramatically, inter alia, to allow for more recognition of customary law principles 
in the legislation. 
                                                 
184  Acting Judge Skweyiya did emphasise though that prospective adoptive parents should in each 
decision concerning adoption be evaluated on a case by case basis as provided for in the Child 
Care Act – at 214. 
185  Although customary marriages have been recognised, adoption by all the parties to such a 
marriage is currently not possible. Another example that could be mentioned is that of siblings 
living together and wishing to adopt a child together — see also “6 4 1 2 Who may adopt under 
the Children’s Act?”. 
186  This portion of the Act has not yet come into operation. 
187  S 231(1)(a)(ii). 
188  S 231(1)(a)(iii). 
189  SALC Report on Project 110 235-236. 
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3 2 3 6 Alternative care and adoption 
 
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution grants the child the right to family care, 
parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment. As I have indicated,190 alternative care includes the right to 
adoptive care. When a child is adopted, the adoption will provide the child with 
the opportunity to grow up as part of a family and thus experience parental care. 
What I am arguing, is that “family care”, “parental care” and “alternative care” 
must not be confused. Adoption is a form of alternative care which grants the 
child the opportunity to experience the family environment by growing up as part 
of a family and experiencing parental care. 
 
 
3 3 ATTACHMENT 
 
3 3 1 Introduction 
 
 [W]hat is believed to be essential for mental health is that the infant and young child 
should experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with his mother (or 
permanent mother-substitute) in which both find satisfaction and enjoyment.191 
                                                 
190  See “3 2 3 2 The role of the State and the Constitution”, “3 2 3 4 Alternative care and the Child 
Care Act” and “3 2 3 5 Alternative care and the Children’s Act”. 
191  Bowlby Maternal Care 11. The attachment theory can be viewed, in large part, as a theory of 
personality development that arose from Bowlby’s interest in the nature of human development – 
Belsky & Cassidy in Rutter & Hay Development through Life 373. Therefore this quotation is 
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One of the factors that need to be taken into account to determine the best 
interests of a child is the child’s emotional security, which is closely linked to the 
environment in which he/she grows up.192 A child’s development unfolds in 
response to the environmental influences to which he/she is exposed. The self-
identity, our image of ourselves, is what we believe about who we are.193 The 
development of the self-identity takes place with the development of 
attachment.194 As human interaction plays such an important role in the 
development of the child’s self-identity, the nature of the environment that the 
child lives in is extremely important, and the self-identity of a child who grows up 
in an institution will greatly differ from that of a child who grows up in a family.195 
It is, generally, in the child’s best interests to grow up in a family. As discussed in 
more detail below,196 “family” in this context does not necessarily mean that a 
child has to be raised by his/her biological family,197 but could also refer to 
appropriate alternative care which, of course, could include adoption. The crucial 
point is that the child should grow up in a family environment. In a family 
                                                                                                                                                 
deemed appropriate to start off this discussion. The reference to mother or mother-substitute does 
not necessarily refer to the biological mother - see “3 3 2 1 What is attachment?”. 
192  S 7(1)(h) of the Children’s Act of 2005. Even prior to the coming into operation of s 7(1)(h) of the 
Children’s Act of 2005, one of the factors included by the court in McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 
201 (C) at 205 was the ability of the parent to provide for the child’s emotional, psychological, 
cultural and environmental development. Also see “6 3 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD”. 
193  Papalia et al A Child’s World 232. 
194  Smith Leer die Kind Ken 12. 
195  Landman 1985 Welfare Focus 17. 
196  See “3 3 2 1 What is attachment” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
197  Wait 1989 Welfare Focus 52. 
Chapter 3: The child and the family 
 74
environment where each child gets enough individual attention the child’s 
feelings of self-worth increase.198  
 
Delay in finding permanent families for children has long been acknowledged as 
harmful.199 In fact, even before the child can make his/her feelings known, he/she 
experiences feelings of acceptance or rejection.200 Therefore, if adoption is the 
appropriate alternative care that the child is to be placed in, it is in the child’s best 
interests that he/she be adopted as early as possible so that the attachment 
process can develop as early as possible. 
 
3 3 2 The theory behind attachment 
 
3 3 2 1 What is attachment? 
 
Known also as emotional bonding,201 attachment is the strong, affectional tie we 
have with special people in our lives that leads us to feel pleasure when we 
interact with them and to be comforted by their nearness during times of 
stress.202 It is also described as a reciprocal, enduring emotional tie between an 
infant and a caregiver, each of whom contributes to the quality of the 
relationship,203 and as a system whose primary objective is the achievement of 
                                                 
198  Landman 1985 Welfare Focus 17; Smith Leer die Kind Ken 9.  
199  Ryburn Open Adoption 70. 
200  Landman 1985 Welfare Focus 18; Bowlby Attachment and Loss 2 100. 
201  Mudie 1989 De Rebus 688. 
202  Berk Child Development 417. 
203  Papalia et al A Child’s World 224. 
Chapter 3: The child and the family 
 75
physical proximity to an adult caretaker with the accompanying subjective 
experience of security.204 The attachment theory is widely regarded as the best 
supported theory of socio-emotional development yet available.205 As the 
founding relationship of a child’s life,206 it is often considered to be synonymous 
with the best interests of the child.207 The development of attachment 
relationships seems to be a universal feature of infant development across 
cultures,208 and Golombok believes there is a growing body of evidence to show 
that the course of a child’s social and emotional development is closely related to 
the quality of the child’s attachment relationships.209 She says that the most 
important factor for a child’s development of secure attachments seems to be the 
quality of interaction between the attachment figures and the child.210 
Consequently, adopted children can develop secure attachments to their 
adoptive parents where the adoptive parents are responsive to them.211 
 
The attachment theory is concerned with the early years of life.212 There is no 
legal, sociological or psychological basis to assume that children are better off 
being raised by men or by women. The main issue is that their attachments must 
                                                 
204  Simmonds in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 33. Attachment has to be distinguished from 
attachment behaviour. Attachment behaviour refers to the various forms of behaviour that a child 
uses to attain and maintain proximity to another individual – Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 195, 
371. 
205  Bowlby Maternal Care 11; Bowlby A Secure Base 28; Papalia et al A Child’s World 228. 
206  Golding 2007 Adoption & Fostering 79. 
207  Clark 2000 Stell LR 19; Cassidy in Cassidy & Shaver Handbook of Attachment 4-5.  
208  Patterson Infancy & Childhood p 235; Papalia et al A Child’s World 225. 
209  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 103; Patterson Infancy & 
Childhood 237; Berk Child Development 425. 
210  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 109-110. 
211  This was also found in a study by Singer, Brodzinsky, Ramsay, Steir and Waters (1985) “Mother-
infant attachment in adoptive families”, in Child Development 56: 1543-1551, as quoted by 
Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 110. 
212  Golding 2007 Adoption & Fostering 77. 
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be protected.213 What is important to bear in mind is that the profile of the family 
has changed drastically over the past few years, as discussed above.214 Owing 
to this, we now have families where there is no biological mother or no mother at 
all, but there is a mother figure or where there is more than one person who fulfils 
the role of the mother, for instance where there is a polygynous customary 
marriage. These are only some possible examples of the changing family. The 
importance of this discussion here is that references to the mother of the child 
do not necessarily refer to the biological mother or even to a female.215 Our 
courts agree that a mother of a child does not necessarily have to be a biological 
mother. In Van der Linde v Van der Linde216 it was held that the quality of a 
parent’s role is not determined by gender and that a father can be as good a 
mother as the child’s biological mother. References in my discussion to the 
mother should therefore be read to include the mother figure or the caregiver and 
references to parents should not be assumed to be one man and one woman.217 
Where the terms “mother”, “mother figure”, “caregiver” or “parent” are used, they 
should therefore be interpreted to refer to the primary caregiver.  
 
3 3 2 2 How are attachments formed? 
 
                                                 
213  Strous 2007 SA Journal of Psychology 231. 
214  See “3 2 1 2 What is a family?”. 
215  Much of the available research focuses on the relationship between the child and the mother. As 
Patterson Infancy & Childhood 233 explains, mothers are usually the caregivers in Western 
culture, which is why so many infants form attachment relationships with their mothers. 
216  1996 (3) SA 509 (O). 
217  See also Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 177 n 2; Bowlby Attachment and Loss 2 3 n 1, who 
indicates that every reference in his works to mother is to the person who mothers the child, rather 
than to the biological mother. 
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Attachment is the result of a relationship that builds between two partners,218 an 
infant and a caregiver.219 It occurs when certain behavioural systems are 
activated.220 The primary attachment figure is usually, but not necessarily, the 
child’s mother.221 Continuity of care-giving is very important when we deal with 
attachment and this determines whether a child is likely to develop favourably.222 
When the relationship of an infant with a caregiver is disrupted more than once, 
as happens due to multiple placements in the child’s early years, the child’s 
emotional attachment becomes increasingly shallow and indiscriminate, in which 
case the child grows up as a person who lacks warmth in his/her contacts with 
fellow beings.223 Infant attachment to parents is most likely to be compromised 
when families are separated as well as when infants are reared in institutional 
settings such as orphanages.224 In a series of studies by Spitz of infants who 
were institutionalised and placed in a large ward where a nurse looked after 
several babies, the infants changed from happy, outgoing babies to withdrawn, 
crying babies who experienced emotional difficulties after the separation because 
they were prevented from forming a bond with adults.225  
 
                                                 
218  Berk Child Development 423. 
219  Papalia et al A Child’s World 225. 
220  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 179. 
221  Belsky in Cassidy & Shaver Handbook of Attachment 254. Also see my discussion under “3 3 2 1 
What is attachment?” above. 
222  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 32-33; Berk Child Development 426; Papalia et al A 
Child’s World 226; Patterson Infancy & Childhood 236-237. 
223  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 32-33. 
224  Patterson Infancy & Childhood 235. 
225  As referred to in Berk Child Development 422. 
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A child who has not formed an attachment to a caregiver inevitably shows 
evidence of behavioural and emotional difficulties.226 Bowlby believes that when 
an individual is confident that an attachment figure will be available to him/her 
whenever he/she desires it, that person will be much less prone to either intense 
or chronic fear than will an individual who for any reason has no such 
confidence.227 When Ainsworth and her colleagues assessed infant behaviour 
and the attachment patterns that they form, they found that there are three types 
of attachment.228 These are “secure attachment”,229 “anxious resistant 
attachment”230 and “ambivalent (resistant) attachment”.231 Secure attachment is 
considered to be central to mental health and effective functioning in the 
community. The child is able to explore, experiment and deal confidently with the 
world.232 Golombok says studies have shown that the most important 
determinant of a secure attachment relationship for a child is the sustained 
presence of a responsive attachment figure.233 Bowlby234 and Ainsworth235 
                                                 
226  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 109; Berk Child Development 
426. 
227  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 2 235. 
228  Papalia et al A Child’s World 225. Later research identified a fourth type of attachment, 
disorganised-disoriented attachment. Although they are referred to differently, the first three are 
basically the same as those identified by Mudie — see n 229-231 below. Disorganised-disoriented 
attachment is where a child experiences the parent as frightened, frightening or dangerous. 
229  Papalia et al A Child’s World 225; Patterson Infancy & Childhood 230-231. Mudie 1989 De Rebus 
688 explains that this is where the child is confident that the parent or parent figure will be 
available, responsive and helpful. 
230  Papalia et al A Child’s World 225. Mudie 1989 De Rebus 688 explains that this is where the parent 
is inconsistent, which leads to uncertainty and insecurity. 
231  Papalia et al A Child’s World 225; Patterson Infancy & Childhood 230-231. Mudie 1989 De Rebus 
688 calls this “anxious avoidant attachment” and explains that this is where the parent ignores or 
rebuffs the child when he/she approaches the parent for comfort or help. 
232  Mudie 1989 De Rebus 688. 
233  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 111. 
234  Bowlby Making & Breaking of Affectional Bonds 130. 
235  Ainsworth 1989 American Psychologist 710-711, 715. 
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believe that attachment to parents remains important beyond infancy and 
throughout the lifespan. 
 
Mothers are usually the principal caregivers for their infants, but most infants also 
form attachment relationships with other people, such as grandparents or child 
care providers.236 However, attachment behaviour is nearly always shown earlier, 
more strongly and more consistently towards mothers.237 Freud first suggested 
that the infant’s emotional tie to the mother provides the foundation for all later 
relationships.238 If the mother consistently and lovingly provides the infant with 
his/her needs, the infant feels safe, secure and stable and perceives the world as 
safe and reliable.239 Although attachment behaviours vary across cultures,240 
both mothers and babies contribute to security of attachment by the way they 
respond to each other.  
 
3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed? 
 
The attachment relationship is the foundation relationship of a child’s life.241 For a 
person to know that an attachment figure is available, gives him/her a strong and 
pervasive feeling of security, and so encourages him/her to value and continue 
                                                 
236  Patterson Infancy & Childhood 233; Papalia et al A Child’s World 228; Berk Child Development 
417, 425. 
237  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 201. Also see Smith Leer die Kind Ken 10; Bowlby Attachment 
and Loss 1 199. Again, bear in mind that “mother” does not necessarily refer to the biological 
mother.  
238  Berk Child Development 417. 
239  Smith Leer die Kind Ken 10. 
240  Berk Child Development 422. 
241  Golding 2007 Adoption & Fostering 79. 
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the relationship.242 The obvious question now is whether it matters to a child’s 
development when these attachments are formed, in other words, whether there 
is a critical period when children become attached to a parent-figure.  
 
Although there are researchers who believe that a critical period for bonding 
does not exist for human beings, such as Chess & Thomas as well as Klaus & 
Kennell who did studies in 1982, and Lamb who researched this in 1983,243 they 
seem to be in the minority. A 1975 study by Tizard & Rees244 found that a first 
attachment bond can develop as late as four to six years of age, but these 
youngsters are more likely to display emotional and social problems.245  
 
Most researchers in this field are of the belief that attachment has to happen 
when the child is young. These proponents believe that attachment or bonding 
between children and their primary carers is particularly crucial in the early years 
of life when children are totally dependent on others.246 Berk believes the 
possibility exists that completely normal development depends on establishing 
close bonds with caregivers during the early years of life.247 Bowlby248 says the 
infant from birth to approximately eight weeks of age is not yet attached,249 but 
most infants of about three months are already responding differently to the 
                                                 
242  Bowlby A Secure Base 26-27. 
243  As quoted in Papalia et al A Child’s World 135. 
244  As referred to in Berk Child Development 422. 
245  Berk Child Development 422. 
246  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 83. 
247  Berk Child Development 422. 
248  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 266-268 divides the development of attachment into four phases 
which stretch from birth to approximately the middle of the third year. 
249  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 268. 
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mother as compared with other people,250 and that within 12 months almost all 
infants have developed a strong tie to the mother.251 Golombok agrees with this 
view. She says252 studies show that when infants fail to form attachments early in 
life, they show several signs of social deprivation, such as rigid body postures, 
delayed language development and signs of depression after the first six months 
of life.253 Smith believes the infant does not discriminate with regard to 
attachment in the first six months, but develops an attachment to one specific 
person from the age of six months254 and starts forming multiple attachments 
from the age of eighteen to 24 months.255 Wait256 similarly opines that a baby 
becomes attached to a specific person from the age of about six to eight months, 
and that the critical phase for the forming of emotional ties is probably between 
the ages of six months and four years.257 Rutter258 is of the opinion that 
attachment during infancy is not crucial, but says this is a sensitive period and he 
believes that completely normal social and emotional development will be less 
likely if attachments are not established early in life. Golombok explains that 
long-term studies indicate that there were significant differences between 
children who were fostered during the first year of life and children who spent 
their first three years in an orphanage. The children from the orphanage showed 
                                                 
250  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 199. 
251  Bowlby Attachment and Loss 1 177. Although he uses the term “mother”, this in every case refers 
to the person who mothers the child and to whom he/she becomes attached, rather than the 
biological mother – see n 237 above. 
252  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 107. 
253  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 108. 
254  Smith Leer die Kind Ken 10. This is also the opinion of Howe Patterns of Adoption 73 and Papalia 
et al A Child’s World 226. 
255  Smith Leer die Kind Ken 11. 
256  Wait 1989 Welfare Focus 48. 
257  Wait 1989 Welfare Focus 50. 
258  Rutter Maternal Deprivation 63. 
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much slower developmental progress and a high rate of behavioural problems, 
compared to the children who were fostered.259  
 
As can be seen, the studies all show that the younger the child is when this 
attachment is formed, the better it is for the child’s later development.260 I believe 
the correct approach would be that early attachments are not necessarily crucial 
for bonding purposes but, where it is possible to achieve early attachment, such 
early attachment will assist in forming a bond between a child and a parent-figure 
and thus also provide the child with the necessary skills to develop positive 
relationships as he/she grows up. Whatever the circumstances of a child are, it 
will always be in the best interests of the child to establish an attachment with a 
caregiver, whatever the age of the child. As also discussed elsewhere,261 
children do not need to be raised by their biological parents to form attachments. 
The quality of the interaction between the child and the adult is more important 
than the biological relationship. Adoption is one way of giving a child the 
opportunity of forming an attachment with an adult, which will go a long way 
towards ensuring that the child will become an emotionally secure, balanced 
adult.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
259  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 108-109. 
260  Papalia et al A Child’s World 228-229. 
261  See “3 3 2 1 What is attachment?” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
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3 4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I distinguished between the different forms a family may take, and 
I also distinguished between family care and parental care. The discussion in this 
chapter should leave no doubt in the reader’s mind about the importance of a 
child’s being in an environment where he/she can grow up as part of a family and 
form attachments. Adoption is one way to provide a family environment to the 
child and to enable him/her to form attachments.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the best interests of the child in the context of 
adoption. 
4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
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4 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Statutory adoptions in South Africa are currently dealt with in terms of the Child 
Care Act of 2005. Section 18(4)(c) of the Child Care Act provides that an 
application for adoption shall not be granted by a children’s court to which such 
application was made, unless it is satisfied that the proposed adoption will serve 
the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child. This is an absolute 
requirement which must be met before the adoption order is granted.1 The 
provisions of the Children’s Act which regulate adoption have not yet come into 
effect,2 but when they do come into operation, section 240(2)(a), in terms of 
which an adoption order has to be in the best interests of the child, will regulate 
this aspect.3 The best interests of the child will therefore remain central in 
statutory adoption applications.  
 
In contrast, the welfare of the extended family, not that of the child, predominates 
in customary law.4 In fact, customary adoption is rooted in the protection of the 
family5 and the interests of the child might be subordinated to those of the 
                                                 
1  Schäfer & Schäfer in Robinson Law of Children 78-79. 
2  For a detailed discussion of the relevant provisions of the Children’s Act, see “6 THE CHILD 
CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
3  In terms of s 240(2)(a) a children’s court considering an adoption application may make an order 
for the adoption of a child only if the adoption is in the best interests of the child. Also see the 
discussion under “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
4  Customary adoption is described under “2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary law” 
above. 
5  Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 346. 
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family.6 However, the Constitution provides that the courts must apply customary 
law when it is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law.7 Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides 
protection for children by rendering a child’s best interests of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child. The requirement that the best 
interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all issues involving 
children is furthermore found in almost all human rights documents.8 Customary 
adoption law will thus have to be adapted to recognise the importance of the best 
interests of the child.9 
 
To act in accordance with the best interests of a child, it is essential that there are 
guidelines indicating how the child can and should be protected. There can be no 
doubt about the importance of the best interests standard when it comes to 
children, but in practice the contents and extent of this standard are uncertain.10 
What follows is a discussion of general aspects that are, in my opinion and in the 
context of this thesis, important to determine the best interests of the child. That 
                                                 
6  Bennett Human Rights 96. 
7  S 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. There is currently no 
legislation dealing with customary adoption.  
8  Maithufi in Davel Child Law 140 — see “4 2 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE BEST 
INTERESTS STANDARD” below. 
9  In Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T) the court had to make a decision about the 
validity of a customary adoption which did not comply with the formalities. It took account of 
customary law and added principles of rationality and common sense to protect the best interests 
of the child and held that the adoption was valid (at 1147-1148). I believe this approach by the 
court shows us that it is possible to find a way to apply customary law and statutory law together 
to act in the best interests of the child. As I shall argue under “9 CONCLUSION”, the legislature 
has to consider ways of including the principles of customary adoption in statutory adoption in 
such a way that the best interests of the child will be served, and I believe that there should be only 
one system of adoption that applies to everyone in South Africa. 
10  Davel 2001 De Jure 274. 
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discussion is followed by a look at the best interests of the child in the context of 
adoption. 
 
 
4 2 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD 
 
4 2 1 Historical development and application in South Africa 
 
The concept “best interests of the child” was already introduced into our 
customary law by courts in the Transkei and Natal at the turn of the twentieth 
century.11 The common-law rule laid down in the 1948 case of Fletcher v 
Fletcher12 was that the most important factor the courts must consider in making 
a decision regarding a child is not the rights of parents but the best interests of 
the child. The court thus confirmed that the best interests standard must be the 
main consideration in matters concerning the child.13  
 
As long ago as 1969, the standard of the child’s best interests was described by 
our courts as “a golden thread which runs throughout the whole fabric of our law 
relating to children”.14 Today, South Africa has a Constitution which has turned 
serving the best interests of the child into a constitutional imperative. The 
standard of the best interests of the child is constitutionalised in section 28(2) of 
                                                 
11  Bennett 1999 Obiter145.  
12  1948 (1) SA 130 (A) at 143. 
13  Bekink & Bekink 2004 De Jure 22-23. 
14  Kaiser v Chambers 1969 (4) SA 224 (C) at 228. 
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the Constitution,15 in terms of which the child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance16 in every matter concerning the child. Unfortunately, though, the 
exact meaning of the standard is not constitutionally defined, and requires judicial 
interpretation.17 There are many factors to be considered when deciding what the 
best interests of a child are. What would be in the best interests of a child in a 
particular case would depend on the circumstances of that case, and has to be 
determined for each case individually.18 
 
4 2 2 International instruments 
 
4 2 2 1 Introduction 
 
In terms of section 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution, a court, tribunal or forum 
must consider international law and may consider foreign law in its deliberations. 
The provisions of these instruments will thus be important in the interpretation of 
the Constitution. A closer look at international law shows us that section 28(2) of 
the Constitution is in keeping with the universal recognition that the interests of 
the child must prevail.19 By ratifying and acceding to the following conventions, 
South Africa confirmed its commitment to international human rights efforts 
                                                 
15  S 28(2): “A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.” See also Fraser v Naude 1999 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 5 (also reported in 1998 11 BCLR 1357 
(CC)); Jackson v Jackson 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA) at 317. 
16  In Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (A) the Appellate Division first gave paramountcy to the 
standard of the best interests of the child. 
17  Bekink 2003 THRHR 255. 
18  Davel & de Kock 2001 De Jure 274. 
19  Bekink & Bekink 2004 De Jure 25. 
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directed towards the protection of (inter alia) children in accordance with the 
standards of international declarations and conventions.20 
 
4 2 2 2 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
An important international instrument that has to be consulted when determining 
the best interests of a child is the Convention on the Rights of the Child.21 It has 
been hailed as a watershed in the history of children.22 Its importance is 
underscored by the unprecedented “rapidity with which States have ratified or 
acceded to it and by the sheer number of States Parties which it has attracted”.23 
The Convention is a comprehensive treaty on the rights of the child and the most 
universally accepted human rights document in history.24 It places children25 at 
the centre of the spread of human rights generally.  
 
Since its introduction, the Convention has become the international standard 
against which legislation and policies are measured.26 It has been ratified by 192 
countries, with only 2 member states yet to do so.27 South Africa became a 
signatory to the Convention on 29 January 1993 and ratified the Convention on 
                                                 
20  Nicholson & Politis 2001 De Jure 594. 
21  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” n 93.  
22  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 401. 
23  Alston in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 183-184. Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 402 explains that no 
other treaty has been ratified by so many states within so short a period of time. 
24  Todres in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 146-147. 
25  A child is defined in art 1 as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the 
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”. 
26 Brandt v S [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA) at 7. 
27  These states are Somalia and the United States of America. According to Simon “United Nations 
Convention on wrongs to the child” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 311 two issues that have held 
up the United States’ ratification of the Convention are abortion and the death penalty. 
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16 June 1995.28 This means that South Africa must comply with the obligations 
the Convention imposes on States Parties.29  
 
The best interest of the child forms one of the foundation stones of the 
Convention.30 The Preamble recognises that children are entitled to the same 
basic set of human rights as every person, but that children are also entitled to 
special care and assistance. The relationship between children and family is also 
contextualised in the Preamble, which states that the family is the fundamental 
group in society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all 
its members and particularly of children. It further recognises that children should 
grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding. The Convention refers to the right of children to be cared for by 
their parents at first instance.31 Separation from parents should be a last resort 
that should only happen where such separation is in the best interests of the 
child.32 If separation cannot be avoided, family ties are to be preserved, unless 
this will be contrary to the best interests of the child.33 Children are primarily 
dependent on those closest to them: their family. The family therefore has the 
primary responsibility to provide for the rights of their own children.34 This is also 
                                                 
28  In terms of art 47, South Africa could not become a party to the Convention through signature 
alone. Subsequent ratification was also required. 
29  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 263; Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 419. 
30  Clark 2000 Stell LR 3. 
31  Art 7(1). 
32  Art 9(1). 
33  Art 9(3). As discussed under “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”, contact with the 
biological family is usually in the best interests of the child when a child is adopted. 
34  Although the family is described in the Preamble, it is not defined. Because the concept of family 
changes as society changes, this might be a good thing — see “3 2 1 2 What is a family?” and “3 2 
1 3 Types of family” above. 
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evident from article 18(1), which accords parents and legal guardians the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of children and provides that 
the best interests of children will be the basic concern of the parents or legal 
guardians.  
 
Article 3(1) of the Convention seems to place the best interests standard at the 
heart of international children’s rights law.35 In terms of article 3(1) the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning 
children. This article is of fundamental importance to the whole Convention 
because it contains the general standard which underpins the application of the 
rights guaranteed.36 The Convention does not provide any definitive statement of 
how an individual child’s interests would best be served in a given situation. It 
contains no definition or list of factors that would indicate the best interests of the 
child,37 but provides “a number of signposts capable of guiding those seeking to 
identify what is in the best interests of the child”.38 These are participation 
(children should participate in decisions affecting their destiny and should 
participate in community life and play an active role in society), protection 
(against discrimination and all forms of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment, neglect and exploitation), prevention (of harm to 
children, the development of preventative health care and the prevention of child 
abduction) and provision (children have a right to have their basic needs met, 
                                                 
35  Parker 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 26. 
36  McGoldrick in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 82. 
37  Bekink & Bekink 2004 De Jure 27. 
38  Alston 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 19. 
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e.g. education, health care, and access to justice).39 All of these principles are to 
be applied with the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.40 Sloth-
Nielsen41 explains that a holistic approach to the rights enshrined in the 
Convention was adopted by the drafters thereof, and says that the Convention 
supports the notion that all rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. 
A concern here is that it is not certain who has to decide what is in the best 
interests of the child, or what criteria have to be used to determine what the best 
interests of the child are.42  
 
The State plays a role when it comes to providing for the best interests of 
children. However, the State’s role is largely confined to situations where 
something has gone wrong, and the child’s parents are unable to serve the 
child’s interests as they should.43 In terms of article 544 children are not children 
of the State, but part of a unit (parents, extended family or community) which has 
primary responsibility for their well-being.45 
 
                                                 
39  Van Bueren in Davel Child Law 203; Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 345. In 
M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) at 1322 the guiding principles were described as survival, 
development, protection and participation. 
40  Art 3. 
41  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 404. 
42  Todres in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 153. Also see the discussion under “4 2 4 Primacy and 
paramountcy”. 
43  Boshier World Congress at http://www.childjustice.org/docs/boshier2005.pdf. 
44  Art 5: State Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community … to provide, in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights recognised in the present Convention. 
45  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 405. 
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The Convention has also been criticised. Freeman46 says the Convention must 
be seen as a real achievement, but also as a spur to further action, and that there 
is a need for revision, reform and innovation, and an input by children 
themselves.47 He criticises the low age encoded in the Convention (fifteen years) 
as the minimum age of enlistment into armed services48 and says that there are 
many children whose interests are inadequately addressed in the Convention 
(such as disabled children and gay children).49 Furthermore, he points out that a 
child’s right to refuse medical treatment or to consent to medical treatment has 
not been addressed, and he believes the failure of the Convention to endorse 
equality before the law is odd.50 Viljoen criticises the omission of an individual 
complaints mechanism, which he says detracts from the potential impact of the 
Convention on the position of children globally.51 
 
Sloth-Nielsen52 believes that there might be a conflict with regard to article 18(1). 
By referring to the primary responsibility of parents and legal guardians and 
providing that the best interests of children must be their basic concern, the 
Convention underscores the potential for conflict between the best interests of 
the child and the interests of the adult members of the family.53 
 
                                                 
46  Freeman “Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 294-297, 301. 
47  At 294. 
48  At 290-291. 
49  At 294-296. 
50  At 301. 
51  Viljoen 1998 CILSA 204. 
52  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 401. 
53  At 405. 
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The Convention establishes a Committee on the Rights of the Child,54 which is 
empowered to examine reports submitted by States Parties on a regular basis,55 
and the Convention Committee may request States Parties to provide further 
information relevant to the implementation of the Convention.56 The functions of 
the Convention Committee, as will be seen hereunder,57 are not as powerful as 
that of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The Committee 
is not full-time, it is under-resourced and it has “no real teeth”.58 Reporting to the 
Convention Committee is done by States Parties and not by individuals. Freeman 
says if international children’s rights are to have a future the Convention must be 
policed more intensively.59  
 
As discussed above, though, the Convention is an important international 
instrument which has served as background to the development of other 
instruments and, if applied as intended, could improve children’s lives.60 
 
4 2 2 3 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
 
The Convention was an inspiration for another international instrument61 that 
deals with the best interests of the child, namely the African Charter on the 
                                                 
54  Hereafter “the Convention Committee”. 
55  Art 44(1). 
56  Art 44(4). 
57  See “4 2 2 3 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child”. 
58  Freeman “Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 302. 
59  Freeman “Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 302. 
60  Freeman “Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 302 calls it a “beginning”. 
61  Davel 2002 De Jure 282. 
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Rights and Welfare of the Child,62 which entered into force on 29 November 
1999. After the Convention, it is the second global and the first regional binding 
instrument that identifies the child as a possessor of certain rights.63 South Africa 
signed it on 10 October 1997 and ratified it on 7 January 2000.  
 
The Convention and the Charter are complementary and both of them provide 
the framework through which children and their welfare are increasingly 
discussed in Africa,64 but this separate Charter for Africa was born out of 
frustration with the United Nations’ drafting process.65 The failures of the 
Convention, according to Viljoen,66 were threefold, namely, underrepresentation 
of Africans during the drafting process of the Convention; the omission of 
potentially divisive and emotive issues in the search for consensus between 
states from diverse backgrounds; and, in order to reach a compromise, specific 
provisions on aspects peculiar to Africa were left out.67  
 
More so than on other continents, African children are in an extremely vulnerable 
position when it comes to the violation of their human rights, owing to such issues 
as poverty, famine and HIV/AIDS. The Charter has a specifically “African” 
flavour.68 Compared to the Convention, the Charter increases the level of 
                                                 
62  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” n 102. 
63  Chirwa 2002 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 157. 
64  Olowu 2002 The International Journal of Children’s Rights128. 
65  Viljoen 1998 CILSA 205. 
66  Viljoen 1998 CILSA 199. 
67  Viljoen 1998 CILSA 205. 
68  Viljoen 1998 CILSA 211. 
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protection for children.69 The strength of the Charter lies in the fact that it 
expressly proclaims its supremacy over any custom, tradition, cultural or religious 
practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations contained in the 
Charter.70 Article 1(1) of the Charter obliges States to recognise the rights, 
freedoms and duties enshrined in the Charter, while article 4 deals with the best 
interests of the child. It declares that in all actions concerning the child the best 
interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.71 
 
The Preamble of the Charter recognises that, for the full and harmonious 
development of his/her personality, a child72 should grow up in a family 
environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. The family 
is the natural unit and basis of society, and enjoys the protection and support of 
the State for its establishment and development.73 Every child shall be entitled to 
the enjoyment of parental care and protection.74 Article 20 indicates that the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of children rests upon 
the child’s parents who are required to ensure that the best interests of the child 
are their basic concern at all times.75 The State has to assist and support the 
parents to fulfil this task.76  
 
                                                 
69  Viljoen in Davel Child Law 224. 
70  Art 1(3); Chirwa 2002 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 158.  
71  Art 4(1). More will be said about the best interests of the child in terms of this article and the use 
of the word “primary” under “4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy”. 
72  Defined in art 2 as every human being below the age of 18 years. 
73  Art 18(1). 
74  Art 19(1). 
75  Art 20(1)(a). 
76  Art 20(2). 
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Interestingly, there is no definition of “family” in the Charter. Perhaps it was a 
deliberate decision because the concept of a family in Western culture differs so 
greatly from the concept in traditional African communities.77 The reality in 
African culture is that children are to a large extent seen as the property of their 
parents.78 Although the omission of a definition of “family” influences the 
interpretation of the Charter, any decision-maker is compelled to bear in mind, as 
the primary consideration, the best interests of the child concerned.79 
 
In order to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the child, an African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which consists of 
11 members,80 was established within the Organisation of African Unity.81 The 
Committee must monitor the implementation and ensure the protection of the 
rights in the Charter82 and has the jurisdiction to formulate principles and rules 
aimed at protecting the rights and welfare of the child.83 Like the Convention 
Committee, the African Committee has to examine State reports,84 but the 
African Committee “may resort to any appropriate method of investigating any 
matter falling within the ambit” of the Charter.85 It may receive and consider 
communications from any person, group or non-governmental organisation,86 
which means a child will be able to lay a complaint about the violation of his/her 
                                                 
77  As also discussed under “3 2 1 5 Family care and international instruments”. 
78  Human 2000 SAPL 383. 
79  Art 4(1). 
80  Art 33 (hereafter referred to as “the African Committee”). 
81  Art 32. 
82  Art 42(b). 
83  Art 42(a)(ii). 
84  Art 43. 
85  Art 45(1). 
86  Art 44(1). 
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rights.87 This represents a significant advance for the potential enforcement of 
children’s rights.88 Human says the biggest challenge that the committee faces is 
to determine which elements of the African culture and tradition should be 
retained, and which should be done away with.89  
 
4 2 2 4 International instruments and adoption 
 
Article 12 of the Convention gives children the right to express their views in all 
matters affecting them.90 In terms of article 20 a child temporarily or permanently 
deprived of his/her family environment is entitled to special protection and 
assistance provided by the State,91 and such care could include adoption.92 
Article 20 further requires that, when considering solutions, due regard has to be 
paid, inter alia, to the desirability of continuity in a child's cultural 
background.93 That means culture will not necessarily be a factor to be 
considered; it is the possibility of considering the cultural background of the child 
that is protected.  
 
Article 21 of the Convention specifically deals with adoption. The strongest 
version of the best interests standard in the Convention is to be found in this 
                                                 
87  Human 2000 SAPL 383. 
88  Viljoen 1998 CILSA 210. 
89  Human 2000 SAPL 384. 
90  In terms of art 12(1) the child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the view of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.  
91  Art 20(1). 
92  Art 20(3). 
93  Art 20(3). 
Chapter 4: The best interests of the child 
 100
article,94 which requires any system of adoption to “ensure that the best interests 
of the child shall be the paramount consideration”. There is thus no doubt about 
the importance of the best interests standard when it comes to adoption. 
Although article 30 of the Convention provides that minorities or persons of 
indigenous origin may not be denied the right to enjoy their culture, inter alia, the 
wording of article 21 is emphatic.95 The best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration in adoption proceedings. This does not mean that 
culture will never be a consideration in adoption proceedings, but because the 
paramountcy of the best interests standard in the Convention is mentioned only 
in respect of adoption proceedings, my view is that the best interests of the child 
will always be determinative96 and that no competing rights (such as the right to 
culture) can be of greater importance.97 Further confirmation of this view can be 
found in the fact that no limitation clause is to be found in the Convention.  
 
The Charter similarly makes the best interests of the child the paramount 
consideration in adoption.98 The protection of the best interests of the child in this 
regard is in line with the protection offered by the Constitution, but unlike the 
Constitution, and in line with the Convention, no competing rights can be of 
                                                 
94  Alston 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 13. Although there is only one “best 
interests” standard in the Constitution (s 28(2)), this is not the case in the Convention, where 
increased protection is given to the best interests of the child in the case of adoption over and 
above the general protection granted in art 3(1). 
95  In M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) at 1324 Sachs J held that the word “paramount” is emphatic. 
96  This is also the view of Freeman “Convention” in Freeman Children’s Rights: a comparative 
perspective 105. 
97  See the discussion about art 3(1) above. 
98  Art 24. 
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greater importance.99 Although it is not clear to me why it was thought that 
children only need increased protection under certain circumstances, such as 
when they are to be adopted, the fact that this increased protection is granted, is 
obviously welcomed. 
 
Article 21(b)100 of the Convention provides that intercountry adoption may be 
considered as an alternative means of childcare if the child cannot be placed in a 
foster or an adoptive family, or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the 
child’s country of origin. The Preamble of the Convention clearly states that 
everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms in the Convention, irrespective of 
(inter alia) race. That means that race cannot be a basis for differentiation when 
the Convention is applied. As explained above, culture will also not necessarily 
be a factor to be considered. When the Convention thus encourages incountry 
adoption before intercountry adoption is considered, the message is clear. The 
best interests of a child will be served if it is possible to keep that child in his/her 
country of origin. Race and culture cannot be overemphasised at the expense of 
the best interests of the child when viewed holistically. It is simply about the best 
interests of the child.101 The wording of the Charter is even stronger than that of 
the Convention on the issue of intercountry adoption. In terms of article 24(b) 
intercountry adoption may be considered as a last resort if the child cannot be 
                                                 
99  My argument here is similar to what was argued above with regard to the paramountcy principle 
for adoption proceedings in terms of the Convention. More will be said about competing rights in 
“5 4 3 Competing rights”. 
100  In terms of art 21(b) States Parties shall “recognise that intercountry adoption may be considered 
as an alternative means of child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive 
family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin”. 
101  As will be discussed under “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”, this means that 
interracial/intercultural adoption is generally preferable to intercountry adoption. 
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placed in the child’s country of origin, leaving no doubt about the preference for 
incountry adoption.  
 
4 2 3  The rights in section 28(1) versus section 28(2) 
 
The best interests standard has formed part of South African common law for a 
long time, and it has been included in the Constitution.102 Although it is certain 
that the best interests standard has to be a determining factor in every matter 
concerning a child, the scope of the concept of the best interests of the child is 
unclear.103 What is clear is that the field of application of the best interests 
standard is not restricted to proceedings under the children’s rights clause.104  
 
There has been much debate about the reach of section 28(2) of the 
Constitution. It is problematic that there is currently no certainty as to how section 
28(2) should be interpreted. It is unclear whether the best interests as embodied 
in section 28(2) constitute a fundamental right. To understand this, one need only 
look at the jurisprudence, especially Constitutional Court cases, to realise there is 
no uniformity with regard to the application of section 28(2). In Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education105 and Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick106 the Constitutional Court held that section 
28(2) is a separate right that is independent of the rights in section 28(1), so, in 
                                                 
102  S 28(2). 
103  Davel & de Kock 2001 De Jure 274. 
104  Clark 2000 Stell LR 3. 
105  2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at 781 (also reported in 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC)). 
106  2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 428 (also reported in 2000 7 BCLR 713 (CC)). 
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other words, the reach of section 28(2) is not limited to the rights enumerated in 
section 28(1).107 In Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick, 
however, the court, directly after calling section 28(2) a right, also referred to it as 
a standard.108 Judge Goldstone held in Sonderup v Tondelli109 that section 28(2), 
read with section 28(1), establishes a set of children’s rights, and called section 
28(2) an “expansive guarantee” that a child’s best interests will be paramount in 
every matter concerning the child.110 The court assumed that section 28(2) is a 
right because it is subject to section 36 limitation.111 In Du Toit v Minister of 
Population Development112 the court referred to section 28(2) as a principle. In 
the Transvaal Provincial Division (now the North Gauteng High Court) in 
Laerskool Middelburg v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Departement van 
Onderwys113 the court was quite clear on its view about the meaning of section 
28(2) when it said “dat art 28(2) inderdaad die fundamentele reg van elke kind 
vestig om in die opweging van strydende partye se botsende belange – en dus 
ook die strydende partye se aansprake op fundamentele regte en die 
handhawing daarvan - in die eerste gelid te staan”, and thus recognised section 
28(2) as a fundamental right. In De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Witwatersrand Local Division, and others,114 the Constitutional Court also 
                                                 
107  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 27 believes that the 
Constitutional Court has not dealt with the best interests in the way it normally treats other 
constitutional rights, which creates the impression that best interests are not really a fundamental 
right. On her view, see further below under this heading. 
108  2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 428-429 (also reported in 2000 7 BCLR 713 (CC)). 
109  2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) (also reported as LS v AT 2001 2 BCLR 152 (CC)). 
110  At 1184. 
111  At 1184. 
112  2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at 207-208. 
113  2003 (4) SA 160 (T) at 178. 
114  2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) at 431-432 (also reported in 2003 12 BCLR 1333 (CC)). 
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referred to section 28(2) as a right. After the recent judgement of the 
Constitutional Court in M v S,115 it is clear that the uncertainty as to the exact 
meaning and extent of section 28(2) is still very much present. The court referred 
to section 28(2) as a right116 and a substantive right,117 but also as a 
principle,118 a provision,119 and a guideline.120 This highlights just how much 
confusion there really is about the reach of section 28(2), and that the courts 
have used conflicting terminology and have thus given conflicting messages 
about the nature of section 28(2).121  
 
In their contribution,122 Anderson and Spijker opine that section 28(2) is regarded 
as a separate constitutional right,123 but Bonthuys124 criticises the use of section 
28(2) as an independent constitutional right. She believes that it is unnecessary 
to classify section 28(2) as an independent constitutional right, as there are other 
constitutional rights of children which apply more directly,125 and says that 
because the Constitutional Court has not dealt with the best interests in the way it 
normally treats other constitutional rights126 it creates the impression that it is not 
                                                 
115  2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC). 
116  At 1321. 
117  At 1323. 
118  At 1320, 1324, 1325. 
119  At 1320. 
120  At 1320. 
121  Also see the discussion under “6 3 3 The Children’s Act and the best interests of the child” below, 
where Davel points out that there is more certainty about the meaning of “the best interests of the 
child” as a result of the Children’s Act. 
122  Anderson & Spijker 2002 Obiter 365. 
123  At 371.  
124  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 26. 
125  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 26. 
126  Bonthuys says when a South African court is faced with an argument that a fundamental right has 
been infringed there are two stages to be followed, namely, whether there has been an 
infringement of the right and whether such infringement is justified. She argues that the courts do 
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really a fundamental right.127 She refers to various cases involving children, such 
as Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,128 Fraser v 
Children’s Court, Pretoria North129 and President of the RSA v Hugo,130 where 
the courts did not refer to the best interests as a right, and she argues that it was 
not really necessary for the courts to refer to the best interests as a right, 
because there were other children’s rights which applied more directly.131 
Bonthuys believes that the best interests of the child should not be regarded as 
an independent right,132 and contends that the wording of section 28(2) suggests 
that the interests of the child should be weighed against the rights of other 
parties.133 Section 28(2) should only operate when there are no other 
fundamental children’s rights.134 She believes that the rights of parents and other 
family members should be considered alongside those of children.135 She 
suggests that the best interests principle136 in the Constitution should play a 
limited role, operating mainly where there are no other fundamental children’s 
rights.137  
 
Although there is not yet any clarity in our law about the exact nature of the best 
interests of the child, I believe that Bonthuys’ view dilutes the importance of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
not analyse and interpret the contents of the best interests in this way because they simply assert 
that a particular rule or practice infringes the best interests of the child. 
127  At 27. 
128  2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (also reported in 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC)). 
129  1997 2 BCLR 153 (CC) at 161-163. 
130  1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
131  At 26. 
132  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 37. 
133  At 28. 
134  At 35. 
135  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 39. 
136  This is the term Bonthuys uses when referring to a child’s best interests. 
137  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 35. 
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standard. I believe section 28(2) was included in the Constitution to emphasise 
the importance of the best interests of a child, and that it should always be 
considered, not only when there are no other avenues to utilise. Just because the 
rights of parents, family members or any other people have to be considered, 
does not detract from the importance of section 28(2). It is possible to balance its 
importance in every matter where it is considered. As discussed below,138 the 
best interests standard is not absolute. It will have to be carefully considered in 
every matter affecting a child, and, where necessary, the child’s best interests will 
have to be balanced against other constitutional rights. I do believe though that it 
is important to know exactly what the role of section 28(2) is so that South African 
courts can apply this standard with certainty. 
 
4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy 
 
If we consider the wording of the various instruments discussed above that relate 
to the best interests of the child, it is apparent that the vocabulary that is used 
when referring to this issue is not consistent. The Convention makes the best 
interests of the child a primary consideration.139 In terms of the Charter the best 
interests of the child has to be the primary consideration,140 while the 
Constitution demands that the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child.141 
                                                 
138  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE” and “4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy”. 
139  Art 3(1). 
140  Art 4(1). 
141  S 28(2). 
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According to McGoldrick142 it was specifically decided to use the words a 
primary consideration in the Convention because there were strong 
reservations in the Working Group of the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission about a proposal to make the best interests of the child the primary 
consideration - it was noted that there were situations in which competing 
interests should be of at least equal, if not greater, importance than the interests 
of the child. Alston says that the objective of the word “a” was to ensure that 
there is sufficient flexibility to enable interests other than those of the child to 
prevail.143 According to Todres144 this desire for flexibility has created a loophole 
in the Convention, in that it allows judges to consider the child’s best interests 
and then to make a decision that may not reflect those interests. Freeman 
believes that this dilutes the paramountcy principle.145 In my view, this leaves the 
best interests of a child open to abuse. 
 
When the drafters of the Charter decided to make the best interests of the child 
the primary consideration, more emphasis was placed on the best interests of 
the child than is the case in the Convention. This is so because the word the is 
obviously stronger than a as used in the Convention.146 Compared to the 
                                                 
142  McGoldrick in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 108 n 41. 
143  Alston 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 13. 
144  Todres in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 176. 
145  Freeman “Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 300. 
146  Parker in Alston The Best Interests of the Child 28. 
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Convention, the Charter thus offers increased levels of protection for the child’s 
best interests.147 
 
I have already shown that the use of the definite article “the” is stronger than the 
indefinite article “a”. The next step is to determine whether the protection offered 
to children by the Constitution as far as their best interests are concerned is 
equally or more comprehensive than that of the two international instruments 
discussed above. To determine whether there is a difference in meaning with 
regard to the terms primary and paramount, a look at the Oxford Student’s 
Dictionary148 shows that “primary” is defined as “of the first importance, chief”, 
while the adjective “paramount” means “more important than anything else”. The 
use of the word paramount in the Constitution is emphatic.149 Arguably then, the 
word primary, which is used in both the Convention and the Charter, is weaker 
than the word paramount (which is the term used in the Constitution).150 Applied 
literally, children’s interests in the Constitution would trump all other rights and 
interests, but Bonthuys151 believes such an interpretation would be unpalatable. It 
would then become pointless to even consider the rights and interests of other 
parties.152 This, in my opinion, is the correct interpretation. Obviously no interests 
                                                 
147  Davel 2002 De Jure 283; Chirwa 2002 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 160. 
148  Allen & Delahunty Oxford Student’s Dictionary 739. 
149  This was confirmed in M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) at 1324. 
150  Parker in Alston The Best Interests of the Child 28. This is also clear from the way these terms are 
defined, as discussed above. 
151  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23. 
152  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 34. 
Chapter 4: The best interests of the child 
 109
can be so strong that they are protected at all costs,153 but the importance of the 
best interests of a child must never be downplayed or overlooked.  
 
This is also the view of the Constitutional Court. In both Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick154 and De Reuck v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division, and others155 the court held that 
section 28(2) is capable of limitation. In M v S156 Judge Sachs held that the word 
“paramount” is emphatic,157 and that if this principle “is spread too thin it risks 
being transformed from an effective instrument of child protection into an empty 
rhetorical phrase of weak application, thereby defeating rather than promoting” its 
objective.158 The court further held that just because the best interests of the child 
are paramount, it does not mean that they are absolute.159 It is always important 
to take into account the facts of each individual case when making a decision 
about the best interests of a child. Giving his view of the application of section 
28(2) Judge Madala, in his minority judgement, held that a child’s best interests 
must prevail unless the infringement of those rights can be justified in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution.160  
 
                                                 
153  This viewpoint does not in any way minimise the importance of the best interests of the child. 
154  2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 429 (also reported in 2000 7 BCLR 713 (CC)). 
155  2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) at 432 (also reported in 2003 12 BCLR 1333 (CC)). 
156  2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC). 
157  At 1324. 
158  At 1325. 
159  At 1325. 
160  M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) at 1352. 
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There can be no doubt about the importance of children’s rights and particularly 
the best interests of the child. The issue is to ensure that this strong protection 
that is offered to children is actually applied. 
 
4 2 5 Criticism of the best interests standard 
 
The best interests of the child, as we have established, are a determining factor 
in every matter concerning the child. The application of the best interests 
standard is not that simple though, and has been the source of much criticism. 
The best interests standard is notoriously vague and indeterminate.161 It has 
failed in the past to provide a reliable or determinate standard.162 It has been said 
that the vagueness and indeterminacy are a result of the subjective application of 
the standard and the difficulty in providing an objective assessment, given the 
rapidly changing social values, standards and customs of our time.163 Parker164 
cautions against the assumption that there is only one best interests standard. It 
has been argued, and this is also my view, that the concept “best interests of the 
child” cannot have a fixed meaning and content that are valid for all communities 
and all circumstances, but should always remain flexible.165 The meaning will be 
determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.166 Heaton makes the 
point that this indeterminacy is present in other legal concepts, such as the boni 
                                                 
161  Bennett 1999 Obiter 155; Bennett Human Rights 100; Bonthuys 1997 SAJHR 636; Mosikatsana 
1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 391; Parker in Alston The Best Interests of the Child 26. 
162  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 618. 
163  Clark 2000 Stell LR 15. 
164  Parker 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 27. 
165  Heaton 1988 LLM 16. 
166  Lubbe v Du Plessis 2001 (4) SA 57 (C) at 66; Van Heerden “Judicial interference” in Van Heerden 
et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 526; Bekink 2003 THRHR 261.  
Chapter 4: The best interests of the child 
 111
mores, but that it can be applied despite this indeterminacy.167 In Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick the court held that the best 
interests standard should be flexible because individual circumstances will 
determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child.168 
Flexibility is necessary to take account of all the relevant circumstances of each 
case and to ensure that, practically, the final outcome is in the best interests of 
the child concerned.169 In fact, the Constitutional Court recently held170 that it is 
precisely this inherent flexibility of section 28 that constitutes the source of its 
strength, and that “indeterminacy of outcome is not a weakness”.171 Although it is 
clear that there must be some limit to the scope of the operation of the best 
interests of the child,172 what is in a child’s best interests requires a value 
judgement that cannot be determined in abstract or in advance.173 
 
A further point of criticism of the best interests standard is that we cannot know 
incontrovertibly what is in a child’s best interests.174 There are two major 
stumbling blocks in reaching a decision on a child’s best interests. They are the 
inability to predict the consequences of alternative outcomes and the lack of 
                                                 
167  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 428-429; 
Heaton 1990 THRHR 98.  
168 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 428-429. 
169  Bekink & Bekink 2004 De Jure 39. 
170  M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC). 
171  At 1324. 
172  Bekink & Brand in Davel Child Law 195. This is also the view of the Constitutional Court, which 
was discussed under “4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy”. Although the authors use the word 
principle, they also use the term rule in the same contribution. There has been much confusion 
about the correct term to use when describing the best interests of a child. This is also evident from 
court (including Constitutional Court) decisions — see “4 2 3 The rights in section 28(1) versus 
section 28(2)” above. 
173  K v M [2007] 4 All SA 883 (E) at 891; P v P 2007 (5) SA 94 (SCA) at 99; Bekink & Bekink 2004 
De Jure 40. 
174  According to Thomas & O’Kane 1998 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 138. 
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consensus on what criteria to use in evaluating the alternatives.175 No decision 
can truly serve the best interests of the child.176 Any decision can merely be 
aimed at serving the interests of the child as well as is possible under the specific 
circumstances. All the options must be known, all the possible outcomes of each 
option must be known, the probabilities of each outcome occurring must be 
known and the value attached to each outcome must be known to determine 
what would be in the best interests of the child.177 Determining the best interests 
of a child in a particular case involves a value judgement based on the facts,178 
and all relevant factors have to be taken into account.179 Furthermore, members 
of various professions dealing with matters concerning children have different 
perspectives on the best interests of the child,180 and the value systems of the 
decision-makers may also influence the interpretation of the best interests.181  
 
Mosikatsana believes that a key question for the success of section 28 is whether 
its child-centered regime is compatible with the communalism of African 
culture.182 I believe that it is indeed compatible.183 It must be emphasised that, 
irrespective of section 28’s acceptance by followers of customary law, there is no 
                                                 
175  Clark 2000 Stell LR 18. 
176  Ex parte H 1963 80 MN (NSW) at 732 as quoted in Heaton 1988 LLM 17. 
177  Heaton 1988 LLM 11. This approach is also adopted by Parker in Parker 1994 International 
Journal of Law and the Family 29. 
178  P v P 2007 (5) SA 94 (SCA) at 99. 
179  K v M [2007] 4 All SA 883 (E) at 891. 
180  Lambiase & Cumes 1987 SALJ 706-707; Mudie 1989 De Rebus 686.  
181  Alston 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 21. In this context we also have to keep 
in mind Eekelaar’s distinction between objectivisation and dynamic self-determinism – see 
Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 46. 
182  Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 346-347. 
183  This will be discussed under “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT” and 
“9 CONCLUSION”. 
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choice whether the best interests standard has to be applied or not. After all, the 
paramountcy of the best interests of the child is a constitutional imperative. 
 
Despite the difficulties with this concept, and despite the criticism lodged against 
it, the courts have thus far been reasonably consistent in their acceptance of 
section 28(2) as a general standard for the protection of the rights of children184 
and have in fact held that some of the so-called criticisms do not really refer to 
weaknesses at all, but to strengths.185  
 
4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach 
 
As discussed above, article 12 of the Convention gives children the right to 
participate in decision-making that affects them.186 This is a significant 
development in children’s rights law, as it “recognizes the child as a full human 
being, with integrity and personality, and with the ability to participate fully in 
society”.187 According to Sloth-Nielsen188 the Convention recognises the growing 
autonomy of children in article 12, where children are given a say in matters 
affecting their well-being. This is important because it emphasises the need to 
allow children to participate in any decisions affecting them where children are 
                                                 
184  See Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T) at 210 (also reported in 2000 11 BCLR 187 (T)) and 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 81 (also 
reported in 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC)). 
185  See M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) at 1324. 
186  See n 90 above. 
187  Freeman “Introduction” in Freeman Children’s Rights: a comparative perspective 3. 
188  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 403. 
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able to do so. As mentioned above,189 this recognition of the child and the views 
of the child are contrary to customary beliefs. Adoption in customary law is 
usually about the needs of the family head, who adopts a boy to be his heir. The 
focus is on the adult, and there is no express protection for or acknowledgement 
of the best interests of the child.190 In fact, quite unlike statutory adoption, 
adoption in customary law often happens even though the child has suitable 
biological parents, because the purpose of such adoption is not to protect the 
best interests of the child, but to look after the interests of the adult. 
 
Article 12 of the Convention does not give children an unequivocal right to be 
heard. This right is restricted to children who are capable of forming their own 
views.191 Also, the best interests of children192 have to be determined by adult 
decision-makers.193 There is thus a necessity for parents to act objectively and in 
the interests of children when needed. The question is how to deal with the 
conflict between the wishes of children and those of parents. 
 
It is generally assumed that children do not have the capacity to act in their own 
long-term welfare.194 Mosikatsana195 says a reading of various legislation196 
points to a duality in approach when dealing with children’s rights. On the one 
hand there is a parent-centered standard that views children as dependent and 
                                                 
189  See “4 1 INTRODUCTION”. 
190  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. 
191  Art 12(1). 
192  As provided for in art 3 of the Convention and s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
193  Barratt in Burman The Fate of the Child 150. 
194  Bonthuys 2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 32. 
195  1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 391-392. 
196  Although this is not only seen in legislation, Mosikatsana only refers to legislation. 
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incapable of making independent decisions about their lives. He says that section 
28(g) of the Constitution, read with sections 18(c) and 39(4) of the Child Care 
Act, apply a parent-centered standard in terms of which someone makes the 
determination as to what is in the child’s best interests. Then, he says, there are 
other provisions which promote autonomous decision-making by children, such 
as decision-making with regard to abortions. Here, he refers to section 2 of the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,197 which promotes autonomous 
decision-making on the part of children. This argument can be applied equally to 
adoption. An adoption application will only be approved if it will serve the 
interests and conduce to the welfare of the child.198 On the one hand, the Child 
Care Act demands consent from the parent of the child,199 which is in line with 
the parent-centered approach, but on the other hand, under certain 
circumstances an adoption application shall only be granted if the child consents 
to such adoption.200 The latter qualification indicates that the child might have to 
be involved in a decision regarding his/her best interests. Thus, as far as the best 
interests of a child are concerned, the dual approach applies as well. Although 
the best interests of a child have to be protected, it is not always certain how this 
should be done. The important issue is to ensure proper protection for children in 
all circumstances. 
 
                                                 
197  Act 92 of 1996. 
198  S 18(4)(c). 
199  S 18(4)(d). 
200  S 18(4)(e). 
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Eekelaar also describes two distinct methods that are used to determine a child’s 
best interests. He refers to these methods as objectivisation and dynamic self-
determinism,201 but they can easily be equated to Mosikatsana’s dual approach, 
as discussed above. Objectivisation is another version of Mosikatsana’s parent-
centered standard, while dynamic self-determinism is similar to Mosikatsana’s 
description of children as autonomous decision-makers. Using objectivisation, the 
decision-maker draws on beliefs which indicate conditions which are deemed to 
be in the child’s interests.202 This, Eekelaar says, is often a process of crude 
generalisation of how children’s well-being will normally be realised within the 
society in which they will live as a group, without considering each individual 
case.203 On the other hand, self-determinism is a way of allowing children to 
develop their own perceptions of well-being as they enter adulthood, instead of 
preventing such development. From this point of view, Eekelaar believes that “the 
best interests principle is not a threat to children’s rights”,204 but a mode of 
enhancing them.205 The child is placed in an environment which is reasonably 
secure but which exposes him/her to a wide range of influences. In the case of 
young children their incomplete personal development of course demands that 
decisions be taken on their behalf.206 As the child develops, he/she is 
encouraged to draw on these influences in such a way that the child contributes 
                                                 
201  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 46. 
202  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 46. 
203  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 58. 
204  This is an interesting choice of words by Eekelaar, but, because there is a danger in using either of 
these methods on its own, he explains that the best response to an issue may be for the child to be 
given the choice, but to give the child guidance when making that choice.  
205  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 58. 
206  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 44. 
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to the outcome. This outcome is then seen to be in the child’s best interests 
because it has, at least partly, been determined by the child.207  
 
Eekelaar emphasises that although dynamic self-determinism does not mean 
that decisions should simply be delegated to a child,208 it is a way of “optimally 
positioning children to develop their own perceptions of their well-being as they 
enter adulthood”.209 The say of a child in a matter will not necessarily outweigh 
that of parents or family, but the child is in a position to express him/herself when 
matters affecting him/her are discussed.210 In my view, this is an important 
distinction with regard to the best interests of the child. When the circumstances 
are as complex as they are in South Africa, with varied cultures, backgrounds, 
values and perceptions, it is important to take these circumstances into account 
when a decision regarding the best interests of a child is made. If the decision is 
taken in line with the objectivisation method, chances are that subjective issues, 
such as the values and background of the decision-maker, and issues such as 
the many AIDS orphans and abandoned babies in South Africa, will influence the 
decision. This will not necessarily be in the best interests of the child. As Parker 
explains, identical problems will be decided differently if the decision-makers 
have different knowledges at any of the above stages.211 If, however, a child is 
allowed to participate in a decision affecting him/her as much as his/her age and 
maturity will allow, a more balanced decision can be taken with regard to the best 
                                                 
207  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 47-48. 
208  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 54. 
209  Eekelaar 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 54. 
210  Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 406. 
211  Parker in Alston The Best Interests of the Child 29. 
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interests of the child. Ultimately then, I believe a balance has to be maintained 
with regard to the views and inputs of all parties involved in the process. 
 
Over and above the issue of balancing the views of the child with those of adults 
to serve the best interests of the child, there is a further issue here, namely, the 
possible conflict that could exist between the best interests of a child and the 
interests of parents, which could also play a part in decision-making. Heaton 
discusses this potential conflict and uses the example of adoption, where the 
adoption will be in the interest of the child, but the parent does not want to 
consent to the adoption.212 She says it has to be considered whether the best 
interests of a child should be approached from a subjective or an objective point 
of view. If the solution is to approach the issue from a subjective point of view, 
the child’s, the parents’ and other interested parties’ subjective opinions would be 
determinative. If the objective point of view is used, the views of the community at 
large should be applied. She explains that the problem then is that there is little 
consensus in the community on what will be in a child’s best interests in a 
particular case,213 and comes to the conclusion that it is undesirable to choose 
between the subjective and the objective approach. She says that a combination 
of both approaches should be used to determine the best interests of a child. As 
will be discussed under “9 CONCLUSION”, I believe that a similar approach 
should be followed in adoption procedures in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
212  Heaton 1990 THRHR 97-98. 
213  Once again, bear in mind the different approaches adopted by statutory law and customary law. 
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There is still much uncertainty about the extent of a child’s involvement in any 
decision that affects him/her, although it is certain that there has to be some input 
by the child. Just how much weight should be attached to the wishes and views 
of the child cannot be determined in advance. Again, the aim is to serve the best 
interests of the child, and each case should be considered individually. In this 
regard, I support Heaton’s viewpoint above. The best interests of a child need to 
be determined with reference to all relevant aspects, which could include the 
opinions of all and any parties that could assist in this regard. This will lead to “a 
balanced and considered conclusion on what will most probably best serve the 
interests of the child”.214 
 
4 2 7 Factors that determine the best interests of the child 
 
It is not an easy task to determine what the best interests of a child are. 
Determining these interests will always be a relative task where factors such as 
age, culture and other individual circumstances have to be considered and 
judgements made.215 The question now is which factors should be taken into 
account. Ultimately, the court is called upon to make a value judgement to 
determine what is in the best interests of the child, bearing all relevant 
                                                 
214  Heaton 1990 THRHR 97. 
215  Ryburn Open Adoption 77. 
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considerations in mind.216 This is the “golden thread” enshrined in section 28(2) 
of the Constitution which runs through the fabric of our law relating to children.217  
 
It is important that all relevant factors are taken into consideration to determine 
the best interests of the child, otherwise a warped picture of these interests may 
be obtained.218 The best interests of a child are influenced by the cultural, social, 
political and economic conditions of the country concerned.219 Heaton220 says 
that the child’s best interests can only be found through a combination of factors 
like the child’s apparent happiness; his/her moral and/or religious welfare; 
material welfare or stability; security and intellectual stimulation. She emphasises 
that there is no single factor that will always carry the most weight. All relevant 
factors have to be taken into account. Any decision taken can merely aim to 
serve the interests of the child as well as possible under the specific 
circumstances.221  
 
For the first time in South African legal history, the court in 1994 in McCall v 
McCall222 made a list of some of the most important factors that have to be taken 
into account and which serve as a guide to determine the best interests of a 
                                                 
216  This is what the court held in P v P 2007 (5) SA 94 (SCA) at 99. In K v M [2007] 4 All SA 883 
(E) at 891 Judge Leach held that all relevant factors have to be taken into account to prevent a 
warped picture of what is in the child’s best interest. 
217 Petersen v Maintenance Officer [2004] 1 All SA 117 (C) at 124 (also reported in 2004 2 BCLR 
205 (C)). 
218  K v M [2007] 4 All SA 883 (E) at 891. 
219  Van Heerden “Judicial interference” in Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the 
Family 503. This is again important in the South African scenario, and will be discussed in more 
detail under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
220 Heaton 1988 LLM 12. 
221  Heaton 1990 THRHR 98. 
222  McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (C) at 204-205. 
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child. Although this list of factors only served as a guide, never enjoyed statutory 
recognition in South African law, and could not be regarded as a numerus 
clausus,223 these factors have greatly assisted courts and have been referred to 
in many cases dealing with children. These factors are: 
 
(a) [T]he love, affection and other emotional ties which exist between parent and child 
and the parent’s compatibility with the child; 
(b) the capabilities, character and temperament of the parent and the impact thereof on 
the child’s needs and desires; 
(c) the ability of the parent to communicate with the child and the parent’s insight into, 
understanding of and sensitivity to the child’s feelings; 
(d) the capacity and disposition of the parent to give the child the guidance which he 
requires; 
(e) the ability of the parent to provide for the basic physical needs of the child, the so-
called ‘creature comforts’, such as food, clothing, housing and the other material needs – 
generally speaking, the provision of economic security; 
(f) the ability of the parent to provide for the educational well-being and security of the 
child, both religious and secular; 
(g) the ability of the parent to provide for the child’s emotional, psychological, cultural and 
environmental development; 
(h) the mental and physical health and moral fitness of the parent; 
(i) the stability or otherwise of the child’s existing environment, having regard to the 
desirability of maintaining the status quo; 
(j) the desirability or otherwise of keeping siblings together; 
(k) the child’s preference, if the Court is satisfied that in the particular circumstances the 
child’s preference should be taken into consideration; 
                                                 
223  Bekink & Bekink 2004 De Jure 24. Any other relevant factors may be brought before the court. 
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(l) the desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex matching, … and 
(m) any other factor which is relevant to the particular case with which the Court is 
concerned. 
 
Subsequently the South African legislature formulated a list of factors that need 
to be taken into account when determining the best interests of a child. The 
compilation of this list contained in section 7(1) of the Children’s Act is 
welcomed.224 This section will be discussed in more detail in another chapter,225 
and will only be referred to in the present chapter, with reference to those 
aspects that are, in my opinion, relevant to adoption. The list of factors in section 
7(1) are: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship between— 
(i) the child and the parents,226 or any specific parent; and 
(ii) the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those circumstances; 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards— 
(i) the child; and 
(ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-giver or 
person, to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the 
likely effect on the child of any separation from— 
(i) both or either of the parents; or 
                                                 
224  On 1 July 2007 certain sections of the Children’s Act came into effect. S 7 was one of these. 
Although reference will be made to relevant parts of this section in this chapter, it will be 
discussed in more detail under “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
225  See “6 3 3 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and the best interests of the child”. 
226  In this section a parent includes any person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect 
of a child – Children’s Act s 7(2). 
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(ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with whom the 
child has been living; 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any 
specific parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s 
right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific 
parent, on a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child— 
(i) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or tradition; 
(g) the child’s— 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
(ii) gender; 
(iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
(h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social 
and cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where 
this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family 
environment; 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be 
caused by— 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation or 
exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence or 
harmful behaviour towards another person; 
(m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
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(n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative 
proceedings in relation to the child. 
 
The best interests of a child are not easily determined. These interests are a 
contentious issue that will be debated as long as decisions about children have to 
be taken. Ultimately I can only reiterate that a decision about the best interests of 
a child has to be made by considering all relevant factors and circumstances, 
whatever these may be at the time. 
 
 
4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION 
 
As discussed elsewhere,227 the importance of attachment in the development of a 
child’s emotional security cannot be overlooked. Attachment is regarded as one 
of the most important developmental needs of the child and is therefore vital for 
the child’s best interests.228 Attachment patterns may be interpreted differently in 
different cultures,229 but the development of attachment relationships shows 
many universal features across cultures.230  
 
It is important that attachment with a parent (whether biological or not) is formed 
as early as possible. The younger the child is when such attachment is formed, 
                                                 
227  See “3 3 ATTACHMENT”. 
228  Clark 2000 Stell LR 19; Patterson Infancy & Childhood 227. 
229  Berk Child Development 421. 
230  Patterson Infancy & Childhood 235; Papalia et al A Child’s World 225. 
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the better the child will adjust socially, emotionally and psychologically.231 Having 
established that a child needs to form attachments early in life,232 the next step is 
to establish whether a child can form an attachment with an adoptive parent.233 
Research shows that successful child rearing does not depend on whether the 
child is cared for by his/her biological parents.234 Adoption in the early weeks of 
an infant’s life gives the adoptive parents the chance to develop a psychological 
parent-child relationship,235 which may be diminished if adoption occurs at a later 
stage.236 Children, when adopted young, seem to have little difficulty in attaching 
themselves to their new carers,237 and the majority of people wishing to adopt 
state a preference for adopting an infant or young child.238 According to Judge of 
Appeal Heher,239 the evidence shows that there is a universal phenomenon that, 
as a child grows towards the age of five, the prospects of adoption diminish. This 
does not mean that an older child cannot form attachments or should not be 
adopted, and the reality is that not only infants, but children of all ages are 
adopted. It is just a reiteration of the importance of finalising the adoption of a 
                                                 
231  Rutter Maternal Deprivation 63; Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 
107. According to Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 19 the psychological parent-child 
relationship is based on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. 
232  This is discussed under “3 3 ATTACHMENT”. 
233  S 7(1)(d) of the Children’s Act lists the separation of a child from a parent, brother, sister, or care-
giver as a factor that is to be taken into account in determining the best interests of the child. As 
discussed in this part of the chapter, the effects of such separation can be minimised if the child is 
given the opportunity to form an attachment with an adoptive parent, and the adoption is open or 
at least has a degree of openness. 
234  Wait 1989 Welfare focus 52. 
235  According to Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 19 this attachment relationship is based on 
day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. 
236  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 22; Patterson Infancy & Childhood 61; Prynn in Treacher 
& Katz Dynamics of Adoption 69; Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 83. This, 
however, does not mean that adoption of an older child will inevitably fail. 
237  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 83. 
238  Finlay 2006 Masters 23. For purposes of adoption studies a baby is defined as a child under six 
months of age - Howe Patterns of Adoption 11. 
239 Judge of Appeal Heher in De Gree v Webb 2007 (5) SA 184 (SCA) at 202.  
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child as quickly as possible. Delay in finding permanent families for children has 
long been acknowledged as harmful for the child.240 Howe says that late 
placement appears to pose a risk of mental health, behavioural and psychiatric 
problems.241 Despite this, he makes an important conclusion,242 namely, that 
although the levels of adjustment of children who were adopted when they were 
older are slightly worse than the general population of non-adopted children 
raised by biological parents and children adopted as babies, their overall levels of 
adjustment are much better than those of children who remain in institutional 
settings. Although the preference of adoptive parents for young children is thus 
understood, it is important that adoptive parents are made aware of the findings 
with regard to older children and that they be encouraged to adopt, whatever the 
age of the specific child.  
 
Goldstein et al, in fact, feel so strongly about early adoption, that they propose 
that an adoption decree should be made final the moment a child is placed with 
the adoptive parents, and that, ideally, infants should be placed even before 
birth.243 This does not mean that adoption is not an option for older children. 
Studies have shown that, even when they were adopted at older ages, adoptees 
developed much more favourably than children reared in foster homes or those 
returned to biological mothers who had changed their minds about giving their 
                                                 
240  Howe Patterns of Adoption 73; Ryburn Open Adoption 70. 
241  Howe Patterns of Adoption 82. 
242  Howe Patterns of Adoption 86. 
243  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 36, 45. 
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children up for adoption.244 Finlay245 comes to the conclusion that children 
adopted as babies do not differ socially or emotionally from the general 
population, but says it would appear that the studies show potential problems in 
the adoption of older children that are sufficient to dissuade the majority of 
prospective adoptive parents from adopting older children.246  
 
According to Golombok247 the most important factor for a child’s development of 
secure attachments is the quality of interaction between the attachment figures 
and the child. Adopted children can therefore develop secure attachments to their 
adoptive parents where the adoptive parents are responsive to them.248  
 
An important aspect to bear in mind is that the more secure a child’s attachment 
to a nurturing adult is, the easier it is for the child eventually to become 
independent of that adult and to develop good relationships with others, which is 
what we all want for our children. The link between attachment in infancy and 
characteristics observed years later, underscores the continuity of development 
and the interrelationship of its various aspects.249 Papalia et al250 describe in 
                                                 
244  Berk Child Development 576-577. 
245  Finlay 2006 Masters 25. 
246  In customary law there is no preference for adopting an infant, and even an adult may be adopted, 
as the aim is to institute an heir. In Zibi v Zibi 1952 (2) NAC 167 (S) at 170 it was confirmed that 
an adult can be adopted for the purpose of instituting an heir. 
247  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 109-110. 
248  This was also found in a study by Singer, Brodzinsky, Ramsay, Steir and Waters (1985) “Mother-
infant attachment in adoptive families”, in Child Development 56: 1543-1551, as quoted by 
Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 110. 
249  Papalia et al A Child’s World 228-229. 
250  Papalia et al A Child’s World 228-229. 
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great detail how securely attached infants develop into confident young adults, 
while insecurely attached infants often have problems later in life. 
 
Golombok confirms that children who experience a number of foster homes in 
their early years may fail to form attachments.251 I have to add that in South 
Africa it is often only the “lucky” children who will be raised in foster homes. Many 
children will merely remain in orphanages or institutions until they have grown up, 
or will end up on the street.  
 
There is evidence of more successful attachment to adoptive families where 
contact with biological families is maintained.252 Most adoptive parents believe 
that contact with the child’s biological parents enhances their relationship with 
their child, and adoptees report a greater sense of closeness and attachment to 
their adoptive parents in adulthood if they re-established contact with their 
biological relatives during childhood.253 
 
Judging by what was said above, it is clear that, ideally, a child needs to form 
attachments to a parent, whether biological or not, as soon as possible after birth. 
If a child is to be adopted, it is therefore better for the child if the adoption takes 
place as soon as possible after birth. If a child is adopted later in life254 the 
                                                 
251  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 111. 
252  Ryburn Open Adoption 94. Also see “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION” below; 
Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 85-86. 
253  Ryburn Open Adoption 95 refers to various studies where this was found to be the case. 
254  This will be where the parents have died, the child has been in an orphanage, or the child has been 
abused, to name but a few. 
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adoption will not necessarily be a failure, but when an older child is adopted, the 
child might not have had the opportunity to form an attachment to a parent at a 
young age255 which, as we have established above, could be detrimental for the 
child. The younger the child is at the time of the adoption, the greater the chance 
is of an attachment forming with the adoptive parent, and the greater the chance 
is of a happy, balanced child.256 The important point is that it is in the child’s best 
interests that any possible adoption has to be finalised as soon a possible, 
whatever the age of the child involved in the adoption. 
 
 
4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION 
 
 In general, it is the policy of the law to make the veil between past and present lives of 
adopted persons as opaque and impenetrable as possible, like the veil which God has 
placed between the living and the dead.257 
 
4 4 1 Introduction 
 
In the past there was much debate about the desirability of exposing an adopted 
child to his/her biological parents and/or members of the biological family. In 
Western culture it was believed that termination of all contact between the 
                                                 
255  This would be the case where the child was abandoned shortly after birth, for example. 
256  See “3 3 2 The theory behind attachment”. 
257  Griffith Adoption: procedure, documentation, statistics, New Zealand 1881-1991 46 as quoted in 
Ryburn Open Adoption 35. 
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adopted child and the biological family was in the child’s best interests.258 In 
customary law, however, adoption is the solution sought by a man who has no 
sons or no heir in a particular house.259 Where a family head has no sons, he 
may adopt a boy for the express purpose of making the child his heir and so 
perpetuate his bloodline.260 He will usually try to obtain the son of a closely 
related family head in his own family group,261 which means that contact is 
maintained between the child and the biological parents and/or family.262 
Although the focus of customary adoption is adult-centered,263 and this practice is 
not conceived to be in the best interests of the child,264 the openness of the 
adoption is definitely something that has to be acknowledged as being in line with 
current beliefs about the best interests of the child.265  
 
Triseliotis266 discovered a link between the absence of information about an 
adopted child’s biological family and a degree of confusion about identity, and 
suggested that during early childhood the overriding developmental consideration 
                                                 
258  Current adoption legislation creates the legal illusion that an adopted child was born to the 
adoptive parents (see s 20 of the Child Care Act). 
259  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319; SALC Project 110 25; Bennett Human Rights 107; Maithufi 
2001 De Jure 392. 
260  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. 
261  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 284; Olivier et al Die Privaatreg van die SA 
Bantoetaalsprekendes 462. 
262  It is my view that where a child has biological parents and there is no valid reason, such as abuse 
or abandonment, why the child should not be raised by the parents, it is not in the best interests of 
the child to be adopted. 
263  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. 
264  Bennett Human Rights 107. In my view, Bennett is correct. The emphasis here is on the 
needs/wishes of the adult to have an heir. There is no express consideration for the interests of the 
child. 
265  Unfortunately the situation is not officially monitored and of course there would be cases where 
continued contact will not necessarily be in the best interests of the child. Also see the discussion 
under “9 CONCLUSION” and “4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption”. 
266  Triseliotis In Search of Origins 79-81. 
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which contributes to the core of identity formation is the quality of children’s 
relationships and attachments to their primary carer(s).267 Although still 
vigorously debated, there is undoubtedly a legislative move towards more 
openness in adoption.268 The ultimate question is of course not what the 
biological parents want, or what the adoptive parents would feel comfortable with, 
or even what the rest of the world thinks about this matter, but only what is in the 
best interests of the child. This section of the thesis will therefore focus on the 
desirability (or not) of open adoption within the context of the best interests of the 
child.  
 
4 4 2 Open adoption 
 
The principles regarding open adoption269 apply to children of all ages. To what 
extent there will be contact, depends on the circumstances of each case, not the 
age of the child. The discussion in this section is based on the assumption that 
an adopted child has biological parents, but is equally relevant to the biological 
extended family. Where the background of the child is known, contact with the 
biological family can still be arranged, provided that such contact will be in the 
best interests of the child.270  
 
                                                 
267  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 92. 
268  In terms of s 242(3) of the Children’s Act the adopted child is no longer viewed as if he/she is 
biologically related to the adoptive parent. 
269  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
270  The fact that the child was abandoned obviously does not bode well as far as any possible 
relationship with the biological family is concerned, and the facts of the case will have to be 
carefully scrutinised to determine the involvement, if any, of the family in the abandonment of the 
child. 
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Many children in South Africa are not fortunate enough to be raised by their 
biological parents/family. They grow up on the streets or as heads of households 
in homes where the parent(s) have for instance died of AIDS. If they are adopted 
at a stage, their need to have contact with their biological family, where possible, 
is equally strong. Although the biological parents may not be part of the child’s 
life for whatever reason, there may be other biological family members, such as 
siblings, and the adopted child can only benefit by contact with these family 
members. If, however, it is impossible to determine the biological background of 
the child, the consideration of openness becomes superfluous. In South Africa it 
often happens that an abandoned child is adopted, in which case the biological 
parents and/or family will probably not feature in the child’s life. In such 
circumstances, this section of the thesis will not be relevant. The child’s need for 
knowledge about his/her background will however be equally strong regardless of 
whether or not he/she has biological parents/family. This issue of the child’s need 
for knowledge about his/her background in the context of interracial/intercultural 
adoption is discussed under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”.  
 
4 4 2 1 Forms of open adoption 
 
Various factors have led to a shift towards more openness in statutory 
adoption,271 such as the realisation that secrecy in adoption has an adverse 
psychological effect on all parties involved, the emergence of a general 
“children’s rights” culture brought about by documents such as the Convention, 
                                                 
271  Louw 2003 De Jure 252.  
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pressure on the State to open up birth records, changes in community values, 
legislation which now allows for the possibility of post-adoption contact and 
access to adoption records, the increasing number of adoptions of older children 
with existing relationships with biological family members, and the introduction of 
the Bill of Rights which enshrines the general principles of equality and non-
discrimination and entrenches the child’s right, inter alia, to a name and 
nationality and recognises the paramountcy of the best interests of the child.272  
 
A distinction has to be made between open adoption and openness in adoption. 
In open adoption the biological parent is actively involved in choosing the 
prospective adopters. Open adoption includes the biological parents and 
adoptive parents meeting each other, sharing full identifying information, and 
having ongoing contact over the years.273 Openness in adoption, or semi-open 
adoption,274 refers to various forms of communication between biological parents 
and adoptive parents, such as the occasional exchange of letters and pictures via 
an agency or meeting once but not engaging in ongoing contact, in other words 
the agency provides full, but non-identifying information to the biological parents 
and the prospective adopters about each other.275 The two concepts are clearly 
not the same. However, for the sake of convenience the term contact is used 
here to include both forms of contact between the adopted child and the 
                                                 
272  Louw 2003 De Jure 254-256. 
273  Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 20; Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 9. 
274  Louw 2003 De Jure 256. Also known as semi-open adoption or indirect contact. Prynn in Treacher 
& Katz Dynamics of Adoption 75-76 refers to ‘letter box’ contact where communication with the 
biological family is done through the mediation of the adoption agency. 
275  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 9; Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 20; Howe 
Patterns of Adoption 113; Louw 2003 De Jure 256. 
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biological parents/family, namely, open adoption and openness in adoption, and 
the term adoption contact is used to refer to both open adoption and openness in 
adoption.  
 
There are various forms of adoption contact. Flexibility and responsiveness to 
changing circumstances can be important ingredients in the maintenance of 
contact.276 There is no single type of contact that will be right for everyone, and 
individual circumstances should always be important determinants of levels or 
degree of contact277 that the child’s best interests require in each adoption. 
Depending on the best interests of the child, there will also be variation in the 
frequency and duration of contact.278  
 
4 4 2 2 Benefits of adoption contact 
 
Adoption is widely regarded as creating inherently contradictory relationships for 
all parties that are likely to increase the difficulties of identity formation for the 
adopted child.279 In the past many adoptive parents were reluctant to tell children 
they were adopted, which made these children feel embarrassed or “second 
class” when they realised that they were adopted.280 Adopted children have 
increasingly been asking for more adoption contact, and internationally there has 
                                                 
276  Ryburn Open Adoption 99. 
277  Bridge 1994 Tolley’s journal of child law 147; Ryburn Open Adoption 99. 
278  Ryburn Open Adoption 75; Louw 2003 De Jure 256. 
279  Ryburn Open Adoption 21. 
280  Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 17. 
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been a shift towards a more open model of adoption.281 As children are now the 
bearers of rights, it is no longer morally282 or legally283 acceptable to deny them 
the right to know of their origins. Furthermore, studies have shown that being 
truthful and honest with children about their status, circumstances, roots, 
genealogy and general background is central to their identity formation and their 
mental health, and sharing such information with children is therefore in the 
child’s best interests and is not to be a choice, but an obligation for parents and 
substitute carers.284  
 
When a young child or baby is adopted, the degree of contact that the child will 
have with the biological parents/family can be determined by the parties involved 
in the adoption. The need for adoption contact in the placement of older children 
may be even stronger, because these children may have been parented by their 
biological parents and may already have a relationship with and memories of 
their biological parents.285 A child of three to ten years old cannot simply forget 
his/her biological parents. Even if the child cannot live with them, a relationship 
can still be maintained with the biological parents, and an older child’s chance of 
success in an adoptive placement can be enhanced by allowing contact to be 
maintained with the biological family.286 If the biological parents have been part of 
                                                 
281  Louw 2003 De Jure 254. 
282  Katz in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 227. 
283  See the discussion under “4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption” below, where the legal 
framework of adoption in South Africa is discussed. Furthermore, children have the right to 
identity in terms of art 8 of the Convention. S 9 of the Constitution grants them the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, and s 28(1)(a) entrenches their right to a name and nationality. 
284  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 84. 
285  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 168.  
286  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 169. 
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the child’s life until the time of the adoption, a relationship between the adopted 
child and the biological parents/family is important after the adoption. As 
discussed above,287 such a relationship has many benefits and will inter alia 
assist in protecting the culture in which the child grew up.288  
 
No matter what the parties to an adoption might think or want, the reality is that 
an adopted child will always have two sets of parents and/or families, even if the 
biological family is not known. Biological ties cannot be severed. Contact in 
adoption acknowledges the child’s past. When a family unit breaks down and the 
breakdown results in divorce, there is no question whether the parents will 
continue to have contact with their biological children after the divorce. 
Continuing contact is the norm, which is deviated from only if the child’s best 
interests demand limitation or prohibition of contact. Why then, should it be 
different when a child is adopted? Studies have further shown that adoption 
without any contact between the various parties is the least desirable of the 
range of possible adoptions.289 Silber and Dorner have compared children of 
open adoption, or where there is openness in the adoption, with children of 
closed adoption, and concluded that the adopted children that have contact with 
their biological families are mentally healthier.290 Even if the adoption was a 
closed one, these children will benefit from opening up their adoption during the 
school-age years, even if the contact simply consists of the sharing of available 
                                                 
287  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
288  Also see “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”, where this will be discussed. 
289  Ryburn Open Adoption 99. 
290  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 66. 
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information.291 Evidence suggests that older children who are pressurised to 
abandon existing meaningful relationships with members of their biological family 
may find it difficult to attach themselves to a new family.292 
 
Adopted children often develop a curiosity about their biological families and 
heritage. This is part of the process of the development of their identity. Identity is 
important because it determines the ways in, and the degree of confidence with, 
which we enter our social world.293 Although development of a child’s identity can 
be complicated by adoption, contact may be of value in fostering the child’s 
identity.294 It could provide the child with the best of both worlds – security in the 
placement with the adoptive parents and a sense of self derived from ongoing 
contact with the biological parents/family.295 Under “9 CONCLUSION” it will be 
suggested that there should be systems and programmes in place in South Africa 
to assist all relevant parties in this regard.296 
 
It is the development of a clear sense of personal identity that permits us to enter 
situations in our lives with a measure of confidence and assurance.297 At its most 
basic, identity relates to how we feel about ourselves and how we think other 
                                                 
291  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 66. 
292  Triseliotis et al Adoption 76. 
293  Ryburn Open Adoption 33. 
294  Nicholson 2000 THRHR 593; Louw 2003 De Jure 255. 
295  Louw 2003 De Jure 277. 
296  As will be discussed in the conclusion, social workers should be trained and should be very 
involved in this process, both before and after the adoption. Similarly, the adoptive parents, the 
biological parents and the child where he/she is of an age and maturity to understand the nature 
and importance of the adoption should be prepared for and informed about the options available 
and the impact of contact on an adoption. 
297  Ryburn Open Adoption 73. 
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people see us.298 There are twin aspects to identity. They are self-identity and 
self-esteem. How we understand at a cognitive level who we are is called self-
identity. A child’s self-identity develops from a very early age, primarily through 
the daily interactions that the child experiences.299 His/her emotional, intellectual 
and moral capacities prosper within family relationships, and these relationships 
determine his/her social reactions.300 Our identity depends on the amount of 
information we have about ourselves,301 which for adopted children includes the 
amount of information that is available about their biological families and 
background. With an interracial adoption, the level and nature of the contact that 
are required may be complicated even more by the race dimension.302  
 
When and how they learn about being adopted, and the degree of clarity about 
their adoptive status, is something that can create a major challenge to an 
adopted child’s existing self-identity or to the development of self-identity.303 
Adopted children need to know that they are adopted.304 Conveying this 
knowledge has to happen as early as possible so that children can feel that they 
always knew,305 but they also have to understand and integrate this knowledge 
and its meaning into their developing selves.306  
 
                                                 
298  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 89. 
299  Landman 1985 Welfare Focus 17. 
300  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 10. 
301  In “3 1 INTRODUCTION” the importance of growing up in a family environment is stressed. 
302  Mallows in Mullender Open Adoption 87. This aspect is discussed in detail under “5 RACE 
VERSUS CULTURE”, especially “5 6 3 2 Physical appearance as a factor”. 
303  Ryburn Open Adoption 36. 
304  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 85. 
305  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 85. 
306  Triseliotis in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 85. 
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Self-identity has to be distinguished from self-esteem. Self-esteem is the 
tendency to feel good about oneself and to conform to others’ views about what a 
mature individual should be,307 or the way that a child sees him/herself or how 
he/she feels about this self-understanding, which makes it a subjective 
experience.308 Self-identity and self-esteem exist in a dynamic and reflexive 
relationship. Our self-esteem is determined by the messages that are received 
and understood in our social environment. Where self-identity and self-esteem 
are clear and positive, negative messages can be shrugged off or 
accommodated.309  
 
Adoption can lead to negative messages that can be received or perceived, with 
resultant damaging effects on self-identity and self-esteem. Firstly, the personal 
loss of genetic continuity brings with it the loss of many issues such as personal 
qualities and characteristics that others take for granted in the development of 
their self-identity. Secondly, the meaning and value that society attributes to 
continuity creates more general difficulties in the acquisition of a clear and 
positive sense of personal identity.310 To lose connection with the past can be, in 
our society, to lose one’s self.311 
 
                                                 
307  Katz in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 218. 
308  Landman 1985 Welfare Focus 17. 
309  Ryburn Open Adoption 33. 
310  Ryburn Open Adoption 34. 
311  Ryburn Open Adoption 35. 
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Richards312 makes a distinction between social and personal identity. Although it 
is not an absolute distinction, he believes that it is an important one. Personal 
identity is founded in the quality of early emotional relationships with others. It is 
forged in the encounter between the infant’s needs for nurture and the emotional 
qualities of the care-givers. Social identity, on the other hand, includes categories 
such as class and race. Critics of interracial adoption, he says, collapse personal 
identity into social identity.313 
 
Who then is adoption contact beneficial for? The answer is all the parties 
involved in the adoption process. Biological families can suffer more in the 
adoption process if there is no contact.314 Even though they choose adoption,315 
they still experience a loss and grieve for it.316 If the adoption is an open one, 
they can deal with the guilt. They are much more at peace with their decision and 
are better able to process their feelings of grief.317 The biological parents also 
want the child’s understanding and forgiveness.318  
 
Although, traditionally, adoptive parents have been seen as the ones with the 
most to lose from continuing contact in adoption,319 available research indicates 
that there can be significant advantages to adoptive parents in parenting their 
                                                 
312  Richards in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 101. 
313  Richards in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 106. 
314  Ryburn Open Adoption 84. 
315  This choice is often not one they wish to make, but it is in the best interests of the child, or it is the 
only one that the biological parent can make. 
316  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 22. 
317  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 15; Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 26. 
318  Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 26. 
319  Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 27. 
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children where there is contact.320 They feel reassured by knowing that their 
children’s placements have been approved by the biological parents.321 In their 
study, McRoy and her colleagues322 concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between contact and the extent to which adoptive parents feel a 
sense of “entitlement” to their children. Most adoptive couples decide after a 
while that they are comfortable with more contact than they originally thought.323  
 
Adopted children grow up with the knowledge that their adoptions originated in a 
personal agreement between biological and adoptive parents,324 and they feel a 
sense of belonging with the adoptive parents since those adoptive parents were 
selected to parent them.325 Adoption contact enhances the identity of adopted 
children.326 It encourages better mental health for children by encouraging 
communication within the family on the subject of adoption, and the child is 
allowed to care about both sets of parents without feeling guilty.327 Research also 
shows that a child’s attachment is not “some limited quantity that has to be 
divided up amongst people”.328  
 
The discussion above clearly shows how the best interests of the child are 
served by adoption contact. Prynn, however, believes that contact may be 
                                                 
320  Ryburn Open Adoption 87. 
321  Ryburn Open Adoption 99; Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 16. 
322  McRoy et al Openness in adoption: new practices, new issues (1988) as quoted in Ryburn Open 
Adoption 87. 
323  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 40. 
324  Ryburn Open Adoption 99. 
325  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 15. 
326  Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 21. 
327  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 15. 
328  Triseliotis in Mullender Open Adoption 24. 
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beneficial to the adopted child whose feelings about the biological parents are 
“ambivalent, fearful or murderous”, but that it is also a constant reminder to 
adoptive parents and adopted children that they are “unreal” or “unnatural”.329 
This point of view has to be criticised. Circumstances change, and decisions 
have to be made. This is life. It does not mean that the past can simply be 
erased. When people get divorced, the legal relationship between the parents is 
terminated, but the biological link between the parent and child remains and the 
parent will continue to have contact with the child. In the same way, the biological 
link between a child and a biological parent cannot be erased in the case of 
adoption, and although legally the biological parent will no longer be the child’s 
parent, the biological link makes contact between the parent and the child 
essential.  
 
Silber and Dorner explain the relationship between the adoptive family and the 
biological family. They say that when there is contact with the biological family, 
the biological family is extended family, like other relatives within the adoptive 
family.330 This, I believe, is a logical view. If the mind shift can be made to see the 
biological family as extended family, it will go a long way towards removing the 
negative connotation that is often still associated with adoption. In fact, as Silber 
and Dorner explain, when biological parents are accepted as relatives, it 
                                                 
329  Prynn in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 76. 
330  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 9. 
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becomes very natural to incorporate them into the child’s life.331 It is important, 
though, that a distinction is made between the various families, and that the 
biological family should never be seen as fulfilling the same role as the adoptive 
family. The adoptive parents must remain the ones responsible for the upbringing 
of the child. As Louw says, if a scheme of multiple parenting exists, it could 
jeopardise the stability of the child and open up endless possibilities for disputes 
between the various “parents”.332 
 
Of course there is also criticism of adoption contact. As with any relationship, 
there can be disappointments, such as differences in lifestyles and values, or 
minor relationship problems, but we have to recognise that there is no perfect 
adoption, just as there are no perfect biological families.333 There have to be 
appropriate degrees of contact.334 Ryburn says those who argue that adoption 
contact can be confusing are applying adult thinking to the situations of children, 
because children consider the person(s) who raise them as their parents.335 He 
says that secrecy “is the failure to celebrate difference, born of the fear that to do 
so will breach the relationship between adopters and their children”.336 In my 
opinion, secrecy creates the idea that there is something to hide, something to be 
ashamed of, and this is certainly not a healthy situation. What is important, I 
believe, is that any contact with biological parents/family has to be monitored 
                                                 
331  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 10. At the same time, the extended family of the 
adoptive parents also play an important role in the child’s life, as discussed in more detail under “3 
2 2 Parental care”.  
332  Louw 2003 De Jure 277. 
333  Silber & Dorner Children of Open Adoption 17. 
334  Mallows in Mullender Open Adoption 87. 
335  Ryburn Open Adoption 83. 
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carefully. In this regard, it is important that there is a close relationship with a 
social worker, who has to assist in this regard. The emphasis here is on contact. 
The biological parent is no longer in a position to make decisions for and about 
the child. This is now the responsibility of the adoptive parent. The biological 
parent fulfils a completely different role in the child’s life. All parties involved need 
to understand and accept this. 
 
Finally, it is important to mention that even if there is agreement about the need 
of an adopted child to maintain contact with the biological family, a very serious 
concern in the South African context is financial constraints. The reality is that 
South Africa is a poor country. The Children’s Act acknowledges this by including 
as part of section 7,337 which contains the factors that have to be taken into 
consideration when the best interests of the child have to be determined, the 
practical difficulty338 and expense of a child having contact with the parent(s).339 
In this regard, government assistance340 will be crucial. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
337  See s 7(1)(e). 
338  This could include logistical difficulties, transport problems, unavailablility of postal services 
and/or technology, to name but a few. 
339  “Parents” in this context refers to the biological parents of an adopted child.  
340  See “6 3 3 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and the best interests of the child” and “9 
CONCLUSION”. 
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4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption 
 
The provisions of section 20 of the Child Care Act create the legal fiction that an 
adopted child is the child of the adoptive parents.341 In the past, the accepted 
adoptive practice in most countries, including South Africa, was closed adoption, 
where neither biological parents nor adoptive parents were permitted contact with 
each other or access to any information about each other and the biological 
origins of the adopted child were kept from him/her, even after adulthood.342 The 
effect of section 20 was probably at least partly to blame for this situation. Louw 
says the possibility of post-adoption contact in South Africa is to a large extent 
determined by the legal effect of adoption, in that all the legal rights and 
obligations between the adopted child and any person who was his/her parent 
immediately prior to such adoption are legally terminated.343 
 
An agreement to effect adoption contact, although possible, is currently very 
difficult to enforce in South Africa, and may lead to some stress for all parties 
involved. Furthermore, access to adoption records in South Africa can only be 
obtained by the adoptive parent from the date on which the adopted child 
reaches the age of 18 years,344 or the adopted child from the date on which 
he/she reaches the age of 21 years.345 Although the Registrar may in his/her 
                                                 
341  In terms of s 20(2) an adopted child is deemed in law to be the legitimate child of the adoptive 
parent, as if he/she was born to that parent. 
342  Louw 2003 De Jure 253-254. 
343  Louw 2003 De Jure 258. 
344  GG 10546 of 12 December 1986, Government Notice R 2612 reg 28(1)(a). 
345  GG 10546 of 12 December 1986, Government Notice R 2612 reg 28(1)(b). Although the age of 
majority has been lowered from 21 years to 18 years in terms of the Children’s Act, Government 
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discretion at any time furnish information regarding an adoption to any person 
who in the opinion of the Registrar has sufficient reason to obtain the 
information,346 the identity of the child, his/her biological parents or adoptive 
parents may not be revealed.347 
 
Fortunately, there has been an international shift towards more transparency in 
adoption in recent times.348 In keeping with this shift, the implementation of the 
adoption chapter of the Children’s Act will do away with the artificial situation that 
was created by the Child Care Act. In terms of section 242(3) of the Children’s 
Act the child will no longer be regarded as if he/she was born to the adoptive 
parent. Instead, an adopted child will for all purposes be regarded as the child of 
the adoptive parent and the adoptive parent will for all purposes be regarded as 
the parent of the adopted child. Furthermore, in terms of section 234 post-
adoption agreements will be provided for. These agreements can be entered into 
by the biological parent or guardian of the child and the prospective adoptive 
parent of the child to provide for communication and the provision of 
information.349  
 
Section 7(1)(f)(i) of the Children’s Act makes reference to the need for a child to 
remain in the care of his/her parent, family and extended family. As we have 
                                                                                                                                                 
Notice R 2612 is not linked to the age of majority, but specifically stipulates the age at which an 
adopted child may access adoption records as 21 years. Until such time as regulations changing 
this age are published, a child will not be able to access adoption records until the age of 21 years. 
346  Presumably, this would be for medical reasons, research, etc. 
347  GG 10546 of 12 December 1986, Government Notice R 2612 reg 28(4). 
348  Louw 2003 De Jure 254. Also see the discussion under “4 4 2 2 Benefits of open adoption or 
openness in adoption” above. 
349  Also see “6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements” where s 234 is discussed. 
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already established, it is not always possible for a child to remain in the care of a 
biological parent. In such a case, in order to protect the best interests of a child, it 
is important to maintain contact with his/her family or extended family where 
possible, as provided for in section 7(1)(f)(ii) of the Children’s Act.  
 
The right of a child to maintain contact with biological parents is also provided for 
in both the Convention and the Charter.350 The United Nations Declaration on 
Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, 
with special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and 
Internationally351 provides that the child’s need for knowledge of family 
background should be recognised, unless such knowledge is contrary to the 
child’s best interests.352 This principle, I believe, should be further extended to 
include that contact with the child’s biological family is also not recommended 
where there are circumstances that indicate that such contact would be contrary 
to the child’s best interests. An example would be where there was, for instance, 
physical or mental abuse of the child. I mention this here, because this is 
definitely something that South African legislation can benefit by. In terms of 
section 234 of the Children’s Act the biological parent and the adoptive parent of 
the child may enter into a post-adoption agreement. If it is in the best interests of 
                                                 
350  Art 9(3) of the Convention and art 19(2) of the Charter. Unfortunately neither the Convention nor 
the Charter provides directly for contact of an adopted child with biological parents/family, but the 
articles referred to above, which deal with children who are separated from their parents, are 
relevant here. 
351  Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/85 of 3 December 1986. Hereafter referred to as “the 
UN Declaration”. 
352  Art 9. 
Chapter 4: The best interests of the child 
 148
the child, the court may confirm such post-adoption agreement.353 Although in 
terms of section 7(1)(h) of the Children’s Act account must be taken of the child’s 
physical and emotional security in determining the best interests of the child, and 
in terms of section 7(1)(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or 
psychological harm is recognised, this may not be enough. I would suggest that 
section 234(4) should read as follows:  
 
A court may, when granting an application in terms of section 239 for the adoption of the 
child, confirm a post-adoption agreement if it is in the best interests of the child but, in 
doing so, the court should bear in mind that there are cases where contact between the 
child and the biological parents is not in the best interests of the child and is therefore not 
recommended. 
 
Although the system is certainly not without its faults, customary adoption can 
serve as an example of how contact after adoption can be in the best interests of 
the child. As I have already indicated,354 the aim of adoption in customary law is 
adult-centered. However, the process is such that there is ongoing contact 
between the child and the biological family. As I shall indicate in “9 
CONCLUSION”, the problems in the customary adoption system could be 
overcome by applying the principles of adoption contact in a more formalised 
way, where there is a post-adoption agreement that will be monitored by a social 
worker who will protect the interests of the child. 
 
                                                 
353  S 234(4). 
354  See “4 4 1 Introduction”. 
Chapter 4: The best interests of the child 
 149
More security for all parties involved that contact will continue after the adoption 
may result in some children, who would not otherwise be placed in adoption, 
being adopted. Where a biological parent loves a child but is unable to fulfil 
his/her parental tasks for whatever reason,355 the parent may not be favourably 
disposed towards adoption, with the result that the child remains in 
circumstances where his/her best interests are not properly served. If, however, 
the parent is secure in the knowledge that he/she could still be a part of the 
child’s life,356 he/she may find it easier to come to terms with and consent to an 
adoption that will be in the best interests of the child. 
 
 
4 5 CONCLUSION 
 
Even though the best interests standard has been part of our law for a long time, 
the discussion above should indicate how much uncertainty and controversy still 
exists with regard to it. What is clear is that children are vulnerable and that they 
need to be protected. It has been established that children’s best interests have 
to be determined by taking into account the specific circumstances of the 
particular case. Ultimately, the child’s present and future best interests must 
remain uppermost in an evaluator’s mind.357 Furthermore, it is in the best 
                                                 
355  These could inter alia include drug or alcohol abuse by the parent, psychological problems and 
serious long-term illness. 
356  This will be the position when s 234 of the Children’s Act comes into operation. As discussed in 
“9 CONCLUSION”, it is important to bear in mind that the relationship of the adopted child with 
the biological parent(s) is not the same as the child’s relationship with the adoptive parent(s). 
357  Strous 2007 SA Journal of Psychology 239. 
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interests of the child to form attachments as early as possible in life, and the 
discussion above makes it clear that the best interests of the child can further be 
served by allowing for contact after an adoption.  
 
In the next chapter, I shall look specifically at the issues of race and culture and 
the influence thereof on adoption.  
 
 
5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE 
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5 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 [T]hey grow up in foster care, institutional facilities, or … are bounced back and forth 
between foster care and biological parents who are incapable of adequately caring for 
them. … [S]uch devastating conditions are not justified in light of the alternative: 
transracial adoption…1 
 
Much has been said about the advantages and/or disadvantages of 
interracial/intercultural adoptions. It has been argued that to consider race in 
                                                 
1  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1080. 
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adoption is a perpetuation of old prejudices, but it has also been argued that a 
race-conscious society mandates consideration of race as a factor.2 In my view, 
in South Africa race is not a factor that should have any relevance in adoption 
applications.3 As customary adoption usually takes place between close family 
members,4 it occurs within the same race and culture. It is therefore safe to 
assume that interracial/intercultural adoption does not happen in customary law.5 
In statutory adoptions race as a factor has been removed from the Child Care 
Act.6 Culture is, however, still a relevant factor in terms of the legislation 
governing adoption in South Africa. Section 40 of the Child Care Act provides 
that, in an adoption, regard shall be had to the religious and cultural background 
of the child concerned and of his/her parents as against that of the person in 
whose custody the child is to be placed or transferred.7 Most troublesome about 
this section, is the emphasis that is placed on cultural backgrounds, as this has 
resulted in strong opposition to interracial/intercultural adoption. The perception 
                                                 
2  Perry 1990-1991 J Fam L 52. 
3  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
4  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. Olivier et al Die Privaatreg van die SA Bantoetaalsprekendes 
462. 
5  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 616 says interracial adoption is fairly new in South Africa. He gives 
figures since 1991, and those figures relate only to adoption under the Child Care Act. His 
statement and figures imply that interracial adoption does not form part of customary law. 
6  In terms of s 40(b) racial classification was an important aspect to consider, but this section was 
repealed by the Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991. In 1988 the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988 deleted any mention of race from the terms for recognising customary law and s 
1(1) made customary law applicable to any court in the country, with the result that the courts 
could apply customary law to Whites. However, customary law has remained associated with race. 
See Bennett Customary law in SA 42. S 1(1): “Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a 
foreign state and of indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with 
sufficient certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public 
policy or natural justice …”  
7  S 40: “ … regard shall be had to the religious and cultural background of the child concerned and 
of his parents as against that of the person in or to whose custody he is to be placed or transferred”. 
S 18(3) provides that the children’s court shall have regard to the matters mentioned in s 40 of the 
Act in considering an application for adoption. Also see “6 7 1 The Child Care Act, adoption and 
culture”. 
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that people of the same race belong to the same culture, aggravates the 
opposition to interracial/intercultural adoption. 
 
With our history of apartheid, South Africans in the past usually associated with 
people from similar backgrounds to themselves. This led to them often being 
extremely rigid in their ways of thinking, and racial background was often 
associated with an obvious difference in culture,8 in other words, the perception 
often existed that people of the same race necessarily belong to the same 
culture.9  
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore this belief and to investigate the role of race 
and culture in adoption within the context of our constitutional dispensation. 
Firstly, I shall consider the definitions of race and culture and analyse the 
differences between them. Next, I shall look at the Constitution. In this regard I 
shall investigate the role of race and culture in the Constitution as well as the role 
of these concepts with regard to interracial/intercultural adoption. After that, the 
conflicting rights relevant to this thesis will be considered, as well as the 
appropriate international instruments. Lastly, I shall discuss the arguments in 
favour of and against interracial/intercultural adoption. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  Joubert 1993 SALJ 738. 
9  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 378. 
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5 2 DEFINITIONS 
 
5 2 1 Race 
 
5 2 1 1 The prevalent view of race 
 
The term “race” has long been, and remains, controversial. 10 The Collins English 
Dictionary defines race as: 
a group of people of common ancestry, distinguished from others by physical 
characteristics, such as hair type, colour of eyes and skin, stature, etc.11 
 
In the Oxford Student’s Dictionary, race is defined as: 
 each of the major divisions of humankind with certain inherited physical characteristics in 
common, e. g. colour of skin, type of hair, shape of eyes and nose.12 
 
Websters Online Dictionary defines the term race as:  
a type of classification used to group living things based on such elements as language, 
heredity, physical attributes and behavior.13 
 
Church defines race in similar terms, namely, as each of the major divisions of 
humankind, having distinct physical characteristics or genetic traits.14 
Ledderboge likewise believes that race refers to physical characteristics which 
                                                 
10  Websters at http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/race. 
11  Collins English Dictionary 1269. 
12  Allen & Delahunty Oxford Student’s Dictionary 843. 
13  Websters at http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/race. 
14  Church 1996 LLM 10. 
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people share, such as facial features, skin colour and hair texture.15 According to 
Fredrickson, race refers to stable and presumably unchangeable 
characteristics.16 Leiris says that a race may be defined as a group whose 
members’ physical characteristics conform, on average, to those arbitrarily 
selected as differentials, and says that there will be overlapping between 
peoples. 17  
 
From the definitions one can conclude that race is merely a matter of physical 
characteristics. It is something that we have no control over, and is determined 
by the genetics of our birth.  
 
5 2 1 2  A different view of race 
 
Over the past few years a new concept of race has been put forward. Social 
scientists have begun to study multiracial people as distinct from the black 
population.18 They argue that race is not an unalterable characteristic of an 
individual.19 They believe that there is evidence that race is not based in 
biological reality20 and that the movement away from strictly defined, singular 
racial identities is a shift towards a more contextualised understanding of 
realities.21 Sociologists thus tend to favour the social constructionist 
                                                 
15  Ledderboge 1997 Social Work 334. 
16  Fredrickson Racism 52-53. 
17  Leiris Race and Culture 14-15. 
18  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 108. 
19  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 115. 
20  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 113, 114. 
21  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 113. 
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perspective,22 which treats race as an individual attribute.23 They see race as a 
variable which must be placed within a social context.24  
 
This approach has to be criticised. The argument of the sociologists is not a 
criticism of race per se. It is only because of the reality that multiracialism exists 
that the sociologists are of the opinion that the biological categorisation of race is 
problematic. Clearly the problem is not race. It is the definition of race that should 
be criticised. If it is true that people are categorised as black when there is 
knowledge of any black ancestry, no matter how remote,25 there is a problem 
with the definition and perception of race, not with the categorisation thereof. In 
my opinion, race in itself is something which cannot be challenged. Race is and 
always will be a matter of genetics. As Leiris points out, from a genetic point of 
view, “it would appear impossible to regard the world population of today as other 
than more or less a hodgepodge”.26 This statement was made more than 50 
years ago, and would certainly be even more apt today. Spencer recognises this 
when he says that even those who favour the social construction view of race 
use the underlying conception of biological race as a basis.27 That of course does 
not mean that determining someone’s race is necessarily simple or easy.  
 
                                                 
22  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 114-115, 118. 
23  Zuberi as quoted in Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 115-116. 
24  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 116. 
25  Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 104 explain the “one drop rule”, in terms of which 
individuals with any known knowledge of black ancestry have no choice other than to identify as 
black. 
26  Leiris Race and Culture 14-15. 
27  Spencer as quoted in Brunsma & Rockquemore 2002 Crit Sociol 115. 
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We now return to the argument of the sociologists with regard to people of mixed 
race. The reality is that people of different races do procreate. Maybe the 
categorisation of such people into a specific race is a problem. I have no expert 
knowledge in the field of sociology. If categorisation of people of mixed race is 
indeed a problem, this problem falls outside the scope of my research, but it does 
not alter the fact that the argument against biology as the basis for classification 
of race cannot stand.  
 
As race is an inherent characteristic over which one has no control, it should not 
per se be relevant in respect of adoption. Different people from different 
backgrounds are meeting, mixing, and procreating on a daily basis. As a result 
people are constantly exposed to new and different cultures. Culture may be a 
factor to consider in regard to adoption. 
 
5 2 2 Culture 
 
5 2 2 1 Culture 
 
Defining a concept as multi-faceted as culture is not easily achieved.28 Race and 
culture go hand in hand, and in an attempt to find the meaning of culture, we 
firstly have to consider some definitions. 
                                                 
28  See the remarks of Judge O’Regan in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal, Thulani Cele: School 
Liaison Officer, Anne Martin: Principal of Durban Girls’ High School, Fiona Knight: 
Chairperson of the Governing Body of Durban Girls’ High School v Navaneethum Pillay, 
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The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary defines culture as:  
improvement or refinement of mind, manners, etc., by education and training; condition of 
being thus trained and refined; particular form or type of intellectual development or 
civilization.29 
 
In the Oxford Student’s Dictionary culture is defined as: 
 the customs, traditions, and civilisation of a particular society or group of people.30 
 
Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, a British anthropologist,31 defines culture as that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society (my 
emphasis). Beukes indicates that Tylor’s definition involves three important 
characteristics of culture.32 Culture is acquired by people through a process of 
acculturation; a person acquires a culture as a member of society; and culture is 
a complex whole. According to Beukes33 culture is a concept that is so rich in 
meaning that it makes it difficult to reflect in one single definition. She says that 
no definition of culture is, or ever can be, exhaustive.34 She also focuses on the 
process of a change in culture (kultuurverandering) because of contact between 
                                                                                                                                                 
Governing Body Foundation, Natal Tamil Vedic Society Trust, Freedom of Expression Institute 
2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 141 (hereafter MEC for Education v Pillay). 
29  Oxford Illustrated Dictionary 409. 
30  Allen & Delahunty Oxford Student’s Dictionary 246. 
31  As quoted in Devenish 1999 THRHR 203. 
32  Beukes 1991 LLD 43-44. 
33  Beukes 1991 LLD 39. 
34  Beukes 1991 LLD 85. 
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different groups,35 a process known as acculturation, which is especially 
important in a country such as South Africa where different communities live 
together. Thaman believes that culture is a shared way of living of a group of 
people, which includes their accumulated knowledge and understandings, skills 
and values, and which is perceived by them to be unique and meaningful.36 
Pieterse says the term “culture” denotes a range of things, from a particular 
lifestyle, to the totality of a group’s historical and social heritage.37 He says 
culture can manifest itself in a number of ways, including manner of dress, art, 
language and peculiar social practices. Fishbayn defines culture as “a fluid, 
open-textured narrative which can and does make sense of new developments 
such as gender equality while retaining a sense of narrative quality”.38  
 
Most of the definitions indicate that, as Ledderboge says, culture is a product of 
the socialisation process.39 Culture thus consists of learnt ways of acting, feeling 
and thinking, rather than biologically determined ways (which determine race). It 
is not something which people are born with, but something gained through 
normal social interaction.40 
 
The definitions also link up with Bennett’s view, namely, that culture implies high 
intellectual or artistic endeavour. A “right to culture” in this sense can be 
                                                 
35  Beukes 1991 LLD 43. 
36  Thaman in Wilson & Hunt Culture, Rights, and Cultural Rights 1. 
37  Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 391. 
38  Fishbayn 1999 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 147. 
39  Ledderboge 1997 Social Work 334. 
40  Thornton in Boonzaaier & Sharp South African Keywords 22. 
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juridically construed to mean the freedom — akin to freedom of expression — to 
perform or practice the arts and sciences. However, culture may also denote a 
people’s entire store of knowledge and artefacts, especially the languages, 
systems of belief, and laws that give social groups their unique characters.41 
 
According to Venter, culture is fundamental to the self-understanding of a person 
and groups with whom such a person is, or wants to be, associated. In other 
words, we are dealing with the identity of individuals and their social 
associations.42 He comes to the conclusion that we are dealing with traditional, 
intellectual and spiritual attributes of specific groups of people in society.43 
Culture is constantly subject to change,44 and is extremely complex.  
 
The definitions all point to the fact, firstly, that culture is acquired (in other words 
it is not inherent like race), and, secondly, that tradition features prominently in 
the acculturation process. In defining culture, the Constitutional Court45 has also 
indicated that culture generally relates to the traditions and beliefs developed by 
a community. It is thus important to look at the meaning of tradition. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41  Bennett Human Rights 23-24. 
42  Venter 1998 SAPL 442. 
43  Venter 1998 SAPL 441. 
44  Beukes 1991 LLD 31; Thornton in Boonzaaier & Sharp South African Keywords 25. 
45  In MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 114. 
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5 2 2 2 Tradition and culture 
 
Whereas race is strictly a question of heredity, culture is essentially one of tradition in the 
broadest sense, which includes the formal training of the young in a body of knowledge 
or a creed, the inheriting of customs or attitudes from previous generations, the borrowing 
of techniques or fashions from other countries, the spread of opinions through 
propaganda or conversations, the adoption — or ‘selling’ — of new products or devices, 
or even the circulation of legends or jests by word of mouth. In other words, tradition in 
this sense covers provinces clearly unconnected with biological heredity and all alike 
consisting in the transmission, by word of mouth, image or mere example, of 
characteristics which, taken together, differentiate a milieu, society or group of societies 
throughout a period of reasonable length and thus constitute its culture.46 
 
As can be seen in this quote,47 tradition forms an integral part of culture. Tradition 
is the transmission of culture, opinion, belief or custom handed down orally or by 
practice, or the passing down of beliefs or customs which humans need in social 
interaction from one generation to another. 48 
 
Tradition can thus be defined as the passing down of elements of a culture from 
generation to generation, especially by oral communication.49 When we speak of 
culture, we have to consider tradition at the same time, as tradition is basically 
the channel that passes on culture.  
                                                 
46  Leiris Race and Culture 21. 
47  Also see “5 2 2 Culture”. 
48  Sykes Concise Oxford Dictionary 1135; Allen & Delahunty Oxford Student’s Dictionary 1119; 
Spiegel & Boonzaaier in Boonzaaier & Sharp South African Keywords 40. 
49  Dictionary.com at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=tradition; Bennett Customary 
Law in SA 22. 
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5 3 RACE AND CULTURE — IS THERE A DIFFERENCE? 
 
5 3 1 Introduction 
 
In a country such as South Africa, racial background is often associated with an 
obvious difference in culture, which makes it easier to understand why race and 
culture are, to some, the same thing, or are often confused. As was indicated 
above,50 race is defined as each of the major divisions of humankind that have 
distinct physical characteristics or genetic traits, or a group whose members’ 
physical characteristics conform, on average, to arbitrarily selected differentials. 
Race is thus an inherent, static biological characteristic. Culture, on the other 
hand, is acquired by people living in a specific environment. Culture (including 
tradition) constantly evolves.51 It develops when and where a person grows up.52 
Thus, whereas race is strictly a question of biological heredity, culture is 
essentially one of tradition in the broadest sense.53 Consequently, while race is 
an issue that can be determined in a fairly objective biological manner, 
determining culture is dependent on various issues and has to be ascertained by 
looking at the facts of each specific case.  
 
 
 
                                                 
50  See “5 2 1 Race” and “5 2 2 Culture”. 
51  Van Bueren in Douglas & Sebba Children’s Rights 17. 
52  See the definitions under “5 2 2 Culture” above. 
53  Leiris Race and Culture 21. For a discussion of the difference between race and culture, also see 
Ferreira 2006 THRHR 665-670. 
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5 3 2 Making a distinction 
 
Race and culture are two distinct concepts that have to be treated as such. In the 
context of adoption and the determination of the best interests of a child, race on 
its own is not, or at least should not be, an issue that is relevant in any way.  
 
Article 1(2) of the UNESCO54 Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice provides 
that “[a]ll individuals and groups have the right to be different, to consider 
themselves as different and to be regarded as such. However, the diversity of life 
styles and the right to be different may not, in any circumstances, serve as a 
pretext for racial prejudice...”.55 In other words, differences in culture may not 
serve as a pretext for racial prejudice. 
 
Fredrickson believes that there is a substantial grey area in respect of race and 
culture, in that culture can be either a concept antithetical to that of race (if we 
think of culture as historically constructed, fluid, variable in time and space, and 
adaptable to changing circumstances), or it can be essentialised to the point 
where it becomes the functional equivalent of race.56 Van Wyk says it is clear 
that an intertwinement of race, culture and ethnicity has taken place.57 It is this 
                                                 
54  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 
55  Art 1(2) of the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice 27 November 1978. 
56  Fredrickson Racism 7. 
57  Van Wyk 1991 Stell LR 199. Also see Roodt 2000 LLD 222. 
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confusion that needs to be addressed. Although these concepts have been 
explained,58 further investigation of the differences between them is needed. 
 
The “essentialist view of racial identity, namely, that there is one clear and 
authentic set of ‘black characteristics’” is largely based on “ideologically dated 
assumptions or methodologically problematic research”.59 Pieterse suggests that 
culture has replaced race as the primary distinguishing factor.60 He explains that 
there is an ideology that assumes that indigenous culture is the same across the 
designated racial/cultural group and ignores variations of culture between 
individuals as well as between different subgroups within the broader group.61 He 
warns that we must remain wary of dichotomising and reinforcing racial 
“difference” through engagement with culture.62 This statement reflects the 
essence of the problem regarding the confusion between race and culture. We 
have established that race and culture are not synonymous.63 Leiris’ conclusions 
that a given culture is not the creation of a particular race, but normally of 
several,64 and also that no given race necessarily practices a single culture,65 
would thus seem to be correct. I firmly agree with the views of Pieterse and 
Leiris. It should be clear that there is no homogeneous culture that can be 
identified by simply determining the race of a person. Culture is a complex issue 
quite separate from race. 
                                                 
58  See “5 2 1 Race” and “5 2 2 Culture” above. 
59  Patel 2007 Adoption & Fostering 32. 
60  Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 367. 
61  Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 373. 
62  Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 389. 
63  See “5 2 1 Race”, “5 2 2 Culture” and “5 3 1 Introduction”. 
64  Leiris Race and Culture 31. 
65  Leiris Race and Culture 32. 
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To illustrate the complexity of distinguishing between race and culture, consider 
the example of the birth of a child. It is often said that someone is born into a 
specific culture. If this is so, race and culture must surely be synonymous, but we 
have established that this is not so.66 Race and culture are not the same, and 
birth is no indication of culture. Furthermore, when a child is born in a specific 
environment it is certainly no guarantee of the culture to which the child will 
belong. In other words, if a child is born to a white mother and a white father, will 
the child have a “white” culture, and if so, what does this mean? In the case of a 
white mother from an Afrikaans background and a white father from an English 
background, or a black mother who grew up in Johannesburg while the black 
father grew up on a farm in Mpumalanga, will they have the same cultural 
background? This certainly seems unlikely. What about a child born to a black 
mother and a black father, where the mother comes from a Zulu background and 
the father from a Sepedi background, or a white mother from Namibia and a 
white father from Egypt? If the parents are not of the same race, this might 
complicate matters even further. Where, for instance, a white woman and a black 
man marry and have a baby, what is the child’s culture? Our law does not 
prohibit people like those illustrated above from having a child and raising 
him/her the way they see fit, which obviously includes exposing the child to the 
culture they choose.67  
 
                                                 
66  See “5 2 1 Race”, “5 2 2 Culture” and “5 3 1 Introduction”. 
67  A law that attempted to prohibit mixed-race or mixed-culture couples from having a child would 
be futile and clearly unconstitutional. 
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The legislature clearly views race and culture as two distinct concepts. Before 
section 40(b) of the Child Care Act was repealed68 it stated that a child could not 
be placed in or transferred to the custody of any person whose classification in 
terms of the Population Registration Act69 (that is, whose racial classification) 
was not the same as that of the child, except where such person was the parent 
or guardian of the child. Section 40(a) of the Child Care Act provided that regard 
had to be had to the religious and cultural background of the child. The 
separation of race and culture into two subsections suggests that the legislature 
acknowledged the difference between race and culture. Section 40(b) of the 
Child Care Act, which disallowed interracial adoption, has been removed from the 
legislation.70 As discussed under this heading above, section 40 as it is now 
formulated is neutral on the question of race.  
 
In many cases the question of race has influenced decisions about adoption in 
various ways.71 In the United States of America the general approach of the 
courts has been that race cannot be an obstacle to adoption or even a decisive 
factor, but that it must be merely one of the factors to be weighed.72 I do not 
support this view. If race is at all considered in an adoption application, it opens 
the door for abuse of the system. Joubert73 says the question of racial preference 
would most obviously be considered in the case of competing applications for the 
                                                 
68  By the Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991. 
69  Act 30 of 1950. 
70  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
71  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 378. 
72  Joubert 1993 SALJ 732. 
73  Joubert 1993 SALJ 732. 
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adoption of a child by parents from the same racial background as the child and 
by parents from a different racial background. He argues74 that often the same 
decision could be reached if the whole matter of race were ignored, simply 
because there are numerous criteria and some of them may predicate the same 
decision. It is important to bear in mind that “race matching” does not guarantee 
“culture matching”, and it does not guarantee a successful adoption and a happy 
child.  
 
Sometimes there is a “mild preference” for same-race adoption. Bartholet 
explains that the “mild preference” with regard to the role of race in adoption 
entails that agencies that have qualified black and white families waiting to adopt 
take race into account in deciding how to allocate the children waiting for 
homes.75 She warns that it is not certain whether it is possible to create a 
genuinely “mild” preference for same-race placement,76 and that enormous 
weight might in fact be given to race.77 As I indicated in the previous paragraph, I 
do not agree that race should be considered at all when a placement is made. 
 
As was pointed out above, race is no longer a factor in adoption applications in 
South Africa, but culture is.78 In the case of cultural difference the “mild 
preference” rule should in my view be applied. An attempt has to be made to 
                                                 
74  Joubert 1993 SALJ 733. 
75  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 181. 
76  Same-race placement is also often referred to as inracial placement. 
77  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 183. 
78  See s 40 of the Child Care Act. In s 240(1)(a) of the Children’s Act the approach to the role of 
culture in an adoption is far more balanced than in s 40 of the Child Care Act. This is discussed 
under “6 7 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and culture”. 
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place the child with suitable parents of the same or at least a similar culture (not 
necessarily race) to that of the biological mother and/or father,79 but should that 
not be possible, there is no reason why parents of a different culture cannot raise 
that child just as well as or maybe even better than parents of the same culture. 
In fact, the quality of the parenting, not race or culture, seems to have the 
principal influence on outcomes in placements.80  
 
It must furthermore be borne in mind that even if the child and the prospective 
adoptive parents are of the same race it does not mean that they will necessarily 
have the same cultural background. When a child is adopted by parents of the 
same race, is culture ever considered? Cultural difference only seems to become 
an issue when there is a racial difference. Surely this is not acceptable! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79  Joubert 1993 SALJ 732. 
80  Quinton & Selwyn 2006 Child and Family Law Quarterly 469. 
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5 4 CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
5 4 1 The Constitution, race and culture 
 
5 4 1 1 Introduction 
 
The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims that South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, united in our diversity, and recognises 11 official languages81 — a clear 
reference to our racial and cultural heterogeneity. The richness in cultural 
qualities makes our country one of the most cosmopolitan in the world.82 In fact, 
South Africa is often referred to as a “rainbow nation”.  
 
As the Constitution is our supreme law, it is important to determine how race and 
culture are reflected in it. The constitutional values form the foundation or basis of 
the South African state83 and should be considered first — all aspects of the 
Constitution are to be interpreted within the meaning of the founding values of the 
Constitution84 that are to be found primarily in section 1. The legitimacy of the 
                                                 
81  S 6(1). 
82  Devenish 1999 THRHR 209. 
83  Kroeze 2001 Stell LR 271. 
84  S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 650 (also reported in 1995 7 BCLR 861 (CC)); s 1 of the 
Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is a “sovereign, democratic state founded 
on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party 
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”. 
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Constitution depends upon these values, and the legitimacy of the Constitution 
determines the stability of the state.85  
 
The Constitution does not define the terms “race” or “culture”, but makes 
provision for both and makes a clear distinction between the two concepts. Non-
racialism is a founding value of the Constitution, entrenched in section 1(b), and 
unfair discrimination based on race is prohibited in the Constitution.86 This non-
racialism is re-iterated by not extending the right of freedom of expression to the 
advocacy of hatred that is based on race.87  
 
Culture clearly forms an integral part of society and is a concept that, in itself, 
requires protection. Although culture is not a founding value,88 it greatly 
contributes towards the identity of the individual. Unfair discrimination on the 
ground of culture is prohibited,89 and cultural rights,90 cultural life,91 cultural 
community92 and cultural heritage93 are protected. As Pieterse says, the 
constitutional right to culture mandates the accommodation of cultural principles, 
practices and values in the legal system in a manner that promotes the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.94 
                                                 
85  Venter 1998 SAPL 446. Kroeze 2001 Stell LR 271 says that the purpose of these objective values 
is to constrain judicial subjectivity. 
86  S 9(3) & (4) – see n 101. 
87  S 16(2)(c). 
88  See “5 4 1 The Constitution”. 
89  S 9(3) & (4). 
90  Ss 31, 185 & 186. 
91  S 30. 
92  S 31. 
93  S 235. 
94  Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 402. 
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It should by now be clear that, in my view, race should be ignored in any 
decisions regarding the best interests of a child, and specifically in the case of 
adoption, and hence most of what follows will focus on culture within the context 
of our constitutional dispensation. The quest is to promote a democratic, equal, 
non-racial society,95 and race will only be referred to when necessary for the 
discussion. 
 
5 4 1 2 The protection of culture by the Constitution 
 
 Just as culture is not a factor which should be excluded from the human rights equation, 
so too must it not be accorded the status of a metanorm which trumps rights.96 
 
The founding constitutional values do not include an express reference to culture. 
This, of course, should not be interpreted to mean that culture is not a very 
important constitutional right. In fact, culture is expressly protected in the 
Constitution,97 and the Constitutional Court has said that cultural practices are 
central to human dignity.98 This emphasises the importance of culture, but it does 
not mean that culture is elevated above the other rights in the Constitution. The 
circumstances of each case will determine its relevance. 
 
                                                 
95  S 1. 
96  Alston 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 20. 
97  See “5 4 1 The Constitution, race and culture”.  
98  MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 118. 
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There are various references to culture in the Constitution. There is a 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious 
and Linguistic Communities,99 while there is also a reference to cultural 
heritage.100 Unfair discrimination on the ground of culture is prohibited by section 
9(3) and (4)101 of the Constitution, and the right to a cultural life is protected in 
sections 30 and 31.102 Here the term culture means a particular way of life of an 
identifiable group of people.103  
 
It is clear that the Constitution caters for both individual and collective self-
identities.104 The reference to culture in section 30 should be distinguished from 
the protection of cultural rights enshrined in section 31.105 Culture is defined by 
reference to a group, but the right to culture in section 30 of the Bill of Rights is 
an individual, not a collective, right.106 Section 30 guarantees the right to 
                                                 
99  Ss 185 & 186. In terms of s 181(1) this is one of the state institutions meant to strengthen 
constitutional democracy in the Republic. 
100  S 235. 
101  S 9: “(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination.” 
102  S 30: “Everyone has the right to … participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one 
exercising [this right] may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights.” 
 S 31: “(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the 
right, with other members of that community- 
 (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
 (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of 
civil society. 
 (2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision 
of the Bill of Rights.” 
103  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 629. 
104  Devenish 1999 THRHR 213. 
105  Mireku 1999 SAPL 450. 
106  Van der Meide 1999 SALJ 105; Mireku 1999 SAPL 450. 
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participate in the cultural life of one’s choice: “Everyone has the right ... to 
participate in the cultural life of their choice ...” (my emphasis).107 
 
Section 31 provides inter alia that persons belonging to a cultural community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their 
culture and to form, join and maintain cultural associations. This section is for the 
benefit of persons “belonging to a cultural community”, in other words the right is 
not for the benefit of everyone. It is restricted.  
 
Section 31 does not refer to culture in general, but to “their culture”, and is thus 
understood as a source of identity.108 This viewpoint is confirmed in MEC for 
Education v Pillay,109 where the court said that cultural identity is one of the most 
important parts of a person’s identity because it comes from belonging to a 
community and not from personal choice or achievement; in other words, 
individuals who draw meaning and their sense of cultural identity from a group 
with whom they share cultural identity and with whom they associate.110 The 
court defined culture as relating to traditions and beliefs developed by a 
community and stated that cultural beliefs do not develop in a vacuum.111  
 
                                                 
107  Van der Meide 1999 SALJ 105; Mireku 1999 SAPL 450. 
108  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 629. 
109  2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 116. 
110  MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 143. 
111  At 114. 
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Section 31 thus introduces a collective dimension. It is about a practice pursued 
by individuals as part of a community,112 in other words, this is the right of a 
collection of people “belonging to a ...community”.113 The question now is what 
would be considered a “community”.  
 
A community can be defined as the people living in one place or country and 
considered as a whole; or as a group with similar interests or origins.114 
According to Currie and De Waal, who believe that defining community is 
difficult, it can mean simply an aggregation of people at its most general, or, more 
precisely, the modern usage of the word denotes an aggregation of people with a 
particular quality of relationship, held together by something in common, and that 
it is the quality of the relationship that is important. They conclude that a 
community for purposes of section 31 should be an identifiable group, united by a 
common religion, language or culture that is self-consciously communal, in other 
words, the members of the community should identify themselves as part of the 
group, and they should be identifiable by other members as such.115 They further 
believe that the enjoyment of culture “presupposes the existence of a community 
of individuals with similar rights”, and “an individual right of enjoyment of culture 
assumes the existence of a community that sustains a particular culture”.116  
 
                                                 
112  MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 144. 
113  Devenish 1999 THRHR 212; Mireku 1999 SAPL 450. 
114  Allen & Delahunty Oxford Student’s Dictionary 201. 
115  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 626-627. 
116  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 624. Also see Currie in Chaskalson et al 
Constitutional Law of SA 35-13.  
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The phrase “[p]ersons belonging to a cultural ... community” (my emphasis) in 
section 31(1) indicates that the right is not a right of just simply anybody, but that 
claimants have to prove that some tie exists between them and their group.117 An 
individual’s right of participation in cultural life will be impugned if some harm 
comes to the cultural community in which that individual takes part.118 
 
An important point119 is that section 31 seeks to protect ties of affinity rather than 
genealogy, and that culture is more a matter of shared experience than a matter 
of genetics. This, again, shows us that the issue is not race, but culture. Currie 
and De Waal confirm this viewpoint, stating that ethnic origin is far less important 
than ties of affinity with an ethnic group and that the important issue is that 
membership of a cultural community is proved by demonstrating a history of 
shared experience and identification with the cultural community in question.120 
 
I have explained that culture is a complex issue and that it is not easy to 
determine what a person’s culture is. In MEC for Education v Pillay121 reference 
was made to “a multicultural South Africa where vastly different cultures exist 
side by side”.122 This richness in cultural qualities makes our country one of the 
most cosmopolitan in the world but, as Devenish123 says, the kaleidoscope of 
                                                 
117  Currie in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 35-17. 
118  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 624. 
119  See Currie in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 35-17. 
120  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 627. 
121  2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC). 
122  At 130. 
123  Devenish 1999 THRHR 202. 
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cultural, linguistic and religious heterogeneity, is also a source of potential 
conflict. 
 
5 4 1 3 Culture and equality 
 
The right to equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law is 
the first substantive right in the Bill of Rights and is contained in section 9(1).124 
Goldblatt and Albertyn believe that the right to equality is the core value of the 
Constitution.125 As Deputy President Mohamed said in Fraser v Children’s Court, 
Pretoria North126 “[t]here can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the 
very heart of the Constitution”.127 The achievement of equality is one of the 
founding values of the Constitution,128 but the reality is that tension can and does 
arise between constitutional values,129 and equal protection does not preclude 
differentiation for purposes of the law.130  
 
Discrimination is a particular form of differentiation. An important issue is to 
distinguish between the protection of culture in section 30 and the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of culture, as provided for in section 9. Section 9(5) of 
                                                 
124  S 9(1): “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law.” 
125  Albertyn & Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 254. 
126  1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) at 272 (also reported in 1997 2 BCLR 153 (CC)). 
127  This was reiterated in Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) at 394 (also reported 
in 1998 3 BCLR 257 (CC)). 
128  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the 
RSA 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) at 19. 
129  Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 9 BCLR 1094 (SE) at 1105. 
130  See in this regard S v Ntuli 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC) at 214 (also reported in 1996 1 BCLR 141 
(CC)) where the judge emphasised that “[i]t is trite ... that differentiation does not amount per se to 
unequal treatment in the constitutional sense”. 
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the Constitution states that discrimination on a ground listed in subsection (3)131 
is unfair, unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. The prohibition of 
unfair discrimination may prove to be particularly useful when dealing with 
children, since it presumes that discrimination based on inter alia race, culture 
and age is unfair.132 
 
The protection of culture and the prohibition of unfair discrimination may 
overlap.133 Where there is interference with a person’s right to culture,134 there 
may be discrimination.135 The question will be whether the discrimination was fair 
or unfair.136 The equality clause does not prohibit discrimination, but rather unfair 
discrimination.137 Here the argument of the Constitutional Court in MEC for 
Education v Pillay138 is relevant. The court weighed the purpose of the 
discrimination against the marginalising effect thereof on a certain portion of 
society.139 The more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights is, the more 
persuasive the grounds of justification must be.140 
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo141 Judge Goldstone said that 
the prohibition on unfair discrimination seeks to promote the establishment of a 
                                                 
131  See n 101. 
132  See n 101. 
133  MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 113. 
134  As provided for in s 30. 
135  As provided for in s 9(4). 
136  See MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) at 113. 
137  In Flynn v Farr 2009 (1) SA 584 (CPD) at 599 it was held that the discrimination between 
children who are adopted de lege and those who are adopted de facto is not inconsistent with the 
provisions of s 9 of the Constitution.  
138  2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC). 
139  At 124. 
140  S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at 395. This is also what s 36 stipulates. 
141  1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 22-23 (also reported in 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC)). 
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society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect 
regardless of their membership of particular groups. The importance of human 
dignity142 has repeatedly been emphasised by the Constitutional Court,143 and 
this court has ruled that dignity is not merely a value, but a right that must be 
respected.144 If culture has to be infringed in order for a child to be treated equally 
to other children and with dignity, that is a small price to pay. 
 
 
5 4 2 Culture and the child 
 
With regard to children, it now has to be established whether a child has a culture 
and, if so, to which culture a child belongs. In other words, it has to be 
established how he/she acquires culture. Does he/she automatically follow 
his/her parents’ culture or does a child have a right to his/her own culture?  
 
The race or the country of birth of a person is an unchangeable fact which will 
always be part of the child and about which there can be no doubt. As far as the 
culture of a child is concerned, this is less “fixed” or exact. When a child is born, 
he/she becomes part of a specific culture by virtue of the fact that this is the 
culture of which the biological parents are part. This, however, does not mean 
                                                 
142  S 10 of the Constitution: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.” 
143  See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 451; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v 
Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at 961. 
144  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at 962. 
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that the child will remain part of that culture. In fact, chances are that the child 
may choose not to be a part of that cultural environment even if he/she is raised 
by his/her biological parents.145 
 
An aspect that comes to mind when dealing specifically with children is whether 
children have a right to self-determination.146 Section 30 of the Constitution,147 
which deals with the right to participate in the cultural life of your choice, is not 
restricted to a particular class of beneficiary, in other words, everybody has the 
right to a cultural life. This obviously means that section 30 applies to children, 
who have legal capacity from birth.148 According to Wald149 age has historically 
been accepted as the only basis for withholding certain rights from children, 
which means that infants might be treated differently from older children when it 
comes to their rights. The question whether children are entitled to choose, for 
instance, their own culture, is not an easy one, as it requires a balance to be 
struck between the interests of children, parents and the state.150 Eekelaar151 
stresses that self-determination has to relate to the question of legal competence.  
 
According to Wald152 it must first be determined what types of skills a person 
needs to make a given decision and to what degree children possess the 
                                                 
145  A good example of this, in my opinion, is found in indigenous groups, where the child is often 
raised in a tribal environment with certain cultural values. When the child grows up, he/she often 
moves to an urban area to find employment, and is thus exposed to new and different cultures.  
146  This is the scope for children to determine what their best interests are. 
147  See n 102. 
148  Heaton Law of Persons 37. 
149  Wald 1979 Davis Law Review 265. 
150  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 601. 
151  Eekelaar in Alston Best Interests of the Child 54-55. 
152  Wald 1979 Davis Law Review 274. 
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required abilities. He says153 research shows that younger children (under 10 to 
12 years old) lack the cognitive abilities and judgmental skills necessary to make 
decisions about events which could severely affect their lives. Although children 
have legal capacity, surely, they cannot decide which community they wish to 
belong to until they have achieved a certain level of intellectual development.  
 
Heaton154 says if the child is an infant or is still very young and has not yet 
formed links with his/her “own” culture, few objections can be raised against 
adoption of the child by parents of a different culture. This has to be the correct 
view. In the case of children, limitation of their rights becomes more difficult to 
justify as they grow older, since the responsibilities of parents and the state 
towards a child are linked to the child’s age and therefore diminish as the child 
gets older.155 The Child Care Act states that a child over the age of 10 years who 
understands the nature and import of such consent has to consent to an 
adoption, and the Children’s Act requires that a child aged ten years or older has 
to consent to his/her adoption.156 This seems to be an indication, inter alia, that 
the child may at that stage have formed ties with a particular culture which should 
not be disrupted without the child’s consent.157 If it is clear that the child has 
formed ties of his/her own with a specific culture, it will become increasingly 
                                                 
153  Wald 1979 Davis Law Review 274. 
154  Heaton 1988 LLM 97. 
155  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 601. 
156  S 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 and s 233(1)(c) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Also 
see “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” and “6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and 
the consent of the child”. 
157  S 233(1)(c) of the Children’s Act contains a similar requirement, as well as an additional 
requirement of consent of a child under the age of 10 years who is of an age, maturity and stage of 
development to understand the implications of such consent. This issue is discussed under “4 5 2 
Consent to adoption”. 
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difficult to ignore culture in the adoption process, and there may be cases where 
the limitation of such a child’s right to culture becomes unjustifiable. The most 
important policy consideration is that an adoption must be in the best interests of 
the child, and removing a child from an environment where he/she has formed 
cultural ties may not be in his/her best interests.158 For an older child, culture may 
be more important than for an infant. 
 
Age — more specifically the distinction between infants and older children — 
thus becomes very important. Young children are not able to determine what 
their best interests are. In the context of adoption, the child’s age, not the issue of 
whether the adoption is an interracial/intercultural one, has the most significant 
impact on the child’s development and adjustment.159 As explained above,160 the 
importance of a child growing up in a family environment and bonding with a 
parent is crucial in the development of a child, and the younger the child is when 
this happens, the more beneficial it is for the child. An older child will obviously 
have been exposed to a specific culture, whether that be the culture of the 
biological parents or not. Thus, when an older child is considered for adoption, 
culture has to be kept in mind and will certainly have some significance. 
However, culture should not be over-emphasised. Ultimately, again, culture, on 
its own, should never be considered more important than the best interests of a 
child as a whole which, as I have consistently argued, are served by allowing a 
                                                 
158  Joubert 1993 SALJ 731. 
159  Simon et al The Case for Transracial Adoption 57. 
160  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY”, specifically“3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?” 
above. 
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child to grow up as part of a family. As Pintens says, there are more important 
impediments to overcome than cultural differences,161 and we do not give up our 
identity when cultural changes occur.162 Of course cultural differences are 
realities which must be taken into account, but assumptions and fears about 
problems that may arise as a result of cultural differences can be illusory and 
must not be taken into account merely because they exist, unless the problems 
manifest themselves as realities in a particular case.163  
 
Bonthuys and Pieterse164 are of the opinion that parents’ constitutional right to 
freedom of religion is interpreted so as to encompass the right to influence the 
religious choices of their children, whereas the ambit of children’s right to 
freedom of religion is in turn determined by their level of maturity and the 
religious direction provided by their parents. This view is equally applicable to 
culture, in other words parents influence their children when it comes to a choice 
of culture. Young children, until they reach some level of maturity, are not in a 
position to decide which culture they choose. They simply follow the culture of 
their parents. My submission is thus that, although (young) children are part of a 
culture (their parents’ culture), they have no control over or their own will about 
that particular culture until they reach an age where they can make an 
independent decision about maintaining ties with that cultural group. Until such 
                                                 
161  Pintens 2008 CILSA 160. 
162  Pintens 2008 CILSA 159. 
163  Joubert 1993 SALJ 738. This article is based on the American experience, but the point of 
departure should be the same in South Africa, although undoubtedly it has to be borne in mind that 
racial background in South Africa might also be associated with differences in language and 
culture. 
164  Bonthuys & Pieterse 2001 SALJ 223. 
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time, they are part of the cultural community chosen by their parents, whether 
their parents are biological parents or not.  
 
What about the situation where a child’s culture is not known, for instance in the 
case of an abandoned child, or where we have a child of mixed race who is 
available for adoption? It will be impossible to consider the child’s culture where 
such a child is put up for adoption. Any attempt to do so will just be a pretext for 
racial matching. The child will develop a culture in the environment where he/she 
grows up. 
 
 
5 4 3 Competing rights 
 
5 4 3 1 Introduction 
 
There are obviously many instances when rights might compete. Children are the 
bearers of various rights, which include the right “to family care or parental care, 
or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment”,165 
the right to equality, and the right to culture.166 These rights may at times 
compete, such as when an adoption is considered and the child and the 
prospective adoptive parents are from different cultures. In order to serve the 
best interests of the child, the solution is to try to balance these competing 
                                                 
165  S 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
166  Ss 30 & 31 – see n 102. 
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constitutional rights. Although this may sound simple, the complexity of this issue 
cannot be denied. It requires a value judgement.167 
 
5 4 3 2 How does the Constitution deal with competing rights? 
 
It has to be remembered that no right is absolute, and that fundamental rights 
may be limited under certain circumstances.168 The question now is whether the 
child’s right to culture may be limited in order to provide a child with appropriate 
alternative care in the form of adoption when removed from the family 
environment. 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights are independently guaranteed. The courts will 
attempt to harmonise conflicting provisions,169 but there are many instances 
where different fundamental rights compete and cannot be reconciled in the 
relevant circumstances. The proper application of the limitation clause will be 
critical in striking a balance between these rights and reasonable limitations 
thereof. A balancing exercise has to be undertaken on a case by case basis.170  
 
Various rights come into play when consideration is given to a child’s 
constitutional rights in the context of this research. The child’s right to culture, the 
best interests of the child, the child’s right to family care, parental care and 
                                                 
167  Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 9 BCLR 1094 (SE) at 1106. 
168  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 185 – the infringement has to be for a compellingly 
good reason. 
169  See S v Rens 1996 (1) SA 1218 (CC) at 1222-1223. 
170  M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) at 1329; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436. 
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alternative care171 and the rights to equality and dignity all play some part. Most 
of the rights in the Bill of Rights are textually unqualified, and there is no 
constitutional hierarchy of rights.172 A few rights, however, are qualified by 
language which specifically demarcates their scope.173 Carpenter174 speaks of 
“internal modifiers”, which she defines as words or phrases that form an integral 
part of the definition of a particular right. Such qualifications can be termed 
demarcations of the right. According to Currie and De Waal175 these 
demarcations place certain conditions on the use of the right and come into play 
when the nature and scope of the right in question are determined. The task of 
the courts is to “generously accommodate cultural liberty while assuring [that 
culture] is not involved as a cheap excuse for every conceivable form of self-
indulgence”.176 As we have established, rights may be limited. In the process of 
balancing rights and determining which rights should be limited, each case will 
have to be considered on its merits.  
 
The limitation of constitutional rights involves the weighing up of competing 
interests and, ultimately, an assessment based on proportionality.177 
                                                 
171  As argued above (see “3 2 3 2 The role of the State and the Constitution”), adoption is a form of 
alternative care that provides the child with the opportunity to experience parental care. 
172  Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) at 347-348; South African 
Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) at 546; 
Johncom Media Investments Ltd v M unreported case CCT 08/08, 17 March 2009 (CC) at par 19. 
173  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 186. 
174  Carpenter 1995 SAPL 261; this phrase is also used by Bekink 2003 THRHR 246 n 34. 
175  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 187. 
176  Devenish 1999 THRHR 215. 
177  See eg S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 31 (also reported in 1998 12 BCLR 1517 
(CC)); Phillips v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (4) BCLR 357 (CC) at 365 (also reported 
in 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC)); Johncom Media Investments Ltd v M unreported case CCT 08/08, 17 
March 2009 (CC) at par 24. 
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Proportionality requires, by definition, the balancing of different interests.178 What 
has to be considered is the proportionality179 between the infringement and the 
purpose, effect and importance of the infringing provision.180 To determine 
whether a limitation is permissible section 36 of the Bill of Rights, the general 
limitation clause, sets out the specific criteria for the restriction of the fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights.181  
The application of these criteria can only be done on a case by case basis.182 
Section 36 reads as follows: 
 
 (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
                                                 
178  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436. 
179  This is also the term used by Chief Justice Langa in MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 
(CC) at 126. 
180  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 31 
(also reported in 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC)). 
181  In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (also reported in 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC)) this 
approach was already adopted by the Constitutional Court as a standard reference when the court 
considers the legitimacy of a limitation – see Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 177. 
Woolman in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 12-1 says that the limitation clause has a 
fourfold purpose - to serve as a reminder that the rights in the Constitution are not absolute; to 
remind us that the rights may only be limited where and when the objective behind the restriction 
is designed to reinforce the values which animate this constitutional project; the limitation clause 
should provide us with a mechanism for balancing competing fundamental values and it represents 
an attempt to solve the problem of judicial review by establishing a test which determines the 
extent to which government may limit our constitutionally protected rights. 
182  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436 (also reported in 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC)). 
President Chaskalson said that the limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is 
reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, 
and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. 
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(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
 
Any rule of law limiting constitutionally protected rights otherwise than in 
conformity with the constraints enunciated in section 36(1) is invalid.183  
 
The Child Care Act, which presently regulates adoption, is a “law of general 
application” as required by section 36(1).184 The next question is whether the 
limitation of cultural rights is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.185 This 
means that a law that restricts a fundamental right may do so only if the law in 
question serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose, and there is sufficient 
proportionality between the harm done by the law (the infringement of 
fundamental rights) and the benefits it is designed to achieve (the purpose of the 
law).186 As Rautenbach187 puts it, there must be a particular relation between a 
limitation and the purpose of the limitation, and it must be a relation that one 
would find in a particular kind of society, namely, “an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”,188 and not in a closed, 
                                                 
183  S 36(2) of the Constitution read with s 2; see also s 172(1)(a). 
184  This means that the limitation must be authorised by a law which, according to Judge Mokgoro in 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 43-46 includes rules of 
legislation, delegated legislation and common law. 
185  S 36(1). 
186  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 176. 
187  Rautenbach in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-71. 
188  Also see Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at 777. 
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undemocratic society in which human dignity is not cherished and people are not 
treated as free and equal human beings. Once it has been established that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, it is necessary to consider each of the 
factors of section 36 individually in the context of intercultural adoption. 
 
(a) The nature of the right: A court has to assess what the importance of a 
particular right is in the overall constitutional scheme. A right that is of particular 
importance to the constitutional ambition to create an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, freedom and equality will carry a great deal of 
weight in the exercise of balancing rights against their infringement.189  
Example: The right to alternative care (as can be provided by adoption) is 
fundamental to a child’s development,190 while the right to culture, on the 
other hand, is not quite as important.191 I shall explain. When there is an 
interracial/intercultural adoption, it might infringe a child’s cultural rights. 
As fundamental rights are protected, this means that for such an adoption 
to be constitutional the limitation of the cultural rights of the child has to be 
reasonable and justifiable. The purpose and the benefits of the adoption 
would have to be balanced against the harm it could do (the infringement). 
According to Currie and De Waal192 the first consideration in this balancing 
                                                 
189  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 178. 
190  In this regard, the discussion under “3 3 ATTACHMENT” illustrates the importance for a child of 
growing up as part of a family. 
191  See “3 3 2 2 How are attachments formed?”. This statement is not an attempt to deny the 
importance of culture, but merely to place the importance of culture in the context of intercultural 
adoption in perspective. 
192  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 178. 
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exercise is the importance of the right in an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality. Section 28 of the Constitution creates 
specific rights for children. As argued above, the purpose of adoption is to 
comply with the constitutionally entrenched right of each child to grow up 
as part of a family and experience parental care. This is one of the special 
rights afforded to children in section 28.193 Further, section 28(2) provides 
that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child. The best interests rule has been established 
in our law and is always, as far as children are concerned, all-important.194 
Furthermore, human dignity and equality, both of which are part of the 
founding values of the Constitution,195 can better be served by providing a 
child with a family than by trying to protect the concept of culture. 
Furthermore, sections 30196 and 31(2)197 of the Bill of Rights specifically 
state that cultural rights may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision in the Bill of Rights, thus implying that these rights may 
be subordinate to the other rights in the Bill of Rights under certain 
circumstances and that they may therefore be limited under those 
circumstances.198 
 
                                                 
193  S 28(1)(b). 
194  Fraser v Naude 1999 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 5 (also reported in 1998 11 BCLR 1357 (CC)); Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 429 (also reported in 
2000 7 BCLR 713 (CC)). 
195  S 1(a). 
196  See n 102. 
197  See n 102. 
198  See Haysom & Kathla in Davis et al Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 292; Bekink 2003 
THRHR 250. 
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(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation: At a minimum, 
reasonableness requires the limitation of a right to serve some purpose, while 
justifiability requires the purpose to be one that is worthwhile and important in a 
constitutional democracy.199  
Example: Intercultural adoption might violate a child’s right to culture. It 
thus needs to be determined whether such adoption would serve a 
purpose that an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality would consider worthwhile and important.200 The purpose of an 
intercultural adoption is to serve the best interests of the child by providing 
him/her with a family environment in which to grow up. This is an 
extremely important purpose201 which would, I believe, justify the limitation 
of the right to culture. Where a child is in need of a family to love and 
protect him/her but suitable parents202 of the same culture203 as the 
child’s biological mother and/or father are not available, will it serve the 
child’s best interests if this child is denied the constitutional right to 
alternative care (adoption) that can be provided by allowing the child to be 
raised by a loving family of a different culture? In other words, could the 
child’s best interests be curbed to protect the right to culture? It is 
submitted that it would never be in the best interests of a child not to have 
a normal family life. Denying a child a family life would also infringe the 
child’s right to equality. Moreover, a healthy permanent family is preferable 
                                                 
199  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 179. 
200  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 179. 
201  See “3 3 ATTACHMENT”. 
202  It would be a mistake to accept any parents of the same race/culture as the child. 
203  In my view race is not the issue, but rather culture. 
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to an institution or foster home in meeting a child’s emotional needs,204 
which inevitably leads one to the conclusion that cultural rights may be 
infringed in order to provide a child with a family.205 Protecting family life is 
a purpose that is important not only for the child personally, but also for 
the healthy development of our future generations. Cultural rights may be 
infringed when the purpose is worthwhile and important,206 and this is such 
a case. If the adoption would otherwise be in the best interests of the child, 
the infringement of cultural rights is justifiable because the purpose is to 
comply with section 28(1)(b) and section 28(2) of the Constitution by 
providing a child with appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment, thereby granting the child a family life and serving the 
child’s best interests. 
 
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation: The infringement of a right should 
not be more extensive than is warranted by the purpose the limitation seeks to 
achieve.207 It is necessary to assess whether there is proportionality between the 
harm done by the infringement and the purpose it is designed to achieve – the 
more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the 
grounds of justification must be.208  
                                                 
204  See “3 3 1 Introduction”and “3 3 2 2 How are attachments formed?”. 
205  Forde-Mazrui 1994 Michigan Law Review 967. 
206  In terms of s 31(2) culture may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provisions of 
the Bill of Rights. 
207  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 181-182. 
208  In S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at 395 (also reported in 1995 12 BCLR 1579 
(CC) and [1996] 1 All SA 11 (CC)) Judge O’Regan said “the court places the purpose, effect and 
importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the 
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 Example: All rights are important and every attempt obviously has to be 
made to infringe any right as little as possible. The child’s right to a cultural 
life might have to be infringed in order to provide a family environment for 
the child. I believe such infringement is warranted by the best interests of 
the child. Furthermore, it is submitted that the infringement of the right to 
culture will be limited in scope,209 especially in the case of a very young 
child or an infant, who may not yet have an established culture.210 As Marx 
says, not all adopted children have a cultural identity and the younger the 
child is when an adoption takes place, the less important culture is.211 
Even where there is an established culture, the culture shock which an 
uprooted child may experience fades and seems inconsequential when 
balanced against the child’s improved quality of life.212 Thus, even where 
there is infringement of this right, such infringement is not as damaging to 
the child as the denial of the right to alternative care, namely adoption, 
would be to the child. 
 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose: There must be a good 
reason for the infringement, and this reason must tend to serve the purpose that 
it is designed to serve. In the absence of proportionality between the harm done 
                                                                                                                                                 
infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The more substantial the inroad into 
fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must be”. 
209  See my argument under “5 2 2 Culture” and “5 4 2 Culture and the child”. 
210  See the discussion under “5 4 2 Culture and the child”. 
211  Marx 2008 Emory Int’l L. Rev 379. 
212  Marx 2008 Emory Int’l L. Rev 379. 
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by the infringement and the beneficial purpose that it is meant to achieve, the 
infringement cannot be reasonable.213 
 Example: The purpose of interracial/intercultural adoption is to comply with 
a child’s right to alternative care when removed from the family 
environment by providing him/her with family life and a family environment 
in which to grow up. Furthermore, the purpose is to protect the child’s 
dignity and to ensure that such a child is treated like children who are part 
of a family. There is thus a rational connection between means and end. 
The only way that a family environment can be enjoyed by a child in need 
of alternative care may be to arrange an intercultural adoption. 
 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose: The question that is asked 
is whether other means could be employed to achieve the same ends that would 
either not restrict the right at all, or would not restrict it to the same extent.214 If 
another method existed for achieving the same purpose that would be less 
restrictive but equally effective,215 a limitation would not be considered 
reasonable.216 If a way could be found to restrict a fundamental right as little as 
possible, it has to be employed. 
                                                 
213  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at 429 (also 
reported in 2000 7 BCLR 713 (CC)); Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 183. Woolman in 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of SA 12-50 believes that this factor should be placed after the 
second factor, because once the legitimacy of the limitation’s objective is established it makes 
sense to ask whether the means employed to achieve the objective are rationally related to 
achieving that objective, and, if not, there can be no good reason to permit the infringement of the 
right; see also Rautenbach in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-72, where he emphasises that s 36 
does not prescribe any particular order in which the factors must be considered. 
214  Rautenbach in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-81. 
215  S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 41 (also reported in 2000 5 BCLR 491 (CC)). 
216  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 183-184. 
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Example: If a child grows up without the opportunity of living in a family 
environment, the child’s best interests are not served. If an adoption is 
possible where the child could be placed with parents of the same cultural 
background as the child, it would usually be preferable (if the parents are 
suitable),217 but when that becomes impossible, there is only one way to 
provide the child with a family environment, and that is intercultural 
adoption. This, of course, does not mean that the limitation of the child’s 
cultural rights will necessarily be very restrictive. The adoptive parents 
might make an effort to expose the child to the culture of his/her biological 
background, where this is known. It also has to be remembered that 
parents are merely there to guide a child with regard to future choices. In 
other words, as the child grows up, he/she will increasingly make 
independent decisions about which culture he/she wishes to follow. 
 
The court in MEC for Education v Pillay218 held that it is helpful to separate the 
enquiry about possible limitation into its constitutive parts, namely whether there 
is a legitimate purpose, whether the limitation achieves this purpose, and whether 
there are less restrictive means available to achieve the purpose.219 The 
legitimate purpose of limiting a child’s right to culture is to provide a child with a 
family and the opportunity to grow up in a family environment. As we have 
already established, this is a right that every child is entitled to, and which can 
only be achieved by allowing a child who cannot be raised by his/her biological 
                                                 
217  Also see “5 3 2 Making a distinction” above, where the “mild preference” rule is discussed. 
218  2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC). 
219  At 129. 
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family to be raised in an alternative family. The only way this can be achieved in 
some cases, is to ignore the culture that a child was born into where no suitable 
parents with the same cultural background as the child are available to adopt the 
child. Of course, it has to be stressed that the child will not necessarily lose 
his/her cultural background entirely. Whether the child’s cultural background will 
be upheld will depend on the willingness and ability of the adoptive parents. 
 
5 4 3 3 Which conflicts are we dealing with? 
 
Now that we have established that there are constitutional rights which may 
compete, and that the Constitution provides guidelines about how to deal with 
these competing rights, the next step is to decide who is/are involved in these 
competing rights. Various possible scenarios have to be considered. Should the 
child’s right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care 
when removed from the family environment be weighed up against the 
community’s right to ensure that cultural rights are upheld; should the child’s right 
to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed 
from the family environment be weighed up against the other rights of the child, 
such as the right to culture, dignity and equality; or should the child’s right to 
family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed 
from the family environment be weighed up against the right to culture as seen 
from the perspective of the parents, such as the biological parents’ cultural rights 
or the rights of the prospective adoptive parents to be considered on an equal 
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footing to other applicants?220 In other words, the essential issue is to determine 
whose constitutional rights compete. 
 
The right to culture is granted to “everyone” and this right may be exercised with 
“other members of that community”. It is therefore an individual right, and in other 
words, the child’s right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate 
alternative care when removed from the family environment has to be weighed 
up against the child’s right to culture. This is in keeping with the view of the court 
in MEC for Education v Pillay.221 The court was of the opinion that the importance 
of a cultural practice depended mainly on the importance of the practice to that 
person.222 It is therefore not the importance of the culture for a specific cultural 
community that is relevant.223 In the context of this research it is an important 
point, because when a young child is adopted it is unlikely that he/she at that 
stage attaches any importance to culture. It is only when the child is older that 
this becomes a possibility, but even where the child has already become part of a 
specific culture, it has been argued throughout this chapter that culture is 
subordinate to the right to grow up in a family environment.  
 
Quinton & Selwyn say young people make up their own minds on the importance 
they attach to cultural features and that they identify with different aspects of their 
heritages for different purposes. It would be a positive personal outcome if 
                                                 
220  In this regard, the argument of Quinton & Selwyn below under the same heading is relevant. 
221  2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC). 
222  At 124. 
223  Malherbe 2008 TSAR 370-371. 
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interracially placed children were content with their ethnic identity,224 even if that 
identity was weaker than that of racially matched children, but such an outcome 
would be negative if the criterion were the maintenance of a culture as a 
whole.225 In other words the question here is whether the relevance of culture has 
to be determined by considering the rights and wishes of the child, or whether it 
is more important to bear in mind the wishes of the community and the 
preservation of culture for the benefit of the community. I think this might be one 
of the most important arguments thus far.226 Ultimately, adoption is not about the 
community or the adults involved in the process, but the best interests of the 
child.227 If we can accept that a child could be satisfied with his/her cultural 
identity, whether that corresponds with the culture of his/her biological parents or 
not, the realisation that it is not about the culture, the community or the parents, 
but about the well-being of the child, will follow. Ultimately, the competing 
considerations are the well-being that results from a permanent home and 
growing up in a family environment weighed against the harmful delay and 
possible total denial of the opportunity to grow up in a family environment that 
results from a decision to deny an intercultural adoption. 
 
 
                                                 
224  This refers to the rights of the child that may compete. 
225  Quinton & Selwyn 2006 Child and Family Law Quarterly 469-470. This refers to the conflict 
between the right of the child and the right of the community. 
226  Although Quinton & Selwyn do not discuss this, I mentioned above that there is a further possible 
conflict – that of the child and the parents, whether biological or adoptive. 
227  Although the views of Heaton (see “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach”) should 
be kept in mind, namely, that all relevant aspects, including the opinions of all relevant parties, 
should be employed to determine the best interests of the child, ultimately these are only 
guidelines and the important issue is the child, not the parents or the community.  
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5 4 3 4 The child’s competing rights 
 
Where conflicts occur between rights pertaining to a single bearer of these rights, 
how should the conflicts be resolved? Under the previous heading I made it quite 
clear that in the context of adoption the only relevant rights are those of the child 
him/herself and the competition that often occurs between these rights. In 
chapter three I said that the right of children to family care or parental care serves 
as an acknowledgement of the importance for a child to grow up within a family 
environment.228 On the other hand, we are also dealing with the child’s right to 
culture. Bennett229 argues the right to culture is expressly subordinated to the 
other fundamental rights, since “no one exercising [the rights to culture] may do 
so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights”.230 Although it 
can no longer be stated that one right is subordinate to another,231 there are 
circumstances in which one right will take precedence over others.232 I believe 
Bennett’s argument that culture may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision in the Bill of Rights supports my argument that culture may be 
limited in order to serve the best interests of the child. His viewpoint is also in line 
with that of Alston, who says it has to be accepted that cultural considerations will 
have to yield whenever a clear conflict with human rights norms becomes 
                                                 
228  Robinson 1998 Obiter 335, as referred to under “3 1 INTRODUCTION”. 
229  Bennett 1999 Obiter 155. 
230  S 30. 
231  This was decided by the Constitutional Court — see Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd 
2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) at 347-348; South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) at 546; Johncom Media Investments Ltd v M 
unreported case CCT 08/08, 17 March 2009 (CC) at par 19. 
232  South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 
(CC) at 546. 
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apparent.233 Section 28(1)(d)234 as well as section 9(3)235 and section 10236 are 
crucial when we follow this argument. A child who is left in an institution in order 
to protect that child’s cultural background may face neglect in the form of 
emotional neglect (such as a lack of affection and love) or physical neglect (such 
as a need for clothing or food). Section 9(3) expressly says that the state may not 
unfairly discriminate on certain grounds.237 If we apply these rules to adoption, 
and a decision not to allow an adoption is made because of a child’s cultural 
background, such a child may have been unfairly discriminated against on the 
grounds of race, ethnic or social origin, colour, culture and birth,238 to name but a 
few. Any inroad into the right to alternative care would therefore be much bigger 
than an inroad in respect of the culture of a child who is interculturally adopted 
would entail.  
 
Clearly, the child’s culture plays a role in the assessment of a child’s best 
interests. The child’s culture should be given due consideration in relation to the 
needs of the particular child on a case by case analysis.239 In this way a balance 
can be found between sections 9(3), 28(1)(b) and 28(2).240  
 
                                                 
233  Alston 1994 International Journal of Law and the Family 21. 
234  S 28(1): “Every child has the right – … 
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation”. 
235  See n 101. 
236  See n 142. 
237  See n 101. 
238  S 9(3) of the Constitution. 
239  Bennett 1999 Obiter 156; Knoetze 2002 Obiter 354. 
240  Nicholson & Politis 2001 De Jure 602. 
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Furthermore, sections 30241 and 31(2)242 expressly state that they may not be 
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Although the rights in the Bill of Rights are all important and each case has to be 
considered individually to determine whether a limitation is possible, I believe the 
proviso in sections 30 and 31(2) is of great significance, as it tells us that there 
are other rights that may have preference and could justify a limitation of culture. 
Section 28 contains no proviso, which indicates that the rights granted to children 
in this section should get preference when having to “choose” between section 
28 on the one hand and sections 30 and 31 on the other. When we also consider 
the argument that culture is often confused with race, and Joubert’s argument 
with regard to race,243 there can be no doubt that the child’s right to culture may 
be limited in order to comply with section 28(1)(b). Section 28(1)(b) (together with 
section 9(3)) places a positive obligation on the state to view the best interests of 
the child holistically rather than to emphasise cultural differences. 
 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that — as Triseliotis et al244 point out — 
whether or not cultural identity is preserved, all children grow up in a dual world 
and are so extensively exposed to other cultures that a mixed pattern may 
emerge in any case. They say that a person need not have a single culture as a 
reference group to avoid identity confusion. 
 
                                                 
241  See n 102. 
242  See n 102. 
243  Joubert 1993 SALJ 732-733, as explained under “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
244  Triseliotis et al Adoption 179. 
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5 4 4 Conclusion 
 
Perhaps it is time to consider the issues of race and culture in adoption from a 
different angle. The discussions and studies about the impact of 
interracial/intercultural adoption focus mainly on racial differences between the 
child and the adoptive parent, and the result thereof with regard to culture, but 
there is in fact no evidence that black parents do a better job than white parents 
(or vice versa) of raising black children with a sense of pride in their racial culture 
and heritage.245 Ultimately a statement by an interracially adopted child, who 
says that “[p]rejudice comes from ignorance”,246 sums up the situation well. 
 
It is my view that culture has to be considered, but it may never carry more 
weight than other relevant factors when considering an intercultural adoption. 
Cultural rights have to be protected, but certainly not at all costs. Should 
intercultural adoption be denied, we are contributing towards keeping South 
Africa a divided nation, instead of working together towards a united rainbow 
nation. If more people looked at the positives, rather than the negatives, they 
might realise that intercultural adoption can be one of the means of showing the 
community how to bridge our differences, how to link different cultures and 
generally just how to get along better. 
 
 
                                                 
245  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 167. 
246  Simon et al The Case for Transracial Adoption 104. 
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5 5 INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
5 5 1 Introduction 
 
As I have already indicated,247 international law and foreign law are important in 
the interpretation of the Constitution. It is thus necessary to analyse the contents 
of relevant international instruments in order to determine how the issues of race 
and culture, specifically with regard to children and their best interests, are 
interpreted in these instruments.  
 
5 5 2  The Convention 
 
Cultural values are referred to in the Preamble of the Convention.248 This serves 
as confirmation of the importance of culture for an individual, but does not elevate 
culture above any other values in the Convention. When considering the role of 
culture, the Convention states that due regard has to be paid inter alia to the 
child’s cultural background when alternative care is considered for such child.249 
A child’s right to enjoy his/her culture in community with other members of his/her 
group is protected in the Convention,250 and article 31(2) requires States Parties 
to promote the right of a child to participate fully in cultural life. It is not clear that 
the culture referred to in these articles is that of the biological parents of the child. 
                                                 
247  See “4 2 2 International instruments”. 
248  “Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the 
protection and harmonious development of the child”. 
249  Art 20(3). 
250  Art 30. 
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It could also be a reference to the group or environment in which the child is 
raised.  
 
Culture is an element of a child’s life which obviously has to be taken into 
account when any decision regarding the best interests of that child has to be 
made. It is, however, not elevated above any of the other elements that form part 
of the child’s life and should not be given more weight than was intended by the 
Convention. Freeman says that article 3 (which makes the best interests of the 
child a primary consideration instead of the primary consideration)251 creates a 
loophole which invites states parties to find other equally weighty primary 
considerations, such as culture.252 This may be so, but such an argument should 
not lead to the conclusion that culture is more important than other rights in the 
Convention. Snow & Covell believe that culture should not be elevated above 
other elements in the Convention that relate to the child.253  
 
5 5 3 The Charter 
 
The Preamble of the Charter refers to cultural circumstances of African 
children254 and takes the virtues of their cultural heritage into consideration in 
respect of the rights and welfare of the child.255 Article 12 grants a child the right 
                                                 
251  See “4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy”. 
252  Freeman “Future of children’s rights” in Freeman Children’s Rights ii 300. 
253  Snow & Covell 2006 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 115. 
254  “ … the situation of most African children, remains critical due to the unique factors of their … 
cultural … circumstances …”. 
255  “Taking into consideration the virtues of their cultural heritage … which should inspire and 
characterize their reflection on the concept of the right and welfare of the child” (my emphasis).  
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to participate in cultural life,256 and the child has the duty to “strengthen African 
cultural values” in his/her relations with other members of society.257 There is, 
however, no indication in article 12 that the culture has to be that of the biological 
parents of the child. In fact, in my view this article actually emphasises the right of 
a child to choose when it comes to culture. It is further unclear what is meant by 
“African cultural values”. There is obviously more than one culture in Africa. 
Perhaps this reference is aimed at minority culture, or perhaps by “African” the 
intention is to refer to “black” culture. This is unclear, but as I have argued,258 
there is in any event not only one distinct black culture. The references to culture 
in this document are vague. Although they should not be ignored, too much 
emphasis cannot be placed on culture under these circumstances. 
 
In support of my view article 3, the non-discrimination article, entitles children to 
the enjoyment of certain rights and freedoms. There is, however, no reference to 
culture here. This does not mean that culture is not protected, but it is (again) a 
confirmation of the lesser role of culture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
256  Art 12: “States Parties recognize the right of the child … to participate freely in cultural life and 
the arts”. In view of the discussion under “5 2 2 Culture” and the different interpretations of 
culture, I believe that the intention of art 12 is more in line with the protection of the artistic aspect 
of culture than the traditions and customs that can also be associated with culture. 
257  Art 31(d). 
258  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
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5 5 4 Conclusion 
 
A common thread in the international instruments is the recognition that a child, 
for the full and harmonious development of his/her personality, should grow up in 
a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. 
There can thus be no doubt about the importance of affording a family 
environment to a child, even at the expense of the child’s biological culture.  
 
Having considered the limitation of constitutional rights within the context of 
intercultural adoption and the approach to culture in international instruments, I 
shall now set out some of the arguments for and against interracial/intercultural 
adoption in more detail.  
 
 
5 6 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INTERRACIAL/INTERCULTURAL 
ADOPTION 
 
5 6 1 Introduction 
 
The arguments regarding the desirability or undesirability of 
interracial/intercultural adoption focus mainly on the issue of culture and whether 
intercultural adoption will result in the loss of a child’s biological culture. There 
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are very strong arguments both in favour of and against interracial/intercultural 
adoption. Although my research focuses mainly on culture, undoubtedly there is 
a close link between race and culture in the context of adoption. When an 
interracial adoption takes place, it will almost certainly also be an intercultural 
adoption. As a result I consider it important to touch on some racial issues, such 
as the difference in appearance between the adoptive parents and the child. 
 
5 6 2 Arguments against intercultural adoption 
 
The issue of race matching and the preservation of culture in the context of 
interracial adoption is not unique to South Africa. In Canada the practice has 
been to keep Aboriginal children in their communities because of the Aboriginal 
belief that the rights of the community supersede the rights of the individual child. 
This belief is similar to that of the indigenous people of South Africa. Children are 
viewed as communal resources and what is in the best interests of the child 
tends to be defined in terms of blood ties rather than living conditions.259 A similar 
belief is shared in customary law in South Africa, where adoption is adult-
centered.260 Although the validity of customary adoption is not denied in any way, 
the aim of customary adoption is completely different to that of statutory 
adoption.261 As I shall argue in “9 CONCLUSION”, I believe that the legislature 
should take account of customary practices and incorporate positive aspects of 
                                                 
259  Snow & Covell 2006 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 110. 
260  The purpose of adoption in customary law is to provide a man with an heir – Bennett Customary 
Law in SA 318. 
261  See “2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary law” above. 
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these adoption practices into legislation. However, the belief that children are 
viewed as communal resources and that their best interests should be 
subordinate to those of the community should, in my view, not be adopted in 
South African legislation as it puts the interests of the community before the 
interests of the child.262 The best interests of the child should not be determined 
by considering anyone other than the individual child.263 If the child is put first, the 
result will be that any decision taken will be in the best interests of the child, and 
of no one else. 
 
An argument that is raised against intercultural adoptions is that these adoptions 
are a threat to the existence/continuation of culture.264 The validity of this 
argument is doubtful as intercultural adoptions make up a very tiny percentage of 
all adoptions. The percentage of children who are adopted interculturally is so 
small that it “poses no realistic threat to the existence of that community or the 
preservation of its culture”.265 Clearly, in the greater picture, there is no significant 
effect, especially on the culture of a community. Furthermore, this argument 
again judges interracial/intercultural adoption from the viewpoint of the 
community and not from that of the best interests of the child. Even if there is a 
slight effect, my view is that opponents of intercultural adoption incorrectly focus 
on cultural concerns at the expense of the child’s best interests.  
                                                 
262  See “5 4 3 3 Which conflicts are we dealing with?”. 
263  This can be seen, inter alia, in s 28(2) of the Constitution and s 7(1) of the Children’s Act. Also 
see my discussion under “4 2 7 Factors that determine the best interests of the child”.  
264  Also see the discussion under “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”. 
265  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 172; Forde-Mazrui 1994 
Michigan Law Review 967. 
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Opponents of interracial adoption argue that the child’s racial identity suffers and 
that the child’s culture is diminished when he/she is raised outside of his/her 
racial group.266 Mosikatsana is the strongest voice against interracial adoption in 
South Africa. He267 argues that interracial adoptions are not in the best interests 
of a child, and believes that they do not conduce to the welfare of the child. He 
suggests that the repeal of section 40(b)268 of the Child Care Act should not 
preclude the courts from disallowing interracial adoptions as part of the best 
interests analysis of section 18(4)(c) of the Child Care Act,269 and that the courts 
may exercise their discretion to prohibit interracial adoptions pursuant to section 
40 of the Child Care Act270 on the basis of prospective cultural or religious 
incompatibility of the child and the prospective adoptive parent.271 His argument 
is that interracial adoptees may suffer identity crises resulting from loss of racial 
or cultural identity, and a child who is interracially adopted may suffer racial 
prejudice from his/her adoptive parents or the community in which the adoptive 
parents live, which may damage the child’s self-concept. He is of the opinion that 
if such a child is socially ostracised by the racial group of the adoptive parent(s), 
he/she may not be able to affiliate with any racial, cultural or linguistic group. He 
argues that cultural disparities create a likelihood of a failed interracial adoption 
policy.  
                                                 
266  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1081. 
267  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 611, 613-614. 
268  See n 4 and “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
269  S 18(4): “A children’s court to which application for an order for adoption is made … shall not 
grant the application unless it is satisfied— 
 (c) that the proposed adoption will serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child”. 
270  See n 7. 
271  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 611, 615-616. 
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I do not think anybody would deny that interracial adoptions may sometimes be 
problematic or difficult, but I also believe that Mosikatsana’s is a fairly cynical 
outlook on life. His views are totally hypothetical. One may just as well say that a 
child may be abused, neglected or assaulted by his or her biological parent(s) or 
adoptive parent(s) of the same racial or cultural group. What about the child who 
has a physical handicap? Such a child may also be socially ostracised or may 
suffer prejudice because of his or her disability. This is all pure speculation, which 
should not be used in support of the view that interracial adoption is undesirable.  
 
Mosikatsana’s line of thinking is, in my view, flawed and negative. Acceptance of 
his argument could also quite easily result in a continuation of race-matching 
(which was certainly not the intention of section 40) as a requirement for 
adoption.272 In the USA Supreme Court case, Palmore v Sidoti,273 the court 
accepted that deviation from the norm often brings ridicule and criticism, but 
rejected the notion that this is necessarily the “basis for implanting neuroses”. 
Forde-Mazrui supports this view. He asks whether a parent must have “worn 
glasses, been fat, worn braces, or been short in order to help her child who, while 
on the playground, is called ‘four eyes,’ ‘fatso,’ ‘tinsel teeth,’ or ‘shrimp’”.274  
 
                                                 
272  See in this regard Zaal 1994 SAJHR 378. 
273  466 US 429 (1984), as quoted in Schneider 2003 Law Quadrangle Notes 77. 
274  Forde-Mazrui 1994 Michigan Law Review 954. 
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When Mosikatsana275 interviewed social workers from the Johannesburg Child 
Welfare Society about interracial placements, they reported that the adoptive 
parents received unfavourable remarks from community members of the same 
race as their adoptive children, and that there tended to be more resistance from 
the black community. I believe that unfavourable remarks and community 
resistance do not provide a sound foundation for rejecting interracial adoption. 
The community may have some prejudices about interracial adoption, but this is 
certainly no reason to argue that interracial adoption is inevitably not in the best 
interests of a child. As Perry says: 
 
 To deny a child a home … on the basis of speculation about potential racial difficulties 
sometime in the future, virtually ignores the value to the child of growing up in a family 
setting.276 
 
Furthermore, in S v Makwanyane,277 President Chaskalson said that if public 
opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for constitutional 
adjudication.278  
 
Mosikatsana believes that post-apartheid South Africa continues to be a race-
conscious society, and that race relations in post-apartheid South Africa are still 
tense. If it were not for class and racial tension, interracial adoptions would take 
                                                 
275  Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 616. 
276  Perry 1990-1991 J Fam L 82. 
277  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
278  At 431. 
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place without even attracting a modicum of attention.279 This leads us to the 
conclusion that it is the prejudices of people that stand in the way of 
interracial/intercultural adoption. The logical inference is that the problem does 
not lie with the parties to an interracial adoption. It may, however, be necessary 
to educate the general public about such adoptions. 
 
Mosikatsana hypothesises that adoption procedures and agency practices 
contain a class and racial bias in that they target mainly white middle class 
families as prospective adoptive parents.280 He says that adoption in South Africa 
is a service provided by voluntary adoption agencies to childless white couples, 
and suggests that a solution would be to change agency policies and 
practices.281 He submits282 that the primary objective of adoption is not to satisfy 
the parenting needs of childless couples, but to regulate the placement of 
children in accordance with their rights and best interests (a view which, I believe, 
everyone shares). I am of the opinion that his argument does not lead one to the 
conclusion that interracial adoption is wrong or inevitably not in the best interests 
of the child. His argument is not one that goes against interracial adoptions. 
Rather, it deals with social prejudices and procedural failures in the adoption 
process. What it does show, is that there may be a serious problem with the 
methods used by adoption agencies when placing children with prospective 
adoptive parents. That, of course, is a different issue to whether interracial 
                                                 
279  Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 604. 
280  Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 610. 
281  Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 620. 
282  Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 611. See also Mosikatsana in Keightley Children’s Rights 131 and 
Rautenbach in Bill of Rights Compendium 3E-14.  
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adoption serves children, and is one that falls outside the scope of this research, 
although it certainly needs serious consideration. 
 
It is my view that when seen from the point of view of the child, the value and 
necessity of interracial/intercultural adoption seems clear. I believe that 
Mosikatsana’s opposition to interracial/intercultural adoption is rooted in his 
personal belief, which is that of the communalism of African culture,283 in other 
words, I believe that he analyses statutory adoption from the point of view of 
customary law, in terms of which the focus is generally on the community rather 
than on the individual.284 I have already explained my belief that customary law 
has a different view of adoption and that the aim of customary adoption285 is 
different to that of statutory adoption.286 Although the importance of customary 
adoption is not denied, I shall argue in “9 CONCLUSION” that current customary 
adoption is not necessarily in the best interests of the child, and that there should 
be an adoption procedure that is valid and acceptable to all who live in South 
Africa. Customary law is an integral and important part of the South African legal 
system, and the customary-law principles that are in line with the best interests of 
the child should be included in statutory adoption legislation. However, any 
adoption procedure should have as its starting point the best interests of the 
child.  
 
                                                 
283  Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 346.  
284  Mosikatsana 1998 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 346. Also see “2 4 2 Customary law and 
adoption”. 
285  Namely, to provide a man with an heir. 
286  Namely, to serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with a loving, suitable family. 
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5 6 3 Arguments in favour of intercultural adoption 
 
5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor 
 
I believe that the approach followed by those opposed to all 
interracial/intercultural adoption is that “race matching” in the adoption process is 
preferred because it leads to “culture matching”. This argument assumes the 
existence of a homogeneous black culture and community, distinct and different 
from a supposedly homogeneous white culture, which is of course just not true. 
One could recognise the importance of racial and cultural difference without 
subscribing to separatism.287 Zaal believes that the statutory requirement of 
considering culture in an adoption288 promotes a continuation of race matching in 
child placements.289 He bases this view on the extent of the applicability of the 
“matching” procedure:290 Religious and cultural differences must be taken into 
account in all situations where children are to be lawfully placed in the custody of 
persons other than the child’s biological parents. He concludes that courts and 
child care workers are required to treat cultural differences as a negative factor 
where applications are made to adopt children. He stresses however291 that 
“culture” and “race” differences should not be automatically applied as negative 
factors where children find themselves in need of a new care-giving institution or 
                                                 
287  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 180. 
288  S 40 of the Child Care Act. 
289  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 400. 
290  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 400. 
291  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 383. 
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person. He submits292 that the requirement of matching up cultural backgrounds 
is particularly unsatisfactory. He says it is merely a legal camouflage for de facto 
apartheid to continue and at best the “cultural” requirement promotes a 
continuation of race-matching in child placements. These remarks by Zaal were 
made many years ago — in fact some of them were made even before our 
Interim Constitution was enacted. Since then, South Africa and its people have 
undergone major change. People have become more tolerant of each other and 
have at least partially learnt to live together in one integrated society.293 It is 
because so much of what Zaal said is still true today, though, that his statements 
are included here. I believe most people in our country have moved on from the 
atrocities of the pre-constitutional era, but care has to be taken not to create a 
situation where some of those racial issues might surface again. It is hard to 
imagine that interracial adoption is more threatening to culture than interracial 
marriage or integration in public education.294 Surely interracial marriage and 
integration in public education pose no less of a “threat” to cultural rights, but they 
are regarded as acceptable. In my view culture seems to be considered as a 
factor only under certain circumstances, such as when there is an interracial 
adoption, and this could result in a situation where race is considered when an 
application for an intercultural adoption is made. It needs to be said that if race 
and culture are treated as one and the same thing, it could lead to a continuation 
of using culture as a smokescreen for racial factors. 
                                                 
292  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 378; Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 400. 
293  Of course, there are exceptions, but, generally, society has changed dramatically over the past 
years. 
294  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 172. 
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Zaal suggests295 that section 40 of the Child Care Act296 has become an 
impediment to many a child’s right to parental care297 and says that the concept 
of “culture matching” must be entirely removed from the Child Care Act so that 
the welfare officials and children’s courts involved in the placement of children 
are never distracted or directed away from the central task of seeking the best 
available haven for such children. I agree with this view. As long as culture is 
over-emphasised in our legislation, the rights and best interests of children might 
suffer. My argument is certainly not that culture must be ignored completely. The 
right to culture is after all one of the rights that a child has, but as culture is just 
one factor to be considered in the adoption process, elevating it by including it in 
a separate section creates the idea that it is “more special” than other rights.298 
As we have also seen,299 the limitation of culture is justified in order to allow the 
child’s right to alternative care to prevail. 
 
My argument can be supported by what has been held in our Constitutional 
Court. In AD v DW300 Judge Sachs held that a child’s need for a permanent home 
                                                 
295  Zaal 1994 SAJHR 384. 
296  See n 7. 
297  Zaal specifically refers to the relevant provision of the Interim Constitution, namely s 30(1)(b). It 
is worth mentioning here that parental care was not a concept that was part of our Interim 
Constitution. Undoubtedly its inclusion in s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution was a huge step forward 
for the rights of children. In the context of adoption it is alternative care that is relevant, not 
parental care. However, as I have argued (see my discussion under “3 2 FAMILY CARE, 
PARENTAL CARE OR APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE CARE” about the difference between 
these terms) alternative care in the form of adoption will provide a child with the opportunity to be 
part of a family and experience parental care.  
298  Also see “6 7 1 The Child Care Act, adoption and culture” and “6 7 2 The Children’s Act, 
adoption and culture”. 
299  See “5 4 3 2 How does the Constitution deal with competing rights?”. 
300  2008 4 BCLR 359 (CC). 
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and family can in certain circumstances be greater than their need to remain in 
the country of their birth.301 He further held that there will be circumstances in 
which intercountry adoption will be preferable for a child over institutional care in 
the country of birth.302 I believe these statements have to apply with equal force 
when it comes to intercultural adoption. A child’s need for a family is greater than 
his/her need to maintain the culture of his/her biological parents. I will go even 
further than Judge Sachs and state that a child’s need for a permanent home and 
family will usually be greater than his/her need to retain his/her culture.  
 
Simpkins et al303 say that the need-fulfilment of the child must take priority over 
all else and there is nothing wrong (morally or ethically) with placing a child in 
need with any adoptive parents who can satisfy that need. This is in line with my 
argument thus far. However, I submit that the wishes of all parties involved in the 
adoption process also have to be considered. As I shall argue below in “9 
CONCLUSION”, the preference expressed by the biological parents is a factor 
that the court must take into account, like all other relevant factors. On the other 
hand, the wishes of the prospective adoptive parents have to be respected, and 
children who are old enough to express their views should also be heard about 
what role culture should play in the adoption process. The older a child is when 
he/she is adopted, the more difficult it will be for him/her to identify with parents of 
a different population group.304 The feelings of the people involved in the 
                                                 
301  At 376. 
302  At 376-377. 
303  Simpkins et al 1990 Social Work 272. 
304  Heaton 1989 SALJ 716. 
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adoption process cannot be disregarded. Under no circumstances should an 
interracial/intercultural adoption take place if the prospective adoptive parents 
indicate that they would prefer to adopt a child of the same race and/or culture.305 
Faced with an interracial/intercultural adoption, prospective adoptive parents 
have to be willing to commit themselves to bringing up the child in such a way as 
to make all attempts to make the child aware of and even possibly maintain the 
child’s cultural identity, where at all possible. Similarly, an adoption cannot 
proceed where the child, who is capable of expressing his/her views, is not 
committed to the process, as will be the case where an intercultural adoption 
proceeds despite the child’s objections. 
 
A further issue that needs discussion is that of prejudice. Article 1(2) of the 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice provides that “[a]ll 
individuals and groups have the right to be different, to consider themselves as 
different and to be regarded as such. However, the diversity of life styles and the 
right to be different may not, in any circumstances, serve as a pretext for racial 
prejudice...”.306 I think opponents of interracial adoption who base their views on 
the loss of culture are doing precisely that — using culture as a pretext for racial 
prejudice. Culture and race may never be used in such a way that the best 
interests of the child — viewed holistically — are neglected. Care should always 
be taken not to place too much emphasis on one specific right at the expense of 
other rights, and ultimately it must always be kept in mind what the best interests 
                                                 
305  This is also the view of Tizard in 1994 Tolley’s Journal of Child Law 54. 
306  Art 1(2) of the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, which was adopted and 
proclaimed on 27 November 1978. 
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of a child in the circumstances are. The best interests of a child who is in need of 
parental care will be served by creating a situation where the child will be able to 
experience such parental care through adoption. As we have seen,307 a child who 
does not grow up in a family environment is in a far worse position than a child 
who experiences a loss of culture. Research has in fact shown that delay in the 
placement of a child is a far more significant factor in adoptive adjustment than 
racial matching.308 
 
Research shows that adoptive families provide a child with a healthier 
environment than foster families or institutional facilities.309 Golombok advocates 
that in deciding where to place a child it is crucial that the child’s attachment 
history is taken into account.310 Although Golombok is of the view that, generally, 
the best placement for a child is with a same-race family from the outset, she 
acknowledges that this cannot always be achieved and may result in the child 
either remaining in a foster home for several years or being moved from one 
foster home to another, both of which circumstances are likely to be harmful to 
the attachment process.311 Aldridge312 says that in spite of what is known about 
the attachment needs of the child and the importance of early placement, it is still 
often thought necessary to keep a child waiting indefinitely for an ethnically 
                                                 
307  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” and “4 BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
308  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 168-169. Also see the discussion 
under “4 5 3 Attachment and the age of the child”. 
309  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1082. 
310  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 111. Also see the discussion 
under “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
311  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 111.  
312  Aldridge in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 189. 
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matched family, which frequently results in the child growing up without a family 
of his/her own.313 
 
Further, I believe that the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption314 offers an analogous argument 
in support of interracial/intercultural adoption. The Hague Convention endorses 
international adoption as a viable alternative for a child in need of a family when 
domestic placement options have been exhausted. The Preamble states that 
intercountry adoption may offer “the advantage of a permanent family to a child 
for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin”. 
International adoption should therefore only be considered if domestic adoption 
by a suitable family315 is not possible. This leads one to conclude that any 
domestic adoption by a suitable family, which obviously includes 
interracial/intercultural adoption, is preferable to international adoption. A child’s 
need for a permanent home and family is greater than the child’s need to remain 
in his/her country of birth.316 This argument, I believe, applies equally with regard 
to a child’s “biological” or “inborn” culture. The need to be part of a family is 
greater than the need to preserve an (often unknown) “biological” or “inborn” 
culture. 
 
                                                 
313  See “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION” and “3 3 2 The theory behind attachment”. 
314  Hereafter referred to as “the Hague Convention”. It entered into effect on 1 May 1995. South 
Africa acceded to it on 21 August 2003, and it entered into force in this country on 1 December 
2003. 
315  A suitable family does not necessarily refer to one of the same race/culture. 
316  Marx 2007 Emory Int’l L. Rev 402-403. 
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Zaal is of the opinion317 that culture matching may create an avenue for 
challenging placements after the child has already bonded with a new parent 
figure. According to him,318 even if it is argued that an interracial placement is not 
ideal, it is often “the least detrimental alternative” that is available. Goldstein et al 
propose that “the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the 
child’s growth and development” should be the standard used to determine 
placements of children.319 I am hesitant to use the phrase “least detrimental 
alternative”, as it creates the impression that the child’s best interests are not 
protected. This viewpoint will be discussed in “9 CONCLUSION”.  
 
Forde-Mazrui320 believes that children may actually benefit from interracial 
placement, as it may assist them with social integration and provide them with 
access to more than one culture, which may increase understanding through 
integration.321 Swize also argues very strongly in favour of interracial/intercultural 
adoption. She believes that advocates of interracial adoption should not 
emphasise the negatives, but rather the positives of this kind of adoption.322 She 
is of the opinion that a child’s visible dissimilarity may encourage the adoptive 
parents to make greater efforts to explore their child’s distinct culture.323 This 
                                                 
317  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 402. 
318  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 403. 
319  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 53-64. 
320  Forde-Mazrui 1994 Michigan Law Review 964-966. 
321  Although Forde-Mazrui does distinguish between race and culture, she seems to fall into the trap 
of believing that there is a distinct white culture as opposed to a distinct black culture — see “5 3 2 
Making a distinction”, where I explain that there is no distinct white culture or black culture.  
322  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1084-1086, 1097. 
323  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1100. 
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physical difference between the child and the adoptive parent is an important 
issue that needs to be discussed. 
 
5 6 3 2 Physical appearance as a factor 
 
Although the main focus of this research is on culture in adoption and not on 
race, and they are two very different issues,324 an intercultural adoption is often 
also an interracial one. When a child of a different race to the adoptive parents is 
adopted, there is of course the (often) very obvious difference in appearance 
between the adoptive parents and the child. Society has been conditioned to 
believe that “the ties that bind us are ties of blood”.325 With same-race adoption 
or racial “matching” there is no genetic relationship between the parents and the 
child, but there is the appearance of a biological relationship, which represents 
the “typical family structure”.326  
 
“Matching” makes it easy to conceal an adoption.327 Interracial adoption, on the 
other hand, is the most open adoption there is. Interracial adoptive parents are 
more open to discussing adoption with a child,328 and acceptance by a child of 
his/her adoptive status contributes to a healthy self-esteem.329 The fact that the 
child was adopted is apparent to the whole world. Swize refers to this as the 
                                                 
324  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction” and “5 4 1 The Constitution, race and culture”. 
325  Bartholet Family Bonds 53. 
326  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1088-1089. 
327  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1088. 
328  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 168. 
329  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1104. 
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“unblinkable difference”.330 She says the obvious difference in appearance 
between the adoptive parents and the child may actually be an affirmation to the 
child that he/she was wanted and chosen. As an interracially adopted child is 
more likely than a same-race adoptee to openly identify him/herself as adopted, 
he/she will benefit from positive thoughts about being adopted.331  
 
Further, the child, because of not sharing racial similarities with the adoptive 
parents, is likely to have freedom to develop his/her own individuality.332 Although 
she recognises that this difference in appearance may cause difficulties for the 
child,333 Swize believes such difficulties are countered both by the potential 
benefits of the difference and by the significant harm that results when a child is 
delayed from becoming part of a permanent family.334 She goes as far as to 
compare adoption to a disability – it can be hidden or obvious.335 If, she explains, 
it is hidden,336 this could lead to psychological harm because this hides the true 
identity of the individual.337 As in the case of an exposed disability, hiding it is not 
an option in the case of an interracial adoption.338 Interracial adoption appears to 
provide the opportunity for a child to develop an awareness of race, a respect for 
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332  Swize 2002 Virginia Law Review 1087, 1100. 
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the physical differences imposed by race and an ease with his/her own racial 
characteristics.339 
 
In my opinion this is an issue that has to be handled carefully, because when the 
appearance of the child is so different from that of the parents, the child may feel 
insecure. The parents thus have a responsibility to provide the child with a strong 
sense of belonging and the ability to deal with any possible negative remarks. If 
this is done, I agree that the child actually has an advantage in that he/she is fully 
aware of the difference between him/her and the parents and further that he/she 
is in a position to develop a healthy self-identity.340 
 
5 6 3 3 Studies conducted 
 
For the same reasons as given above,341 studies conducted about interracial 
adoption are relevant to this thesis. Empirical studies support interracial adoption. 
Singer et al342 did a study in the United States of America where they examined a 
group of families with infants of the same race as the adoptive parents, as well as 
those of a different race from the adoptive parents (interracial). No difference in 
the quality of attachment was found between the same-race and interracial 
adoptive infants.  
                                                 
339  Simon et al The Case for Transracial Adoption 86. 
340  See “3 3 1 Introduction”. 
341  See “5 6 3 2 Physical appearance as a factor”. 
342  Singer, Brodzinsky, Ramsay, Steir and Waters (1985) Mother-infant attachment in adoptive 
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Triseliotis et al343 explain that findings of studies of interracially adopted children 
in both the United States of America and Britain344 indicate that 20 to 25 percent 
of these children experience moderate to severe problems in adjustment to 
family, school or community, but that this proportion is about the same as the 
proportion of adopted children in same-race homes who experience problems of 
the same intensity. According to them interracially adopted children appear 
similar to adopted children in same-race homes on measures of self-esteem and 
they show pride in their racial heritage.345 
 
Simon & Alstein published the results of extensive studies of interracial adoptions 
that were undertaken across the United States of America between 1974 and 
1999 and their findings, as well as the results of a comprehensive study which 
they conducted over a period of twenty years between 1971 and 1991.346 The 
findings included the following: 
 
• Interracially adopted children make as successful an adjustment in their 
adoptive homes as other children had in previous studies. 
 
                                                 
343  Triseliotis et al Adoption 167. 
344  These studies were of interracially adopted children of colour placed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
345  Triseliotis et al Adoption 167. 
346  Simon & Altstein Adoption across Borders 49-53. These include studies by Grow and Shapiro in 
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1983, Shireman and Johnson in 1988, Vroegh in 1992, Barth in 1988, Bagley in 1993 and Brooks 
and Barth in 1999. 
Chapter 5: Race versus culture 
 226
• There are whites who are capable of rearing emotionally healthy black 
children. 
 
• The child’s age, not the interracial adoption, had the most significant 
impact on development and adjustment. 
 
• The quality of parenting was more important than whether the child had 
been adopted interracially.347 
 
• Interracial adoptions were no more likely to be disruptive than other types 
of adoptions. 
 
• Racial differences between the adoptees and their parents did not affect 
overall adjustment patterns.  
 
• Interracial adoption appears to provide the opportunity for children to 
develop an awareness of race and a respect for physical characteristics, 
whatever they may be. 
 
Although not all feedback in the studies mentioned above was positive, it seems 
that children of all ages who are adopted interracially can make a successful 
adjustment in their adoptive homes and that the younger the child is when 
                                                 
347  See also Triseliotis et al Adoption 171, who observe that research has shown that the quality of 
parenting may be the paramount factor, rather than racial matching.  
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adopted, the better the chances are of raising a happy, well-adjusted child.348 
The evidence seems to “indicate uniformly that transracial adoptees do as well 
on measures of psychological and social adjustment as ... children raised 
inracially in relatively similar socio-economic circumstances ... This evidence 
provides no basis for concluding that ... there are any problems inherent in 
transracial placement”.349 There can, in my opinion, be little doubt that interracial 
adoption can serve the best interests of children.350 
 
5 6 3 4 Conclusion 
 
The discussion above shows that intercultural adoption is a very viable and 
positive option when a child is in need of a family. Much of the discussion above 
has focussed on the question whether parents of one culture are able to 
successfully convey a positive identity to a child of another culture and, in my 
opinion, the arguments in favour of intercultural adoption clearly support this. I 
believe that a child’s cultural identity may be considered by agency staff when 
making adoption placements, but this should never be given any greater 
consideration than other factors.351 Furthermore, studies support this finding and 
even the obvious difference in appearance between the adoptive parents and the 
child in the case of an interracial adoption is not a factor that should be 
considered. In my view, there can be no doubt that intercultural adoption does 
                                                 
348  See “3 3 ATTACHMENT”, especially “3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?”. 
349  Simon & Altstein Adoption across Borders 78. I use the term “interracial” and not “transracial” — 
see “1 4 TERMINOLOGY”.  
350  This is also the conclusion that Simon & Altstein Adoption across Borders 141 come to.  
351  Also see O’Halloran Welfare of the Child 264. 
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not have to be considered any less of an option than same-culture adoption when 
it comes to the best interests of a child, even if the adoption is also interracial. 
 
 
5 7 CONCLUSION 
 
In the fifteen years since democracy South Africa has changed dramatically, and 
so have the beliefs, views and mindsets of its people. The country is 
experiencing a period of restructuring. South Africa is a multi-ethnic country, and 
people from different backgrounds, of different races, with different beliefs and 
cultures, to name but a few, mix on a regular basis with the result that there is an 
intertwinement of cultures, religion, beliefs etcetera taking place. South Africans 
are being exposed to a variety of cultural influences, which has resulted in 
acculturation between groups, and cultures that have existed for centuries are 
slowly being eroded and diluted.  
 
The importance of cultural rights is not denied in any way, but there is no 
homogeneous black culture that is distinct and different from a supposedly 
homogeneous white culture. As people are exposed more regularly to different 
races and different cultures it will also, I hope, go a long way towards eradicating 
the (erroneous) belief that race and culture are the same. In my opinion culture 
will become even less defined in the future, with the result that the arguments 
that are used to oppose intercultural adoption will gradually fade away 
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completely. Simon emphasises that black children adopted and raised in white 
families have a positive sense of their black identity and knowledge of their 
history and culture.352 Such children believe that race is not the most important 
factor in defining who they are or who their friends should be.353 If more people 
could have this outlook on life, I believe there would be no discussion about the 
desirability or not of interracial/intercultural adoption. It would just happen. 
 
 
                                                 
352  Simon in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 149. This is confirmed by Bartholet 
in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 163. 
353  Bartholet in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 165. 
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6 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Child Care Act1 was drafted during the apartheid era with little or no 
recognition of international children’s rights or of the main challenges facing the 
majority of South African children.2 The South African Law Reform Commission 
began to research and develop new legislation for children in 1997. The result of 
this, the Children’s Act,3 will eventually replace the Child Care Act.4 To date, only 
some sections of the Children’s Act have come into operation.5 The chapter on 
adoption is yet to come into force. Until it does, the Child Care Act will regulate 
adoption in South Africa. 
 
In chapter 2 of this thesis the Child Care Act and the Children’s Act were 
discussed briefly.6 The aim of the present chapter is not to cover every aspect of 
the best interests of the child or the adoption process as provided for by the Child 
Care Act or as envisaged by the Children’s Act, but to look at selected issues that 
are relevant to the topic of this thesis. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to 
analyse and discuss all aspects of intercultural adoption that are to be found in 
                                                 
1  Act 74 of 1983. 
2  Skelton & Proudlock in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 1-11. 
3  Act 38 of 2005. In chapter 2 (n 151) I indicated that this Act would be referred to as the Children’s 
Act of 2005. In this chapter, however, the Act will simply be referred to as the Children’s Act. 
4  In the past, majority in South Africa was attained at the age of 21 years in terms of the Age of 
Majority Act 57 of 1972. However, s 17 of the Children’s Act, which came into operation on 1 
July 2007, lowered the age of majority to 18 years. The lowering of the age of majority does not 
have any effect on the meaning of “child” in respect of adoption, as only a “child” can be adopted 
and both s 1 of the Child Care Act and s 1 of the Children’s Act define a “child” as a person under 
the age of 18 years. 
5  On 1 July 2007 certain sections came into effect. The sections that are relevant to adoption and 
which have already come into operation will be highlighted in this chapter. Chapter 15, which 
regulates adoption, has not been implemented yet. 
6  See “2 4 3 5 Child Care Act 74 of 1983” and “2 4 3 6 Children’s Act 38 of 2005”. 
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these two Acts and to consider the impact (both positive and negative) that I 
believe the Children’s Act will have on intercultural adoption. Some sections of 
the Child Care Act and the Children’s Act that are relevant have already been 
analysed in other chapters of this thesis. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
completeness, the relevant issues will again be mentioned in this chapter.7 
 
 
6 2 GROWING UP IN A FAMILY ENVIRONMENT 
 
6 2 1 Introduction 
 
I have argued above that the best interests of the child, including his/her 
emotional health, are best served by providing the child with family life, in other 
words, by placing the child in a family environment.8 There are two important 
issues to be found in this statement, namely, the best interests of the child and 
the family environment of the child. I shall first consider the issue of growing up in 
a family environment within the context of the Child Care Act and the Children’s 
Act. Then I shall discuss the child’s best interests within the context of the two 
Acts.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7  Several of the sections/articles referred to in this chapter are quoted in footnotes, not to minimise 
their importance, but to avoid interrupting the flow of the contents.  
8  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” and “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
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6 2 2 The Child Care Act and growing up in a family environment 
 
The Child Care Act makes provision for alternative care for the child,9 but does 
not refer to family care or parental care. The supreme law in South Africa,10 the 
Constitution, introduced the right of a child to family care or parental care, or to 
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment.11 
Therefore, even though the Child Care Act does not mention the child’s right to 
family care or parental care, the child has this right within the context of the Child 
Care Act as well. In the case of the many children in South Africa who do not 
have surviving biological parents or family, or whose biological parents or family 
are not part of the child’s life, adoption in terms of the Child Care Act can and 
must be used to give effect to the child’s right to alternative care and thus to 
enable the child to experience parental care and life in a family environment. 
Furthermore, the general principles of the Children’s Act that have come into 
operation apply to all legislation applicable to children.12 This means that the 
factors that are included in section 7 of the Children’s Act that need to be taken 
into account when determining the best interests of the child, now also apply to 
the Child Care Act. In terms of section 7(1)(k) of the Children’s Act,13 read with 
                                                 
9  This could take the form of foster care or adoption, for example. 
10  S 2 of the Constitution. 
11  S 28(1)(b). 
12  S 6: “(1) The general principles set out in this section guide— 
 (a) the implementation of all legislation applicable to children, including this Act”. 
13  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is not 
possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment”. Also 
see the discussion under “6 3 3 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and the best interests of the child” 
and n 91. 
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section 18 of the Child Care Act,14 those officials who apply the provisions of the 
Child Care Act thus have to give effect to the child’s need to be raised in a stable 
family environment or, where it is impossible for the child to grow up in a stable 
family environment, in an environment that resembles a caring family 
environment as closely as possible. There is no arguing that adoption — 
including intercultural adoption — is a highly suitable mechanism to provide a 
child with a family environment. 
 
In the context of the Child Care Act, one of the problems with attempting to 
provide the child with the opportunity to grow up in a family environment is that 
the Act does not contain a definition of the term “family”. As a result, there has 
not been consensus in South African society about what constitutes a family for 
purposes of the Child Care Act.15 Families have in the past been defined in many 
ways, ranging from the nuclear family16 to the extended family,17 with much 
uncertainty existing about the actual meaning of the term “family” and the scope 
of the term.18 This situation of uncertainty needed to be addressed. This has 
been done in the Children’s Act, which is discussed immediately below. 
 
 
                                                 
14  S 18: “(4) A children’s court to which application for an order of adoption is made ..., shall not 
grant the application unless it is satisfied— … 
(c) that the proposed adoption will serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child”. 
15  See the discussion under “3 2 1 2 What is a family?”. 
16  See chapter 3, n 24 and the accompanying text 
17  See chapter 3, n 28 and the accompanying text. 
18  Also see my argument under “3 2 1 2 What is a family?”. I suggested that the terms “family” and 
“parent” could be used to signify the difference between the extended family and the nuclear 
family. 
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6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family environment 
 
Whereas the Child Care Act contains no Preamble, the Children’s Act has a long 
Preamble, which is an important part of the Act.19 The Preamble confirms, inter 
alia, that every child has the rights set out in section 28 of the Constitution.20 It 
refers to the need to extend particular care to the child as stated in various 
international instruments, including the Convention and the Charter.21 
Furthermore, the last part of the Preamble, which states that the child, for the full 
and harmonious development of his/her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, is taken 
directly from the Preambles of both the Convention22 and the Charter.23 This 
again shows the commitment of the South African legislature to the values and 
                                                 
19  Preamble: “WHEREAS the Constitution establishes a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights and seeks to improve the quality of life of all citizens and to 
free the potential of each person; 
 AND WHEREAS every child has the rights set out in section 28 of the Constitution; 
 AND WHEREAS the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill those rights; 
 AND WHEREAS protection of children’s rights leads to a corresponding improvement in the 
lives of other sections of the community because it is neither desirable nor possible to protect 
children’s rights in isolation from their families and communities; 
 AND WHEREAS the United Nations has in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
proclaimed that children are entitled to special care and assistance; 
 AND WHEREAS the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child, in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child and recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
statutes and relevant instruments of specialised agencies and international organisations concerned 
with the welfare of children; 
 AND WHEREAS it is necessary to effect changes to existing laws relating to children in order to 
afford them the necessary protection and assistance so that they can fully assume their 
responsibilities within the community as well as that the child, for the full and harmonious 
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment and in an 
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding”. 
20  S 6(2)(a) confirms that the child’s rights as set out in the Bill of Rights have to be respected, 
protected, promoted and fulfilled.  
21  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” n 102.  
22  See “4 2 2 2 The Convention on the Rights of the Child”. 
23  See “4 2 2 3 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child”. 
Chapter 6: The Child Care Act and the Children’s Act 
 238
principles of international instruments and serving the child’s interests by having 
the child grow up in a family environment. The Preamble of the Children’s Act 
further states that the protection of children’s rights leads to a corresponding 
improvement in the lives of other sections of the community because it is neither 
desirable nor possible to protect children’s rights in isolation from their families 
and communities. The Preamble thus amply emphasises children’s rights and the 
importance of a child being raised in a family environment. 
 
The emphasis on children’s rights and on the child being raised in a family 
environment also finds expression in the stated objects of the Children’s Act.24 
These objects include: 
 
• Giving effect to the child’s constitutional right to family care or parental 
care or appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
                                                 
24  S 2, which came into effect on 1 July 2007. “The objects of this Act are— 
(a) to promote the preservation and strengthening of families; 
(b) to give effect to the following constitutional rights of children, namely— 
(i)  family care or parental care or appropriate alternative care when removed from 
the family environment; 
(ii)  social services; 
(iii)  protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; and 
(iv)  that the best interests of a child are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child; 
(c) to give effect to the Republic’s obligations concerning the well-being of children in terms of 
international instruments binding on the Republic; 
(d) to make provision for structures, services and means for promoting and monitoring the sound 
physical, psychological, intellectual, emotional and social development of children; 
(e) to strengthen and develop community structures which can assist in providing care and 
protection for children; 
(f) to protect children from discrimination, exploitation and any other physical, emotional or moral 
harm or hazards; 
(g) to provide care and protection to children who are in need of care and protection; 
(h) to recognise the special needs that children with disabilities may have; and 
(i) generally, to promote the protection, development and well-being of children.” The Child Care 
Act does not set out its objects. 
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environment.25 This object, read with section 7(1)(k) of the Children’s Act, 
provides clear guidelines about the kind of family environment that the 
child needs. Section 7(1)(k) recognises that the child has a need to be 
brought up within a stable/caring family environment. It is no use simply 
providing a child who does not have a family or a suitable family with an 
alternative family. The importance of a stable family environment has 
been emphasised for a long time, but the Children’s Act offers the first 
legislative recognition of this requirement in South Africa. Thus, an 
adoption needs to be carefully considered before a decision is made. 
Sometimes an intercultural adoption can provide more stability and be 
more appropriate for a specific child than an adoption where culture 
matching prevails.  
 
The right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care 
when removed from the family environment was discussed in detail under 
“3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY”. It is important to bear in mind that this 
is a right of the child,26 and that there is a duty on parents and family to 
ensure that this right of the child is provided.27 Accordingly, adoption 
                                                 
25  S 2(b)(i). 
26  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 605; Kruger 2007 THRHR 253; Heaton in Bill of 
Rights Compendium 3C-54. 
27  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 82 (also 
reported in 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC)); Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender 
Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) at 375-376 (also reported in 2003 2 BCLR 111 
(CC)). 
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should not be viewed as a way to serve the interests of adoptive parents 
but as a way to serve the child’s interests.28 
 
The child’s right to family care or parental care is not confined to biological 
parents, but extends to step-parents, adoptive parents and foster 
parents.29 As I explained above,30 adoption is a form of alternative care 
which provides the child with the opportunity to experience parental care. 
Thus, where a child does not have biological parents, the biological 
parents cannot or will not care for the child, or the biological parents are 
not part of the child’s life for whatever reason, the child has a right to be 
cared for by, inter alia, adoptive parents. 
 
• The promotion of the preservation and strengthening of families.31 As I 
have argued,32 and as the Constitution orders by giving the child a right to 
family care,33 a child needs to grow up in a family environment. Where at 
all possible and in the best interests of the child, the bond between the 
child and the biological family needs to be preserved. This does not 
necessarily mean that the child will be raised by his/her biological family, 
because keeping the child with his/her biological family might not be in the 
child’s best interests, or the child might not have biological family. Family 
                                                 
28  Also see “3 2 2 3 Parental care and the Constitution”. 
29 “Parent” in the Children’s Act is interpreted to include the adoptive parent of a child — s 1(1). 
Also see Heystek v Heystek [2002] 2 All SA 401 (T) at 404 and Clark 2000 Stell LR 11. 
30  See “3 2 3 2 The role of the State and the Constitution”. 
31  S 2(a). The distinction between the family and the extended family must be kept in mind. This is 
discussed below under this heading. 
32  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY”. 
33  S 28(1)(b). 
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ties can be preserved, however, by making the adoption an open one, 
where the child will maintain contact with his/her biological family.34 
 
• Where the child cannot be raised by his/her biological family, adoption by 
suitable adoptive parents would provide him/her with the opportunity to 
grow up as part of a family. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4,35 it is 
important that the child forms ties with the adoptive family as early as 
possible in order to form attachments with the members of the adoptive 
family. Forming such attachments as early or as young as possible, will 
strengthen the child’s family ties. 
 
• To have his/her best interests enjoy paramountcy in every matter 
concerning him/her.36 This object will be discussed in more detail below.37 
It is certainly possible that a situation could arise where a child’s interests 
are protected, but the situation is not in the best interests of the child, in 
other words paramountcy is not afforded to those best interests. An 
example would be where a child is cared for in an institution. The child’s 
interests are protected because he/she has a place to stay, a warm bed 
and food to eat. This situation would not be in the best interests of the 
child though. It has been established that the best interests of the child 
                                                 
34  See “4 4 2 Open adoption” and “6 6 ADOPTION CONTACT”. 
35  See “3 3 ATTACHMENT” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
36  S 2(b)(iv). 
37  See “6 3 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
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can best be achieved by providing a child with a family environment.38 The 
legislative confirmation of the paramountcy of the child’s best interests39 
in section 2 of the Children’s Act is welcomed.  
 
• Making provision for structures, services and means for promoting and 
monitoring the sound physical, psychological, intellectual, emotional and 
social development of children.40 The importance of caring for the child’s 
emotional and physical development to protect the best interests of the 
child is recognised by the Act.41 Children have to be protected because 
they are a vulnerable group. This applies to all children, but when the child 
is adopted, chances are greater that the sound development of the child 
might require special attention, which special attention could be provided 
in terms of the Act. Examples of issues that might need to be addressed 
through the structures, services and means provided for by the Act are the 
psychological adjustment to becoming part of a family if he/she has been 
institutionalised for some time, whether the child is able to adjust to the 
social environment of the adoptive family, financial matters such as 
whether the child’s physical needs are catered for, whether the child is 
able to form emotional attachments with the adoptive parents, and 
whether the child is struggling to overcome emotional issues arising from 
                                                 
38  See “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” AND “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
39  Also see s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
40  S 2(d). 
41  In terms of s 7(1)(h), a factor that has to be taken into account where relevant when the best 
interests of the child standard has to be applied, is the child’s physical and emotional security and 
his or her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development.  
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abuse that led to him/her being removed from a previous parent/caretaker. 
The Children’s Act provides for the services of a social worker who is 
involved in the adoption process in various ways, including the counselling 
of the biological parents of the child and, where applicable, the child, about 
the decision to make the child available for adoption42 and assisting with 
the preparation of a post-adoption agreement.43 There are also structures 
in place that are there to benefit the child in the adoption process. The Act 
makes provision for a Register on Adoptable Children and Prospective 
Adoptive Parents44 which can benefit the child and serve his/her best 
interests in the adoption process by speeding up the adoption process 
and/or finding suitable adoptive parents through the use of this register.45 
Furthermore, post-adoption agreements can be utilised to ensure contact 
between the child and his/her biological family, which could serve the 
child’s needs.46  
 
The best interests of the child can only be served if all these matters are 
attended to and, as I shall argue in “9 CONCLUSION”, this monitoring 
needs to be done both before and after the adoption has taken place. The 
Child Care Act also makes provision for monitoring of the adoption 
process, and the involvement in the Children’s Act is confirmation of this 
                                                 
42  S 233(4). 
43  S 234(3). 
44  Hereafter referred to as RACAP. 
45  See “6 3 3 3 Register of Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive Parents” below, where this 
register is discussed. 
46  Post-adoption agreements are provided for in s 234. Also see “6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements”. 
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need for monitoring. However, the increased level of involvement by a 
social worker in terms of the Children’s Act is welcomed.47  
 
Section 6(1)48 of the Children’s Act contains the general principles that guide all 
decisions applicable to children in domestic legislation and guides the 
implementation of all legislation applicable to children and all proceedings, 
actions and decisions in relation to children.49 Section 6(2)50 is in line with our 
constitutional and international obligations,51 as it includes obligations with regard 
to the best interests standard,52 human dignity, equality and non-discrimination.53 
For the purposes of this thesis, section 6 is very important. The general principles 
in this section guide all legislation applicable to children. In all proceedings 
concerning children the factors included in section 7 must be taken into 
consideration, which means that adoption is now subject to clear and specific 
guidelines regarding the best interests of the child. One of these factors that need 
to be applied with regard to the child’s best interests is the child’s need to grow 
                                                 
47  Both the RACAP and post-adoption agreements are innovations provided for by the Children’s 
Act. 
48  S 6 came into effect on 1 July 2007. 
49  See n 12 above. 
50 S 6(2): “All proceedings, actions or decisions in a matter concerning a child must— 
(a) respect, protect, promote and fulfil the child’s rights set out in the Bill of Rights, the best 
interests of the child standard set out in section 7 and the rights and principles set out in this Act, 
subject to any lawful limitation; 
(b) respect the child’s inherent dignity; 
(c) treat the child fairly and equitably; 
(d) protect the child from unfair discrimination on any ground …”. 
51  Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-3. 
52  S 28(2) of the Constitution; art 3(1) of the Convention; art 4(1) of the Charter. 
53  Ss 1, 7, 9 and 10 of the Constitution; Preamble and art 2 of the Convention; Preamble and art 3 of 
the Charter. 
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up in a stable family environment or, where this is not possible, in an environment 
resembling a caring family environment as closely as possible.54 
 
Like the Child Care Act, the Children’s Act does not define “family”, but it 
provides a very comprehensive definition of “family member”.55 This definition is 
so wide that it encompasses all possible forms of family, obviously including the 
extended family that is part of customary law. Section 7(1)(f) refers to and 
distinguishes between parent, family and extended family.56 This subsection 
thus recognises the need to distinguish between the family (“gesin”) and the 
extended family (“familie”).57 The family refers to the “gesin”, in other words the 
members that make up the family, such as the mother, father and all siblings. 
The extended family includes all other members of the family, such as uncles, 
grandparents and cousins. The categories that are distinguished in the section 
include all forms of family that could exist, thus acknowledging the importance of 
all forms of family that exist in South Africa, while also clearly distinguishing 
between the different family relationships. This distinction is welcomed, as all 
possible confusion that might have existed with regard to the meaning of the term 
                                                 
54  S 7(1)(k). Also see the discussion under “6 3 2 The Child Care Act, adoption and the best interests 
of the child”. 
55  S 1: (1) “‘family member’, in relation to a child, means— 
 (a) a parent of the child; 
(b) any other person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(c) a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt or cousin of the child; or 
(d) any other person with whom the child has developed a significant relationship, based on 
psychological or emotional attachment, which resembles a family relationship”. 
56  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(f) the need for the child— 
(i) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
(ii)  to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or 
tradition”. Also see n 91. 
57  The need for this distinction was discussed under “3 2 1 2 What is a family?”. 
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“family” for purposes of adoption legislation has now been removed.58 The 
adopted child thus has the right to be brought up in a “gesin”, whichever form that 
may take.59 If the child is not part of such a biological family, an adoptive family 
could fulfil this role. 
 
With regard to the child’s opportunity to grow up in a family environment, the 
Children’s Act is undoubtedly an improvement on the Child Care Act. As 
explained above, the Child Care Act, which was enacted before the Constitution, 
does not adequately provide for the child to grow up as part of a family and 
experience parental care, while this lacuna has been rectified by the Children’s 
Act. 
 
 
6 3 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 
6 3 1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have explained the importance of the best 
interests of the child, although determining what the best interests of the child are 
is not an easy task.  
 
 
                                                 
58  Also see “3 2 1 7 Family care and the Children’s Act”; “3 2 1 8 Family care and adoption” and 
“3 2 2 2 Family care versus parental care” above. 
59  S 2(b)(i) of the Children’s Act and s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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6 3 2 The Child Care Act, adoption and the best interests of the child 
 
By providing for adoption, the Child Care Act, which pre-dates the Constitution, 
recognises the importance of providing a family environment for the child. This 
recognition is in keeping with the constitutional imperative to serve the best 
interests of the child.60  
 
With regard to adoption, section 18(4)(c) of the Child Care Act makes provision 
for the protection of the interests and welfare of the child. This section provides 
that an application for adoption shall not be granted by a children’s court to which 
such application was made, unless it is satisfied that the proposed adoption will 
serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child.61 This is an absolute 
requirement.62 The inclusion of this requirement in the adoption process is in line 
with the protection of the best interests of the child as is found in South Africa 
and internationally.  
 
The Child Care Act does not contain a general clause detailing the factors that 
are to be considered in determining the best interests of the child.63 Over the 
years, because of the previous lack of statutory recognition of the rights of the 
child and because of the many contradictory opinions about the meaning of the 
best interests of the child, there has been much debate about the content and 
                                                 
60  See the Constitution s 28(2). 
61  See n 14 above. Also see “4 1 Introduction”, where this aspect is discussed. 
62  Schäfer & Schäfer in Robinson Law of Children 78-79. 
63  The long title makes reference to the protection and welfare of “certain children”. Section 18(4)(c) 
is one of the provisions that regulate the interests and welfare of the adopted child.  
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scope of the best interests of the child. This debate also affected adoption and 
the interpretation of the child’s best interests in adoption proceedings.64  
 
Another problem is that the Child Care Act does not contain any guidelines about 
how the best interests of a child are to be applied and, as a result, it was often 
difficult to determine whether the best interests of the child were being served in 
a specific matter. In other words, there were no guidelines to assist the court to 
know which factors to consider in order to determine the best interests of the 
child in general or in adoption matters in particular.65 However, court decisions 
relating to adoption under the Child Care Act have guided us over the years in 
this regard.66 During the past decade or so matters have improved. In 1994 the 
court in McCall v McCall67 provided a comprehensive, open-ended list68 of factors 
to be taken into account to determine the best interests of the child in custody 
cases.69 Furthermore, section 28(2) of the Constitution now dictates that the 
child’s best interests are paramount in all matters concerning the welfare of the 
child. Although there is uncertainty about the exact interpretation of section 
28(2),70 it is clear that the best interests standard has to be a determining factor 
in every matter concerning a child. Section 28(2) raises the best interests 
                                                 
64  In this regard, see the discussion under “4 2 1 Historical development and application in South 
Africa”; “4 2 5 Criticism of the best interests standard”; Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on 
the Children’s Act 2-6. 
65  Palmer in Keightley Children’s Rights 113. 
66  See “4 2 1 Historical development and application in South Africa”. 
67  1994 (3) SA 201 (C) at 204-205. 
68  The last factor, (m), was “any other factor which is relevant to the particular case with which the 
Court is concerned”. 
69  For this list, see “4 2 7 Factors that determine the best interests of the child”. 
70  See “4 2 3 The rights in section 28(1) versus section 28(2)”. 
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standard to “a principle of paramountcy”71 in every matter concerning the child, 
including adoption.72 Section 28(2) was included in the Constitution to emphasise 
the importance of the best interests of a child, and should always be considered 
when a child is involved, whatever the circumstances. This, therefore, applies to 
adoption under the Child Care Act. Since 1 July 2007 there are further definite 
guidelines about the application of the best interests of the child standard in 
terms of the Children’s Act. The general principles set out in section 6 guide the 
implementation of all legislation applicable to children73 and all proceedings, 
actions and decisions by any organ of state in any matter concerning a child or 
children in general.74 Thus, these general principles and the guidelines about the 
child’s best interests set out in the Children’s Act will also apply to adoption in 
terms of the Child Care Act. 
 
6 3 3 The Children’s Act and the best interests of the child 
 
6 3 3 1 General 
 
The recent implementation of certain sections of the Children’s Act,75 more than 
a decade after the coming into operation of our final Constitution, reflects growing 
sensitivity to the child’s constitutional rights. This Act includes numerous 
                                                 
71  Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-6. 
72  See “4 2 3 The rights in section 28(1) versus section 28(2)” and “4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy”. 
73  S 6(1)(a). 
74  S 6(1)(b). The factors that have to be considered to determine the best interests of the child in 
terms of s 7 are discussed below under “6 3 3 The Children’s Act and the best interests of the 
child”. 
75  On 1 July 2007 several sections of this Act came into operation. 
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references to the best interests of the child. It affords great significance and 
recognition to the best interests of the child in the Preamble,76 section 2(a)(iv),77 
section 778 and section 9,79 all of which came into operation on 1 July 2007.  
 
The Preamble emphasises the importance of a child being raised in a family 
environment, and states that the protection of the rights of the child leads to a 
corresponding improvement in the lives of other sections of the community, and it 
confirms that every child has the rights set out in section 28 of the Constitution. 
These matters relate to the best interests of the child. Furthermore, the Preamble 
shows the commitment of the South African legislature to the values and 
principles of international instruments which protect the best interests of the child. 
 
One of the objects of the Children’s Act as set out in section 2 is to give effect to 
four constitutional rights of the child.80 These are the right to family care or 
parental care or appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment;81 social services;82 protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or 
degradation;83 and that the best interests of the child are of paramount 
                                                 
76  It states that every child has the rights set out in s 28 of the Constitution, which of course includes 
the best interests of the child in s 28(2). Also see “6 3 1 Introduction” above. 
77  S 2 describes the objects of the Act – see n 24.  
78  This section contains the factors that must be considered when applying the best interests of the 
child standard – see n 91 below. 
79  S 9: “In all matters concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child the standard that the 
child’s best interest is of paramount importance, must be applied.” 
80  S 2(b). See n 24 above. 
81  S 2(b)(i). 
82  S 2(b)(ii). 
83  S 2(b)(iii). 
Chapter 6: The Child Care Act and the Children’s Act 
 251
importance in every matter concerning the child.84 In other words, these four 
rights are singled out and protected by the Children’s Act. Growing up in a family 
environment85 and the paramountcy of the best interests of the child86 are thus of 
the utmost importance in the context of this Act and, particularly, in the context of 
adoption under the Act.  
 
Section 9 of the Act, which is in line with section 28(2) of the Constitution, 
confirms the paramountcy of the best interests of the child, by making the best 
interests of the child paramount in all matters concerning the care, protection and 
well-being of a child. A further development that emphasises the rights of the 
child in the Children’s Act, is the use of the term “parental responsibilities and 
rights”87 instead of the traditional term “parental authority” in the Act,88 thus 
shifting the emphasis with regard to the relationship between parents and 
children. Whereas parental authority referred to the rights, powers, duties and 
responsibilities parents had in respect of their minor children and those children’s 
property,89 parents now have responsibilities as well as rights with regard to 
children, which include, but are not restricted to, the responsibility and the right to 
care for the child, to maintain contact with the child, to act as guardian of the 
                                                 
84  S 2(b)(iv). 
85  S 2(b)(i) – see n 24 above. 
86  S 2(b)(iv) – see n 24 above. 
87  As referred to in s 18 of the Act, which came into operation on 1 July 2007. S 18: “(2) The 
parental responsibilities and rights that a person may have in respect of a child, include the 
responsibility and the right— 
(a) to care for the child; 
(b) to maintain contact with the child; 
(c) to act as guardian of the child; and 
(d) to contribute to the maintenance of the child.” 
88  Also see “3 2 2 5 Parental care and the Children’s Act”. 
89  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 265. 
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child, and to contribute to the maintenance of the child.90 This again places more 
emphasis on the best interests of the child by placing the responsibility on the 
parent to care for the child. 
 
Apart from emphasising the paramountcy of the best interests of the child, the 
Act provides a list of factors to be applied in determining the best interests of the 
child. Section 7 provides us with this list of 14 factors that have to be taken into 
consideration when the best interests of the child standard has to be applied.91 
                                                 
90  S 18(2). Also see “3 2 2 2 Family care versus parental care”. 
91  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— 
(a) the nature of the relationship between— 
  (i) the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii) the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those circumstances; 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards— 
(i) the child; and 
(ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-giver or person, to 
provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the likely 
effect on the child of any separation from— 
(i) both or either of the parents; or 
(ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with whom 
the child has been living; 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific 
parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child— 
(i) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or 
tradition; 
(g) the child’s— 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
  (ii) gender; 
  (iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
(h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and 
cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is not 
possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment; 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused by— 
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Each factor must be taken into consideration where relevant. It is up to the court 
to determine which factors are relevant. This list is the first of its kind included in 
legislation in South Africa. Despite some shortcomings,92 this list of factors is 
long overdue and without a doubt a welcome inclusion in the Children’s Act. The 
list goes a long way in assisting with the application of the best interests of the 
child, by providing guidelines about what to consider when deciding what these 
best interests are.93 These clear guidelines make the task of determining the best 
interests of the child much easier.  
 
The importance of the best interests of the child in terms of the Children’s Act is 
thus clear. The Children’s Act not only complies with the Constitution as far as 
the protection of the best interests of the child is concerned, it exceeds its 
requirements. The Children’s Act has undoubtedly taken the protection of the 
best interests standard in South Africa to an increased level and provided us with 
greater clarity regarding the factors that are relevant to determining the child’s 
best interests.94 Those factors that are relevant to the topic of this thesis will be 
discussed throughout this chapter. For present purposes, I shall simply state that 
a list of factors that can guide us as to how the best interests of the child are to 
be determined is welcomed. It is a pity that the list is not an open-ended one. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation 
or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence or 
harmful behaviour towards another person; 
(m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
(n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative proceedings 
in relation to the child.”  
92  See the discussion in the rest of this chapter. 
93  However, also see the criticism of this section below under the same heading. 
94  Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-12. 
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Davel95 points out this shortcoming of section 7. Whereas the list in McCall v 
McCall makes provision for the possibility that the court could consider “any other 
factor which is relevant to the particular case with which the Court is 
concerned”,96 section 7 contains no such provision. It should be obvious that 
there can never be a truly complete list of factors that could point to what is in the 
best interests of every child in every circumstance. Davel argues that judicial 
officers can and should use their inherent discretion to consider other factors 
where relevant,97 and I certainly hope and trust that they will. However, this might 
not be enough. In my opinion, it is not in the best interests of the child to leave 
such an important decision to court officials. I believe that the Act should provide 
for circumstances where other relevant factors that could play a part in 
determining the best interests of the child may be considered. This 
omission/oversight98 could be detrimental to the best interests of a child and 
should be corrected by the legislature.99 
 
6 3 3 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and the best interests of the child 
 
In terms of section 230(1)(a) a child may be adopted if the adoption is in the best 
interests of the child.100 The wording used in this section is much stronger than 
that in section 18(4)(c) of the Child Care Act and leaves no doubt about the 
                                                 
95  Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-8. 
96  McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (C). See “4 2 7 Factors that determine the best interests of the 
child”. 
97  Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-8. 
98  It is hoped that it was only an oversight which will be rectified in the near future. 
99  Also see the discussion under “9 CONCLUSION”. 
100  S 230: “(1) Any child may be adopted if- 
 (a) the adoption is in the best interests of the child”. 
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importance of the best interests of the child. The best interests are paramount. I 
submit that if a proposed adoption is not in the best interests of the child, the 
adoption application may not be granted at all. My view is based on the 
difference in the way that section 230(1)(a) of the Children’s Act and section 
18(4)(e) are phrased. Section 18(4)(c) of the Child Care Act provides that an 
adoption cannot be granted unless the proposed adoption will serve the interests 
and conduce to the welfare of the child. It is, in my opinion, quite possible that an 
adoption can serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child without 
necessarily being in the best interests of the child, as required by section 
230(1)(a) of the Children’s Act. When section 230(1)(a) of the Children’s Act 
comes into effect, nothing will be more important in adoption proceedings than 
the best interests of the child. Currently, however, this is not the case. At present, 
under the Child Care Act, as long as the interests of the child and the welfare of 
the child are served (even if there are better ways of doing so), the adoption may 
proceed. 
 
Section 240(2)(a) of the Children’s Act provides that the best interests of the child 
have to be served before an adoption order may be made by a children’s 
court,101 and in terms of section 240(1) the court considering the adoption of a 
child must take all relevant factors into account.102 These requirements reflect 
                                                 
101  S 240: “(2) A children’s court considering an application may make an order for the adoption of a 
child only if- 
 (a) the adoption is in the best interests of the child”. 
102  S 240: “(1) When considering an application for the adoption of a child, the court must take into 
account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the religious and cultural background of— 
 (i)  the child; 
Chapter 6: The Child Care Act and the Children’s Act 
 256
the reality (which is not expressed in the Child Care Act) that there may be many 
relevant factors which should be taken into account when determining the best 
interests of the child in an application for an adoption.103 In terms of section 
240(2)(a) a court considering an adoption application may make an order for the 
adoption of the child only if the adoption is in the best interests of the child. This 
is further confirmation of the importance of the best interests of the child, and of 
the legislature’s commitment to ensuring that the child’s best interests are 
paramount. For the same reasons as explained in the previous paragraph, the 
provisions of the Children’s Act provide more protection with regard to the best 
interests of the child than the Child Care Act does.  
 
Sections 230(1), specifically section 230(1)(a), and 240(2)(a) must be read 
together with the other sections of the Act that deal with the best interests of the 
child, particularly section 7.104 As has been pointed out, section 7 contains a list 
of factors that must be considered when determining the best interests of the 
child. These factors will now be considered individually. 
 
• The first factor that must be taken into account in terms of section 7 of the 
Children’s Act is the nature of the relationship between the child and the 
parent(s) and the relationship between the child and any other relevant 
                                                                                                                                                 
 (ii)  the child’s parent; and 
 (iii)  the prospective adoptive parent; 
(b) all reasonable preferences expressed by a parent and stated in the consent; and 
(c) a report contemplated in section 239(1)(b) [my emphasis]”. 
103  More will be said about this requirement under “6 7 1 The Child Care Act, adoption and culture” 
and “6 7 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and culture” below. 
104  See “6 3 3 The Children’s Act and the best interests of the child” above. 
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care-giver or person.105 This factor is most important in the context of 
adoption. For example, a policeman, social worker or authorised officer 
who has reason to believe that a child is a child in need of care, inter alia, 
because the relationship between the parent and the child is unhealthy,106 
may remove the child from the biological parents,107 and the child may be 
put up for adoption. The unhealthy relationship could play a role in the 
adoption application. For example, the court might decide that the 
unhealthy relationship requires that post-adoption contact between the 
child and his/her biological family should not be allowed.108 On the other 
hand, the nature of the relationship between the child and the child’s care-
giver could be very healthy. If the child is in the care of foster parents who 
wish to adopt him/her, the relationship between the parties is clear. If this 
relationship is healthy, the adoption will most probably serve the best 
interests of the child. Where the foster care is intercultural, a healthy 
relationship will certainly indicate that culture per se is not all that 
important and that the child’s best interests can be served even if there is 
a difference in culture between the child and the foster parent(s). 
                                                 
105  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely—  
(a) the nature of the relationship between— 
(i)  the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii)  the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those circumstances”. 
Also see n 91 above. 
106  The circumstances under which a child may be considered to be in need of care are currently 
contained in s 14(4) of the Child Care Act. When it comes into operation, s 150 of the Children’s 
Act will regulate protection of a child in need of care and protection. There could be numerous 
reasons for being in need of care, such as neglect, poverty, abuse and violence, to name but a few. 
107  S 12 of the Child Care Act and, when it comes into operation, s 151 of the Children’s Act. As was 
discussed under “6 2 GROWING UP IN A FAMILY ENVIRONMENT”, it is important for the 
best interests of a child to be raised as part of a healthy, stable family. This was also discussed in 
“3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY”. 
108  See “4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption”. 
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Regardless of whether it is healthy or unhealthy, it is vital that the social 
worker establishes what the relationship between the foster parent and the 
child is and that this relationship is taken into account when a decision 
about a possible adoption is made.  
 
A parent in terms of the Children’s Act includes an adoptive parent.109 
Once an adoption has taken place, monitoring of the relationship needs to 
continue. The relationship between the child and the adoptive parent(s) 
needs to be monitored to ensure that the best interests of the child are 
protected. What I shall argue in the conclusion is that an adoption process 
needs to be monitored carefully, not only before the adoption, but also 
afterwards.110  
 
• The attitude of the parents towards the child and the exercise of parental 
responsibilities and rights111 in respect of the child, as provided for in 
section 7(1)(b),112 are equally important. The attitude of the parents will 
play a major part in establishing a normal, healthy family relationship and 
environment. In the case of an adoption, the attitude of the parents 
towards the child with regard to his/her background will be extremely 
                                                 
109  S 1(1). 
110  This is provided for in s 7(1)(a)(i) of the Children’s Act. 
111  With regard to the use of “parental responsibilities and rights”, see “6 3 3 1 General”.  
112  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards— 
(i)  the child; and 
(ii)  the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child”. Also 
see n 91 above. 
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important. If the adoptive parents display a healthy, positive attitude about 
the adoption, the child will also experience the situation in a positive light. 
If, on the other hand, the adoptive parents come across as negative about 
the adoption experience, this will also affect the way the child experiences 
the relationship. Especially where the adoption is intercultural, the positive 
attitude of the adoptive parents will allow the adopted child to experience 
the adoption as a healthy relationship where he/she feels comfortable with 
the situation and at ease to pursue his/her cultural/biological background. 
 
• In terms of section 7(1)(c) the capacity of the parent or other care-giver to 
provide for the needs of the child is a factor that must be taken into 
account to determine the best interests of the child.113 The needs of the 
child refer to all needs, including physical, emotional and intellectual 
needs.114 With regard to physical needs, there are certain constitutional 
rights, such as basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social services that no child should have to do without. This aspect is 
discussed in more detail below.115 The emotional needs of the child are 
analysed below where section 7(1)(h) is discussed. 
 
                                                 
113  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-giver or person, to 
provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs”. Also see n 91. 
114  This subsection should be read with s 7(1)(h), which deals with the child’s physical and emotional 
security, and is in line with the object envisaged by s 2(d) of the Children’s Act. 
115  See “6 4 2 1 The Child Care Act and the financial means of the applicant(s)” and “6 4 2 2 The 
Children’s Act and the financial means of the applicant(s)”. Also see s 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution.  
Chapter 6: The Child Care Act and the Children’s Act 
 260
• In terms of section 7(1)(d) change in the child’s circumstances and the 
effect on the child of separation from his/her parents, sibling(s) or care-
giver is another factor that has to be taken into account when determining 
the best interests of the child.116 Any change, whether good or bad, that a 
child experiences will affect him/her while growing up. Separation from a 
loved one may also emotionally affect the child. Counselling may be 
appropriate under such circumstances. When a child who has experienced 
dramatic change or has experienced being separated from parents/family 
is adopted, counselling both before and after the adoption should be 
considered. 
 
• Section 7(1)(e) lists the practical difficulty and expense of a child having 
contact with parents, and whether that difficulty or expense will 
substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and 
direct contact with the parents on a regular basis, as another factor that 
must be taken into consideration when the best interests of the child 
standard has to be applied.117 When applying this factor to the adopted 
child, it must be borne in mind that there is evidence that the relationship 
                                                 
116  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the likely 
effect on the child of any separation from— 
  (i)  both or either of the parents; or 
(ii)  any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with whom 
the child has been living”. Also see n 91. 
117  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific 
parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on a regular basis”. 
Also see n 91. 
Chapter 6: The Child Care Act and the Children’s Act 
 261
of the parties to an adoptive family improves where the child maintains 
contact with his/her biological parents/family.118 It is therefore important 
that every effort is made for the child to have contact with his/her biological 
parents/family,119 unless such contact is not in the best interests of the 
child.120 Difficulty in maintaining contact with the child’s biological parents 
should not be a reason for contact not to take place. This contact becomes 
even more important in the case of intercultural adoption. By keeping 
contact with the biological parents/family, the child maintains contact with 
his/her cultural background. Although it is my view that a child’s need for a 
family is greater than his/her need to maintain the culture of his/her 
biological parents/family,121 it does not detract from the fact that, where 
possible and in the best interests of the child, an adopted child needs to 
maintain his/her cultural heritage.  
 
• Section 7(1)(f)(i) of the Children’s Act refers to the need for a child to 
remain in the care of his/her parent, family and extended family, unless 
such contact will not be in the best interests of the child,122 while section 
7(1)(f)(ii) recognises that a child who cannot stay in the care of a parent or 
                                                 
118  See “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
119  Again, there are many cases where the child does not have biological parents/family or does not 
know who or where they are. 
120  This will be the case where there is, for instance, physical or emotional abuse of the child. 
121  See “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”. 
122  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (f) the need for the child- 
 (i)  to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family, and  
(ii)  to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or 
tradition”. Also see n 91. 
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family, needs to maintain contact with them. Although it is not always 
possible for the child to maintain contact with the biological parents, for 
example because the biological parents may be deceased, they may be 
unknown to the child, or contact may not be in the best interests of the 
child, contact with the rest of the family is also important. If the child is in 
the process of being adopted then obviously he/she either does not have 
parents, the parents are unable to or do not wish to be part of the child’s 
life, or a decision has already been made by the children’s court that the 
child cannot remain in the care of his/her parents or family. In order to 
protect the best interests of a child, it is important to maintain contact 
with his/her family or extended family where possible, as provided for in 
section 7(1)(f)(ii) of the Children’s Act.123 This contact in the context of 
adoption is referred to as open adoption. The benefits of open adoption 
have been referred to on several occasions.124 Where the adoption is 
intercultural, adoption contact becomes even more important, as this is a 
way for the child to maintain his/her biological culture. 
 
• As already discussed,125 and as will also be pointed out below,126 
subsection 7(1)(g) of the Children’s Act is extremely important for a child 
who is in the process of being adopted, and even more so where the 
                                                 
123  Also see “4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption” and “6 6 2 The Children’s Act and 
adoption contact”. 
124  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”, “5 6 3 2 Physical appearance as a factor”. 
125  See “4 5 AGE OF THE CHILD” and “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
126  See “6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the child” below. 
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adoption is an intercultural one.127 In terms of section 7(1)(g)(i) the child’s 
age, maturity and stage of development have to be taken into account 
when determining the best interests of a child. As will be explained 
below,128 a child has to consent to an adoption under certain 
circumstances. As this consent is subject to certain provisos, the age, 
maturity and stage of development of the child are of crucial importance in 
order to determine whether informed consent has actually been given by 
the child or not. This subsection will be discussed in more detail below.129 
 
The age, maturity and stage of development of the child are also important 
as far as the attachment process in an adoption is concerned. It has been 
established that a child adjusts better socially, emotionally and 
psychologically if an attachment is formed while the child is young.130 
Thus, adoption at a young age is beneficial to the child as far as the 
attachment process is concerned. In this regard RACAP, the register that 
is envisaged by the Children’s Act,131 can only be beneficial to the 
                                                 
127  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(g) the child’s— 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
  (ii) gender; 
  (iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child”. Also see n 91. Although gender 
is a very important factor that could play an important part in an adoption, it will not be elaborated 
on here. 
128  See “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child”. 
129  See “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” below. 
130  Rutter Maternal Deprivation 63; Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 
107. See further “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
131  See n 44. 
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adoption process. As discussed below132 this register, if maintained 
properly, together with the provisions of section 237 which require the 
clerk of the children’s court to gather certain information for the proposed 
adoption,133 could assist in speeding up the adoption process and thus 
contribute to the promotion of the best interests of the child. On the other 
hand, where an older child is adopted, he/she may have formed an 
attachment with a biological parent or other care-giver. This attachment 
may influence the child’s relationship with his/her adoptive parent, but is 
also important with regard to adoption contact.134  
 
The benefits of adoption contact for all the parties to an adoption have 
been pointed out.135 If the child is very young, he/she probably would not 
have formed any bond with a biological parent or other care-giver, but an 
older child probably would have formed such a bond. The child’s maturity 
and stage of development, together with his/her age, will greatly determine 
how he/she will deal with something as drastic as adoption. Where such 
an adoption is also intercultural, these factors will play a massive role in 
determining how the child will deal with the situation and adapt to his/her 
new circumstances.  
 
                                                 
132  See “6 3 3 3 Register of Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive Parents”. 
133  See s 174. 
134  See “6 6 ADOPTION CONTACT” below. 
135  See “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
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The background of the child136 is important for various reasons. The child’s 
background largely determines the child’s maturity and development. 
Furthermore, the child’s background needs to be known to determine 
whether an adoption will be an intercultural one, and, if so, which adoptive 
parents will serve the best interests of the child. The child’s background 
could also influence his/her physical137 and emotional138 security.139 
 
• The inclusion in section 7(1)(h) of the consideration of a child’s physical 
and emotional security is welcomed.140 Physical security has two parts to 
it. Children have the constitutional right to food, housing, and basic health 
care,141 as well as the constitutional right to be protected from neglect and 
abuse.142 These matters need to be taken into account to determine the 
best interests of the child. Emotional security is equally important. 
Emotional bonding, also known as attachment, is the strong, affectional tie 
we have with special people in our lives.143 The recognition by the 
legislature of emotional security as a factor that could influence the best 
interests of the child reflects the recognition of the attachment theory as 
                                                 
136  S 7(1)(g)(iii). 
137  This could be influenced by, for instance, poverty, neglect, ill-treatment or crime.  
138  Violence, neglect or abuse, for example, could be important. 
139  There is a link between this subsection and subsections (h) and (l), which are discussed below. 
140  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— 
(h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and 
cultural development”. Also see n 91. 
141  S 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
142  S 28(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
143  See “3 3 2 1 What is attachment?”. 
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crucial in the development of a child.144 It has already been explained that 
a child’s emotional security develops and is largely determined in 
response to the environmental influences to which he/she is exposed145 
and that the desired environment can be provided by adoptive parents.146 
South African legislation dealing with children has until now not recognised 
the importance of emotional bonding in the family relationship. Research 
shows that an adopted child can develop secure attachments to adoptive 
parents,147 as successful child rearing does not depend on whether the 
child is cared for by his/her biological parents.148 Adoption can thus 
provide a child with physical and emotional security. 
 
If a child is not physically and/or emotionally secure, or his/her intellectual, 
emotional, social and cultural development is not taken into account,149 
this could greatly influence and even jeopardise an adoption. Again, in the 
case of an adoption the child might find the adoption difficult to deal with if 
proper attention is not given to these factors before the adoption is 
granted. If the adoption is an intercultural one, this may add to the 
difficulties, not per se because the adoption is intercultural, but because 
                                                 
144  Also see “3 3 2 The theory behind attachment” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
145  See “3 3 1 Introduction”, “3 3 ATTACHMENT” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
146  Clark 2000 Stell LR 11. Also see “3 3 ATTACHMENT” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND 
ADOPTION”. 
147  Golombok in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child at 110 quotes a study by Singer, 
Brodzinsky, Ramsay, Steir and Waters (1985) “Mother-infant attachment in adoptive families”, in 
Child Development 56: 1543-1551. See further “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”.  
148  Wait 1989 Welfare Focus 52. 
149  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and 
cultural development”. Also see n 91. 
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the intercultural dimension is another factor that the child has to deal with 
on top of other issues which may already be complicated. It is therefore 
important that attention is paid to these aspects and, where necessary, the 
child needs to be counselled with regard to his/her security and 
development, possibly before and after the adoption. 
 
• In terms of section 7(1)(i) and (j), the disability of a child150 and the chronic 
illness of a child151 are factors that need to be considered when the child’s 
best interests are determined. With regard to adoption, the presence of a 
disability or a chronic illness, I believe, could be an important factor in an 
adoption. The disability or illness has to be considered, not because the 
child should be treated differently to any other child, but because the 
presence of a disability or a chronic illness could mean that the child has 
special needs that could influence the selection of the adoptive parents 
who can serve the best interests of the child. 
 
• An object of the Children’s Act is to give effect to the constitutional right of 
a child to family care or parental care or appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment.152 This object, read with section 
7(1)(k), provides clear guidelines about the kind of family environment that 
                                                 
150  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (i) any disability that a child may have”. Also see n 91. 
151  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (j) any chronic illness from which a child may suffer”. Also see n 91. 
152  S 2(b)(i). 
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the child needs.153 Section 7(1)(k) recognises that the child has a need to 
be brought up within a stable/caring family environment. It is no use 
simply providing a child who does not have a family or a suitable family 
with an alternative family. In this regard, the list of names contained in 
RACAP154 can certainly assist any official involved in the adoption process 
with the process of finding a suitable family for a child who is in the 
process of being adopted. The importance of a stable family environment 
has been stated for a long time, but the Children’s Act offers the first 
legislative recognition of this requirement in South Africa. When a child is 
adopted, all relevant factors that determine the best interests of the child 
have to be taken into account to find a family who can provide the child 
with such an environment.  
 
• In terms of section 7(1)(l) and (m), children have to be protected from 
violence, because they are unique and vulnerable.155 Where a child has 
suffered physical or psychological harm, or has been exposed to physical 
or psychological harm for whatever reason,156 or has been exposed to 
                                                 
153  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is not 
possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment”. Also 
see n 91. 
154  See n 44. 
155  S v Mokoena 2008 (5) SA 578 (T) at 592. Also see “4 5 CONCLUSION”. 
156  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused by— 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation 
or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence or 
harmful behaviour towards another person”. Also see n 91. 
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family violence,157 the need may exist for the child to be removed from the 
harmful or violent situation. In such a case, the child may be taken to a 
place of safety and may eventually be put up for adoption.158 The need to 
protect a child against physical or psychological harm was already 
provided for in legislation before the Children’s Act came into force,159 but 
the express inclusion of this factor in section 7 is welcomed as 
confirmation of the importance of protecting children from harm and 
violence when the need arises. 
 
• Section 7(1)(n) lists the avoidance or minimising of further legal or 
administrative proceedings in relation to the child as another factor that 
must be taken into account in determining the best interests of the child. 
Subjecting a child to several legal or administrative proceedings is not in 
the best interests of that child.160 Children are vulnerable, and subjecting 
them to unnecessary proceedings of this nature can undoubtedly affect 
them negatively. Where a decision has to be taken with regard to a child, it 
is suggested that such a decision is taken as soon as possible so as not to 
subject the child to unnecessary procedures. Once the chapter regulating 
adoption in the Children’s Act comes into effect, the officials involved in 
                                                 
157  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child”. Also see n 91. 
158  Section 7(1)(a), which is discussed above under this heading, relates to this subsection too. 
159  The Child Care Act, ss 11-15, deals with this aspect in detail. 
160  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative proceedings 
in relation to the child.” Also see n 91. 
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the adoption process will have some help with the process of matching a 
child with suitable adoptive parents as soon as possible. The information 
gathered by the clerk of the children’s court with regard to the consent 
required for the adoption161 will eliminate some administrative tasks and 
RACAP162 will provide information that will allow the adoption officials to 
find suitable adoptive parents for the child as quickly as possible.  
 
Section 7(1)(n) confirms that it is in the best interests of the child not to 
prolong important decisions in relation to him/her. The need to take 
speedy decisions about the future of a child has already been established 
in the context of attachment,163 and Goldstein et al propose that there 
should not be a delay in finalising an adoption decree once the child is 
placed with the adoptive parents.164 Where a child is thus considered for 
an adoption, it is important that such a decision is taken speedily. A child 
who is in the situation where he/she is not raised by biological 
parents/family, may be part of a foster family. In such a case, there is no 
certainty or stability for the child, who may be moved from one foster 
family to another over the years. For such a child, it is also in his/her best 
interests to be adopted as soon as possible. The foster child, who is 
constantly moved from one foster family to another, might ultimately 
believe that he/she is to blame for this situation. Even if he/she is raised in 
                                                 
161  See s 237(1). 
162  S 232. Also see n 44. 
163  See 4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION” above. 
164  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 36, 45. 
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one foster family, he/she might think that he/she is to blame for the fact 
that the temporary situation is not made permanent by way of adoption. If 
the fostering is intercultural/interracial the child might even believe that 
his/her cultural/racial background is to blame for the fact that he/she is not 
growing up as part of a permanent family.  
 
I feel confident that the best interests of the child in adoption procedures will in 
future receive adequate protection, provided that the requirements of the 
Children’s Act are met and the guidelines in section 7 are properly taken into 
account. 
 
6 3 3 3 Register of Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive Parents 
 
Section 232 of the Children’s Act provides for a Register of Adoptable Children 
and Prospective Adoptive Parents (RACAP) which must be kept and 
maintained.165 Its aim is to keep a record of adoptable children as well as fit and 
proper adoptive parents.166  
 
The need for early placement of children has been emphasised.167 If this register 
is maintained properly, it will greatly improve and even speed up the adoption 
                                                 
165  S 232: “(1) The Director-General must keep and maintain a register to be called the Register on 
Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive Parents for the purpose of— 
(a) keeping a record of adoptable children; and 
(b) keeping a record of fit and proper adoptive parents.” 
166  S 232(1). The Child Care Act does not contain any similar provision. 
167  See “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
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process. Not only will there be an improvement in the process, but I believe that 
the incidence of intercountry adoptions might also be reduced due to the 
availability of this list.168 There are many children, especially older ones, who are 
in need of families and are waiting to be adopted by suitable adoptive parents. 
Up to now there has not been any means of establishing the availability of local 
families beyond informal checks by agencies and adoption social workers, which 
are not adequate in the absence of a properly managed database.169 “Searching” 
for suitable adoptive parents will largely be eliminated when RACAP is introduced 
and, I believe, more effort will go into finding homes for adoptable children, as 
RACAP will be a constant reminder of the fact that those children are waiting to 
be adopted.  
 
Mosikatsana & Loffell believe that this register could be used to match children 
with prospective adoptive parents who share their cultural background.170 This is 
true, but it will also speed up the process if there are no suitable prospective 
adoptive parents who share the cultural background of the child, and thus 
eliminate the situation where a child is kept waiting indefinitely for culturally 
matched parents. The child could therefore be placed as soon as possible with 
suitable parents.  
 
                                                 
168  See “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”, where I argue that, generally, any domestic adoption by a 
suitable family is preferable to intercountry adoption. 
169  Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-10. 
170  Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-10. 
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In terms of section 237 of the Children’s Act, the clerk of the children’s court 
where a child becomes available for adoption, must take steps to obtain 
information with regard to the consent required for the adoption.171 Section 237 
should be used with section 232172 to the benefit of the child. The database of 
section 232, together with the information in section 237, could greatly help to 
facilitate the speedy and proper placement of children countrywide and so serve 
the best interests of the child.173 
 
As mentioned above,174 the Child Care Act does not contain much recognition of 
or any guidelines with regard to the best interests of the child. In contrast, the 
Children’s Act strongly emphasises the best interests of the child and provides 
specific guidelines to be used to determine the best interests of the child.175 
There can be no doubt that the Children’s Act is a major improvement on the 
Child Care Act as far as the best interests of the child are concerned. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
171  S 237: “(1) When a child becomes available for adoption, the clerk of the children’s court must 
take— 
(a) the prescribed steps to establish the name and address of each person whose consent for the 
adoption is required …; and 
(b) reasonable steps to establish the name of any person whose consent would have been necessary 
but for section 236, and the grounds on which such person’s consent is not required.” S 236 sets 
out the circumstances when consent is not required. 
172  See n 165. 
173  Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-18. 
174  See “6 3 2 The Child Care Act, adoption and the best interests of the child”. 
175  References to the best interests of the child can be found in the Preamble, ss 2, 7 9, 230(1)(a) & 
240(2)(a) — see “6 3 3 The Children’s Act and the best interests of the child”. 
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6 4 QUALIFICATIONS OF THE APPLICANTS  
 
6 4 1 Who may adopt? 
 
6 4 1 1 Who may adopt under the Child Care Act? 
 
In terms of the Child Care Act,176 read with Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development177 and section 13 of the Civil Union Act,178 a child may 
be adopted by spouses jointly; same-sex life partners jointly; civil union partners 
jointly; a widow, widower, unmarried or divorced person; a married person whose 
spouse is the parent of the child; a civil union partner whose partner is the parent 
of the child; a person who is the child’s parent’s same-sex life partner; or the 
natural father of a child born out of wedlock.179 There are, however, still some 
South Africans who do not qualify to adopt in terms of the Child Care Act, for 
example, adoption by all the parties to a customary marriage is currently not 
possible,180 and siblings living together may not adopt a child jointly. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176  S 17. 
177  2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at 213, as read with the order handed down in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare 
and Population Development 2001 12 BCLR 1225 (T). 
178  Act 17 of 2006. 
179  See “3 2 3 4 Alternative care, adoption and the persons who may adopt”. 
180  See Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 616-617, where the exclusion of parties to a polygamous customary 
marriage from adoption is discussed and criticised.  
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6 4 1 2 Who may adopt under the Children’s Act? 
 
When the rest of the Children’s Act comes into operation, many people who are 
prevented from adopting in terms of the Child Care Act will be able to adopt.181 In 
terms of section 231(1)(a) a child may be adopted jointly by a husband and 
wife,182 partners in a permanent domestic life-partnership,183 or other persons 
sharing a common household and forming a permanent family unit.184 Thus, read 
with section 13 of the Civil Union Act, married heterosexual couples, same-sex 
and heterosexual life partners, civil union partners and the parties to a 
polygamous marriage would be able to adopt jointly.185 The Children’s Act does 
not define the term “permanent domestic life-partnership”. Conventionally, a life 
partnership refers to living together outside marriage in a relationship which is 
analogous to, or has most of the characteristics of, a civil marriage.186 After the 
commencement of the Civil Union Act on 1 December 2006, a permanent 
                                                 
181  S 231: “(1) A child may be adopted— 
 (a) jointly by— 
  (i)  a husband and wife; 
  (ii)  partners in a permanent domestic life-partnership; or  
(iii)  other persons sharing a common household and forming a permanent family 
unit;  
 (b) by a widower, widow, divorced or unmarried person; 
 (c) by a married person whose spouse is the parent of the child or by a person whose permanent 
domestic life-partner is the parent of the child; 
 (d) by the biological father of a child born out of wedlock; or 
 (e) by the foster parent of the child”. 
 Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-7 state that s 
231 has remedied all of the constitutional defects that were contained in s 17 of the Child Care 
Act. 
182  S 231(a)(i). 
183  S 231(a)(ii). 
184  S 231(a)(iii). 
185  However, see the next paragraph where the uncertainty with regard to the meaning of s 
231(1)(a)(iii) is discussed. 
186  Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 227. 
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domestic life partnership presumably refers to a life partnership that falls outside 
the ambit of the Civil Union Act.187 
 
Section 231(1)(a)(iii), in terms of which a child may be adopted jointly by persons 
sharing a common household and forming a permanent family unit, was included 
in the Act to allow for joint adoption by, for instance, a husband and all his wives 
(the kraal) in a customary-law setting.188 This provision of the Act is sensitive to 
the different peoples living in this country. The inclusion of customary-law 
principles in this section of the Children’s Act paves the way for more recognition 
of customary-law principles in adoption legislation and, in my view, provides 
support for my suggestion in “9 CONCLUSION” that there should be only one 
legal form of adoption in this country. However, how “persons sharing a common 
household and forming a permanent family unit” will be interpreted, remains to be 
seen. It is not clear whether this phrase would also include friends living together, 
or brothers and/or sisters who live together. In other words, how far this provision 
in the Children’s Act will be extended is unsure. In my opinion, the courts will 
probably find that “persons sharing a common household and forming a 
permanent family unit” would need some sexual connotation, in other words the 
persons sharing a common household and forming a permanent family unit will 
need to be in an intimate relationship, failing which they will merely be regarded 
as applicants who wish to adopt singly.  
 
                                                 
187  Heaton Law of Persons 70 n 170; Heaton in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 
3-11. 
188  SALC Report on Project 110 235-236. 
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Section 231(1)(b)-(e) contains the categories of people who may adopt on their 
own. They are a widower, a widow, a divorced or unmarried person, a step-
parent who is married to the child’s biological parent, the biological father of a 
child born of unmarried parents, and the foster parent of the child. By virtue of 
section 13 of the Civil Union Act a stepparent who is the child’s biological 
parent’s civil union partner will also be able to adopt his/her partner’s child on 
his/her own.  
 
The extension of those who are allowed to act as adoptive parents is welcomed, 
as this means that the pool of potential adoptive parents is enlarged. This does 
not necessarily mean that the process of finding suitable adoptive parents will be 
any easier, but having more prospective adoptive parents to choose from will 
certainly improve the chances of finding such parents (more quickly) with the 
result that the child will benefit.  
 
As indicated above under this heading, the Children’s Act addresses the issue of 
the exclusion of many people as potential adoptive parents. The provisions with 
regard to the qualifications of the applicants to an adoption in the Children’s Act 
are therefore welcomed.  
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6 4 2 The financial means of the applicant(s) 
 
6 4 2 1 The Child Care Act and the financial means of the applicant(s) 
 
In terms of section 18(4)(a) of the Child Care Act an adoption cannot be granted 
if the applicant(s) are financially unable to maintain and educate the child.189 This 
provision excludes many people from adopting simply because they are poor. 
The exclusion of an adoption applicant because of poverty is unacceptable. 
Being poor should not be a bar to an adoption. On the other hand though, a child 
has certain basic needs and rights, such as the constitutional right to basic 
nutrition, shelter and basic health care services and should therefore not, 
because of an adoption, be placed in a position where he/she lacks these 
things.190 A possible solution to this dilemma is discussed under the next 
heading. 
 
6 4 2 2 The Children’s Act and the financial means of the applicant(s) 
 
The Children’s Act removes the applicants’ financial ability as a requirement for 
the granting of an adoption order. Section 231(2)(b) requires merely that a 
prospective adoptive parent must be “willing and able” to undertake, exercise and 
                                                 
189  S 18: “(4) A children’s court to which application for an order of adoption is made …, shall not 
grant the application unless it is satisfied — 
 (a) that the applicant is or that both applicants are … possessed of adequate means to maintain and 
educate the child”. 
190  S 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. More will be said about this problem directly below under “6 4 2 2 
The Children’s Act and the financial means of the applicant(s)”. 
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maintain the parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child,191 and 
section 231(4) provides that a person may not be disqualified from adopting a 
child by virtue of his or her financial status.192 The exclusion of people who do not 
have “adequate means” from adopting a child indeed needed to be addressed.193 
While the “willing and able” test in the Children’s Act is undoubtedly a great 
improvement on the position in terms of the Child Care Act, there will be 
challenges in the implementation of this requirement. On the one hand, poverty 
has to be ignored when determining whether a person is fit to adopt a child. On 
the other hand, if the basic needs of the child, both physical and psychological, 
cannot be met, the best interests of the child may be jeopardised. There are 
certain basic physical needs, such as food, shelter, basic health care services 
and social services that no child should have to do without.194 Having his/her 
basic physical needs met is a constitutional right of the child.195 Provision for the 
child’s physical needs is also a factor included in the Children’s Act.196 In terms of 
the Convention197 every child has the right to a standard of living that is, inter alia, 
adequate for the child’s physical development. It is not only the physical needs of 
                                                 
191  S 231: “(2) A prospective adoptive parent must be— … 
(b) willing and able to undertake, exercise and maintain those responsibilities and rights 
[contained in s 231(2)(a)]”. 
192  S 231: “(4) A person may not be disqualified from adopting a child by virtue of his or her financial 
status.” 
193  Already in 1997 Mosikatsana argued that indigent families should be given assistance in the form 
of government subsidies and tax breaks to enable them to raise children – see Mosikatsana 1997 
SAJHR 616. 
194  See s 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. See also Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) 82, where it was held that the obligation to provide shelter as provided for in s 28(1)(c) is 
imposed primarily on the parents or family and only alternatively on the state. 
195  S 28(1)(c). 
196  S 7(1)(c). Also see “6 3 3 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and the best interests of the child” and s 
7 of the Children’s Act (n 91). As indicated in s 2(d) (see n 25), the sound physical and 
psychological development of the child is also an object of the Children’s Act. 
197  Art 27. 
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the child that need to be met though. There are also psychological needs that 
cannot be met without money, such as counselling where the child is in need of 
this.198 How adoption social workers apply the provisions of section 231(4) of the 
Children’s Act in the adoption process will be crucial for the protection of the best 
interests of the child. If the needs, both physical and psychological, of the child 
cannot be met by the adoptive parents because of a lack of money, the best 
interests of the child will undoubtedly suffer. 
 
Another problematic issue is whether the Act makes provision for a form of 
subsidised adoption which could, for example, assist some foster parents to 
adopt their foster children. Foster parents of children who are in official foster 
care receive a government grant.199 During the discussions leading up to the 
drafting of the Children’s Act there was much debate by the South African Law 
Commission and the participants to the discussion, about the desirability of 
setting a requirement regarding the financial ability of a prospective adoptive 
parent200 and the inclusion of social security measures in the Children’s Act. 
Although the inclusion of an adoption grant was overwhelmingly supported by the 
participants in the process leading up to the Bill201 and was ultimately 
recommended by the South African Law Commission,202 such a grant was not 
included in the Children’s Act. Often foster parents who might wish to adopt their 
foster child cannot consider adoption because they are unable to provide for the 
                                                 
198  These needs are provided for in art 27 of the Convention and s 7(1)(c) of the Children’s Act. 
199  This is provided for in the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
200  See SALC Project 110 56, 58-59, 87-91, 146. 
201  SALC Project 110 87-91. 
202  SALC Report on Project 110 249-250. 
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child without the foster grant. Section 231(5) of the Children’s Act makes 
provision for financial assistance for a person who adopts a child.203 In terms of 
this subsection, any person who adopts a child may apply for “means-tested 
social assistance where applicable”. The question is whether this assistance 
should be regarded as subsidised adoption which would assist many potential 
adoptive parents who currently are not able to adopt a child, such as very poor 
foster parents. In other words, the question is whether this assistance is in effect 
another way of obtaining a subsidised adoption or a child support grant, or 
whether it is something entirely different. The answer is unclear.  
 
South Africa is not a rich country and the fact that subsidised adoption was 
omitted from the Children’s Act, suggests that the assistance provided for in 
section 231(5) cannot be regarded as subsidised adoption and that the cases 
where the financial assistance will be “applicable” will be limited. If this was not 
the legislature’s intention, I believe the legislature would have called the 
assistance in section 231(5) subsidised adoption as suggested by the South 
African Law Commission.  
 
Mosikatsana, in discussing section 231(5), says that the very stringent means 
test for a child support grant will exclude many who need financial assistance in 
order to adopt a child.204 This suggests that he believes that section 231(5) 
                                                 
203  S 231: “(5) Any person who adopts a child may apply for means-tested social assistance where 
applicable.” 
204  Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-9. 
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provides for a child support grant. In terms of the Social Assistance Act,205 the 
legislative mechanism for the administration of social grants, a child support 
grant206 is available to a person if he/she is the primary caretaker of that child.207 
The primary caretaker would obviously include an adoptive parent. Mosikatsana’s 
interpretation of means-tested social assistance thus seems to be correct. It is 
unfortunate though that the nature of the grant was not specified in clearer terms 
in the Children's Act.  
 
Although it cannot escape criticism, the inclusion of section 231(4) and (5) in the 
Children’s Act will be welcomed by all involved in adoption, as these subsections 
remove at least one obstacle in the path of many prospective applicants, thus 
making adoption more accessible to all and more fair. These subsections should 
in particular be viewed favourably by Mosikatsana, who believes that adoption 
procedures and agency practices currently have a class and racial bias in that 
they target mainly white middle class families as prospective adoptive parents. 
Although he states208 that the national guidelines for adoption do not take into 
account that most black and coloured applicants are poor, he does acknowledge 
that the provisions of section 231(4) & (5) address some of the criticisms that 
were levelled at section 18(4)(c) of the Child Care Act.209  
 
I believe there is a solution that could assist indigent prospective adoptive 
parents (including foster parents) in their quest to adopt a child, while taking 
account of the financial implications for the state. The payment of an adoption 
                                                 
205  Act 13 of 2004. 
206  A child support grant is provided for in s 4. 
207  S 6. 
208  Mosikatsana 1997 SAJHR 612, 614; Mosikatsana 1995 SALJ 618. 
209  Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-9. 
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grant would not only be very difficult for the state to afford, but might also lead to 
applications for the adoption of a child for the wrong reason, namely to obtain the 
grant, which might be used for other purposes. In other words, I do not believe 
that a grant in the form of money is the best solution. My proposal is that, instead 
of the adoptive parents receiving money, the adopted child should receive 
alternative assistance. Using a means-based test, the adopted child should have 
access to free education, medical services, transport to and from school, food 
packages at school, etcetera.210 An adopted child might also need counselling, 
either to deal with the major impact that adoption has on the life of the child, or 
because of circumstances in the past and the psychological effect of the 
background of the child on him/her. Where the adoption is an intercultural one, 
this need may be even stronger. If counselling of the child is necessary, a system 
could be implemented to provide for free counselling for the child, both before 
and after the adoption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
210  A suggestion will also be made in “9 CONCLUSION” that Government assistance might be 
crucial to ensure equality and fairness in adoption applications. This assistance should extend to 
facilitating contact between the adopted child and the biological parents, where such contact is in 
the best interests of the child – see “9 CONCLUSION”. 
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6 5 CONSENT AND CHILD PARTICIPATION 
 
6 5 1 The consent of the parent 
 
6 5 1 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the parent 
 
An adoption application can only be considered if the required consent has been 
obtained. In terms of the Child Care Act, the parent of a child in respect of whom 
an adoption application has been made, has to consent to the adoption, 
irrespective of whether the parent is a minor or not.211 If the parent is a minor, 
he/she need not be assisted by his/her parent or guardian.  
 
Section 19 of the Child Care Act provides for circumstances where the consent of 
the parent/guardian may be dispensed with.212 These circumstances are 
irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis, but the principle of dispensing with the 
parent’s consent needs to be mentioned in order to place the discussion under 
the next heading in perspective.213 
 
 
 
                                                 
211  S 18: “(4) A children’s court to which application for an order of adoption is made ..., shall not 
grant the application unless it is satisfied— … 
 (d) that consent to the adoption has been given by both parents of the child … whether or not such 
mother or natural father is a minor or a married person and whether or not he or she is assisted by 
his or her parent, guardian …”. 
212  Also see “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” below. 
213  See “6 5 1 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the parent” below. 
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6 5 1 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the parent 
 
Like the Child Care Act, the Children’s Act requires the consent of the parent of 
the child who is to be adopted. However, unlike the Child Care Act, the Children’s 
Act prescribes that where the parent is a minor he/she must be assisted by 
his/her guardian.214 Section 236 of the Children’s Act provides for circumstances 
where the consent of the parent may be dispensed with, but this section does not 
apply to the assistance of the parent’s guardian.215 No section of the Act sets out 
the circumstances in which the assistance of the guardian of a parent who is a 
minor may be dispensed with. In terms of section 45 of the Children’s Act the 
children’s court may adjudicate any matter involving the protection and well-being 
of a child, including the adoption of the child.216 Unfortunately, it does not seem 
that this section is broad enough to empower the court to dispense with the 
assistance of the guardian of the child’s parent. It therefore seems that the Act 
does not provide for dispensing with the assistance of the parent’s guardian at 
all. This is a serious lacuna in the Act. 
 
The assistance of a minor by his/her guardian is generally supported, as a minor 
often does not have the intellectual capacity or the experience to participate 
independently in legal and commercial dealings.217 However, the mandatory 
                                                 
214  S 233: “(1) A child may be adopted only if consent for the adoption has been given by— 
 (a) each parent of the child, regardless of whether the parents are married or not: Provided that, if 
the parent is a child, that parent is assisted by his or her guardian”. 
215  Also see “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” below. 
216  S 45(1)(a), (i) & (k). This section has not yet come into effect. 
217  Heaton Law of Persons 85. 
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requirement of assistance by the parent’s guardian in the case of an adoption 
contained in the Children’s Act might cause problems and delays which are not in 
the best interests of the child who is to be adopted. The reason for the inclusion 
of the requirement of the assistance of the guardian of the minor parent is clear, 
namely to protect the minor. There may, however, be instances where the minor 
parent does not want his/her guardian to know about the pregnancy or the birth 
of the child — perhaps because the minor is afraid of his/her guardian or 
ashamed of the pregnancy or the child’s birth. In such a case the minor, who is 
compelled to obtain his/her guardian’s assistance in consenting to the adoption, 
might believe that termination of the pregnancy is the better option.218 
Furthermore, there is always the possibility that the guardian may unreasonably 
withhold assistance, or be missing or unable to give assistance because of 
incompetence, etcetera.219 The Act does not even provide for dispensing with the 
guardian’s assistance in these circumstances. 
 
As the Children’s Act does not provide for circumstances where the assistance of 
the guardian of the parent is not appropriate, cannot be obtained or is being 
withheld unreasonably, other options have to be considered. Any person who has 
an interest in the care, well-being and development of a child may apply to the 
High Court for an order granting him/her guardianship of the child in terms of 
                                                 
218  In terms of s 5(1) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, the termination of a 
pregnancy may only take place with the informed consent of the pregnant woman, and in terms of 
s 5(2) no consent other than that of the pregnant woman is required, except if she is incapable of 
giving consent. In Christian Lawyers’ Association v National Minister of Health 2004 10 BCLR 
1086 (T) at 1092 Justice Mojapelo said that the cornerstone of the regulation of the termination of 
a pregnancy is the requirement of her “informed consent”. A minor may therefore independently 
consent to a termination of her pregnancy provided that she is able to give informed consent. 
219  See Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-12.  
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section 24 of the Children’s Act.220 This section could possibly provide a solution 
to the problem of a parent’s guardian who is unable/unavailable to give 
assistance or is unreasonably withholding assistance, as a person with an 
interest in the care, well-being and development of the child could approach the 
High Court. Once guardianship is obtained an application for adoption could 
proceed. However, it is unclear who such a person, with an interest in the care, 
well-being and development of the child, could be. The prospective adoptive 
parent(s) and the adoption social worker come to mind, but applying for 
guardianship seems to be quite a drastic step with serious consequences, one 
that probably will not be taken by a social worker,221 and one that is probably not 
appropriate for the prospective adoptive parent to take. It also has to be borne in 
mind that High Court proceedings are expensive and time consuming and the 
High Court is not very accessible.222 Furthermore, in the event of a person 
applying for guardianship of a child who already has a guardian, the applicant 
must submit reasons why the child’s existing guardian is not suitable to have 
guardianship in respect of the child.223 It would thus seem that where there is a 
guardian who is suitable to give assistance (such as in the situation where the 
minor is ashamed of the pregnancy and is for this reason afraid to approach 
his/her guardian) this section would not apply. All in all, the use of section 24 of 
the Children’s Act does not seem to be a viable option. 
                                                 
220  S 24(1). This section is not yet in operation. 
221  Guardianship refers to administering and safeguarding the child’s property and property interests, 
assisting or representing the child in administrative, contractual and other legal matters, and giving 
or refusing any consent that is legally required in respect of the child – s 18(3) of the Children’s 
Act. 
222  Gallinetti in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 4-11. 
223  S 24(3). 
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The High Court as the upper guardian of all minors has the power to appoint a 
guardian for the minor, or even to dispense with the requirement of assistance by 
the minor’s guardian.224 Thus the lacuna in the Children’s Act could be overcome 
by approaching the High Court for an order dispensing with the assistance of the 
parent’s guardian. This seems to be a more viable option than the previous one, 
as the power of the High Court is not limited by the fact that there is a guardian, 
as is the case in terms of section 24 of the Children’s Act. However, the same 
criticism that was raised above with regard to section 24 applies in this case, 
namely that proceedings in this court are expensive and time-consuming, and 
that the High Court is not very accessible. Furthermore, having to approach the 
High Court causes a delay in the adoption proceedings, which is not in the best 
interests of the child. 
 
The problems experienced by a minor parent who needs the assistance of 
his/her guardian for the adoption of his/her child could cause a delay in the 
placement of the child for adoption, which is not in the best interests of the child. 
In my opinion the addition of the requirement of the assistance of the guardian of 
the parent before an adoption may proceed is a retrogressive step. Unfortunately 
I therefore believe the provisions of the Child Care Act with regard to this aspect 
                                                 
224  As upper guardian of all children, the High Court may inter alia suspend a parent’s guardianship – 
see Cronjé & Heaton Family Law 280-281. The court took this step in P v P 2002 (6) SA 105 (N) 
and Ex parte Kedar 1993 (1) SA 242 (W). In AD v DW 2008 4 BCLR 359 (CC) at 193 the 
Constitutional Court held that the High Court, in its capacity as upper guardian of all minor 
children, has the jurisdiction to make an order for sole custody and sole guardianship. It is 
unthinkable that the High Court would hold that its powers do not extend to dispensing with the 
assistance of the guardian of a minor who has given his/her child up for adoption and wants to 
give his/her consent to the adoption.  
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were more in line with the best interests of the child than those of the Children’s 
Act. 
 
An additional aspect regarding parental consent which has been included in the 
Children’s Act, and is not found in the Child Care Act, is the preference 
expressed by the biological parent with regard to the possible adoptive parent. 
According to section 240(1)(b) of the Children’s Act the court must take into 
account all reasonable preferences expressed by a parent and stated in the 
consent.225 It is important to note that this requirement does not allow the parent 
to decide who may adopt the child concerned. The preference of the parent is a 
factor that the court must take into account, nothing more. If this provision is 
applied incorrectly, it could lead to serious abuses of the system. It could mean 
that the parent of the child may be responsible for preventing an adoption from 
taking place, even though all other circumstances/factors indicate that the 
adoption will be successful and in the best interests of the child. To illustrate this, 
a woman may become pregnant after having sex with a man of a specific race or 
culture, who is not willing to marry her. She may resent him so much that she 
states in her consent that she does not want her child to be adopted by any 
person of that race or culture, with the result that the child might have to be 
placed with parents who are not quite as suitable to raise the child or, even 
worse, the child might not be adopted at all and miss out on the opportunity to be 
raised in a family environment. 
 
                                                 
225  See n 102. 
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6 5 2 The consent of the child 
 
6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child 
 
In the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority,226 the most significant decision of the twentieth century on the legal 
relationship between parents and children,227 the court developed the “Gillick 
competency test”, in terms of which a court will evaluate the relevant 
circumstances to decide on the best interests of a child. The court dealt with 
children’s growing autonomy in general. It confirmed that parental rights do not 
exist for the benefit of the parent and that a child becomes increasingly 
independent as he/she grows older. Parental responsibility dwindles 
correspondingly. Parental rights are recognised by the law only as long as they 
are needed for the protection of the child.228 This child-centered approach is 
supported. Each case has to be judged on its merits. Children are individuals and 
the extent to which their views and wishes have to be taken into account cannot 
be determined by applying a fixed age, but will differ from one case to the next.  
 
Section 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act229 provides for child participation in the 
adoption process under certain circumstances by requiring that a child, who is 
                                                 
226  [1985] 3 All ER 402 (HL). 
227  Kruger 2005 Codicillus 5.  
228  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402 (HL) at 410-413. 
229  S 18: “(4) A children’s court to which application for an order of adoption is made ..., shall not 
grant the application unless it is satisfied— … 
 (e) that the child, if over the age of ten years, consents to the adoption and understands the nature 
and import of such consent”. 
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over the age of ten years, consents to his/her adoption and understands the 
nature and import of such consent. Child participation in the adoption process is 
in line with the child-centered approach,230 but I believe that this section is flawed 
because the requirement is too rigid.  
 
Firstly, linking the requirement of the child’s consent to a specific age does not 
take into account the individual circumstances of the child and of the particular 
case. Age alone should not be assumed to be the determinate for the mental 
development and maturity of the child, for mental development and maturity are 
determined by many factors.231 On the one hand, a child aged ten years may 
have a much younger mental age.232 Where, for example, the child is older than 
ten years but suffers from some mental illness, consent might be inappropriate. A 
child under the age of ten years, on the other hand, might have the mental 
development of a much older child and may be mature enough to consent. The 
way section 18(4)(e) is phrased does not take this into account. Similarly, 
maturity develops at different times for different children. Age and maturity do not 
always cohere.233 It is quite possible that a child of ten years might not be mature 
enough to be involved in an adoption process and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
230  Child participation, as discussed under “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach”, 
should be determined by the circumstances of each case and should not be rigid. Also see Heaton 
1990 THRHR 97-98. 
231  Strous 2007 SA Journal of Psychology 235.  
232  Mental development is not the same for all children, and can be influenced by many factors.  
233  Strous 2007 SA Journal of Psychology 235. 
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Furthermore, even where the child is capable of and mature enough to give 
consent other factors, such as abuse, fear, or the desire to get out of a children’s 
home at any cost, may influence such consent and make it unsuitable, 
inappropriate or undesirable. It is submitted that the validity of consent should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, section 18(4)(e) is phrased in 
such a way that consent cannot be dispensed with even if it is found that the child 
does not understand the nature and import of such consent. Section 18(4)(e) 
divides the consent requirement into two parts, both of which must be satisfied 
before the consent requirement can be said to have been met. A child who is 
over the age of ten has to consent to the adoption and has to understand the 
nature and import of the consent. This means that if a child over ten years does 
not understand the nature and import of the consent, an adoption cannot be 
granted in respect of the child. The result seems to be that such a child cannot be 
adopted at all, for the Act does not provide for dispensing with the child’s 
consent. Depending on the circumstances of the individual case the best 
interests of the child can therefore be compromised by the way the section is 
phrased. 
 
My argument is thus that consent should not be dependent on a specific age, but 
rather on the development and maturity of the particular child as well as the 
circumstances of the case. In line with Eekelaar’s dynamic self-determinism 
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method,234 it is important that children should be involved in the adoption 
process, but only as far as they are able to participate.235 
 
To complicate matters even further, the section gives no exact indication of the 
nature and import of what it is that the child needs to understand before he/she 
consents. Is it the nature and importance of an adoption in general that needs to 
be understood, or is it the nature and importance of the specific adoption and all 
that it entails that needs to be understood? The child may understand the nature 
and import of an adoption, but may not understand that there are issues in 
his/her specific adoption that could have an even greater impact on him/her than 
adoption ordinarily has, such as the effect that an intercultural adoption could 
have on his/her biological culture. Whether the child’s adoption could go ahead 
under these circumstances is unclear. In my opinion, the child should be required 
to understand the nature and import of his/her specific adoption. If the child 
understands the nature and import of adoption in general, but does not 
understand the impact thereof on him/her for whatever reason, his/her consent to 
the adoption should not count for anything. The social worker facilitating the 
adoption should be required to determine whether the child is capable of giving 
consent, and should also be required to counsel the child about his/her decision 
and should receive proper training to be able to fulfil this task. Unfortunately the 
                                                 
234  See “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach” above. 
235  See s 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act, s 233(1)(c)(i) of the Children’s Act, art 12(1) of the 
Convention and art 4(2) of the Charter.  
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Child Care Act does not make provision for such a role for the adoption social 
worker.236  
 
It would have been better had section 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act been worded 
in such a way that a children’s court to which application for an order of adoption 
is made, could not grant the application unless it was satisfied that the child, who 
is of an age and maturity to understand the nature and import of consent under 
the circumstances of the specific adoption, consents to the adoption. This would 
have been more in line with the best interests of the child. The consent 
requirement should not be linked to a specific age and should require the child to 
understand exactly what it is to which he/she is consenting. It should also not bar 
the adoption of children who are incapable of understanding the nature and 
impact of consent. 
 
Both the Convention and the Charter take a very balanced approach when it 
comes to children’s age and their involvement in decisions that affect them. In my 
view, this approach is far better than the rigid approach dictated by the Child 
Care Act, as discussed above. The Convention does not make the consent of a 
child subject to a specific age, but rather relies on the age and maturity of the 
child. Article 12(1) of the Convention states that a child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views has the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the view being given due weight in accordance with the age 
                                                 
236  This unfortunate situation has been addressed in the Children’s Act in s 233(4). Section 233(4) of 
the Children’s Act is discussed below under “6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the 
child”. 
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and maturity of the child. Similarly, article 4(2) of the Charter provides that in all 
judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child, the child who is capable of 
communicating his/her own views has to be heard, and those views shall be 
taken into consideration by the relevant authority. Each case will therefore be 
judged on its own merit, and the views of the child will be taken into account if the 
child’s age and maturity allow this. Although it does not explicitly require the 
consent of a child to an adoption, article 21(a) of the Convention provides that 
States Parties that recognise and/or permit adoption have to ensure that the best 
interests of the child are the paramount consideration and that, if required, the 
persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption. In terms 
of article 24(a) of the Charter, States Parties which recognise the system of 
adoption have to ensure that the best interest of the child is the paramount 
consideration and that, if necessary, the appropriate persons concerned have 
given their informed consent to the adoption. There is no specific indication of 
who these persons are in either the Convention or the Charter and, in my 
opinion, the consent of the child who is of an age and maturity to be able to give 
consent is included in this requirement. 
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6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the child 
 
Section 233(1)(c) of the Children’s Act,237 read with section 10,238 provides for 
child participation in the adoption process in terms of this Act. There are two 
parts to section 233(1)(c). In the first place, section 233(1)(c)(i) requires that a 
child aged ten years or older has to consent to his/her adoption.239 I have argued 
that age in itself should not be the determining factor for consent.240 The criticism 
that is levelled against section 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act241 in this regard 
applies equally to section 233(1)(c)(i) of the Children’s Act. It is my view that if 
other factors such as maturity are not taken into consideration, the child’s 
consent is inappropriate.  
 
Whereas the Child Care Act requires the child’s understanding of the consent, 
section 233(1)(c) does away with this part of the consent requirement. The 
section requires that a child aged ten years or older consent to the adoption, 
apparently regardless of whether he/she understands such consent or not. I 
                                                 
237  S 233: “(1) A child may be adopted only if consent for the adoption has been given by— … 
 (c) The child, if the child is— 
  (i)  10 years of age or older; or 
(ii)  under the age of 10 years, but is of an age, maturity and stage of development to 
understand the implications of such consent.”  
238  S 10: “Every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able to 
participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate in an appropriate way 
and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration.” 
239  S 233(1)(c)(i). See n 237 above. 
240  The Children’s Act extends the requirement of consent to children under ten years under certain 
circumstances. These circumstances will be discussed below. 
241  See “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” above. The provisions of cl 
117(2)(h) of the Children’s Bill 2007 of Botswana, in terms of which a court to which application 
for an adoption is made has to take the views of the child into consideration subject to the child’s 
age, maturity and level of understanding before it grants the application, are, in my opinion, more 
in line with the best interests of the child – see “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act” and “8 6 2 
Reform proposals”. 
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believe that this provision is more detrimental to the best interests of the child 
than section 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act. Even though it is unclear what the 
intention was when the legislature included the requirement of understanding in 
the Child Care Act, the inclusion of the requirement is not criticised. It is simply 
the way in which it was worded that is problematic.242 The removal of the 
requirement that the child needs to understand the consent is not supported. 
Section 233(1)(c)(i) should rather have been rephrased to grant more protection 
to the child who has to consent to an adoption. It is crucial that the child 
concerned understands to what he/she is consenting before such consent can be 
taken into account. Consent should not be dependent on a specific age, but 
rather on the development and maturity of the particular child as well as the 
circumstances of the case. In terms of section 233(4) the social worker facilitating 
the adoption of a child must counsel the child before consent to an adoption is 
granted.243 Unfortunately though, section 233(4) only requires counselling, 
nothing more. The child then has to decide whether to consent or not. The 
decision to consent or not is not affected by the counselling. Surely, counselling 
by a properly trained adoption social worker will be in the best interests of the 
child, but I believe this section should be extended to require the social worker to 
determine whether the child is then capable of giving the requisite consent.  
 
                                                 
242  See “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” above. 
243  S 233: “(4) Before consent for the adoption of the child is granted in terms of subsection (1), the 
adoption social worker facilitating the adoption of the child must counsel … the child on the 
decision to make the child available for adoption.” 
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There is a second part to this subsection, namely section 233(1)(c)(ii). It requires 
that a child under the age of ten years who is of an age, maturity and stage of 
development to understand the implications of such consent has to consent to an 
adoption before the adoption application can be considered.244 In my opinion, this 
subsection, although it cannot escape criticism, serves the interests of the child 
better than subsection (i). The requirement in subsection 233(1)(c)(ii) at least 
takes into consideration the maturity and stage of development of the child, and 
whether he/she understands the implications of the consent. Like section 18(4)(e) 
of the Child Care Act, this subsection of the Children’s Act does not indicate what 
it is that the child needs to understand, in other words, it is unclear whether the 
child needs to understand the implications of consenting to adoption in general, 
or whether the child needs to understand the implications of consenting to 
adoption in his/her specific case.245 Again, it is submitted that the social worker 
facilitating the adoption should determine whether the child is capable of giving 
consent and, if necessary, counsel the child about this issue. At least the 
Children’s Act provides for counselling by the adoption social worker where 
applicable,246 but I believe the adoption social worker should be trained to 
determine whether the child is mature enough to understand the consent and to 
have an input with regard to the child’s ability to consent to his/her adoption. As 
mentioned above,247 proper training of adoption social workers will be very 
important.  
                                                 
244  S 233(1)(c)(ii) - see n 237 above. 
245  Also see my argument under “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” above. 
246  S 233. 
247  See “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the child” above. 
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In line with article 12 of the Convention and article 4(2) of the Charter a better 
approach, in my view, would have been to base the decision about the 
involvement of a child in both the giving of consent and the child’s best interests 
in general in adoption proceedings for children of all ages on section 10,248 read 
with section 7(1)(g)(i), of the Children’s Act.249 Section 10 incorporates the 
provisions of article 12(1) of the Convention into our domestic law, thereby 
complying with South Africa’s obligations in that regard.250 In terms of section 10, 
every child who is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be 
able to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate 
in an appropriate way, and views expressed by the child must be given due 
consideration. Section 7(1)(g)(i) provides that the age, maturity and stage of 
development of a child need to be taken into account to determine the best 
interests of the child.251 In my opinion section 233(1)(c) does not comply with the 
provisions of section 7(1)(g)(i). Section 233(1)(c) should rather have read as 
follows:  
 
A child may be adopted only if consent for the adoption has been given by— … 
(c) the child, if the child is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be 
able to consent to the adoption and understand the implications of such consent. The 
adoption social worker facilitating the adoption is tasked with determining whether the 
                                                 
248  See n 238 above. 
249  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
(g) the child’s— 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development”. 
250  Davel in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-14. 
251  See n 91 above. 
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child is able to consent to the adoption, taking into account the personal circumstances of 
the child.  
 
Alternatively, a provision that lists circumstances where the consent of the child 
to an adoption can be dispensed with should be inserted into the Children’s Act. 
Both the Child Care Act252 and the Children’s Act253 make provision for 
dispensing with the consent of the parent of the child who is to be adopted. Such 
consent could be dispensed with because the parent is dead, missing, mentally 
ill, has abandoned the child or has abused the child, to name but a few. There is 
no reason why this section cannot be amended to make provision for 
circumstances where the consent of the child could be dispensed with where 
such consent is inappropriate. Where the child is incapable of consenting, or 
consent was acquired in an unacceptable manner (for example where undue 
pressure was placed on the child to consent), the consent of the child should be 
dispensed with. It is recommended that section 233(1)(c) should be amended to 
set out those circumstances in which the child’s consent may be waived.  
 
Until this amendment is made, there is a way to overcome the problem of a child 
having to consent to his/her adoption where such consent is not appropriate. 
Section 236(5) of the Children’s Act254 provides that a parent or person can be 
excluded from giving consent to an adoption if grounds for such exclusion exist. 
                                                 
252  S 19. 
253  S 236. 
254  S 236: “(5) A children’s court may on a balance of probabilities make a finding as to the existence 
of a ground on which a parent or person is excluded in terms of this subsection from giving 
consent to the adoption of a child.” 
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Unfortunately there is no indication in the Act of what would amount to “a ground 
on which a parent or person is excluded” from giving consent to the adoption of a 
child. This of course complicates matters, as the presiding officer in an adoption 
application will have to use his/her own discretion, which could give rise to many 
different interpretations of what these grounds are. Be that as it may, when it 
comes into effect, the courts should interpret this section in such a way that the 
requirement with regard to the consent of the child can be dispensed with where 
appropriate. A child is a person, which means that the children’s court may make 
a finding that he/she is excluded from giving consent for the adoption. In other 
words, I submit that by using section 236(5) the court should be able to dispense 
with the consent of a child over the age of ten years and to allow an adoption to 
proceed without the child’s consent where appropriate. Careful scrutiny of the 
adoption process is always advocated, but if the child’s consent is to be 
dispensed with, the best interests of the child demands that this process be 
overseen even more carefully by all parties involved. I say this because in these 
circumstances the child is not in a position to have any input in the adoption and 
thus needs the security of knowing that the other parties will take care of his/her 
best interests. 
 
The important issue for participation of a child in any matter concerning the child, 
which obviously includes adoption, is not the age of the child per se, but the age 
of the child together with all other relevant factors. Again, I would recommend 
that it would be more in line with the best interests of the child if section 233(1)(c) 
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provided that a child may be adopted only if consent for the adoption has been 
given by the child who is of an age, maturity and stage of development to 
understand the nature and import of consent under the specific circumstances. If 
the child is not of an age, maturity and stage of development to understand the 
nature and import of consent to the adoption under the specific circumstances of 
his/her adoption, his/her consent should be dispensed with. As I have already 
argued, an adoption social worker who has been properly trained to make such a 
recommendation, should make a recommendation to the presiding officer of the 
children’s court255 about the ability of the child to consent to the adoption or not. 
Although I do not believe that the court ought to be bound by the decision of the 
social worker, the social worker should guide the court in this regard.256 Anyone 
                                                 
255  An adoption application is heard in the children’s court – s 239(1)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
256  The role of the adoption social worker can be equated to that of the family advocate as provided 
for in the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987, where the family advocate may 
make recommendations and report to the court on any matter concerning the welfare of a minor or 
dependent child of a marriage – s 4(1). Although the court is not bound by these recommendations 
and report, the recommendations do usually play an important role: see eg Terblanche v 
Terblanche 1992 (1) SA 501 (W); Van Vuuren v Van Vuuren 1993 (1) SA 163 (T); Whitehead v 
Whitehead 1993 (3) SA 72 (SE); Van den Berg v Le Roux [2003] 3 All SA 599 (NC); P v P 2007 
(5) SA 94 (SCA). Although the family advocate usually reports to the High Court, he/she also has 
a role to play in respect of the children’s court. With regard to parental responsibilities and rights 
of unmarried fathers (s 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act), parenting plans (s 33(5) of the Children’s 
Act) and lay forum hearings (s 49(1)(a) of the Children’s Act) parties may not approach the court 
as a first resort for the resolution of their disputes, but must first attend mediation through (inter 
alia) a family advocate. These matters are discussed in De Jong 2008 THRHR 632-635. Also, in 
terms of s 62 of the Children’s Act, the children’s court may order an investigation by inter alia a 
family advocate for purposes of deciding a matter before it. Furthermore, the Jurisdiction of 
Regional Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008 (which is not yet in operation) extends the 
jurisdiction of the regional divisions of the magistrates’ courts. The Act empowers regional 
divisions to decide divorce and nullity cases, cases relating to customary marriages, and matters 
arising from such cases, and confers the same jurisdiction as the High Court on the regional 
divisions for purposes of deciding these cases (s 29(1B) of the Magistrates' Courts Act as inserted 
by s 7 of the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act). Family advocates and family 
councillors who have been appointed in terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 
will be deemed also to have been appointed in respect of the regional divisions and will therefore 
have the same powers to investigate and to make recommendations regarding the interests of 
children that they enjoy in the High Court. Thus recommendations and reports of family 
advocates, like recommendations of social workers, operate in the context of children's court. 
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who feels aggrieved by the decision of the children’s court may approach the 
High Court.  
 
Both section 18(4)(e) of the Child Care Act and section 233(1)(c) of the 
Children’s Act are, in my opinion, too rigid with regard to the circumstances under 
which a child has to consent to his/her adoption. As explained above, I believe 
that there should be no reference to a specific age, but that it would be more 
appropriate to determine the need for the child’s consent in every case, based on 
his/her ability to understand the nature and import of consent under the specific 
circumstances. As a result, it cannot be said that the Children’s Act is an 
improvement on the Child Care Act in this regard. 
 
 
6 6 ADOPTION CONTACT 
 
6 6 1  The Child Care Act and adoption contact 
 
In the past, the accepted adoptive practice in most countries, including South 
Africa, was closed adoption, where neither biological parents nor adoptive 
parents were permitted access to any information about each other, and the 
biological origins of the adopted child were kept from him/her, even after 
adulthood.257 If an intercultural adoption had taken place, this would have meant 
that the child’s biological culture/cultural background was kept from him/her after 
                                                 
257  Louw 2003 De Jure 253-254. 
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the adoption, and the child would have been denied the opportunity to learn 
about his/her biological culture. If the adoption was interracial, there would 
usually have been a definite and obvious difference in appearance between the 
child and the adoptive parents. This, in my view, would have created tremendous 
confusion for the child. Even though he/she would have been aware of the 
obvious difference in appearance between him/her and the adoptive parents and 
the fact that they could not be biologically related, the child’s biological origins 
were not known by the child and even if the adoptive parents wanted to, they 
probably would not have been able to provide him/her with information about 
his/her biological background.258 The child would have been denied the 
opportunity to learn about his/her cultural and racial background. The child’s 
knowledge that he/she is for instance black while the adoptive parents are white 
would not have assisted with establishing the biological culture of the child 
because, as I have argued,259 there is no such thing as a “black culture” or a 
“white culture”. In South Africa, the provisions of section 20 of the Child Care Act, 
which create the legal fiction that an adopted child is the child of the adoptive 
parents,260 are probably at least partly to blame for this situation.  
 
                                                 
258  In the next paragraph I explain that access to adoption records is extremely difficult in terms of the 
Child Care Act. 
259  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
260  S 20: “(1) An order of adoption shall terminate all the rights and obligations existing between the 
child and any person who was his parent … immediately prior to such adoption, and that parent’s 
relatives. 
(2) An adopted child shall for all purposes whatever be deemed in law to be the legitimate child of 
the adoptive parent, as if he was born of that parent during the existence of a lawful marriage.” 
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The Child Care Act further severely limits access to adoption records.261 Access 
to adoption records in South Africa can only be obtained by the adoptive parent 
from the date on which the adopted child reaches the age of 18 years,262 or by 
the adopted child from the date on which he/she reaches the age of 21 years.263 
It is therefore not easy for an adoptive parent or an adopted child to obtain 
information about the biological parents/family of the child. This situation 
seriously hampers the chances of maintaining contact between the child and the 
biological parents/family. Where an adopted child is not able to obtain any 
information about his/her biological background and parents/family, it also 
prevents him/her from obtaining any information about his/her cultural 
background. 
 
6 6 2 The Children’s Act and adoption contact 
 
When the relevant part of the Children’s Act comes into effect, it will do away with 
the artificial situation that was created by section 20(2) the Child Care Act. In 
terms of section 242(3) of the Children’s Act, the child will no longer be regarded 
                                                 
261  The circumstances under which access to these records can be obtained are discussed under “4 4 2 
3 South African law and open adoption”. 
262  GG 10546 of 12 December 1986, Government Notice R 2612 reg 28(1)(a). 
263  GG 10546 of 12 December 1986, Government Notice R 2612 reg 28(1)(b). Although the age of 
majority has been lowered from 21 years to 18 years in terms of the Children’s Act, Government 
Notice R 2612 is not linked to the age of majority, but specifically stipulates the age at which an 
adopted child may access adoption records as 21 years. Until such time as regulations changing 
this age are published, an adopted person will not be able to access adoption records until he/she 
reaches the age of 21 years. This situation can be detrimental to the adopted person who wishes to 
obtain knowledge about his/her biological background. 
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as if he/she was born to the adoptive parent.264 Instead, an adopted child will for 
all purposes be regarded as the child of the adoptive parent and the adoptive 
parent will for all purposes be regarded as the parent of the adopted child. This 
more realistic situation is welcomed. By not legally terminating the relationship 
between the child and his/her biological parents the Children’s Act, in my opinion, 
recognises the child’s need to maintain contact with his/her biological parents 
and family. The legislature has taken note of the reality that biological ties cannot 
be severed.265  
 
The Children’s Act also recognises that a child who cannot stay in the care of a 
parent or family needs to maintain contact with them.266 Even if it is not possible 
for the child to maintain contact with his/her biological parents, contact with the 
rest of his/her biological family is just as important. In terms of section 7(1)(f)(ii) a 
factor that must be taken into consideration when determining the best interests 
of the child is the maintenance of a connection with his/her family or extended 
family, culture or tradition where possible.267 The realisation that an adopted child 
needs to have knowledge about and contact with his/her biological family and 
cultural background, will be extremely beneficial to the interculturally adopted 
                                                 
264  S 242: “(3) An adopted child must for all purposes be regarded as the child of the adoptive parent 
and an adoptive parent must for all purposes be regarded as the parent of the adopted child.” 
265  Also see “4 4 2 2 Benefits of adoption contact” and “4 4 2 3 South African law and open 
adoption”. 
266  S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely— … 
 (f) the need for the child- 
 (i)  to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family, and  
(ii)  to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or 
tradition”. Also see n 91 above and the discussion under “6 3 3 2 The Children’s 
Act, adoption and the best interests of the child”. 
267  Also see “4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption”. 
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child, who now has the opportunity to learn about his/her cultural background. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the relationship of the parties to an adoptive 
family improves where the child maintains contact with his/her biological 
parents/family.268 It is therefore important that every effort is made for the child to 
have contact with his/her biological parents and/or family,269 unless such contact 
is not in the best interests of the child.270  
 
Difficulty in maintaining contact with the child’s biological parents and/or family is 
no reason for contact not to take place.271 In fact, section 18 of the Children’s Act 
shifts the emphasis of the relationship between the parent and child by giving 
parents responsibilities towards their children.272 These responsibilities include 
the duty to maintain contact with the child,273 thus placing the responsibility of 
keeping contact with the child on the parent as well. An adopted child thus has 
the right to be cared for by the adoptive parent and to maintain contact with a 
biological parent and the parents, both biological and adoptive, are responsible to 
maintain this contact.274 
 
                                                 
268  See “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION”. 
269  Again, there are many cases where the child does not have biological parents/family members or 
does not know who or where they are. 
270  This will be the case where there is, for instance, physical or emotional abuse of the child. 
271  S 7(1)(e) of the Children’s Act. S 7: “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best 
interests of the child standard to be applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration 
where relevant, namely— … 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific 
parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on a regular basis”. 
Also see n 91. 
272  Also see n 87. 
273  S 18(2)(b). Also see n 87. 
274  In terms of s 1(1) of the Act a parent includes both a biological parent and an adoptive parent. 
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6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements 
 
The Children’s Act introduced post-adoption agreements into our legal system. In 
their discussions leading up to the formulation of the Children’s Act, the SA Law 
Commission did not recommend a legislative scheme for open adoption, but 
supported a system of voluntary agreements regarding openness in adoption, in 
other words, post-adoption agreements.275 Reference was made to Western 
Australia, where a similar scheme exists in terms of which adoption plans are 
negotiated. In that state, the Adoption Act276 provides that an adoption plan has 
to be negotiated, if possible, between the birth parents who have consented to 
the adoption, the prospective adoptive parents and, if the Director-General 
believes it to be appropriate, the child’s representative.277 There, the 
unwillingness of a party to negotiate an adoption plan may even lead to a child 
becoming unadoptable.278 Although the Commission refers to post-adoption 
contact in Western Australia, the Commission’s Discussion Paper does not 
indicate whether post-adoption contact is successful in Western Australia.  
 
In terms of section 234 of the Children’s Act, which has not yet come into 
operation, the biological parent or guardian and the prospective adoptive parent 
of the child may enter into a post-adoption agreement to provide for 
communication, including visitation/contact, between the child and the biological 
                                                 
275  SALC Project 110 147-152. 
276  Act 9 of 1994. 
277  S 46(1). 
278  S 49. 
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parent or guardian, and the provision of information, including medical 
information, about the child before an application for the adoption of the child is 
made.279 The social worker facilitating the adoption of the child must assist the 
parties in preparing a post-adoption agreement and counsel them on the 
implications of such an agreement.280 If it is in the best interests of the child, the 
court may confirm the post-adoption agreement,281 which only takes effect if it is 
made an order of court.282 
 
A post-adoption agreement could certainly serve the best interests of the child, 
and it could actually be indispensable to the health of the child where there is a 
family history of some illness or a genetic condition, for example, that could affect 
the child or be life threatening. Although post-adoption agreements are, in terms 
of the Children’s Act, not compulsory, I have a concern about these agreements. 
                                                 
279  S 234: “(1) The parent or guardian of a child may, before an application for the adoption of a child 
is made in terms of section 239, enter into a post-adoption agreement with a prospective adoptive 
parent of that child to provide for— 
 (a) communication, including visitation between the child and the parent or guardian concerned 
and such other person as may be stipulated in the agreement; and 
 (b) the provision of information, including medical information, about the child, after the 
application for adoption is granted. 
 (2) An agreement contemplated in subsection (1) may not be entered into without the consent of 
the child if the child is of an age, maturity and stage of development to understand the implications 
of such agreement. 
 (3) The adoption social worker facilitating the adoption of the child must assist the parties in 
preparing a post-adoption agreement and counsel them on the implications of such an agreement. 
 (4) A court may, when granting an application in terms of section 239 for the adoption of the 
child, confirm a post-adoption agreement if it is in the best interests of the child. 
 (5) A post-adoption agreement must be in the prescribed format. 
 (6) A post-adoption agreement— 
 (a) takes effect only if made an order of court; 
 (b) may be amended or terminated only by an order of court on application— 
  (i)  by a party to the agreement; or 
  (ii)  by the adopted child.” 
280  S 234(3). Again, the social worker will need to be trained properly to do this. 
281  S 234(4). Also see “4 4 2 3 South African law and open adoption”. 
282  S 234(6)(a). 
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Will the willingness of a party (specifically the prospective adoptive parent) to 
enter into a post-adoption agreement be taken into account when an adoption 
application is considered? Could the refusal or unwillingness by someone to 
enter into such an agreement be construed as evidence that the person does not 
have the best interests of the child at heart? What might happen is that someone 
who does not want to participate in such an agreement, might feel pressurised 
into a post-adoption agreement, which, of course, may not necessarily be in the 
best interests of the child.  
 
Post-adoption agreements, if properly monitored, can contribute greatly to the 
best interests of the child, and could be of tremendous importance for the 
interculturally adopted child who could be enabled to keep contact with and have 
knowledge of his/her cultural background. I have already pointed out the 
importance of contact between the adopted child and his/her biological 
parents/family.283 However, if these agreements are not properly monitored, they 
could actually work against the best interests of the child. As I have explained, a 
party to an adoption who agrees to a post-adoption agreement because of 
pressure or guilt or for whatever reason other than the belief that such an 
agreement is in the best interests of the child, may come to resent the other 
parties to this agreement. Perhaps this aspect of openness in adoption needs 
more time and attention.284 
 
                                                 
283  See “4 4 2 Open adoption”. 
284  This is also the view of Louw 2003 De Jure 277. 
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Whereas adoption in terms of the Child Care Act created the artificial situation 
where the child was considered as if born to the adoptive parents285 and access 
to the adoption records of the child was restricted,286 the Children’s Act 
emphasises the importance of contact between the adopted child and his/her 
biological family.287 The Children’s Act supports openness in adoption, something 
which has been found to be in the best interests of the child.288 Although I voiced 
my concern about the implementation of post-adoption agreements and the 
willingness of parties to enter into such an agreement, the provisions in the 
Children’s Act are welcomed.  
 
6 6 4 Customary law and adoption contact 
 
Although the system is certainly not without its faults, customary adoption can 
serve as an example of how adoption contact can be in the best interests of the 
child. As I have already indicated,289 the aim of adoption in customary law is 
adult-centered. However, with customary adoption there is ongoing contact 
between the child and the biological family, even after the adoption. The solution 
to the problems in customary adoption is, I believe, to apply the principles of 
adoption contact in customary law, but to do it in a more formalised way, by 
including the customary adoption principles in statutory adoption and by involving 
a social worker who will monitor the adoption and who will protect the interests of 
                                                 
285  S 20(2). 
286  See “6 6 1 The Child Care Act and adoption contact”. 
287  See “6 6 2 The Children’s Act and adoption contact” and “6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements”. 
288  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
289  See “4 4 1 Introduction”. 
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the child. In this way, there will be one procedure that will regulate adoption in 
South Africa, which will be in the best interests of the child.290  
 
 
6 7 CULTURAL ASPECTS 
 
6 7 1 The Child Care Act, adoption and culture 
 
The need for a child to maintain a connection with the culture of his/her biological 
parents and family has been discussed at length in this thesis.291 The importance 
of culture must not be overlooked, but at the same time culture, in isolation, 
should never be considered more important than the best interests of the child, 
viewed holistically. The Child Care Act places tremendous emphasis on the role 
of culture in an adoption.292 Section 18(3) compels a children’s court to which an 
application for an adoption order is made to have regard to the matters 
mentioned in section 40 of the Act.293 Section 40 provides that regard must be 
had to the religious and cultural background of the child and his or her parents as 
against that of the person in or to whose custody the child is to be placed or 
transferred. Section 40 thus isolates and emphasises two particular factors that 
need to be considered before an adoption takes place. The emphasis that is 
                                                 
290  Also see “9 CONCLUSION”. My suggestion is that the principles of customary adoption should 
be incorporated into legislative adoption. 
291  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
292  See also “5 1 INTRODUCTION”. 
293  S 40: “… regard shall be had to the religious and cultural background of the child concerned and 
of his parents as against that of the person in or to whose custody he is to be placed or transferred.” 
 S 18: “(3) In considering any such application the children’s court shall have regard to the matters 
mentioned in section 40.” 
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placed on these two factors creates the impression that they are somehow more 
important than other relevant factors when an adoption is considered. The 
emphasis on cultural background and the impression that cultural differences are 
particularly important have resulted in strong opposition to intercultural adoption 
— sometimes without proper consideration being given to the best interests of 
the child.294  
 
6 7 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and culture 
 
As appears, inter alia, from comparing section 18 of the Child Care Act to section 
240(1)(a) of the Children’s Act, the role of culture is far more balanced in the 
Children’s Act than in the Child Care Act.295 Section 240(1)(a) of the Children’s 
Act, which is not yet in operation, provides that the court considering the adoption 
of a child must take into account all relevant factors, including the religious and 
cultural background of the child, the child’s parents and the prospective adoptive 
parents.296 The difference in emphasis and formulation reflect the reality (which is 
not evident in the Child Care Act) that there are other factors besides religion and 
culture which are relevant in the case of an adoption and which should be taken 
                                                 
294  See further “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor” where I explained that this requirement actually 
works against the best interests of the child. 
295  S 240: “(1) When considering an application for the adoption of a child, the court must take into 
account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the religious and cultural background of— 
 (i)  the child; 
 (ii)  the child’s parent; and 
 (iii)  the prospective adoptive parent; 
(b) all reasonable preferences expressed by a parent and stated in the consent; and 
(c) a report contemplated in section 239(1)(b).”  
296  Also see “4 1 INTRODUCTION”. 
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into account. The inclusion in the Act of a reference to “all relevant factors” is 
welcomed, and will hopefully mean that less emphasis will in future be placed on 
religion and culture and more emphasis on the best interests of the child as a 
whole, which could of course include taking religion and culture into account.  
 
However, the specific references to religion and culture in section 240(1)(a) still 
create the impression that those two factors are particularly important. That 
religion and culture have to be included as relevant factors when considering an 
application for adoption goes without saying. The wording of the section which 
stipulates that the court must take into account all relevant factors including 
religious and cultural background indicates that there are other relevant factors 
too. Specifically mentioning these two factors however creates the impression 
that the two factors that are mentioned by name (ie religion and culture) are, or 
may be considered, “more relevant” than other relevant factors such as age, 
language, etcetera. In other words, the section creates the impression that there 
is a hierarchy of relevant factors, with religion and culture being in the top 
position. It would have been preferable for the legislature to merely state that all 
relevant factors have to be taken into account, and left it to the court to consider 
all the factors that are listed in section 7 of the Act and to decide which of them 
are relevant in the particular case and how much weight should be attached to 
each of the relevant factors. If, for instance, a baby is adopted, culture should not 
be considered very important in the decision about the adoption of the child, 
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because the child has not yet formed an attachment with any culture.297 
However, if an older child has formed ties with a specific culture, culture might be 
considered important in deciding whether or not to allow an intercultural 
adoption.298 
 
In terms of section 231(3), an adoption worker may take the cultural diversity of 
the child and the prospective adoptive parent into account in the assessment of 
the prospective adoptive parent.299 This subsection does not pertain to the 
applicant’s eligibility to adopt.300 It is confirmation that culture does not have to be 
taken into account. It may be taken into account.301 In other words, cultural 
difference does not automatically exclude an applicant as a possible adoptive 
parent. Where the prospective adoptive parent and the child have different 
cultural backgrounds, this is a factor that the social worker may consider. As 
mentioned above,302 if there is a prospective adoptive parent with a similar 
background to the child who is suitable, the “mild preference” rule may be 
applied, and he/she may be deemed more appropriate to adopt the child than 
another prospective adoptive parent who, although suitable, has a different 
cultural background to the child. Thus, difference in culture is not a bar to 
                                                 
297  This does not mean that the cultural background of the child is not important or should not be 
maintained. It simply should not be particularly important when the decision about the adoption is 
taken. 
298  See “5 4 2 Culture and the child”.  
299  S 231: “(3) In the assessment of a prospective adoptive parent, an adoption social worker may take 
the cultural and community diversity of the adoptable child and prospective adoptive parent into 
consideration.” 
300  Mosikatsana & Loffell in Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act 15-8. 
301  Whether culture will be taken into account, will obviously depend on the circumstances of the 
case. 
302  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
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adoption, but it may be taken into account. It is important that the adoption social 
worker has to be trained to understand this difference. Knowledge of this 
difference is essential for the proper application of this section by social workers 
dealing with intercultural adoptions. 
 
Section 229 of the Children’s Act sets out the purposes of adoption, namely, to 
protect and nurture children by providing a safe, healthy environment with 
positive support303 and to promote the goals of permanency planning by 
connecting children to other safe and nurturing family relationships intended to 
last a lifetime.304 When the intention to introduce the Children’s Bill in Parliament 
was published in 2003 by the Minister of Social Development305 section 229 
(which was then clause 229) contained three subsections. Subsections (a) and 
(b) were exactly the same as they are in the Children’s Act. Subsection (c), which 
was removed before the reintroduction of the Bill as a section 75 Bill, read as 
follows: 
 
 The purposes of adoption are to— … 
 (c) respect the individual and family by demonstrating respect for cultural, ethnic and 
community diversity. 
 
The purposes in section 229 are listed as equal. There is no indication that one 
has to receive preference over the others. The removal of subsection (c) before 
                                                 
303  S 229(a). 
304  S 229(b). 
305  GG 25346 of 13 August 2003, General Notice 2200. 
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the resubmission of the Bill and the eventual enactment of the Act, in my view, 
leads to a very important conclusion, namely, that the legislature was wary of 
placing too much emphasis on culture. This is further confirmation that culture, 
although important, should not carry more weight than other factors that could 
influence the best interests of the child. It is my belief that the legislature removed 
respect for cultural, ethnic and community diversity from this section precisely 
because the goals of protecting and nurturing the child306 and of promoting the 
goals of permanency planning307 are more important than protecting culture. 
 
Even though I have some objections to and reservations about the listing in 
section 240(1)(a) of religion and culture, I am of the opinion that, overall, the 
Children’s Act is a huge improvement on the Child Care Act as far as the role of 
culture in the adoption process is concerned. 
 
 
6 8 CUSTOMARY LAW, ADOPTION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 
 
Although the discussion in this chapter focuses on statutory adoption law, some 
reference to customary law is needed. Adoption in customary law is usually about 
the needs of the family head, who usually adopts a boy to be his heir. The focus 
is on the adult, and there is no express protection for or acknowledgement of the 
                                                 
306  S 229(a). 
307  S 229(b). 
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best interests of the child.308 Having established that the legislature in the 
Children’s Act has given more recognition, not less, to the rights and interests of 
the child, it seems that customary adoptions do not comply with current trends, 
both local and international, about the rights of children in the context of adoption. 
 
However, in the Children’s Act the legislature recognised the need to 
accommodate some customary-law principles and the values of all population 
groups. Thus, in section 1(1) “family member” is defined in broad terms to include 
“a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt or cousin” of the child, and in section 
7(1)(f) recognition is given to the extended family.309 In terms of section 231(1)(a) 
“persons sharing a common household and forming a permanent family unit” are 
allowed to adopt a child. This subsection was included to allow for joint adoption 
by, for instance, a husband and all his wives (the kraal) in a customary-law 
setting.310 I believe that the inclusion of these provisions is an attempt by the 
legislature to make provision within the Act for statutory adoptions that would be 
in line with customary principles and values. The inclusion of customary-law 
principles and values into the Act enables more people to comply with the 
requirements for a statutory adoption, while simultaneously protecting the best 
interests of the child. As I shall argue in the conclusion of this thesis, there should 
always be allowance for the customary practices that are part of our indigenous 
law, but if these practices do not take proper account of the best interests of the 
                                                 
308  Bennett Customary Law in SA 319. See “2 4 2 2 Development of adoption in customary law”, 
where customary adoption is discussed. 
309  See “6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family environment” above. 
310  SALC Report on Project 110 235-236. 
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child they should be reformed in order to give effect to the constitutional provision 
that the child’s best interests are paramount.311 
 
 
6 9 CONCLUSION 
 
Although both the Child Care Act and the Children’s Act serve the best interests 
of the child to some extent, neither of these Acts, in the context of intercultural 
adoption, provides complete protection of the best interests of the child. There 
are issues in both Acts that deserve attention. However, as the Child Care Act 
will soon be replaced in toto by the Children’s Act, it is unlikely that the Child 
Care Act will be amended again.  
 
The Children’s Act, when implemented, will greatly improve the position of the 
child in general and specifically of the child who is involved in an intercultural 
adoption. As appears above in this chapter,312 there is much more emphasis on 
the best interests of the child in the Children’s Act, which is of course welcomed. 
Furthermore, the approach to culture in the adoption process is far more 
balanced than it is under the Child Care Act.313 Therefore, the full implementation 
of the Children’s Act is eagerly awaited. I trust that those aspects that could 
prove to be problematic or deserve further attention will be adequately addressed 
                                                 
311  Constitution s 28(2). Also see “9 CONCLUSION”. 
312  See “6 3 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
313  See “6 7 CULTURAL ASPECTS”. 
Chapter 6: The Child Care Act and the Children’s Act 
 320
by the courts when they arise, should the legislature not address them in the near 
future. 
 
This chapter concludes the discussion of the South African position with regard to 
the intercultural adoption of children and the protection of their best interests. The 
following two chapters will focus on intercultural adoption in Botswana and New 
Zealand. 
 
7 ADOPTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
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7 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Because the situation in South Africa is so different from that of most countries,1 
it is important when analysing the adoption procedures in other countries to try to 
find a country with similar circumstances. Like South Africa, New Zealand is a 
multicultural society.2 The people of New Zealand are mainly European and 
Maori. Maori people3 are an integral part of the wider New Zealand society,4 
which creates a challenge when formulating and administering family law in such 
a way that it guarantees all citizens equal consideration and respect for their 
cultural views and practices.5 There are racial differences as well as cultural 
ones, and the issues that arise in New Zealand when it comes to interracial and 
intercultural adoption are probably similar to those that we face in South Africa. 
As is the case in South Africa in respect of the black perspective,6 there has been 
criticism in New Zealand from the Maori perspective of the way in which the 
current adoption legislation is formulated,7 and much of the reform suggestions 
                                                 
1  See “1 1 INTRODUCTION”. 
2  NZLC Preliminary Paper 38 5. Robinson also suggests this in his discussion of New Zealand 
culture and family law in Robinson 1996 Stell LR 210. 
3  S 2 of the Maori Affairs Act 94 of 1953 defined a Maori as “a person belonging to the aboriginal 
race of New Zealand; and includes a half-caste and a person intermediate in blood between half-
castes and persons of pure descent from that race”. This definition was replaced by the definition 
in s 4 of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 4 of 1993, which defines a Maori as “a person of the 
Maori race of New Zealand, and includes a descendant of any such person”. The Maori Affairs Act 
was replaced by the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, which came into force on 1 July 1993. 
4  Cultural beliefs are very strong among the Maori people. In New Zealand, Maoris are in the 
minority. In South Africa the situation is different, because people of European descent are in the 
minority. Also see “1 1 RESEARCH PROBLEM”. 
5  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 42. 
6  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
7  See “7 2 5 Adoption Act 93 of 1955”, where it is suggested that the Adoption Act of 1955 rejects 
Maori customs and beliefs. Once again, it has to be remembered that the circumstances in South 
Africa are different to those in New Zealand, as Maoris are in the minority in New Zealand, 
whereas in South Africa, blacks are in the majority. 
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for adoption in New Zealand involve more awareness of Maori culture.8 Another 
reason for selecting New Zealand for comparative purposes is that the Bill which 
preceded the Adoption of Children Act9 in South Africa was modelled on the 
Infants Act10 of New Zealand. Furthermore, socio-economic circumstances in 
New Zealand and South Africa are similar.11 
 
 
7 2 LEGISLATION 
 
7 2 1 Adoption of Children Act 9 of 1881 
 
Before the promulgation of the Adoption of Children Act12 adoption was as 
common in New Zealand as it was in other countries, but it was not formally 
governed by means of legislation. This was the case for both Europeans13 and 
Maoris.14 These adoptions had no secure legal foundation.15 Children were cared 
for by foster parents who agreed to receive and raise them as members of their 
family,16 and Maori adoptions arranged by whanau17 were open, based on long-
                                                 
8  See “7 5 FUTURE REFORM OF NEW ZEALAND ADOPTION LAW”. 
9  Act 25 of 1923. 
10  Act 86 of 1908. See also “2 4 3 1 Introduction” above. 
11  Kruger 2005 CILSA 246.  
12  Hereafter referred to as the Adoption Act of 1881. This Act came about as a result of the initiative 
of GM Waterhouse, at the time a private member of Parliament.  
13  Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 1. 
14  Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 68. 
15  Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 1 227. 
16  Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 1. 
17  This term is defined under “7 2 5 Adoption Act 93 of 1955”. 
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standing Maori custom.18 Any adoption agreement dispute had to be dealt with 
under common law.19 
 
Even after the introduction of legislation, Maoris wishing to adopt continued to 
have a choice to use customary adoption.20 In 1901, while the practice of 
customary adoption was still permitted, it became essential to register the 
adoption in order for a claim to the estate of any Maori who died after 31 March 
1902 to be recognised.21  
 
In 1881, New Zealand became the first British community to introduce adoption 
legislation.22 This followed the recognition that informal adoption, described by 
Campbell23 as a “system of voluntary guardianship”, was already taking place. 
The Adoption Act of 1881 was a very short and basic Act.24 There was no 
reference to race or culture, and no restrictions with regard to adoption of this 
nature.25 The Act thus applied to everyone, and Maoris could adopt a child, both 
Pakeha (European) and Maori, under the provisions of this Act in the same way 
                                                 
18  Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 1 227. 
19  Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 1 227. 
20  Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 68. 
21  S 50 of the Native Land Claims Adjustment and Laws Amendment Act 65 of 1901. 
22  Else A Question of Adoption x. The Adoption Act of 1881 came into effect on 19 September 1881. 
23  Law of adoption in NZ 1. 
24  The Act consisted of only 11 sections. 
25  See “2 4 3 2 Adoption of Children Act 25 of 1923”. As I argued there, this was possibly not 
because the legislature was in favour of such adoptions, but rather because the legislature did not 
consider the possibility of such adoptions taking place. The only reference in this Act that possibly 
has a cultural link is in s 8 where provision is made for the adoption of deserted children by 
benevolent institutions if the child is of the same religious denomination as that of the institution. 
This is a strange section, as the religious denomination of a very young deserted child will surely 
not be known. 
Chapter 7: Adoption in New Zealand 
 325
that a European could.26 Maoris wishing to adopt thus had a choice between 
customary Maori placement or European adoption via the courts.27 The important 
difference between European adoption and Maori adoption is that Maori culture 
sees the child as belonging to the larger family (the whanau, hapu and iwi), rather 
than to the parents.28 
 
Even though there was certainly not much focus on the rights of children as long 
ago as 1881, this Act did recognise the interests of the child.29 To illustrate this: a 
district judge could make an order authorising an adoption when certain 
circumstances had been met, one of these being that “the interests of such a 
child will be promoted by the adoption”. The adopted child retained his/her 
biological name in addition to the name of the adoptive parent(s)30 and there was 
no restriction on contact or the passing of information between the child,31 the 
biological family, and the adoptive family. This creates the impression that open 
adoption existed in the first adoption legislation. Unfortunately this changed, and 
open adoption is currently a very sensitive and contentious issue.32  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 68. 
27  Native Rights Act 11 of 1865. 
28  Else 1987 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 241. 
29  S 3. 
30  S 10. 
31  A child was defined in s 2 as a boy or a girl under the age of 12 years. 
32  See the discussion below under “7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption”. 
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7 2 2 Adoption of Children Act 8 of 1895 
 
The Adoption Act of 1881 was later replaced by the Adoption of Children Act.33 
Insofar as the topic of this thesis is concerned, the Act did not differ significantly 
from the Adoption Act of 1881. Just like the previous Act, there were no 
legislative restrictions regarding race and culture in adoption procedures.34 In 
terms of the Adoption Act of 1895 a Maori could still adopt any child, whether 
Maori or European, and vice versa. The requirement about the interests of the 
child was extended though, so that it was required that “the welfare and interests 
of the child will be promoted by the adoption”.35 That the welfare and interests of 
a child were important was further illustrated by the fact that the legislature for the 
first time included a requirement that the child, if over the age of 12 years, had to 
consent to the adoption.  
 
7 2 3  Infants Act 86 of 1908 
 
The Adoption Act of 1895 was consolidated as Part III of the Infants Act,36 which 
was very similar to the Adoption Act of 1895. With regard to Maori adoptions, the 
same principles applied as in the two preceding Acts. The new Act did, however, 
include a section37 which indicated the circumstances in which the consent of 
                                                 
33  Hereafter the Adoption Act of 1895. It came into effect on 20 August 1895. 
34  The adoption of a deserted child with the same religious denomination as a benevolent institution 
was still possible in term of s 10 – see n 25.  
35  S 5(3). See my discussion below under “7 4 2 The welfare and interests of the child” about the 
meaning of “welfare” and “interests”. 
36  Act 86 of 1908. Ss 15-26 dealt with adoption. 
37  S 23. 
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parents could be dispensed with, which had not formed part of the previous 
legislation. On the other hand, the sections in the Adoption Act of 189538 and the 
Adoption Act of 188139 which conferred the name of the adoptive parent on the 
adopted child were not included in the Infants Act. Furthermore, it was required 
that a judge had to be satisfied that a child, if over the age of 12 years, had 
consented to an adoption before an adoption order could be made.40  
 
7 2 4 Maori Land Act 15 of 1909 and the Maori Affairs Act 94 of 1953 
 
After the commencement of the Maori Land Act41 customary adoptions by Maoris 
were no longer recognised, unless they were registered before the 
commencement of the Act.42 It was no longer lawful to make an order under the 
Infants Act for adoption of a child by a Maori,43 and these adoptions had no legal 
force or effect.44 An important change that was implemented by the Maori Land 
Act was that Maoris could no longer adopt non-Maori children. Maoris could only 
adopt a Maori or a descendant of a Maori.45 In contrast, adoptions by Europeans 
were still regulated by Part III of the Infants Act, which meant that a Maori child 
could still be adopted by a European adoptive parent. This provision stayed in 
                                                 
38  S 12. 
39  S 10. 
40  S 18(1)(d). 
41  Also referred to as the Native Land Act. This Act came into effect on 31 March 1910. 
42  S 161. 
43  S 81(1). This prohibition of customary adoptions is continued by s 19 of the Adoption Act of 1955. 
This Act is discussed below under “7 2 5 Adoption Act 93 of 1955”. 
44  S 80(1). 
45  S 164. 
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force until 1955, when the Adoption Act of 195546 was enacted. The Adoption Act 
of 1955 is discussed under the next heading below.  
 
In terms of the Maori Affairs Act47 jurisdiction to make orders of adoption in 
favour of Maoris was conferred on the Maori Land Court.48 Furthermore, an order 
of adoption could not be made under the Maori Affairs Act in respect of any child 
other than a Maori child or a descendant of a Maori child.49 The reason for the 
inclusion of this section was unclear, but the ban on interracial adoption by 
Maoris remained in force until 1955.50 
 
7 2 5 Adoption Act 93 of 1955 
 
The Adoption Act,51 which repealed the Infants Act as well as part IX of the Maori 
Affairs Act,52 thus making the same rules applicable to both European and Maori 
adoptions, currently regulates adoption in New Zealand. Section 18 of the 
Adoption Act of 1955 provides that the Act applies to all New Zealanders, as “[a]n 
adoption order may be made under this Act on the application of any person, 
                                                 
46  See n 51. 
47  Act 94 of 1953. Part IX “Adoption of children by Maoris” (ss 80 – 90) of this Act covered 
adoption. The Act was a continuation of the system introduced by the Maori Land Act. 
48  S 81(1).  
49  S 81(2) of Part IX, Adoption of Children by Natives. 
50  Else A Question of Adoption 179. This was until the Adoption Act of 1955 was legislated.  
51  Hereafter the Adoption Act of 1955. It came into effect on 27 October 1955. 
52  Although s 19(2) of the Adoption Act of 1955 provides that an adoption in accordance with Maori 
custom that was made and registered in the Maori Land Court before 31 March 1910 has the same 
force and effect as if it were lawfully made by an adoption order under Part IX of the Native Land 
Act this is, today, of purely academic value. 
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whether a Maori or not, in respect of any child, whether a Maori or not”.53 As 
discussed under “5 2 4 Maori Land Act 15 of 1909 and the Maori Affairs Act 94 of 
1953”, both the Maori Land Act and the Maori Affairs Act only outlawed adoption 
of European children by Maoris, and not the other way around. Although it is 
undoubtedly a positive feature that the ban on Maori adopting Pakeha children 
has been repealed,54 the repeal raises some serious and complicated issues. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that the passing of the Adoption Act of 195555 is 
a positive step which consolidates and amends the legislation relating to adoption 
by applying the same body of rules to both European and Maori adoptions. On 
the other hand, it could also be argued that this Act brings to an end a period of 
cultural awareness as far as adoption is concerned. It has been said that the Act 
rejects Maori beliefs and customs,56 and brings Maori adoptions under virtually 
the same provisions as Pakeha ones. In other words, the Act creates much 
greater changes for Maori than for Pakeha. The customs and beliefs of the Maori 
people are ignored, and this may be seen as pressure on Maori people to 
abandon their customs and beliefs.57 The Maoris, for example, give preference to 
relatives as adoptive parents,58 whereas the Adoption Act of 1955 barely 
acknowledges the possibility of preference being afforded to relatives.59 Else 
                                                 
53  See also Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 15. 
54  Interestingly, the Native Land Act only outlawed adoption of European children by Maoris, and 
not the other way around as well.  
55  It repealed Part IX of the Maori Affairs Act, which regulated Maori adoptions. 
56  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 47. 
57  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 48. 
58  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 61. This is discussed in more detail 
below under this heading. 
59  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 61. 
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says ignoring the customs and beliefs of Maori people makes no sense in the 
Maori context.60  
 
In a 1962 amendment of the Adoption Act of 195561 the last remaining aspect of 
customary adoption was terminated. The government decided to end the 
jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court in respect of adoption, so that Magistrates’ 
Courts henceforth dealt with all adoptions.62 The stated aim of the amendment 
was to “do away with one or more of the provisions that differentiate between 
Maoris and other New Zealanders … [T]he Maori people are … better equipped 
to deal with the normal Courts and their attitude toward adoption has come more 
closely into line with that of the rest of the community”.63 This statement is 
debatable, to say the least. The problem is that there is a fundamental difference 
in the way in which Maori tradition and the law define the concept of adoption. In 
legislation, adoption is distinguished from fostering, where a child is placed 
temporarily in the custody and care of an adult or adults other than his/her 
biological parent(s).64 The principle in the Adoption Act of 1955 is that adoption 
replaces one set of parents with another. According to the Act it is as if the child 
was born to the adoptive parent(s) in lawful wedlock,65 extinguishing the child’s 
legal connection with his/her biological parents. The adopted child ceases to be 
                                                 
60  Else A Question of Adoption 180. 
61  S 2(c) of the Adoption Amendment Act 134 of 1962 repealed the definition of the term “court” and 
substituted it with the definition “a Magistrate’s Court of civil jurisdiction”. This Act came into 
effect on 1 April 1963. 
62  In 1980 Magistrate’s Courts were replaced by District Courts (s 3(1) of the District Courts 
Amendment Act 125 of 1979), which came into effect on 1 April 1980. 
63  New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1962, 330 at 609, as quoted in Else A Question of Adoption 
181. 
64  S 11 of the Guardianship Act 63 of 1968. 
65  S 16(2)(a). 
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the child of his biological parents.66 In contrast, Maori do not approve of the 
complete severance of relations between the child and his/her biological 
parents.67 According to Maori tradition, children belong not only to their parents 
but also to the extended family.68 This extended family forms the basic family 
structure in Maori custom69 and is called the whanau (a group of relatives defined 
by reference to a recent ancestor, comprising several generations, several 
nuclear families and several households, and having a degree of ongoing 
corporate life focused in group symbols such as a name).70 When it is fully 
functional, its members are bound to each other by ties of loyalty as well as 
affection. 71 Then there is the hapu (the middle tier in a hierarchy of groups 
organised on the basis of descent, each of which is made up of several 
associated whanau) and iwi (the top tier of the hierarchy of groups, each made 
up of several related hapu),72 and the members of both of these tiers are to be 
treated with respect, love, and care by all members of the group.73 The whanau, 
hapu and iwi have a major say in the welfare of the child, and their views may 
take preference over the views of the child’s biological or adoptive parents.74 
Maori give members of their whanau a child to raise as their own.75 Where adults 
other than biological parents and grandparents are the primary caregivers of a 
                                                 
66  S 16(2)(b). 
67  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 62. 
68  Else 1987 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 241; Robinson 1996 Stell LR 213. 
69  Atkin 1988-1989 Journal of Family Law 232. 
70  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 50. 
71  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 50. 
72  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 54; Kruger 2005 CILSA 247. 
73  This has not been incorporated into the Adoption Act of 1955, but the Department of Social 
Welfare made a recommendation to that effect in Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory 
Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, 1986).  
74  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 53.  
75  Robinson 1996 Stell LR 214. 
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child for any significant period, this system of caring for children has been 
equated with guardianship. The term that is used in a situation like this is 
whangai, and is often referred to as “Maori customary adoption”.76 
 
I believe that it is important to have one single adoption Act which regulates 
adoption in a country, but this Act must be sensitive to all people living in that 
country.77 As discussed above, it is clear that current adoption legislation78 
focuses on the traditional nuclear family, and does not take account of other 
cultures in New Zealand. It does not end with this, though. Taking other cultures 
into account again creates other problems. It has been said79 that adoption by 
near relatives ends the child’s legal relations with either the maternal or the 
paternal side of the family, and to an extent distorts the relationship on the side 
within which the adoption takes place.80 This statement puts the complexity of the 
problem into perspective. Although there is a lot of merit in the way Maori 
tradition deals with adoption, it does incur its own problems. When relatives 
become the adoptive parents, as is preferred in Maori culture, this could create 
problems in the relationships that the child forms with family members. To 
illustrate: The extended family of a child plays an important role in any child’s life. 
Where a child is, for instance, adopted by a sister or mother of the biological 
                                                 
76  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 61; NZLC Preliminary Paper 38 
12. The Maori term matua whangai means adoptive parent, and the term tamaiti whangai means 
adopted child. 
77  Also see my recommendations for South Africa under “6 4 1 2 Who may adopt under the 
Children’s Act?” and “9 CONCLUSION”. 
78  Adoption Act of 1955. 
79  In MR v Department of Social Welfare (1986) 4 NZFLR 326 the court quotes from “A review of 
the Law of Adoption” by PM Webb, a paper produced for the Justice Department in Wellington, 
1979. 
80  At 328. 
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mother, this creates the situation where the relationships with the biological 
family, which should continue after an adoption,81 change82 and the child 
becomes an integral part of the biological mother’s family. On the other hand, the 
child’s relationship with the biological father’s family remains as it was before the 
adoption, which naturally creates an imbalance in these relationships.  
 
The reality is that there are children who need parents, and adoption can solve 
this dilemma. In my view, the Adoption Act of 1955 needs drastic amendment, 
and the sooner this is seriously considered, the better. Some proposals for 
change have been made by the Department of Social Welfare and the Ministry of 
Justice, but these have not been implemented.83 These proposals will be 
discussed under “7 5 FUTURE REFORM OF NEW ZEALAND ADOPTION LAW” 
below. Until such time as the current adoption legislation is revised or replaced 
though, the provisions of the Adoption Act of 1955 have to be complied with. The 
challenge is to balance the interests of the various parties in such a way that the 
best interests of the child will triumph. 
 
7 2 6 Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 24 of 1989 
 
As a result of the Adoption Act of 1955 a situation was created where the 
biological parents became legal strangers and the adoptive parents became the 
                                                 
81  Also see my arguments under “7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption” and “4 4 OPEN VERSUS 
CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
82  In terms of s 16(2)(a) of the Adoption Act of 1955 it is as if the child were born to the adoptive 
parent. 
83  See “7 5 2 Reform proposals” below. 
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adopted child’s parents in all respects (as if the child had been born to them). 
This was based on the idea of legitimising the child by adoption, and enabling the 
full burden of financial and other responsibilities to pass to the adoptive parents. 
Statistics show, however, that the New Zealand family has been changing over 
the last 25 years.84 The Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act,85 which 
is a milestone among family statutes in New Zealand as it took the first steps 
towards acknowledging that a child has rights86 and also recognised the diversity 
of family forms to be found in New Zealand,87 came into effect on 1 November 
1989. It is described in the heading as an Act to advance the well-being of 
families and the well-being of children and young persons as members of 
families, whanau, hapu, iwi and family groups. The central focus of this Act is the 
family, not parents.88 
 
The CYPF Act provides a culturally sensitive approach89 and emphasises that it 
is crucial for a child90 to maintain contact with the family and wider family group; 
in other words, it focuses on the importance of the child’s family or origin.91 In 
contrast to the Adoption Act of 1955,92 this Act not only recognises the existence 
of whanau, hapu and iwi, but also authorises their participation in decisions 
                                                 
84  Henaghan “Defining the family” in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 6. 
85  Act 24 of 1989, hereafter the CYPF Act. 
86  Tapp & Taylor in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 147. 
87  Hall & Metge in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 65; Robinson 1996 Stell LR 215. 
88  Atkin 2006 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 477. 
89  Robinson 1996 Stell LR 314. 
90  In this Act a child is a boy or girl under the age of 14 – s 2(1). 
91  Ss 5 and 13. See also Henaghan & Atkin in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ v. 
92  See “7 2 5 Adoption Act 93 of 1955” above. 
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affecting a child or young person.93 It further includes the promotion of children, 
young persons and their families among its objectives.94  
 
The CYPF Act is the first New Zealand Act95 to define the extended family under 
the term “family group”.96 Cultural identity is an important aspect of a child’s 
welfare, and, according to the CYPF Act, it is best nurtured by the child’s 
placement with persons of the same race and culture as the child.97 In all matters 
relating to this Act, the welfare and interests of the child or young person “shall 
be the first and paramount consideration”.98 This is a recognition of children’s 
rights that is more in line with current trends. Section 5(a) provides that, wherever 
possible, “a child’s or young person’s family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group 
should participate in the making of decisions affecting that child or young person, 
and accordingly that, wherever possible, regard should be had to the views of 
that family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group”. However, the view of the 
family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group is not determinative.99 
 
When they are known, the family of a child who will be adopted can play an 
important role in making a decision about the prospective adoptive family. A 
danger is that “in listening to a family group’s input attention can become focused 
                                                 
93  S 5(a). 
94  S 4. 
95  Henaghan “Defining the family” in Henaghan & Atkin Family Law Policy in NZ 11. 
96  S 2(1). 
97  Ss 5(a) & (b) and 13. This is a very rigid approach, and not necessarily one that protects the 
interests of the child. 
98  S 6.  
99  Robinson 1996 Stell LR 319 explains that the terminology used, namely that “regard must be had”, 
indicates this.  
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on the needs and wishes of the adults and be diverted from the needs and rights 
of the child”.100 Although not specifically enacted to deal with adoptions,101 this 
Act has been referred to in adoption applications, as can be seen in the following 
examples:  
 
• In the important case of BP v D-GSW102 the mother of the child had 
chosen to have the child adopted. An appeal was launched by the 
maternal grandmother against the Family Court’s refusal to grant custody 
of her grandchild to herself. A point of appeal was that the Family Court 
judge was wrong to find that, if the principles of certain sections of the 
CYPF Act had been applicable, there would have been no different 
result.103 It was argued on behalf of the appellant that if the principles of 
the CYPF Act had been applied, the child would have been placed with a 
member of the whanau rather than with strangers selected through the 
department.104 The Full Court of the High Court found that placement of a 
child with the whanau is a desirable end, not an imposed one, and that 
there will be circumstances where placement within the whanau is 
inappropriate or impossible.105 The court reiterated that the statutorily 
imposed standard in respect of adoption is the welfare of the child,106 and 
held that the application of the CYPF Act would not have resulted in a 
                                                 
100  In the Adoption of J [1992] NZFLR 369 at 373. 
101  This was confirmed by the court in Re Custody of C (1993) 10 FRNZ 344 at 351-352. 
102  [1997] NZFLR 642. 
103  At 650-651. 
104  At 651. 
105  At 651. 
106  Although the court did not specifically indicate when the welfare of the child will be the 
benchmark, it is assumed that it is with respect to adoptions, as this is the relevant issue. 
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different outcome.107 
 
• In B v M108 the court held that the relevant sections in the CYPF Act 
specifically apply to care and protection and youth justice issues and have 
no direct application in the case of adoption. It was decided that the 
mother, as the child’s sole guardian, had the right to make the decision to 
have the child adopted according to her own system of beliefs and 
conscience. Judge Inglis QC said109 that the practical effect of an adoption 
outside of the whanau need not necessarily be to distance the adopted 
child from the whanau or to sever the child’s links on a permanent basis. 
Noting the Maori view that an adoption simply adds people to a child’s 
family rather than substituting one family for another, he emphasised that 
the bloodlines do remain after the adoption.  
 
Care has to be taken not to attempt to apply the principles of the CYPF Act 
directly to adoption applications. The CYPF Act was not enacted to deal 
specifically with adoptions,110 but to reform the law relating to children and young 
persons who are in need of care or protection or who offend against the law.111 
As this Act caters for children and young persons who are in need of care or 
protection, and the Preamble requires that such children should be cared for by 
                                                 
107  At 651. 
108  [1997] NZFLR 126 at 138. 
109  At 135. 
110  This was confirmed by the court in Re Custody of C (1993) 10 FRNZ 344 at 351-352. 
111  Preamble of the Act.  
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their own family, whanau, hapu, iwi or family group wherever possible,112 it may 
therefore sometimes come into play in adoption situations, but will not 
necessarily be applicable. As discussed above though, current adoption 
legislation is not adequate to protect the interests of children. Therefore, the 
courts have to use what legislative provisions they have available to them. 
Although the object of the CYPF Act is to promote the well-being of children, 
young persons, and their families and family groups, this Act can play an 
important part when adoption applications are heard, as it is in line with the 
principles of open adoption, which I strongly support.113  
 
7 2 7 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
New Zealand ratified the Convention on 6 May 1993, and therefore has to comply 
with the obligations the Convention imposes. The importance of the Convention 
has been discussed throughout this thesis,114 and repeating everything under this 
heading serves no purpose. It is important though to bear in mind that the 
Convention places great emphasis on the best interests of the child. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112  Preamble, under (c). 
113  Open adoption is discussed under “7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption” and “4 4 OPEN VERSUS 
CLOSED ADOPTION”.  
114  See specifically “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY” and “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD”. 
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7 3 RACE AND CULTURE IN NEW ZEALAND ADOPTION LAW 
 
We cannot alter or change our genetic makeup, but cultural identification 
depends on many variable factors and choices. As discussed in “5 2 
DEFINITIONS” above, our race is determined by our ancestry, but we can 
choose or change our culture. It also should not be assumed that people will 
necessarily identify with the culture of their family.  
 
The Adoption Act of 1955 confirms that adoption does not affect the race of the 
child,115 but it can of course affect the cultural awareness and values of the child. 
The Adoption Act of 1955 does not refer to the relevance of culture at all. The 
baby’s biological parent does not legally have a say when it comes to cultural 
issues under the Adoption Act of 1955. However, when a parent or guardian 
consents to an adoption116 or appoints the chief executive as the guardian of the 
child until such time as the child is legally adopted,117 such consent may be 
subject to conditions with respect to the religious denomination and practice of 
the applicant(s).118 
 
                                                 
115  In terms of s 16(2)(e) of the Adoption Act of 1955 “the adoption order shall not affect the race … 
of the adopted child”. 
116  In terms of s 7(6) such consent can even be given where the parent or guardian does not know the 
identity of the applicant. 
117  In terms of s 7(4) a parent who wishes to have his or her child adopted may (with the prior consent 
of the chief executive) appoint the chief executive of the Department responsible for the 
administration of the CYPF Act, in writing, as the guardian of the child until such time as the child 
is legally adopted, and may impose conditions with respect to the religious denomination and 
practice of the applicant(s) to adopt the child. 
118  In terms of s 11(c) an adoption order cannot be made by the Court unless it is satisfied that any 
condition imposed by a parent or guardian of the child with respect to religious denomination is 
complied with. 
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Much of what follows has already been discussed in “5 RACE VERSUS 
CULTURE”, but for the sake of completeness it will be touched on here as well. 
The relevance or importance of culture is certainly not denied. This discussion is 
simply an attempt to put the role which it plays in adoption into perspective. 
There have been claims that interracial adoption does not work,119 that it is not in 
the interests of the child and should therefore not be allowed. Of course, the 
interracial factor is an additional complication or stress in adoption, but the same 
can be said for something like interracial marriages, and few would suggest they 
cannot work or are not in the interests of the parties involved. Although it is true 
that marriage is between consenting adults and adoption deals with vulnerable 
children, the courts need to make a decision about the best interests of a child 
and in this regard need to be very careful. An interracial/intercultural adoption 
might well be in the best interests of a particular child. I am of the opinion that it 
will usually be better, when circumstances are ideal, for adopted children to be 
placed with adoptive parents with the same cultural background.120 All things 
being equal, I do not think the validity of placing a child in a home where the 
circumstances are as similar as possible to that of the biological family can be 
denied. In this way, all aspects of a child’s heritage can be preserved. This is not 
always possible or advisable though.121 Often the culture of the biological parent 
is not even known, as is the case where a baby is abandoned, and a further 
                                                 
119  See the discussion under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
120  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
121  Various issues come to mind. Firstly, there might not necessarily be adoptive parents that fit this 
mould. Secondly, the child’s background might be unknown and, lastly, the background of the 
child might of such a nature that a drastic change is required for the positive development of the 
child. This aspect is discussed in more detail under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. As the child 
gets older, culture becomes increasingly important when making a decision about adoption. 
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problem that is faced when culture becomes a factor in adoptions, is that all 
people of the same race do not necessarily have the same culture. Maoris, for 
instance, belong to different tribes (iwis), that all have different cultures, and 
Europeans similarly have different cultures.122 
 
To complicate matters even more, inter-marriage of Maori and Pakeha takes 
place on a large scale.123 The racial division between Maori and Pakeha is 
therefore not clear cut and very few Maori claim to be of pure blood. In fact, most 
Maoris have mixed Maori and European ancestry.124 People of mixed origins may 
choose to identify more fully with the culture of one race or the other. Some 
identify with both and have their own mix of cultural values. We may even adopt 
a culture as a way of life, without any real genetic identity.125  
 
In Hamlin v Rutherford,126 the court said that the undoubted, but uncertain, future 
advantages to a girl with Maori blood of having access to her cultural heritage 
through her Maori blood relatives, could not be allowed to predominate over her 
immediate security which was best served by her being adopted into the care of 
a loving European couple, who were friends selected by the child’s European 
mother.127 In another case, Powell v Duncan,128 the court accepted that, while 
cultural factors are significant in considering the welfare of a child, the child’s 
                                                 
122  Also see the discussion under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE” above. 
123  Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 6 55.  
124  Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 6 55.  
125  This aspect was discussed in more detail under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE” above. 
126  (1989) 5 NZFLR 426. 
127  At 433. 
128  [1996] NZFLR 721 at 729. 
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psychological health and safety must take precedence over more abstract 
cultural concerns. In the High Court, Wellington, in H v R and H,129 Judge Heron 
indicated that the court’s concern in that case was with the upbringing of a small 
child. Even though “[c]ultural diversity has splendid benefits”, it is “capable of 
being enjoyed only in the future”.130 The court said that it has to attend to the 
child’s material and emotional needs, and that the balancing of the relationships 
between the adoptive parents, the biological parents and the child is a delicate 
one which must be based on agreement, co-operation and a mutual desire to 
serve the best interests of the child.131 With this the court confirmed that the 
welfare of the child at the time of the adoption application is not necessarily 
served by taking too much account of the child’s cultural background. 
 
Re Adoption 17/88132 provides us with an excellent example of the clash between 
the Maori and the European concepts of adoption. In this case a Maori child was 
adopted. The paternal grandmother raised Maori tradition as a basis to have an 
interim adoption order set aside. Although both biological parents consented to 
the adoption, the paternal grandmother argued that the court had no jurisdiction 
to make the adoption order. Her belief that the adoption of a Maori child was a 
matter to be determined by the whole whanau and not just the biological parents 
was founded in tradition. Judge Inglis QC, however, said that New Zealand does 
                                                 
129  (1989) 5 FRNZ 104 at 110. 
130  At 110. 
131  At 110-111. 
132  (1989) 5 FRNZ 360. 
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not give rights of guardianship or custody to a grandmother.133 Judge Inglis did, 
however, recognise the importance for the child of maintaining her place in the 
biological father’s lineage.134 Judge Inglis urged all involved to protect and 
harness her lineage as well as the special place of each party to the adoption,135 
but also emphasised that the child had bonded with the adoptive parents, and 
held that it was questionable whether the child’s bonds with the only parents she 
had ever known should be broken for the sake of providing her with the 
intangible advantages of absorption into her whanau on her father’s side.136 
The application was dismissed. Again, this case confirms that cultural 
considerations are not decisive in an adoption application. 
 
Generally speaking, cultural issues do now play a major part in proceedings 
under the Adoption Act of 1955. In Re Application by Nana137 the court noted that 
there has been a growing awareness of the importance of cultural identity 
between the child and adoptive parents.138 In T v F139 the judge emphasised that 
both sides of a child’s ancestry must be acknowledged. He said that “...in this day 
and age, it has to be recognized that this child’s feet stand astride two cultures. It 
is not for this Court to say that one is better for this child than the other. Rather it 
is for a Family Court to say that the child should be offered the best of both. The 
welfare of the child comes first. It is the paramount consideration for the Family 
                                                 
133  At 370-371. 
134  At 376-377. 
135  At 377. 
136  At 371. 
137  [1992] NZFLR 37. 
138  At 41. 
139  (1996) 14 FRNZ 415. 
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Court. And when matters are seen in that light it becomes clear that for this child 
of dual ancestry both sides of that ancestry are important to her and that in her 
upbringing neither is to be diminished at the expense of the other without good 
reason. For when the child reaches maturity and is able to make her own 
choices, her upbringing in both cultures will give her the opportunity to decide 
which course she wants her life to take.”140 The court made an interim order that 
the Maori paternal grandparents, who were both eminent and distinguished within 
their community, were suitable for appointment as additional guardians following 
the hearing of the adoption application if the adoptive parents did not object, 
which would foster the child’s cultural heritage.141  
 
In a High Court judgment confirming a Family Court decision, T v T,142 Judge 
Robertson declined an adoption order in favour of paternal grandparents who 
were seeking to adopt their Maori grandchild. The court said that it has to be 
satisfied that the best interests of the child would be promoted by an adoption,143 
and that the alternative mechanisms of custody and guardianship would assure 
the grandparents of security and stability “without going through a process which 
in law extinguishes rights even if within the Maori cultural reality they might 
continue and thrive”.144 In my view, the cases above show a positive approach 
which could provide balance and stability in the child’s life, but once again 
respecting that the adoptive parents are responsible for raising the child in the 
                                                 
140  At 421. 
141  At 429. 
142  (1998) 16 FRNZ 599. 
143  At 602. 
144  At 603. 
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way they see fit.145 
 
It has to be mentioned that the problems and stresses discussed above are not 
unique to interracial/intercultural adoption, but often also emerge where the 
adoption is inracial or by adoptive parents of the same culture as the child. 
Unfortunately there has been little debate or research in New Zealand about the 
positive and negative aspects of intercultural adoption, and there appears to be 
no research at all in that country on the success of interracial adoptions.146 There 
is a need for more in-depth research in this regard.  
 
 
7 4  THE ROLE OF THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
ADOPTION LAW 
 
7 4 1 Introduction 
 
According to Campbell147 the principal purpose and chief motive of adoption is 
usually to benefit a child148 who has no parents or whose parents are unable or 
unwilling to care for him/her. Thus it is recognised that adoption under favourable 
conditions is preferable to reception in an institution. It is submitted, in line with 
international trends, that the proper purpose of adoption has to be seen from the 
                                                 
145  Also see “9 CONCLUSION”, where I emphasise that biological parents and adoptive parents have 
a different role in the adopted child’s life. 
146  Griffith NZ adoption resource vol 6 192. 
147  Campbell Law of Adoption in NZ 14. 
148  In terms of the Adoption Act of 1955 a child is someone under the age of 21. 
Chapter 7: Adoption in New Zealand 
 346
child’s point of view, namely to provide the child with a permanent substitute 
family because the biological parents/family do not want the child, because they 
are unable to provide the family environment essential to normal growth, or 
because the child, for whatever reason, has no biological parents/family. 
 
The “welfare of the child” has been familiar terminology in New Zealand law for 
decades.149 Sadly though, when the Adoption Act of 1955 was enacted 60 years 
after the Adoption Act of 1895, the wording of section 11(b), which deals with the 
welfare and interests of a child in adoption, was exactly the same as that of 
section 5(3) of the Adoption Act of 1895. Today, more than a century after the 
Adoption Act of 1895 was legislated, the law remains unchanged. This shows a 
lack of understanding as far as children’s rights go, and certainly no move 
towards protecting children’s rights. Of course, this Act was introduced at a time 
when children’s rights did not carry as much weight as they do today, but it is 
surprising that increased rights for children have not been introduced by means 
of an amendment to the Act.  
 
The Adoption Act of 1955 does require that in all adoption matters the court has 
to be satisfied that the “welfare and interests of the child will be promoted by the 
adoption”,150 but it does not expressly describe the interests of the child as 
“paramount” or the primary purpose of adoption. It may be that any differences in 
phrasing or emphasis are merely semantic, but the question is what “the welfare 
                                                 
149  Austin 1995 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 273.  
150  In terms of s 11(b) the welfare and interests of the child have to be promoted by the adoption. 
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and interests of the child” means and how this is applied in practice. Taking the 
requirements of the Act at face value, it seems that the Act focuses mainly on the 
needs and rights of adults rather than those of children.151 Fortunately, the courts 
have used their power of interpretation in such a manner that the interests of the 
child have not been neglected. Thus, for example, in Director-General of Social 
Welfare v L152 the welfare and interests of the child were regarded as the ultimate 
test in an adoption application, where the court confirmed that the primary 
purpose of adoption is to benefit the child.153  
 
7 4 2 The welfare and interests of the child 
 
7 4 2 1 Determining welfare and interests 
 
Welfare and interests can (wrongly) be promoted without necessarily protecting 
the best interests of the child. When determining what the terms “welfare” and 
“interests” mean and how they should be applied, the courts have done so in a 
manner that cannot be seen as consistent. In Director-General of Social Welfare 
v L154 Judge Bisson drew a distinction between “welfare”, which he described as 
the day-to-day care and upbringing of the child, and “interests”, which he said 
was more about the effects on the child of the termination of the parent-child 
                                                 
151  Robert Ludbrook, a leading authority on adoption law in New Zealand, identified this as a 
disadvantage associated with adoption in a submission subsequent to NZLC Preliminary Paper 38 
in NZLC Report 65 38. 
152  [1989] 2 NZLR 314 (CA). 
153  At 326. 
154  [1989] 2 NZLR 314 (CA) at 324-325. 
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relationship. However, Judge Richardson, with whom Judge Somers concurred, 
stated that the words “and interests” in s 11(b) were simply added for the purpose 
of emphasis. He said that “welfare” was concerned with “all aspects of the 
wellbeing of the child which must include considerations of blood ties”.155 Judge 
Callaghan in Re B,156 however, suggested that the “interests” of the child extend 
beyond nurturing to include “the child’s interests for the rest of its life, both as an 
infant and an adult, and genealogical ties”.  
 
Each case obviously has to be considered by bearing in mind its particular facts. 
It has been said that in determining the child’s welfare and interests, the Court is 
“not concerned with any generalised philosophy about adoption on which 
opinions can legitimately differ, and may not be materially assisted by predictions 
for the future based on generalised research but which may or may not apply to 
this child, this mother, or these adopting parents”.157 In the case of In the matter 
of B158 the Court held that it is interested in the long-term welfare and interests of 
the child.159 I believe that it is not possible to attempt to focus on the child’s 
welfare without also involving the child’s interests, and vice versa. These two 
concepts make up one phrase; they are intertwined. A meaningful distinction 
cannot be drawn in this context between a child’s “welfare” and “interests”. 
 
                                                 
155  At 319.  
156  Family Court Christchurch FP 009/32/99, 30 March 2001 at 11 (as quoted by Caldwell in Jenkison 
Family Law Service par 6.711). 
157  In the matter of A (adoption) [1998] NZFLR 964 at 974. 
158  [1999] NZFLR 161. 
159  Adoption Application by T [1996] NZFLR 28. 
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The High Court in Re Appeal by T160 held that precedent is of little value in 
determining the child’s welfare and interests, and that when considering the 
child’s welfare and interests, “full regard should be had to the cultural attitudes of 
the family concerned”. Judge Tompkins declared that “[a]n adoption that may be 
considered inappropriate in a European setting may well promote the welfare and 
interests of the child in a Polynesian setting”. Judge Inglis QC, who presided over 
In the matter of A,161 stated that whether the welfare and interests would be 
promoted involves a comparison between “what can reasonably be predicted if it 
does not proceed”. This dictum was cited with approval in Re B.162  
 
In a step that has to be applauded, the Court of Appeal in Director-General of 
Social Welfare v L163 used clever interpretation to incorporate modern views and 
values in a situation where the existing adoption legislation falls short.164 
Although the Adoption Act of 1955 requires the welfare and interests of a child to 
be promoted by an adoption, this requirement is not enough today.165 The child’s 
welfare and interests have to be the paramount consideration in any decision 
affecting the child. The court recognised this and interpreted the welfare and 
interests of a child to be the first and paramount considerations when a decision 
                                                 
160  [1995] NZFLR 773 at 777 per Judge Tompkins. 
161  Family Court Christchurch A 009 009 98, 28 September 1998 at 9 (as quoted by Caldwell in 
Jenkison Family Law Service par 6.711). 
162  [2007] NZFLR 399 at par [44] (as quoted by Caldwell in Jenkison Family Law Service par 6.711 n 
7f). 
163  [1989] 2 NZLR 314 (CA). 
164  As discussed under “7 5 FUTURE REFORM OF NEW ZEALAND ADOPTION LAW”, there is 
an urgent need for change in the adoption legislation. 
165  See the discussion under “7 4 1 Introduction”. 
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about adoption is made. It took the view166 that adoption involves a change of 
guardianship, which links it with the Guardianship Act. In the Guardianship Act 
the paramountcy principle is statutorily prescribed in section 23(1) which 
stipulates that the welfare of the child is the first and paramount consideration in 
any proceedings where any matter relating to the custody or guardianship of a 
child is in question. In 2005 the Guardianship Act was replaced by the Care of 
Children Act.167 It is, fortunately, possible to interpret the principles of this Act in 
the same way as was done by the court in Director-General of Social Welfare v 
L.168 Although I believe that it can be dangerous for courts to interpret legislation 
in a way that it was probably not intended, I also believe that the court in this 
instance acted quite correctly. If legislation falls short and the legislature is not 
prepared to accept that the existing legislation that governs adoption is in need of 
attention and amendment, the responsibility lies with the courts, where possible, 
to protect the interests of litigants, especially children. 
 
7 4 2 2  Factors to be taken into account 
 
In Re Custody of C169 a fifteen-year-old mother wanted to have her child adopted. 
The parents of the sixteen-year-old father argued that the biological family should 
come first when a decision is made about placing the child for adoption, but the 
                                                 
166  At 319. 
167  Act 90 of 2004, which came into effect on 1 July 2005. The term “custody” was replaced with 
“day-to-day care” and the term “access” was replaced by “contact”. 
168  [1989] 2 NZLR 314 (CA). In terms of s 4(1) the welfare and interests of the child are first and 
paramount in the administration and application of the Act and in any proceedings involving the 
guardianship, day-to-day care or contact with a child. 
169  (1993) 10 FRNZ 344. 
Chapter 7: Adoption in New Zealand 
 351
Court held that no principle of the Adoption Act of 1955 requires that biology 
should come first.170 The Court said that while biological family and whanau are 
emphasised in the CYPF Act, the same principles do not apply to adoption.171 
Placing the child for adoption at the mother’s wish was held to provide the best 
environment for the child. It was also held in Director-General of Social Welfare v 
L172 by the Court of Appeal that “except in a singular case” the biological family 
relationship will be of little, if any, consequence in the assessment of the child’s 
welfare and interest once consent has been either given or dispensed with. The 
point stated by the Court of Appeal in J v J & J,173 that New Zealand law (contrary 
to Maori tradition) contains no presumption that a child’s welfare is best met 
through care by the biological parents or family, was reiterated in M & B v H & 
S174 and in B v M.175 Ultimately, in an adoption application, the court will always 
consider a child’s welfare and interests, which may not necessarily be met by 
placing too much emphasis on biological background. 
 
Culture is an issue that has featured in many adoption applications, and has 
been dealt with by the courts in different ways.176 In an application for an 
interracial adoption in 1990, Application by C,177 the Maori mother consented to 
the adoption. The identity of the father was unknown, but he was European. The 
Family Court, Porirua, took note of the Maori tradition whereby the tribal group’s 
                                                 
170  At 350. 
171  At 351-352. 
172  [1989] 2 NZLR 314 (CA) at 326. 
173  (1983) 1 FRNZ 1 at 5.  
174  (1989) 5 FRNZ 636 at 642. 
175  [1997] NZFLR 126 at 131. 
176  In this regard, also see “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
177  [1990] NZFLR 280. 
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responsibility for a child takes precedence over the views of the biological 
parents.178 Some members of the child’s whanau were opposed to the 
adoption.179 Judge Borrin said that Maori culture is a minority culture in New 
Zealand and, unless it is fostered with care, a child will be lost to it, whereas 
European culture, being dominant, can be more readily acquired.180 As the court 
was not satisfied that the child’s welfare and interests would, in cultural respects, 
be promoted by the adoption, the application was dismissed.181 I do not support 
this decision. The Adoption Act of 1955 promotes the welfare and interests of the 
child. The Court of Appeal held in B v G182 that section 11(b) of the Adoption Act 
of 1955 is expressed broadly, and that the Court is not limited in its consideration 
of matters that can be taken into account to determine the welfare and interests 
of the child.183 This judgment is supported. The court has to consider any 
factor(s) that may influence the welfare and interests of a child. It is, of course, 
important that the cultural background of a child has to be protected, but never at 
the expense of the welfare and best interests of a child viewed holistically. As I 
have argued,184 culture is one of many factors that have to be considered. It 
should not be singled out and be rendered dominant. In, for example, In the 
                                                 
178  At 285. 
179 At 285. 
180  At 286. In this regard, see my remarks under “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”, where I argue that 
there is no such thing as a “black” culture or a “white” culture. The same argument can be used in 
this case. 
181  At 287. 
182  [2002] NZFLR 961. 
183  At 971-972. This is in line with the provisions of the Children’s Act of 2005 in South Africa, and 
reflects the reality that there are many factors that could affect and influence the best interests of a 
child. 
184  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE” and “7 3 RACE AND CULTURE IN NEW ZEALAND 
ADOPTION LAW”. 
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matter of B,185 it was held that psychological issues should be accorded no less 
weight than cultural issues.186 This adds support to my viewpoint about not 
singling out culture at the expense of other factors. This does not mean that the 
relevance of culture is denied, but merely places its importance into perspective.  
 
My argument finds support in the matter of B v M.187 The Family Court, Hastings, 
made it clear that it is always a matter of assessing what is “in the best welfare of 
this child in these circumstances, and generalised perceptions and assumptions 
must give way to particular facts and circumstances as they affect the child”.188 
The court then went further and added that cultural heritage and Maori ancestry 
are essential elements, but not the only elements, in assessing the child’s 
welfare. The court stated that the real issue is how the child’s Maori ancestry and 
cultural heritage are to be balanced with other factors relevant to her welfare.189 
In conclusion, the court found190 that the advantages of being placed in a “stable, 
loving, child-centered two-parent home where the child’s natural heritage is 
recognised and respected greatly outweigh any perceived disadvantages”. This 
statement by the Court confirms that it is not necessary for an adopted child to 
retain his/her own culture, as long as that culture is recognised and respected. 
The above decision is in line with my view on the question of the best interests of 
a child.  
                                                 
185  [1999] NZFLR 161. 
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An interesting decision is that of Re Adoption of J,191 where the judge said that an 
adoption is unlikely to be successful unless the adoption serves the interests of 
the intending adoptive parents, and to this extent the interests of the adoptive 
parents and the child are intimately linked.192 This may be true, and I understand 
the logic of this decision in that the best interests of the child can only be 
promoted if the adoptive parents are comfortable with any decisions that are 
taken in the interests of the child. Ultimately, however, the interests of the 
adoptive parents are not the important issue. Fortunately, Judge Keane qualifies 
this statement by adding that the interests of the adoptive parents are strictly 
secondary to the interests and welfare of the child.193 
 
The child’s role in an adoption order is another aspect that needs consideration. 
With more, not less, emphasis on children’s rights over the years, it seems 
strange that the Adoption Act of 1955 does not contain a requirement that 
consent by a child is needed before an adoption order may be made.194 It is true 
that the wishes of the child are not necessarily synonymous with the child’s 
welfare,195 and the court must inquire beyond the child’s preferences, however 
strongly and sincerely they are articulated.196 On the other hand though, the 
wishes of the child have to carry some weight, taking into account the child’s age 
                                                 
191  (1995) 13 FRNZ 248. 
192  At 251. 
193  At 251. 
194  In terms of the Adoption Act of 1895 a child over the age of 12 had to consent to an adoption – see 
“7 2 2 Adoption of Children Act 8 of 1895”. This was also a requirement in terms of the Infants 
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and understanding.197 Section 11(b) of the Adoption Act of 1955 inter alia 
requires that the court making an interim order or an adoption order has to give 
due consideration to the wishes of the child, this being subject to the age and 
understanding of the child. This is in line with article 12(1) of the Convention, 
which New Zealand has ratified, in terms of which the views of a child, who is 
capable of forming such views, have to be considered in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child. In my opinion the requirement should have been that 
the consent of a child is a requirement for an adoption order to be made, subject 
to the age and understanding of the child.198 If this were the case, there would be 
a change in emphasis. The court would make a judgement about the ability of a 
child to consent, not about the value it attaches to such consent.  
 
7 4 2 3  Is adoption still valid? 
 
With all the emphasis that is placed on heredity and the continued role of the 
biological parents/family in the life of an adopted child nowadays,199 the question 
is whether adoption is still a viable option for children in New Zealand. It has 
been suggested that total control of, or total responsibility for, a child will enable 
the adoptive parent(s) to function better and without anxiety, and that the child 
will feel better as a permanent member of a particular family rather than being 
                                                 
197  Adoption Application by T [1999] NZFLR 300 at 306. 
198  This is especially important for the adoption of older children. Also see my recommendation under 
“6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the child”. 
199  See “7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption” and “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
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shared between families.200 This, in my opinion, is an archaic view of adoption. I 
do not believe that the relationship should be viewed as one where the parent 
has control over the child as if the child were an object, but I do believe that 
permanency is very important. Adoption can in some cases provide the child with 
certainty, security, and a particular sense of belonging to a family who loves and 
cares for him/her. The factor of permanency for the child has received much 
attention in the New Zealand case law and has been given significant weight in 
decisions such as In the Adoption of AJM.201 Orders for guardianship and 
custody under the Guardianship Act, or the CYPF Act, are not “set in concrete, 
and if that route were chosen there would be the prospect and the fear of 
continued access and review applications at the least. The prospect and that fear 
alone would have a destabilising effect.”202 Adoption orders can provide a child 
with a sense of security and belonging that orders of guardianship and custody 
cannot. 
 
The concept of the best interests of a child is something that will always warrant 
discussion, as it is constantly evolving. It is important that legislation should place 
more emphasis on the best interests of the child. In the light of current trends, 
and especially international instruments, such as the Convention which requires 
the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration,203 this is an area of 
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the Adoption Act of 1955 that needs attention. It is clearly time for the New 
Zealand legislature to address this issue.204  
 
7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption 
 
The Adoption Act of 1955 places great emphasis on secrecy when it comes to 
adoption. This is inter alia illustrated by the automatic change of the surname of 
the child to that of the adopter(s) in terms of s 16(1) of the Adoption Act of 1955 
and the inaccessibility of the original birth entry and court records of the adoption 
as legislated in section 23 of the Adoption Act of 1955. It is also true, though, that 
although there is currently no statutory provision for adoption contact,205 New 
Zealand adoption statutes have never expressly prohibited contact after an 
adoption. In fact, New Zealand has been described as “leading Western adoption 
practice with respect to openness”.206 Adoption contact has always been and 
remains a matter of choice between the parties concerned. The Adoption Act of 
1955 does not prevent biological parents and adoptive parents from arranging an 
open adoption with free access to information and freedom of contact within the 
adoption triangle. The frequency and regularity of contact between the biological 
parents and adoptive family is an individual arrangement, determined by all 
parties, in terms of what is commonly known as a “contact agreement”. These 
arrangements are, by their very nature, flexible and can be reviewed by either 
party as the need arises.  
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The best interests of the child are central to adoption contact.207 The main reason 
for supporting contact after an adoption is to ensure that the child has continued 
access to both biological and adoptive parents/families. As the child grows older, 
he/she usually participates in making decisions about the type, and the 
frequency, of contact. Adoption social workers can be involved in helping the two 
families to reach a mutually acceptable contact agreement.208 Allowing for 
adoption contact is one of the keys to ensuring that a child does not lose his/her 
biological past. The child maintains a link with the biological parents/family, which 
obviously includes the culture of the biological parents/family. Often with an 
interracial or intercultural adoption, there is concern about the adoptive parents’ 
ability and/or willingness to ensure that the child does not lose this important 
aspect of his/her past. With an open adoption, the child will undoubtedly be in the 
best position to be exposed to and influenced by all aspects of both the biological 
and adoptive parents/families. This could unfortunately also include negative 
influences, such as an abusive relationship and criminal behaviour, and the 
relationships therefore have to be monitored carefully. 
 
In an article by Bridge, Perry and Bridge209 the view was expressed that the 
balancing of relationships between the adoptive parents, the biological parents 
and the child is a delicate one that must be based on agreement, co-operation 
and a mutual desire to serve the best interests of the child. It is my opinion that a 
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contact agreement can never work if this advice is not followed by all relevant 
parties to the adoption. This is illustrated in H v R and H.210 A contact agreement 
was negotiated between the parties, but the biological father abused the terms of 
this contract to such an extent that his conduct became invasive.211  
 
The problem is that contact agreements are not legally enforceable in New 
Zealand. Although the Adoption Act of 1955 does not specifically demand that 
information about an adoption and the parties thereto has to be concealed, there 
is also no provision in this Act, or any other Act, for adoption contact. Section 23 
of the Adoption Act of 1955 states that the adoption records of a child can be 
inspected,212 but only where inspection is required for some purpose in 
connection with the administration of an estate or trust of which that person is an 
executor, administrator, or trustee; where forbidden degrees of relationship are 
investigated under the Marriage Act; where forbidden degrees of relationship for 
purposes of a civil union are investigated under the Civil Union Act; and where a 
report has to be prepared by a social worker. Therefore, unless the parties to an 
adoption agree to have contact, the information about an adoption and the 
parties thereto is generally not available to any of the parties to the adoption. 
Griffith explains that legislation that regulates contact between the adopted child, 
the biological parents and the adoptive parents would protect all the parties 
involved in an adoption, and the child’s access to both families would thereby be 
protected. Relationships are more likely to work when the parties feel they are 
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regarded as equals. Lack of legislative provision puts biological parents in an 
unequal and powerless situation. Large numbers of people choose adoption 
contact, and the law needs to address this reality.213  
 
Where a contact agreement has been agreed to, secrecy is obviously not a 
problem, but there are many adoptions where the parties do not have any 
information about the other parties to the adoption, or where there is no contact 
between the relevant parties. A positive step in this regard is the Adult Adoption 
Information Act.214 In terms of this Act, it is now possible for an adult adoptee or 
the biological parents of an adult adoptee to obtain information about the 
adoption. The emphasis on secrecy where no contact agreement has been 
made, has shifted in the following ways:  
 
• An adult adopted person215 is able to apply for their original birth 
certificate,216 but biological parents of persons adopted before 1 March 
1986 have the power to veto the revelation of identifying information.217 
This is because they were promised secrecy when they entered into the 
adoption process and this gives them the opportunity to maintain secrecy 
if they wish. Persons giving up children for adoption after 1 March 1986 do 
not have the power of veto. 
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• The Act also provides that a biological parent can obtain identifying 
information about a child placed for adoption when the adopted child turns 
21,218 but the child has a right to register the desire not to have contact 
with his/her biological parents.219 
 
• S 11 provides for circumstances where a doctor may obtain information on 
medical grounds.  
 
The inclusion of the above provisions in the Adult Adoption Information Act is 
welcomed. Children have the need to know where they come from, which 
includes their biological background.220 In B v M221 Judge Inglis QC said it is not 
necessarily in the adopted child’s best interests to shield the child from 
knowledge of his/her origins.222 Unfortunately this Act is only applicable once the 
adopted person is no longer a child. This restriction has to be criticised. The 
parties to an adoption should not have to wait until the child is an adult before 
being able to obtain information with regard to the adoption. The need for 
information and/or contact exists from the moment of the adoption. The restriction 
is also contrary to Maori culture. Maori use descent to identify themselves and, 
provided he/she has access to this biological information, an adopted child can 
do the same.223 An adopted person who has no knowledge of his/her biological 
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background is disadvantaged in the Maori community. Although this aspect of 
Maori culture is dissimilar to European culture in general, it does not minimise the 
need of a European child to have knowledge of his/her biological background. I 
believe the legislature in New Zealand needs to give attention to this issue, and 
make adoption less secretive. The secrecy that was part of adoption previously 
created the unnatural situation where the child was seen as the biological child of 
the adoptive parent(s). We have moved on from this,224 and it is time for legal 
change too. Ultimately, the best interests of the child still come first and these 
interests require openness in an adoption. 
 
 
7 5 FUTURE REFORM OF NEW ZEALAND ADOPTION LAW 
 
7 5 1 Introduction 
 
 The Adoption Act 1955 … was passed at a time when some Family Court Judges were 
not even twinkles in their parents’ eyes and others were running around in nappies.225 
 
Current adoption legislation in New Zealand was enacted more than 50 years 
ago.226 There have been minor amendments over the years, but the basic 
structure of the Act has remained unchanged. Adoption in New Zealand has 
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often been referred to as the “Cinderella” of family law.227 The Adoption Act of 
1955 still reflects the values and morals of the New Zealand society of the 1950s. 
Social needs and perspectives change throughout history. What is acceptable 
practice for one generation can be considered completely unacceptable for 
another, and vice versa.  
 
It is time for the existing adoption legislation to be amended to fit in with current 
views and acceptable practices. In 2002 the Court of Appeal stated that “[g]iven 
the age of the Act and the different social circumstances in which it was passed 
law reform does seem appropriate”.228 However, the Court of Appeal further 
observed that, until such reform occurs, any case had to be dealt with in 
accordance with the existing legislation.229 This does not mean, though, that 
allowances should not be made for changing times. In the case of In the matter of 
B (adoption)230 the court said that if counsel suggests that the welfare and 
interests of the child must be determined with reference to “what was known 
about the needs of children in 1955 and in the context of the social outlook at the 
time”, it rejects such submission. The court said that the welfare and interests of 
children must always be determined by the best information available.231 This, I 
believe, would of course include current social values and understandings, and 
allow for an interpretation of the Adoption Act of 1955 that makes provision for 
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changing circumstances. In Application for Adoption by RRM and RBM232 it was 
held that, although some observers believe that the Adoption Act of 1955 is 
obsolete, the legislation remains on the statute book and that “modern trends” 
can be adequately reflected under the present statute by way of a case by case 
application of the over-arching concept of the child’s welfare and interests.233 As 
discussed under “7 4 2 The welfare and interests of the child”, this has already 
happened in at least one case,234 where the court used clever and innovative 
interpretation to develop the law.  
 
Until such time as the legislation changes, judges will have to use their discretion 
in each case to determine the interests of the parties involved, especially those of 
children. The practice of adoption is moving towards more involvement of all 
people in the child’s life and more openness about the process so that the child is 
not cut off from the past.235 The child may have no knowledge about his/her past, 
but that does not detract from the importance of raising the child with an 
awareness of his/her past. Again, it is possible that an adopted child may not 
have any knowledge of his/her past. A baby who is abandoned shortly after birth, 
for instance, can have no knowledge of his/her biological parents/family and their 
culture. Where it is known, however, the biological background of an adopted 
child is an important part of that child’s life. 
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7 5 2 Reform proposals 
 
As discussed above,236 there is a need for stronger formulation of the rights of 
children within the context of adoption in New Zealand. The Department of Social 
Welfare237 and the Ministry of Justice drafted proposals for new legislation and 
have proposed a number of changes.238 Further, the Law Commission produced 
a discussion paper, Preliminary Paper 38239 in October 1999. The brief from the 
Minister of Justice was to “review the legal framework for adoption in New 
Zealand as set out in the Adoption Act 1955 … and to recommend whether and 
how the framework should be modified to address contemporary social needs”.240 
The Commission was asked to consider inter alia:241 
 
• The principles that should apply in relation to adoption. 
 
• Whether special recognition should be given to Maori customary adoptions 
or any other culturally different adoption practices, and whether provision 
should be made for future contact between biological parents and other 
persons, including grandparents, adoptive parents and the adopted child. 
 
• At what stage an adopted child should be entitled to information about 
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his/her identity. 
 
The Law Commission requested interested parties to submit comments and 
answers to the questions raised in Preliminary Paper 38. The submissions and 
recommendations that were received as a result of this discussion paper led to 
the drafting in September 2000 of the Law Commission’s final report, Report 65, 
which was published after extensive consultation with various concerned groups. 
This report proposed that the Adoption Act, the Guardianship Act and the CYPF 
Act all be incorporated into a single Care of Children Act.242 For the purposes of 
this thesis, the following important recommendations were made: 
 
• The fundamental purpose of adoption should be to provide a child who 
cannot or will not be cared for by his/her biological parents with a 
permanent family life.243  
 
• The welfare and interests of the child should be the paramount 
consideration.244 
 
• The legal effect of adoption should be the transfer of permanent parental 
responsibility from biological parents to the adoptive parents,245 and 
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parental responsibilities and rights should specifically be defined in the 
Care of Children Act.246 
 
• Adopted persons, biological parents and adoptive parents should have 
unrestricted access to their adoption information, but existing vetoes on 
access to information should remain in force.247 
 
• Where practicable, a child should be placed within a family of the same 
culture as the child. If that is not possible, the court should be satisfied that 
the prospective adopter(s) will help foster the child’s cultural, social, 
economic and linguistic heritage, and facilitate contact with the child’s 
family.248 The cultural heritage of the child should be taken into account in 
such a way as to ensure that the child has full access to his/her cultural, 
social and economic heritage.249 This recommendation reflects the logical 
and realistic approach the Law Commission adopted by saying that a child 
should not remain in care because there are no suitable adopters 
available from the child’s cultural group. This provision, like all other 
provisions in the proposed legislation, has to be applied in accordance 
with the overriding principle that the welfare and interests of the child are 
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paramount. A similar argument is made with regard to adoption in South 
Africa.250 
 
• In applications to adopt a Maori child, a Maori social worker, preferably 
one that has iwi affiliations with the child, should provide the social 
worker’s report.251 In my view, this is an important issue, but not only when 
the adoption relates to a Maori child. I believe that in any adoption every 
attempt should be made to assign a social worker to the case who has 
knowledge of the background, values and circumstances of the child, and 
who understands the cultural background of the child. This 
recommendation is also made for adoptions in South Africa.252 
 
• When an intercultural adoption application is considered, the court should 
call for a report on cultural matters to ascertain the suitability of the 
placement and how the prospective adopters intend to foster the child’s 
cultural heritage.253 As I have argued above, the suitability of the 
placement is not only determined by cultural issues. Although cultural 
heritage is important, a report should be prepared to determine the 
suitability of the adoptive parents in all ways. 
 
                                                 
250  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”, where “mild preference” is explained, and “9 CONCLUSION”. 
251  NZLC Report 65 90. 
252  See “9 CONCLUSION”. 
253  NZLC Report 65 91. 
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• A key element of successful adoption is adequate preparation and 
counselling, and there should be mandatory pre-adoption counselling for 
the child, the biological and prospective adoptive parents.254 In my opinion, 
this is probably one of the most important proposals. Both pre- and post-
adoption counselling are essential elements of any adoption. This issue 
will be discussed in more detail in “9 CONCLUSION”. 
 
• Post-adoption counselling should be available to adoptive parents, 
biological parents and adopted persons,255 and these services should be 
provided separately from adoption assessment services, which are 
provided before the adoption.256 Post-adoption counselling is at least as 
important as pre-adoption counselling and probably even more so. It is 
also important to understand that the counselling may have to be ongoing. 
It will have to continue for as long as the situation of a particular child 
requires it. A further suggestion was that such services should be state 
funded,257 which in South Africa will be crucial. More about this under “9 
CONCLUSION”. 
 
• The Adoption Information Services Unit of the Department of Child, Youth 
and Family Services,258 which has overall responsibility for the welfare and 
                                                 
254  NZLC Report 65 95, 98.  
255  NZLC Report 65 100. 
256  NZLC Report 65 101. 
257  NZLC Report 65 110. 
258  See n 237 — the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services was previously known as the 
Department of Social Welfare. 
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protection of children in New Zealand, should remain the sole assessor of 
the suitability of prospective adoptive parents.259 I believe the important 
issue here is not so much who determines the suitability of adoptive 
parents or an adoption in general. The emphasis has to be on proper 
training for the decision-makers. 
 
• Upon registration of an adoption order, an adopted person should 
automatically be provided with two birth certificates, a post-adoption birth 
certificate that only shows the adoptive parents, and a full birth certificate 
that lists all details of the person’s birth and subsequent adoption.260 
Adoption records should be open to inspection as of right by adoptees, 
adoptive parents and biological parents.261 
 
Although the Law Commission recommended that adoption reform should be 
included in a Care of Children Bill,262 the Care of Children Act that was 
subsequently enacted263 only deals with guardianship and care. To date the 
Government has not made any decisions on proposals for the reform of adoption 
law.264 There are no immediate plans for any changes to the Adoption Act of 
1955.265  
 
                                                 
259  NZLC Report 65 104. 
260  NZLC Report 65 224. 
261  NZLC Report 65 225. 
262  See above. 
263  This Act came into operation on 1 July 2005. 
264  E-mail dated 12 March 2008 from L Johns of the Department of Justice in New Zealand. 
265  This was confirmed via an e-mail dated 19 February 2008, by P Adamson of the Law Commission 
of New Zealand.  
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The decision of the New Zealand authorities not to implement any of the changes 
that were recommended to the Adoption Act of 1955 is, to say the least, 
unfortunate. There is broad consensus in New Zealand on the need for reform in 
this area.266 The content of this Act is in many ways archaic and outdated. It has 
taken approximately 50 years to review this Act and it will probably be a while 
before any changes are again considered and maybe approved. In the 
meantime, the best interests of many children may be neglected.  
                                                 
266  Henaghan 2006 NZFLJ 133 calls this Act an embarrassment. In this article, he even asks readers to 
write to the Minister of Justice to request that the Act be updated. 
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8 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Botswana1 was invaded by British troops and declared a British Protectorate in 
1885. Until then the peoples who make up Botswana today lived alongside each 
other as independent entities.2 In 1891 the High Commissioner of South Africa 
was given the right to administer the Protectorate. The law of the (then) Cape 
Colony3 was introduced and so Roman-Dutch law was introduced into 
Bechuanaland.4 Botswana became an independent Republic on 29 September 
1966.5  
 
Roman-Dutch law as influenced by English law still survives today.6 It is 
recognised as an independent source of law and together with statute law is 
labelled the common law.7 Botswana’s dual legal system, which recognises the 
                                                 
1  Known from colonisation until independence in 1966 as Bechuanaland. 
2  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana xv. 
3  The common law of the Cape of Good Hope was the Roman–Dutch law. 
4  Booi Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Botswana.htm; Nsereko Constitutional 
Law in Botswana xv-xvi; Himsworth 1972 Journal of African Law 4. 
5  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana xix. 
6  Booi Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Botswana.htm. 
7  Molokomme Children of the Fence 29.  
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co-existence of this common law8 and customary law,9 applies to different 
sections of the population and provides different laws for persons based upon 
their ethnic or social origin, religious beliefs and other factors.10 Statutory law 
applies to all individuals while customary law varies from community to 
community.11  
 
Often the relationship between statute law and customary law is vague.12 In 
respect of adoption it is, however, clear that it can take place either in terms of 
customary law13 or in terms of statute.14 A similar dual system exists in South 
Africa with regard to adoption, where both customary adoption15 and statutory 
adoption16 take place. In New Zealand adoption could also take place either in 
terms of customary law or statute,17 but this dual system for adoption was 
terminated when the Maori Land Act came into force.18  
 
                                                 
8  This is referred to as common law/state law/statute law. For consistency I shall use the term 
“statute law” in the remainder of this chapter. 
9  Booi Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Botswana.htm. 
10  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 183; 
Himsworth 1972 Journal of African Law 4. 
11  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 84. 
12  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 186. 
13  S 16 of the Adoption of Children Act 1952 states that nothing in the Act shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption in accordance with customary law of a child who is subject to customary law 
by a person who is also subject to customary law. In other words, this will only be possible where 
both the child and the prospective adoptive parent are subject to customary law. More will be said 
about this under “8 4 RACE AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW”. 
14  Quansah Family Law in Botswana 138. 
15  See the discussion about South Africa’s customary adoption under “2 4 2 Customary law and 
adoption”. 
16  The current legislation which regulates statutory adoption is discussed in the chapter “6 THE 
CHILD CARE ACT AND THE CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
17  See “7 2 1 Adoption of Children Act 9 of 1881”. 
18  See “7 2 4 Maori Land Act 15 of 1909 and the Maori Affairs Act 94 of 1953”. 
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Ethnically Botswana is heterogeneous, with more than 30 ethnic groups, and 
most of the population being indigenous Africans.19 The Central Statistics Office 
of the Government of Botswana has not included race in their census 
questionnaires since 1964,20 which obviously makes it hard to obtain the actual 
racial distribution of the population.21 However, according to Commeyras & 
Chilisa the Tswana speaking ethnic groups comprise about 80% of the country’s 
population.22 According to the 2001 population and housing census23 Botswana 
had a population of 1.7 million people at that stage,24 “almost all of them 
Africans”.25 About 44% of this figure was children below the age of 18 years with 
the majority of these children living in rural areas.26 According to Molokomme the 
vast majority of Botswana citizens live their lives and settle their disputes largely 
according to customary law.27 There is thus ample indication that the indigenous 
population comprises the majority of people in Botswana, which makes the 
population distribution in Botswana similar to that of South Africa, where the 
black population makes up the bulk of the citizens in the country.28  
 
                                                 
19  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana xxi. 
20  Statistics at http://www.cso.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=139. 
21  In terms of s 15(3) of the Constitution of Botswana (hereafter “the 1966 Constitution”), different 
treatment of different persons on various grounds, including race, is discriminatory. 
22  Commeyras & Chilisa International Journal of Educational Development 434. 
23  This is quoted in Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 83. 
24  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana xxi; Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & 
Tribulations 83. 
25  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana xxi. 
26  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 83. 
27  Molokomme Children of the Fence 40. 
28  In 2008 the population in South Africa was nearly 50 million people, of which roughly 38 731 000 
were black – StatsOnline at http://www.statssa.gov.za/timeseriesdata. 
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South African law was incorporated into Botswana with little modification.29 When 
the Adoption of Children Act30 was proclaimed in 1952, the Children’s Act of 1937 
was the statute that regulated South African adoption legislation.31 The Adoption 
of Children Act is very similar to the Children’s Act of 1937, which is 
understandable as it is obviously based on the South African Act.32 However, 
whereas the South African Children’s Act of 1937 was replaced by the Children’s 
Act of 1960 when it became outdated, Botswana has retained the Adoption of 
Children Act for the past 56 years.  
 
The inclusion of the adoption laws of Botswana into this thesis is done for various 
reasons. Both South Africa and Botswana have dual systems regulating 
adoption.33 As discussed above, the division of the population with regard to race 
is similar in South Africa and Botswana and the Adoption of Children Act of 
Botswana is based on the South African Children’s Act of 1937. Unfortunately, 
adoption is not something with which the population of Botswana is very 
familiar,34 with the result that very little information on the subject is available for 
research purposes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  Booi Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Botswana.htm. 
30  Adoption of Children Act. See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act”. This Act still regulates statutory 
adoption in Botswana. 
31  For more about this Act, see “2 4 3 3 Children’s Act 31 of 1937”. 
32  See the discussion above in this paragraph. 
33  Also see “2 4 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW”. 
34  E-mail dated 23 October 2008 from Prof EK Quansah of the University of Botswana. 
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8 2 CUSTOMARY LAW 
 
8 2 1 Introduction 
 
Before Botswana became independent in 1966, customary law was the only 
regulatory mechanism within any community in the country. However, after 
independence the inclusion of common law into the legal system introduced a 
new kind of universal law that applied to all individuals living within Botswana.35 
Customary law is not codified,36 but the term “customary law” is defined by 
statute. The statutory definition of customary law is that it consists of rules of law 
which by custom are applicable to any particular tribe or tribal community in 
Botswana, not being rules which are inconsistent with the provisions of any 
enactment or contrary to morality, humanity or natural justice.37 In other words, 
customary law is applicable to members of a tribe38 or tribal community within 
Botswana.39 Thus, as in South Africa,40 adoption in terms of customary law is not 
available to everyone. However, the Common Law and Customary Law Act41 
provides that in all cases in which customary law is the proper law to apply, the 
courts have to apply customary law. Thus, the courts do not have a discretion 
whether to apply customary or statutory law. 
                                                 
35  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 84. 
36  Seepapitso IV in Brothers et al Botswana in the 21st Century 343. 
37  S 4(1) of the Common Law and Customary Law Act 1969.  
38  A tribesman is defined as “a member of a tribe or tribal community of Botswana …” — s 3 of the 
Common Law and Customary Law Act. Also see Stewart & Armstrong Women in Southern Africa 
10. 
39  Quansah Family Law in Botswana 126. 
40  See “2 4 2 Customary law and adoption”. 
41  S 5 of the Common Law and Customary Law Act. 
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Unlike statutory law42 there are no rules defining what a child is under customary 
law and the status of a child depends largely on the laws and customs of the 
individual tribe.43 According to Molokomme & Mokobi44 traditional customary law 
does not treat the rights of the child separately from those of the rest of the family 
as a unit. Further, parents are defined in a different manner from the Western 
concept, as biological parents are not necessarily recognised as a child’s only 
parents.45 This reminds us of the view of Mosikatsana,46 who focuses his beliefs 
and viewpoints on the community, rather than the individual,47 and is also similar 
to the cultural beliefs of the Maori of New Zealand, who view the child as 
belonging to the larger family, rather than to the parents.48 Molokomme & Mokobi 
believe that this broad definition of parenthood can be both beneficial and 
detrimental to the interests of the child.49 As I have already argued,50 I believe 
that this viewpoint is not conducive to the best interests of the child. To determine 
the best interests of a child he/she, and nobody else, should be considered. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42  See “8 3 LEGISLATION” below. 
43  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 84. 
44  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 186. 
45  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 184. 
46  Also see “5 6 2 Arguments against intercultural adoption”. 
47  See “5 6 2 Arguments against intercultural adoption”. 
48  See “7 2 1 Adoption of Children Act 9 of 1881”. 
49  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 184. 
50  See “5 6 2 Arguments against intercultural adoption”. 
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8 2 2 Adoption in terms of customary law 
 
There are no written rules or fixed procedures to be followed for the adoption of 
children in terms of customary law.51 The parents as the natural guardians of the 
child have the sole right to decide whether the child should stay with them or go 
to a relative.52 In Marman v Marman53 it was confirmed that an agreement to 
adopt along with the implementation of the adoption constitutes a customary 
adoption, in other words the transfer of a child from his/her biological family to an 
adoptive family is effected by agreement between the two families.54 The child’s 
views are not taken into account. The parents are expected to have the best 
interests of the child at heart in all matters affecting the child, and are regarded 
as the spokespersons of the child in all matters of customary law.55  
 
In customary law, two kinds of adoption are known, namely temporary adoption 
and permanent adoption. In terms of the system of temporary adoption a child is 
sent to live for a while with some paternal or maternal relative, sometimes as a 
sign of the attachment between two families, and sometimes for a special reason 
such as the child being ill or unhappy at home.56 The biological parents have the 
sole right to decide whether a child should be sent to stay with relatives.57 In the 
case of temporary adoption the biological parents remain the guardians and there 
                                                 
51  Molokomme Children of the Fence 27; Sigweni 2008 LLM 7. 
52  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 173. 
53  2003 (1) BLR 97 (HC) at 98. 
54  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 173. 
55  Sigweni 2008 LLM 35. 
56  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 173. 
57  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 173. 
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is no change in the child’s status.58 The ties of the biological parents are never 
extinguished,59 and the child could return to his/her biological parents at any 
time. In my view this arrangement should not be referred to as adoption. As the 
biological parents remain the guardians, referring to this custom as adoption just 
creates unnecessary confusion. This could rather be compared to a form of foster 
care. This temporary system will not be regarded as adoption in the remainder of 
this discussion. 
 
A child may also be permanently adopted under customary law. This form of 
adoption generally takes place when the people to whom the child is sent have 
no children of their own, or have children of one sex only.60 Prospective adoptive 
parents request relatives or friends to give them a child, or the biological parents 
may decide that when their next child is born, the child will be given to some 
special relative or friend.61 This form of adoption is therefore a way in which 
members of the extended family assist other family members or even friends who 
do not have biological children.62 In other words, the focus is on the needs of the 
adults and the tribe, not the needs and best interests of the children.  
 
When a child is adopted permanently in terms of customary law, a distinction is 
made between adoption by relatives and adoption by friends. If adopted by 
relatives, the child is considered the child of the adoptive parents in every way, 
                                                 
58  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 173-174. 
59  Roberts Tswana Family Law 22- 23, 64, 101, 132, 166, 199-200, 237, 265-266, 296. 
60  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. 
61  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. 
62  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. 
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as if he/she was born to the adoptive parents.63 This is similar to statutory 
adoption.64 There is one difference, however: If the child is ill-treated by the 
adoptive parents the biological parents may take him/her back or the child may 
flee to them.65 Although it could be argued that this arrangement serves the best 
interests of the child because the biological parents may step in if the child is not 
looked after properly, it creates a situation similar to fostering where there is 
always a sword over the heads of the adoptive parents and the child. The 
adoptive parents never know when the child may be taken away from them, and 
the child cannot develop the sense of belonging that he/she needs to form an 
attachment to the adoptive parents.66  
 
On the other hand, if the adoption is by friends, they do not exercise the same 
control over the child as do adoptive parents who are relatives.67 They have to 
inform and consult the biological parents about all important matters affecting the 
child’s welfare.68 In other words, the parent-child relationship between the 
biological parents and the child is not severed and could be resumed at any 
time.69 The child thus lives in an uncertain and non-permanent situation which, in 
my view, is not in his/her best interests. Again, referring to this as adoption is 
                                                 
63  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. 
64  See “8 5 2 2 Legislation” below. 
65  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. Presumably the biological parents determine whether the 
child is ill-treated.  
66  For a discussion of the value of attachment, see “3 3 ATTACHMENT” and “4 3 ATTACHMENT 
AND ADOPTION”. 
67  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. 
68  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 174. 
69  This seems to be similar to temporary adoption, discussed above. 
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probably not the best way of describing this kind of relationship and should, in my 
opinion, rather be called fostering. 
 
The value of the customary adoption system cannot be denied. Where 
permanent adoption by relatives takes place, the child is raised in a familiar 
environment by people who (it is hoped) love and care for him/her. However, in 
Botswana permanent adoption in terms of customary law is aimed at serving the 
interests of society in general70 and adults in particular, instead of the interests of 
the child because the focus is on the needs of the adults and the tribe instead of 
on the best interests of the child. That the adoption is not primarily intended to 
serve the child’s interests also appears from the fact that the child has no direct 
say about the adoption.71 Furthermore, the non-permanency of the system is not 
in the best interests of the child. The administration of customary adoptions by 
traditional leaders, who have not been trained specifically to deal with children’s 
rights issues and human rights in general,72 could also lead to a situation where 
the child’s best interests may not necessarily be protected. The system of 
customary adoption should be reconsidered. As I shall argue in “9 
CONCLUSION”, the principles of customary adoption in South Africa should be 
included in adoption legislation so that there is one system that regulates 
adoption. The same argument applies to adoption in Botswana.73 
 
                                                 
70  See Sigweni 2008 LLM 15. 
71  Sigweni 2008 LLM 23. 
72  Sigweni 2008 LLM 37. 
73  Also see “8 7 CONCLUSION”. 
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8 3 LEGISLATION 
 
8 3 1 Introduction 
 
Adoption in terms of statute is the legal process by which the parental rights of a 
child’s biological parents are extinguished and replaced by a set of legal relations 
between the child and his/her adoptive parents,74 in other words, it is an act 
whereby the relationship of parent and child is created between persons who are 
not necessarily biologically so related.75 The important thing to remember about 
statutory adoption is that legally the relationship between the child and the 
biological parents is terminated while a new legal relationship is created between 
the child and the adoptive parents. After the adoption the child is treated for all 
purposes as the legitimate child of his/her adoptive parents.76 These adoptions 
are administered by Magistrates’ Courts in accordance with the provisions of the 
Adoption of Children Act.77 
 
8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act 
 
Statutory adoptions were introduced in Botswana by the Adoption of Children 
Act, which came into effect on 12 December 1952. The contents of this Act are in 
                                                 
74  Quansah Family Law in Botswana 138. 
75  Kiggundu Private International Law in Botswana 239. 
76  S 6(2) of the Adoption of Children Act. 
77  “Court” is defined in s 2 of the Adoption of Children Act as a Magistrates’ Court. Unfortunately 
there is no provision in the Act for the involvement of social workers in the adoption process. 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 385
many ways similar to the South African Children’s Act of 1937, which has not 
regulated adoption in South Africa for the past 48 years. As will be seen 
throughout the rest of this chapter, much of the contents of the Adoption of 
Children Act are, in my opinion, outdated. There are currently plans to present a 
draft of the Children’s Bill 2007, which might eventually replace both the 
Children’s Act and the Adoption of Children Act,78 to the National Assembly. This 
draft Bill will be referred to throughout this chapter, where relevant.  
 
The introduction of the Adoption of Children Act did not replace customary law 
adoptions — both systems today operate together.79 This situation is similar to 
that in South Africa, where both customary adoptions and statutory adoptions are 
also known.80 The Adoption of Children Act is the first and only piece of 
legislation regulating the adoption of children in Botswana.81 According to 
Quansah,82 this Act ensures that neither the adopting parents nor the child who is 
being adopted is taken advantage of or unnecessarily prejudiced, and that the 
rights of the parents83 of the child who is being adopted are properly protected. I 
believe this should be the aim of any adoption legislation. However, as I shall 
point out below,84 there are several aspects of the Adoption of Children Act which 
might fall short of this aim and might need reconsideration. 
                                                 
78  Cl 137. The Bill is still in its early stages. 
79  Also see “8 1 INTRODUCTION” and my comments below under “8 7 CONCLUSION”. 
80  For a discussion of customary adoptions, see “2 4 2 Customary law and adoption”. For a 
discussion on statutory adoptions in South Africa, see “6 THE CHILD CARE ACT AND THE 
CHILDREN’S ACT”. 
81  Sigweni 2008 LLM 39. 
82  Quansah Family Law in Botswana 138. 
83  Presumably these are the biological parents. 
84  Also see the discussion under “8 5 2 2 Legislation” below. 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 386
 
The court85 of the district in which the child resides is the court which has 
jurisdiction to grant an adoption order on the application of the adoptive 
parent(s).86 This Act defines a child as a person under the age of 19 years.87  
 
An application for an adoption order cannot be granted unless the court is 
satisfied that the requirements that are contained in section 4(2) of the Adoption 
of Children Act are met. These requirements are: 
 
4(2) A court to which application for an order of adoption is made shall not grant the 
application unless it is satisfied— 
(a) that the applicant is or that both applicants are qualified to adopt the child; 
(b) that the applicant is or that both applicants are of good repute and a person or 
persons fit and proper to be entrusted with the custody of the child and 
possessed of adequate means to maintain and educate the child; 
(c) that the proposed adoption will serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of 
the child; 
(d) that consent to the adoption has been given— 
(i) by both parents of the child or, if the child is illegitimate, by the mother of 
the child whether or not such mother is a minor or married woman and 
                                                 
85  In terms of s 2 of the Adoption of Children Act “court” means a Magistrates’ Court established 
under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1974. In Mbambo v Ndlovu 2001 (2) BLR 611 (HC) at 614 it 
was held that the adoption of a minor that is not covered by the Adoption of Children Act 1952 can 
be brought before the High Court — see the discussion of this case under “8 5 2 2 Legislation” 
below. 
86  S 4(1) of the Adoption of Children Act. 
87  S 2 of the Adoption of Children Act. The Children’s Bill 2007 defines a child as a person under the 
age of 18 years. This is more in line with international instruments. In terms of s 49 of the 
Interpretation Act 1984 the age of majority is attained at the age of 21 years. The current South 
African legislation defines a child as someone under the age of 18 years. Also see the discussion 
about the age of the adopted child under “8 5 2 2 Legislation” below. 
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whether or not she is assisted by her parent, guardian or husband, as the 
case may be, 
(ii) if both parents are dead, or in the case of an illegitimate child, if the 
mother is dead, by the guardian of the child, 
(iii) if one parent is dead, by the surviving parent and by any guardian of the 
child who may have been appointed by the deceased parent, 
(iv) if one parent has deserted the child, by the other parent, or 
(v) by a guardian specially appointed under section 5; and 
(e) that the child, if over the age of 10 years, consents to the adoption. 
 
Some of these requirements need further consideration. A very important 
requirement is the one in section 4(2)(c), namely that the proposed adoption will 
serve the interests and conduce to the welfare of the child. As this issue is so 
important, it will be discussed separately below.88  
 
According to section 4(2)(b) the applicants have to possess adequate means to 
maintain and educate the child. In my view, financial strength should not be a 
prerequisite if a person would like to adopt a child.89 This requirement would 
exclude many people living in Botswana from adopting and is therefore 
discriminatory.90 I do not advocate a situation where people who cannot 
adequately feed, clothe and educate the child should be allowed to adopt a child, 
                                                 
88  See “8 5 2 2 Legislation”. 
89  See my discussion under “6 4 2 The financial means of the applicant(s)”. Unfortunately, this 
requirement remains in the Children’s Bill 2007 – see cl 117(2)(a). 
90  S 15 of the 1966 Constitution prohibits discrimination. Interestingly though, this section does not 
apply to any law that makes provision for adoption – s 15(4)(c). Presumably this is because of the 
distinction with regard to customary adoptions that are only applicable to a certain portion of 
Batswana. Also see the discussion under “8 4 RACE AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA 
ADOPTION LAW”. 
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as that would not be in the best interests of the child. However, I do believe that 
there is a way of overcoming the problem of the lack of financial security without 
making it a pre-requisite for adoption. South Africa faces a similar problem. My 
suggestion was discussed under “6 4 2 2 Children’s Act and the financial means 
of the applicant(s)” and will also be touched on in “9 CONCLUSION”. 
 
Section 4(2)(e) requires that if the child is over the age of 10 years, he/she has to 
consent to the adoption. The involvement of the child in the adoption process is 
welcomed. However, the nature of the process, whereby the involvement is 
restricted to children over the age of 10 years is, in my opinion, not without its 
faults.91 The 1966 Constitution enshrines the right to communicate one’s ideas 
and information.92 Nothing in the 1966 Constitution excludes children of any age 
from this right, which, in my view, means that the restrictive application in the 
Adoption of Children Act of the views of the child93 is unconstitutional.94  
 
There is no indication in section 4(2) of the Adoption of Children Act that race has 
to be considered when an adoption is made, or that the culture of the child or the 
parents (whether biological or adoptive) plays any part in an adoption application. 
This is welcomed, and more will be said about this under “8 4 RACE AND 
CULTURE IN BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW” below. 
                                                 
91  This requirement will be discussed in detail below under “8 5 2 2 Legislation”.  
92  S 12 of the 1966 Constitution. 
93  S 4(2)(e), which only grants this right to children over 10. The Children’s Bill 2007 has taken 
account of the problem with regard to the age of the child in case of consent. Cl 117(2)(h) provides 
that the views of the child have to be taken into consideration subject to the child’s age, maturity 
and level of understanding. This reformulation is welcomed, although it is unsure how the 
provision will be applied, as the court only has to take the views of the child into consideration. 
94  Also see “8 5 2 2 Legislation”. 
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As will be discussed under “8 7 CONCLUSION”, I am of the opinion that the 
Adoption of Children Act needs to be reconsidered and perhaps rewritten.95 In 
order to protect the best interests of the child, there are many issues which need 
urgent attention. The Botswana legislation on adoption has not advanced with the 
times.96 
 
8 3 3 Constitution of Botswana 
 
Until the enactment of the 1966 Constitution the protection of human rights in 
Botswana was largely left to the common law and statutory law.97 Today the 
principal source of law governing human rights protection in Botswana is the 
1966 Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights in chapter 3. The 1966 
Constitution came into effect on 30 September 1966. Even though it contains no 
explicit provision to that effect, the 1966 Constitution is the supreme law of 
Botswana.98 Section 3 guarantees the protection and enjoyment of fundamental 
rights to every person in Botswana, inter alia, regardless of race. 
 
                                                 
95  Also see the remarks under “8 5 THE ROLE OF THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS IN 
BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW” and “8 6 FUTURE REFORM OF BOTSWANA ADOPTION 
LAW”. 
96  As has been mentioned, the Children’s Bill 2007 will probably be presented to the National 
Assembly soon. 
97  Fombad in Fombad The Law of Botswana 7. 
98  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana 9; Attorney-General v Unity Dow, Civ App 4/91, an 
unreported case referred to by Otlhogile in Edge & Lekorwe Botswana 156. 
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Section 15(1) of the 1966 Constitution protects individuals from discrimination.99 
Section 15(3)100 limits protection from discrimination to discrimination in respect 
of “race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed” only. This 
section is very narrow in terms of the groups that are protected from 
discrimination.101 There are many aspects, such as gender, age, disability and 
language, to name but a few, which also deserve protection, but have been left 
out of this section. Furthermore, adoption legislation is excluded from this section 
in terms of section 15(4)(c).102  
 
Equality is not protected in the 1966 Constitution. Nsereko, however, believes 
that the essence of the ban on discrimination103 implies that all inhabitants in the 
country should be treated equally.104 This, in my opinion, is not necessarily so. 
Equality and non-discrimination are not the same thing.105  
 
The 1966 Constitution does not specifically provide for the protection of children 
or the family. Fombad argues that the principles of the common law and 
international human rights principles which have become part of customary 
                                                 
99  S 15(1): “Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of this section, no law shall make 
any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.”  
100  In terms of s 15(3) discrimination in this section means “different treatment to different persons, 
attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, 
political opinions, colour or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to 
disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are 
accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description”. 
101  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana 239. 
102  Also see n 90 above and “8 4 5 Race and statutory adoption” below. 
103  See s 15(3) — n 100 above. 
104  Nsereko Constitutional Law in Botswana 239. 
105  See “5 4 1 3 Culture and equality”. 
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international law may be relied upon to fill any gaps in the 1966 Constitution.106 
This may be so, but it would be in line with the best interests of the child and 
international instruments107 if a section protecting children’s rights is included in 
the 1966 Constitution.  
 
8 3 4 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
Botswana acceded to the Convention on 13 April 1995. Ratification is a reflection 
of the country’s commitment to the international minimum standards established 
for the protection and promotion of children’s rights.108 The Convention can be 
used by the Botswana courts in the interpretation of laws, especially determining 
what is in the best interests of the child.109 
 
Article 2 of the Convention contains the non-discrimination clause.110 
Molokomme & Mokobi believe that Botswana does not comply with the 
requirements of article 2 because of its plural legal system which recognises the 
co-existence of state and customary laws which apply to different sections of the 
population and which provide different laws for persons based upon their ethnic 
                                                 
106  Fombad in Fombad The Law of Botswana 16. 
107  See the Convention (art 3) and the African Charter (art 4), which are both applicable to Botswana. 
108  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 182. 
109  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 85. 
110  2(1): “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each 
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his 
or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”  
 2(2): “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against 
all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, 
or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members.” 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 392
or social origin, religious beliefs and other factors.111 I agree with this statement. 
Customary adoption certainly does not comply with this article, as it only allows 
for adoption of a child who is a member of a tribe, which is obviously 
discriminatory.112 The Adoption of Children Act is similarly discriminatory. It 
makes a distinction with regard to the treatment of legitimate and illegitimate 
children.113 Section 16 is also discriminatory as it provides legislative approval for 
customary adoptions which, as I have already argued, are discriminatory.114 
Molokomme & Mokobi come to the conclusion that some of the provisions of 
Botswana customary law and state law are inconsistent with some of the 
principles of the Convention.115 This is also my opinion.  
 
The Convention has been discussed at length in this thesis. It serves no purpose 
to repeat what has already been said. I shall thus simply reiterate the importance 
of the best interests of the child in this international document and again state 
that the Convention can be of great assistance in determining the best interests 
of the child. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 183. 
112  This will be discussed under “8 4 RACE AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW”.  
113  In s 4(2)(d)(i) legitimate and illegitimate children require different forms of consent from their 
biological parents for an adoption. The Children’s Bill 2007 refers to children born out of 
wedlock, but still makes a distinction. 
114  This section, together with its predecessor, will be discussed in more detail under “8 4 RACE 
AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW” below. 
115  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 201. 
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8 3 5 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
 
Botswana signed and ratified the Charter on 10 July 2001. Just like the 
Convention, it can be used by the Botswana courts in the interpretation of laws, 
especially determining what is in the best interests of the child.116 The discussion 
under “5 5 2 The Charter” applies to Botswana as much as it does to South 
Africa, and will not be repeated here. Similar to the Preamble of the Convention, 
the Preamble of the Charter prohibits distinction on any ground such as race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. Article 3 contains the non-
discrimination clause. The criticism levelled against the non-discrimination article 
in the Convention117 applies equally to article 3 of the Charter. 
 
 
8 4 RACE AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW 
 
8 4 1 Culture and customary adoption 
 
The first question I shall attempt to answer is whether intercultural adoption takes 
place in Botswana. If we consider that customary adoptions happen within a 
specific tribe,118 it appears as if intercultural adoptions are not a reality in terms of 
                                                 
116  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 85. 
117  See “8 3 4 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”. 
118  See the definition of customary law above, which describes customary law as law in a particular 
tribe or tribal community. 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 394
customary law. There does not seem to be any custom that prohibits marriage 
between different tribes,119 but intertribal marriages are unlikely, since the women 
who are traditionally regarded as the man’s most suitable brides are his own 
relatives of certain categories.120 It is possible for someone to transfer his 
allegiance to the Chief of another tribe. It is therefore possible that there may be 
instances where intercultural adoption does take place, but as these will be few 
and far between, I believe that it is not too much of a generalisation to say that 
intercultural adoption would be rare. The control of parents over the marriage of 
their children has been greatly weakened, so that this situation might change with 
time, but for the moment it is my contention that intercultural adoption is unlikely. 
 
Furthermore, customary adoptions are always either by relatives or friends. In the 
case of family, our definitions of culture tell us that culture is the knowledge, 
belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired 
by man as a member of society.121 This leads one to the conclusion that the 
persons living in the same tribe will most likely have the same culture. Even in 
the case of adoption by friends the chances are great that the friends are of the 
same tribe, and the same argument as with regard to relatives thus applies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119  See Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 127-130. 
120  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom 128. 
121  See the definitions under “5 2 2 Culture”. 
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8 4 2 Culture and statutory adoption 
 
Section 4(2) of the Adoption of Children Act, which contains the requirements 
that have to be met before an adoption order can be granted, does not contain 
any reference to culture. In fact, there is no reference to culture anywhere in the 
Adoption of Children Act.122 This is not necessarily an indication that culture is 
not important; it is however an indication that culture should not be elevated 
above any of the other requirements in the case of an adoption. Furthermore, the 
1966 Constitution contains no reference to culture. Although I believe that culture 
needs to be protected, and that the 1966 Constitution thus falls short in this 
regard, the complete omission of any reference to culture in the 1966 
Constitution and the Adoption of Children Act leads me to the conclusion that 
intercultural adoption in Botswana, if it does happen, will not be frowned upon. 
This is in line with my argument that intercultural adoption should be allowed if it 
is in the best interests of the child.123 
 
8 4 3 Culture and case law 
 
The decision in the matter of In re OM [an infant]124 has to be welcomed. This is 
an unreported case which is discussed in Sigweni 2008 LLM 46, but 
unfortunately I could not establish whether this was a customary law or statutory 
                                                 
122  The Children’s Bill 2007 states that the child’s cultural, ethnic or religious identity is a factor to be 
taken into account in determining the best interests of the child.  
123  See in general “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE” and specifically “5 6 3 Arguments in favour of 
intercultural adoption”. 
124  MH 585 of 2000. This is an unreported case which is discussed in Sigweni 2008 LLM 46. 
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law adoption. The biological parent of the child objected to her adoption by a 
family of another tribe who were of the Christian religion. The focus of the 
objection was the difference in religion, and not a difference in culture. 
Considering the child’s age (she was eight years old) and the fact that her mother 
had neglected and abandoned her, the court held that the child was still very 
young and would easily adjust and adapt to the new environment. Clearly the 
court believed that religion is less important for a young child than the opportunity 
to be raised as part of a family.125 The court ignored religious differences 
between the adoptive parents and the child in order to satisfy the best interests of 
the child. It is encouraging to see that the best interests of the child viewed 
holistically were considered above all else. The same approach should be 
adopted in the case of cultural differences.  
 
8 4 4 Race and customary adoption 
 
As I explained above, customary law does not apply to everyone in Botswana, 
but only to members of a tribe or tribal community. Adoption in accordance with 
customary law is thus not possible if either the child or the prospective adoptive 
parent is not subject to customary law.126 The members of a tribe or tribal 
community who practise customary law are almost exclusively black.127 This in 
                                                 
125  Also see the discussion under “4 5 3 Attachment and the age of the child”, where it is emphasised 
that the younger the child is at the time of adoption, the easier it is for the child to adjust. 
126  See “8 2 1 Introduction”. 
127  See my argument under “8 4 5 Race and statutory adoption” below. 
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effect excludes other races from adopting in terms of customary law. This is 
obviously racist and discriminatory and needs to be addressed. 
 
8 4 5 Race and statutory adoption 
 
When the Adoption of Children Act first came into effect in 1952, it was racist in 
nature. Blacks were expressly excluded from participating in the statutory form of 
adoption which it created.128 They could only adopt African children in 
accordance with Tswana customary law.129 This was in terms of section 15, 
which read as follows: 
 
This Proclamation shall not apply to Africans, and nothing in this Proclamation contained 
shall be construed as preventing or affecting the adoption of an African child by an 
African or Africans in accordance with Tswana law and custom. 
 
As can be seen from the section, the idea was that blacks would adopt in 
accordance with custom. The section referred to “Africans”. The term is not 
defined, but the classification was clearly ethnic130 and the wording of the section 
referred to the indigenous people of Botswana who lived in accordance with 
customary law.131 Furthermore, textbooks about customary law deal with “Native 
                                                 
128  S 15. 
129  Customary law was until 1968 referred to as “Tswana law and custom” – see Himsworth 1972 
Journal of African Law 14. 
130  Himsworth 1972 Journal of African Law 12. 
131  Although it is possible that there is the rare tribesman who is not African (see Himsworth 1972 
Journal of African Law 12), the members of the tribes are mainly black. 
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Customary Law”132 and “Tswana law”.133 Clearly thus customary law is reserved 
for the indigenous blacks of Botswana.134 Not providing them with the choice to 
adopt in terms of statute was, of course, discriminatory.  
 
The provision excluding blacks from participating in the statutory form of adoption 
was repealed in 1964 by the General Law (Removal of Discrimination) Revision 
Law.135 Currently, the Adoption of Children Act does not draw a distinction with 
regard to race. This means that anybody, no matter what their race, can adopt in 
terms of statute provided they comply with the requirements of the Adoption of 
Children Act. This has opened up the possibility of statutory adoption to blacks, 
which is welcomed.  
 
Section 16 of the Adoption of Children Act makes provision for the adoption in 
accordance with customary law of a child who is subject to customary law by a 
person who is also subject to customary law,136 with the result that indigenous 
blacks now have the choice to adopt either in terms of customary law or in terms 
of statute, while other races do not have this same opportunity. This is 
discriminatory and falls foul of section 15(1) & (3) of the 1966 Constitution which 
                                                 
132  Schapera Tswana Law and Custom vii. Sykes Concise Oxford Dictionary 674 defines the term 
“native” as indigenous or black. 
133  Roberts Tswana Family Law ix. 
134  As I have indicated (see “8 4 1 Culture and customary adoption”) it is certainly possible for a 
person of another race to belong to a tribe, but, if it does happen, it will be extremely rare. 
135  No 28 of 1964, as quoted in Sigweni 2008 LLM 12. 
136  This provision is also found in cl 129 of the Children’s Bill 2007. 
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prohibits discrimination on the ground of race.137 Granted, section 15(4)(c) of the 
1966 Constitution excludes adoption from the discrimination clause, but, as I 
shall argue directly below, it is my opinion that this subsection is in itself 
discriminatory. My argument finds support in the Convention138 and the 
Charter139 which both prohibit discrimination against children.  
 
The provisions of the Adoption of Children Act, specifically section 16, are clearly 
discriminatory. People subject to customary law have two forms of adoption 
available to them, while that is not the case for people who are not subject to 
customary law.140 In terms of section 15(3) of the 1966 Constitution no law may 
make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect. However, 
section 15(4)(c) excludes adoption from the general prohibition on discrimination. 
Section 15(4)(c) reads as follows: 
 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of this section, no law shall 
make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect. 
 (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes 
provision— … 
 (c)  with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on 
death or other matters of personal law; 
 
                                                 
137  S 15(1) prohibits discriminatory provisions in any laws, while s 15(3) states that different 
treatment of persons inter alia attributable to race, is discriminatory. However, also see the 
discussion below under the same heading about s 15(4)(c) of the 1966 Constitution. 
138  Art 2. 
139  Art 3. 
140  See the discussion above under this heading. 
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The reasoning behind this provision is not clear. I believe it is probably an 
attempt to incorporate the provisions of the customary law in such a way that 
there is no contravention of the provisions in the 1966 Constitution.141 Firstly, 
there is no limit as far as the exclusion in section 15(4)(c) is concerned. In other 
words, with respect to adoption no provision in any law can be discriminatory, no 
matter how far-fetched or unequal. Providing that the non-discrimination clause 
does not apply to adoption matters does not make any sense and it contravenes 
the non-discrimination clause of the Convention142 and the Charter. The interests 
and welfare of the child have to be protected in an adoption.143 However, these 
interests and welfare could be at risk if the non-discrimination section does not 
apply to the child.  
 
 
8 5 THE ROLE OF THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS IN BOTSWANA 
ADOPTION LAW 
 
8 5 1 Introduction  
 
Traditional customary law does not treat the rights of the child separately from 
those of the rest of the family as a unit.144 However, the principle of the best 
                                                 
141  As I shall argue in “8 7 CONCLUSION”, I believe that it is time that the statutory system and the 
customary system are integrated into one set of laws that are applicable to everyone and acceptable 
to everyone. 
142  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 87. 
143  S 4(2)(c) of the Adoption of Children Act. 
144  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 186. 
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interests of the child was introduced into the law of Botswana by section 6 of the 
Customary Law (Application and Ascertainment) Act145 in 1969,146 to apply 
specifically to custody cases.147 Section 6 provides that “in any case relating to 
the custody of children the welfare of the children concerned shall be the 
paramount consideration irrespective of which law or principle is applied.”148 It 
can be argued that statutory adoption would fall under this provision, as the effect 
of such adoption is that custody is awarded to the adoptive parents,149 and 
Himsworth says this section lends statutory confirmation to a well-established 
rule that the welfare of the children involved must be the paramount 
consideration.150 This to me clearly indicates that the intention is that section 6 
applies to all cases dealing with the welfare of the child where custody is 
concerned. The welfare of children has in any event become part of the law of 
Botswana and has been relied upon in a number of cases.151 Although not 
enshrined in the 1966 Constitution, the principle of the best interests of the child 
has become the standard against which decisions affecting children are now 
measured.152 Within the courts it has become a guiding principle for all actions 
involving children. The courts have generally interpreted it to mean that in all 
                                                 
145  Customary Law (Application and Ascertainment) Act 1969. 
146  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 184. 
147  Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 189. 
148  Whether the term “interests” or “welfare” is used, they both relate to the best interests of the child 
and can be interpreted as synonymous — Molokomme & Mokobi in Ncube Children’s Rights in 
Eastern and Southern Africa 189; Quansah Family Law in Botswana 132. The court in Ex parte 
Veen in re Infant Otlogetswe Kgosietsile 1978 BLR 43 (HC) at 47, 52 also used these terms as 
synonyms. My view is that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the two concepts – 
see “7 4 2 1 Determining welfare and interests”. 
149  In terms of s 6(2) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952 an adopted child shall for all purposes 
whatsoever be the legitimate child of the adoptive parents. 
150  Himsworth 1972 Journal of African Law 11. 
151  Quansah Family Law in Botswana 132. 
152  Rwezaura in Ncube Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa 41. 
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cases involving children the welfare of the child should be the paramount 
consideration irrespective of what law is applied.153  
 
In 1996 a Presidential Task Group was appointed to work on Vision 2016, a 
project of the Botswana National Vision Council. This is Botswana’s strategy to 
propel its socio-economic and political development into a competitive, winning 
and prosperous nation.154 Vision 2016 has as part of its aims the eradication of 
all negative social attitudes towards the role of women, youths, the disabled and 
so forth. Specifically it provides that “[n]o citizen of the future Botswana shall be 
disadvantaged as a result of gender, age, religion or creed, colour, national or 
ethnic origin …”155 Like the Convention, Vision 2016 envisions a future where 
children are able to develop to their fullest potential, acknowledging the vital roles 
played by family life and parents in children’s development, and the need to 
protect Botswana’s vulnerable children.156 If this vision comes to fruition, it can 
only be beneficial to the best interests of the child. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 87. In terms of the Children’s 
Bill 2007 the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration (cl 6), and it contains a list 
of factors that have to be taken into account in determining the best interests of the child (cl 7). 
154  Vision 2016 at http://www.vision2016.co.bw/index.html. 
155  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 87. 
156  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 83. 
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8 5 2 Adoption and the child’s best interests 
 
8 5 2 1 Customary law 
 
Customary courts rarely keep records of proceedings.157 Although customary law 
is generally known by customary court members and the community,158 it is not 
easy to establish what the customary courts consider important in the case of a 
customary adoption if no records are kept.159 Customary law develops constantly, 
and it is very difficult to determine what development has taken place under 
these circumstances. This could be detrimental to the best interests of the child. 
 
Customary law does not provide for child participation in adoption decisions, 
although an elder would speak on the child’s behalf.160 This, to my mind, is not in 
the best interests of the child. As I have argued already,161 a child who is mature 
enough to participate should be allowed to participate in any adoption 
proceedings, failing which such adoption should not proceed.162  
 
                                                 
157  Sigweni 2008 LLM 28. 
158  Molokomme Children of the Fence 27. 
159  This was a problem in Marman v Marman 2003 (1) BLR 97 (HC), where the court had to decide 
whether a customary adoption had in fact taken place. The applicants’ case was that there was no 
adoption, and the court had to call an expert in customary law to explain the procedures in such an 
adoption. This is a problem in South Africa as well. In Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 
(4) SA 771 (TkA) at 773-774 various experts in customary law were called in order to determine 
whether a customary adoption had indeed taken place.  
160  Sigweni 2008 LLM 23. 
161  See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act”. 
162  Also see “8 5 2 2 Legislation” below. 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 404
Where a child does not have biological parents, the head of the extended family 
makes the decision about which of the family members will raise the child.163 
This, I believe, is also not in the best interests of the child. Not only are the views 
of the child ignored, but also the views of the adoptive parents. In fact, the 
adoptive parents may not even want a child at all, but they are not in a position to 
refuse to adopt the child.164 As I have explained elsewhere,165 it is important that 
the views of all parties to the adoption166 are taken into account. If this is not 
done, it could lead to a situation where there are unwilling parties to an adoption, 
which will obviously not be in the best interests of the child. 
 
There is no independent party involved in customary adoptions who is there 
specifically to look after and make decisions in the best interests of the child. In 
the absence of such a person, I would suggest that a campaign is launched to 
educate people about adoption, its consequences and the best interests of the 
child. Below in this chapter I will argue167 that customary adoption needs to be 
incorporated into statute law in such a way that the interests of all the people of 
Botswana are served. 
 
                                                 
163  Sigweni 2008 LLM 31. 
164  Sigweni 2008 LLM 31. 
165  See “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach”, where I discuss the importance of 
taking into account the views of all relevant parties before an adoption order is made. 
166  Before an adoption takes place, all relevant parties have to be consulted. Where there are no 
biological parents, it would mean that the adoptive parents and the child, if he/she is able to give 
an opinion, have to be consulted. 
167  See “8 7 CONCLUSION” below. 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 405
With customary adoptions contact is maintained between the child and the 
biological family,168 which is in line with both the Convention169 and the 
Charter,170 and also with the guidelines of open adoption.171 Keeping contact with 
the biological family is usually in the best interests of the child, although the 
relationship between the child and the biological family should always be 
monitored.172 
 
8 5 2 2 Legislation 
 
In terms of section 4(2)(c) of the Adoption of Children Act an adoption application 
shall not be granted unless the proposed adoption will serve the interests and 
conduce to the welfare of the child.173 Whether the Adoption of Children Act 
actually serves these best interests, will be investigated next. 
 
This Act makes no provision for the involvement of a social worker or similarly 
trained welfare official in the adoption process. Without such a person, it is not 
certain how much protection there is for the child and his/her best interests in the 
adoption process. It is certainly possible that the best interests of the child are 
protected by the current adoption process, but there is nothing in the Adoption of 
                                                 
168  See the discussion under “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
169  Art 9(3). Botswana acceded to the Convention on 13 April 1995. 
170  Art 19(2). Botswana signed and ratified the Charter on 10 July 2001. 
171  See “4 4 2 Open adoption”. 
172  See “4 4 2 2 Benefits of adoption contact” and “6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a 
family environment”, as well as my recommendation under “9 CONCLUSION”. 
173  In terms of cl 117(2)(a) of the Children’s Bill 2007, an application for an adoption cannot be 
granted unless the court is satisfied that the adoption would be in the best interests of the child. As 
I argue under “6 3 3 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and the best interests of the child”, the 
protection is thus stronger in the Children’s Bill 2007. 
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Children Act to indicate what this possible protection is. If a social worker were 
involved in the process, there would be more certainty that there was someone to 
look out for the best interests of the child.  
 
As was indicated above,174 section 4(2)(e) of the Adoption of Children Act 
requires that a child, if over the age of 10 years, has to consent to an adoption, 
failing which an adoption order cannot be granted. Furthermore, if the child who 
has to consent to the adoption gives such consent in Botswana, such consent 
has to be in writing and signed in the presence of a District Commissioner, who 
has to attest to the consent. If the consent is given outside Botswana it has to be 
signed and attested in the manner prescribed.175 The requirement regarding the 
written consent needs further consideration. Although some form of tangible 
proof of the consent is needed, there is always the possibility that a child who 
needs to consent to an adoption is illiterate.176 In such a case, an alternative form 
of consent should be considered. It is a pity too that the section does not require 
the Commissioner to ask questions and discuss the consequences of consent 
with the child.177 Such a requirement would certainly offer more protection with 
regard to the best interests of the child who may not have consented voluntarily 
                                                 
174  See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act” above. 
175   A similar provision is found in cl 117(3) of the Children’s Bill 2007. 
176  A national literacy survey was undertaken for the first time in Botswana in 1993 by the Central 
Statistics Office to establish the rate of adult literacy and the extent of inadequate literacy among 
the adult population of Botswana. Unfortunately the target population for the survey was citizens 
aged 12-65 years old who never attended school or left school before completing standard five — 
Commeyras & Chilisa International Journal of Educational Development 434-435. It is therefore 
not possible to know what the literacy rate of children in Botswana is, but it can be assumed that 
among younger children especially there has to be some illiteracy. 
177  There are no regulations under the Adoption of Children Act 1952. Confirmation of this was 
obtained from Professor EK Quansah of the University of Botswana via e-mail dated 25 
November 2008. 
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or who may not be fully aware of what that consent entails. There is also the 
matter of the age requirement with regard to consent. As I have argued 
elsewhere,178 the approach of stipulating a specific age is far too rigid and can 
actually work against the best interests of the child.  
 
For purposes of the Adoption of Children Act a court is a Magistrate’s Court and 
a child is a person under the age of 19 years.179 This means that someone could 
be adopted in terms of this Act up to the age of 18 years and 11 months if the 
Magistrate’s Court is approached with an adoption application and the necessary 
requirements are met. In Mbambo v Ndlovu180 the applicants approached the 
High Court after a statutory adoption application was declined in the Magistrate’s 
Court because the minor was 19 years old and was therefore not a child within 
the meaning of the Adoption of Children Act. The court held that the High Court 
has unlimited jurisdiction in terms of section 95(1) of the 1966 Constitution181 and 
that this should include those matters in which the subordinate courts lack 
jurisdiction.182 The application for the adoption was denied because the consent 
was not properly attested, but the applicants were granted leave to file proper 
consent before presenting the application for an appropriate order.183 This 
                                                 
178  In this regard, see my criticism of the New Zealand legislation under “7 4 2 2 Factors to be taken 
into account” as well as my remarks under “6 5 2 1 The Child Care Act and the consent of the 
child” and “6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the child”. 
179  S 2.  
180  2001 (2) BLR 611 (HC) at 614. 
181  S 95(1): “There shall be for Botswana a High Court which shall have unlimited original 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law and such other 
jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law”. 
182  At 614. 
183  At 615. 
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decision has to be criticised.184 Although it is true that the High Court is the upper 
guardian of all minors,185 I do not believe that it has the power to hear an 
application which is reserved for the Magistrate’s Court by statute. Furthermore, 
the Adoption of Children Act is very specific about who it considers to be a child, 
and I do not believe the High Court should interfere with this age.  
 
Section 5 of the Adoption of Children Act provides that if an application has been 
made for an order for the adoption of a child, the Minister may under certain 
circumstances appoint a guardian for the child for the purpose of proceedings 
under the Adoption of Children Act.186 Although the Act stipulates that a “suitable 
person” may be appointed, there are no guidelines about who this person should 
be or whether he/she should have any specific attributes or qualifications. The 
reason for including such a section in the Act was surely to protect the best 
interests of a child who does not have parents to protect him/her in any 
proceedings under the Act, but this section needs rethinking. Today a social 
worker, who has been trained to know what the best interests of a child require in 
the case of an adoption, should be the one responsible for ensuring that the best 
interests of the child are protected under these circumstances.187 
 
                                                 
184  Also see n 85 above. 
185  In terms of s 49 of the Interpretation Act the age of majority is attained at the age of 21 years in 
Botswana. 
186 These circumstances are the following: if the child’s parents are dead and no guardian has been 
appointed for the child; if the parents have deserted the child; if the parents are, or one of the 
parents is, incapable by reason of mental disorder or defect of consenting to the adoption. S 70 of 
the South African Children’s Act of 1937 contained a similar provision. Cl 118(1) of the 
Children’s Bill 2007 contains a similar provision. 
187  Also see my remarks above under this heading about the need to include social workers in the 
adoption process in all cases. 
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In terms of section 6 of the Citizenship Act188 an adopted child who is not a 
citizen of Botswana will only become a citizen if the adopter is at the date of the 
adoption a citizen and the child is no older than three years. Citizenship thus 
automatically follows an adoption under these circumstances. However, section 7 
of the Citizenship Act provides that the Minister may register a child over the age 
of three years adopted by a citizen of Botswana as a citizen upon application by 
the adoptive parent, provided that a child shall not be registered as a citizen if the 
Minister is satisfied that the child, “being sufficiently mature to have formed a 
character, is not of good character”. This distinction with regard to citizenship 
based on the age of the child is discriminatory. Further, it could have some 
(possibly) unintended consequences. If a child is adopted but cannot become a 
citizen of Botswana, it could lead to a situation where prospective adoptive 
parents are less likely to choose a child who is older than three years. Granted, it 
is not necessarily in the best interests of the child to lose his/her biological or 
current citizenship, but knowing that the adopted child might retain a foreign 
citizenship could sway prospective adoptive parents to rather choose a younger 
child who will automatically become a citizen of Botswana upon adoption. 
Another question that comes to mind is how it will be determined whether a 
young child has a “good character”. It could be that the Minister will wait until 
he/she is satisfied that the child is mature enough to have formed a character to 
make a decision about citizenship, which might never happen, or the Minister 
might decide that the child is not “of good character”. This would lead to 
                                                 
188  The Citizenship Act 1982. 
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tremendous uncertainty for the child and would not be in the best interests of the 
child. It seems to me as if the concern here is not the child’s best interests. 
 
Finally, the decision in Ex parte Veen in re Infant Otlogetswe Kgosietsile189 has to 
be mentioned. This was not an adoption application, but an application by the 
applicants to be appointed as joint guardians and to be awarded custody of a 
minor. The court held that emotional security is one of the most important factors 
in any child’s psycho-social development. As I have already argued, the 
importance of attachment in the development of a child’s emotional security 
cannot be overlooked, and such emotional security can be obtained through 
adoption.190  
 
Overall, the determination of the best interests of a child is a complicated matter, 
but there are certain factors that have been proven to work either towards or 
against the best interests of the child. If these factors are properly considered, it 
can only make it easier to achieve the goal of acting in the best interests of the 
child.191  
 
 
                                                 
189  1978 BLR 43 (HC) at 48. 
190  See “4 3 ATTACHMENT AND ADOPTION” and “4 4 2 2 Benefits of open adoption”. 
191  On 4 February 2005 the Children in Need of Care Regulations (Statutory Instrument no 8 of 2005) 
were introduced under s 38 of the Children’s Act 1981. These regulations apply when there is 
reasonable cause to believe that a child is in need of care (reg 3(1)). Reg 7 deals with the best 
interests of the child and lists the factors to which the court must have regard (reg 7(2)). These or 
similar factors could undoubtedly assist the court in the case of adoption as well, and it would be 
in the best interests of the child if consideration was given to the making of regulations for the 
Adoption of Children Act 1952 too. 
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8 5 3 Open versus closed adoption 
 
The court may at the time of making an adoption order or at any time thereafter 
direct that a biological parent192 or guardian of the child shall have access to the 
child for a period not exceeding two years from the date of adoption, provided 
that the court will not make such an order if access will probably be to the 
disadvantage of the child.193 At first glance this seems like approval for open 
adoption.194 However, in my opinion this section is not in the best interests of the 
child. It is important that, where possible and in the best interests of a child, the 
biological parent(s)/family and/or guardian are part of the child’s life after an 
adoption order is made. The benefits of open adoption have already been 
discussed.195 Post-adoptive contact, in whichever form,196 between the child and 
the biological parents/family is in the best interests of the child.197 Once it is 
determined that contact between the child and the biological parents after an 
adoption is in the best interests of the child, there can be no justification for 
terminating that relationship after a period of, at most, two years if the concern is 
the welfare of the child. The only reason I can think of for the enactment of such 
a limiting provision is that it grants the biological parents the opportunity to 
                                                 
192  The Act does not specify, but “parent” here apparently refers to the biological parent. 
193  S 7. This is similar to s 72 of South Africa’s Children’s Act of 1937. There is no similar provision 
in the Children’s Bill 2007, but cl 122 of the Children’s Bill 2007 provides that the court shall not 
make any order prohibiting the adopted child from maintaining contact with his/her biological 
parents unless it would be in the best interests of the child for it to do so. It also contains an 
interesting provision (cl 120) which states that an adoptive parent has to give an undertaking, in 
writing, that he/she shall inform the child that the child is adopted, and the whereabouts and 
circumstances of the child’s biological or other parents if they are still alive. Cl 120 is in line with 
the principles of open adoption. 
194  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
195  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
196  The different forms of contact are discussed under “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. 
197  See “4 4 OPEN VERSUS CLOSED ADOPTION”. There are, of course, exceptions. 
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ensure that the child is happy and well cared for, but if this is the case, a social 
worker can perform this task.198 The parents should be part of the child’s life, but 
not to fulfil the role of a social worker and not just for a limited period. 
 
 
8 6  FUTURE REFORM OF BOTSWANA ADOPTION LAW 
 
8 6 1 Introduction 
 
Although it has been discussed,199 reference should again be made to Vision 
2016, which envisions a future where children are able to develop to their fullest 
potential, and which, if its aims are achieved, could ultimately benefit the child 
and be in the best interests of the child.  
 
As I mentioned above,200 Botswana adoption legislation needs urgent attention. 
Currently, a draft Children’s Bill, 2007,201 is in the process of being prepared for 
eventual presentation to the National Assembly. The object of the Bill is to give 
effect to Botswana’s obligations in terms of the Convention and the Charter 
regarding the well-being of children, as well as to promote the well-being of 
families and communities in Botswana.202 
                                                 
198  As discussed above under this heading, there is no involvement of a social worker or similar 
person in the adoption process at all. This important deficiency needs to receive attention. 
199  See “8 5 1 Introduction”. 
200  See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act”. 
201  Hereafter referred to as “the Bill”. The Bill does not have a number yet. If enacted, it will be cited 
as the Children’s Act, 2008. 
202  Memorandum to the Bill. 
Chapter 8: Adoption in Botswana 
 413
 
The Bill provides, amongst other things, for the protection and care of children in 
circumstances in which parents are unable to protect or care for their children. In 
this process the best interests of the child must be paramount.203  
 
In the next paragraph, I shall consider the contents of this Bill and whether the 
proposed amendments will have any positive impact on adoption legislation in 
Botswana. 
 
8 6 2 Reform proposals 
 
As can be seen from the rest of this chapter, there are issues in the adoption 
legislation of Botswana that need attention. I shall now consider the contents of 
the Bill and whether it addresses the matters that need attention.  
 
• The protection of the best interests of the child is undoubtedly more 
comprehensive in the Children’s Bill than it is in the Adoption of Children 
Act. In terms of section 4(2)(c) of the Act an adoption order shall not be 
made unless the court is satisfied that the proposed adoption will serve the 
interests and conduce to the welfare of the child.204 The Children’s Bill, 
however, mandates a person or the court performing a function or 
exercising a power under the Bill to regard the best interests of the child 
                                                 
203  Memorandum to the Bill. 
204  Also see “8 5 2 2 Legislation”. 
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as the paramount consideration,205 and a court may not grant an adoption 
application unless it would be in the best interests of the child to do so.206 
This is a definite improvement of the protection of the best interests of the 
child. As I explained above,207 the way the Act is formulated, it would be 
possible that a child’s interests might possibly be served without the 
adoption necessarily being in the best interests of the child. The protection 
of the best interests in the Bill is much better than it is in the Adoption of 
Children Act. 
 
• Under “8 5 2 2 Legislation”, the requirement of consent by the child before 
an adoption is granted, is discussed and criticised. Whereas the Act 
demands the consent of a child over the age of ten years,208 the Bill 
requires the views of the child to be taken into consideration, subject to the 
child’s age, maturity and level of understanding, before an adoption 
application may be granted by the court. Even though this approach to the 
consent of the child is welcomed, the Bill provides that the court needs to 
take the views of the child into consideration, and it is not clear how the 
court will interpret this requirement. As I suggested above,209 consent by 
the child should be a requirement, subject to the child’s age, maturity and 
stage of development, as determined by a trained social worker.210 
                                                 
205  Cl 6. 
206  Cl 117(2)(a). 
207  See “6 3 2 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family environment”. 
208  S 4(2)(e) of the Adoption of Children Act. 
209  See “6 5 2 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the child”. 
210  Also see “7 4 2 2 Factors to be taken into account”. 
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• The Children’s Bill contains a list of factors that need to be taken into 
account to determine the best interests of the child.211 This list is generally 
welcomed. However, the inclusion of the child’s cultural identity212 as a 
factor to be taken into account to determine the best interests might be 
interpreted as an indication that intercultural adoption is not in the child’s 
best interests. This has to be criticised.  
 
• The financial ability of prospective adoptive parents to care for the child as 
a requirement of the Adoption of Children Act213 was criticised above.214 
Unfortunately this requirement has been retained in the Children’s Bill.215 
 
• In terms of section 7 of the Adoption of Children Act, the court may at the 
time of making an adoption order or at any time thereafter direct that a 
parent or guardian of the child shall have access to the child for a period 
not exceeding two years from the date of adoption.216 In line with the 
principles of adoption contact, the Children’s Bill provides that the court 
shall not make any order prohibiting an adopted child from maintaining 
contact with his/her biological parents, unless it would be in the best 
                                                 
211  Cl 7(1). 
212  Cl 7(1)(e). 
213  S 4(2)(b) of the Act. 
214  See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act”. 
215  Cl 117(2)(d). 
216  See “8 5 3 Open versus closed adoption”. 
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interests of the child to do so.217 This change is welcomed. Furthermore, 
the Bill provides that an adoptive parent has to give an undertaking, in 
writing, that he/she shall inform the child that the child is adopted, and of 
the whereabouts of the child’s biological or other parents, if they are still 
alive.218 This provision also embraces the principle of adoption contact. 
 
• In Botswana, adoption may take place either in terms of statute law or in 
terms of customary law.219 It is my opinion that it is not in the best interests 
of the child to retain such a dual system,220 but that there should be one 
system that caters for all people. In terms of clause 129 of the Children’s 
Bill, adoption in accordance with customary law of a child who is subject to 
customary law by a person who is also subject to customary law, is not 
affected by the Bill. It is unfortunate that the legislature retained this dual 
system of adoption. 
 
Even though there are still issues in the Bill which need attention, the Bill on the 
whole serves the best interests of the child in adoption better than the current 
Adoption of Children Act.  
 
 
 
                                                 
217  Cl 122. 
218  Cl 120. 
219  See “8 2 2 Adoption in terms of customary law” and “8 3 LEGISLATION”. 
220  See “8 2 2 Adoption in terms of customary law”, “8 7 CONCLUSION” and “9 CONCLUSION”. 
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8 7 CONCLUSION 
 
Adoption is a complicated matter as it is. As we have established, both in this 
chapter and in other chapters, there are numerous issues that have to be 
considered in any attempt to act in the best interests of the child in an adoption 
application and thereafter. Having a dual system of adoption does not make this 
task any easier. There is much disconnect between statutory law and the majority 
of the populace, whose living law is customary law.221 It might be time to 
reconsider and restructure adoption procedures so that there is a single adoption 
system that is acceptable for, and applicable to, all the peoples of Botswana.222 If 
this is not done, it might lead to neglect of the best interests of the child. 
                                                 
221  Tabengwa et al in Sloth-Nielsen & du Toit Trials & Tribulations 88. 
222  The Children’s Bill 2007 unfortunately retains this dual system. 
9 CONCLUSION 
 
 
9 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 420 
 
9 2 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD .............................................. 422 
  9 2 1 Introduction ............................................................................. 422 
 9 2 2 Growing up in a family environment .................................... 427 
 9 2 3 Attachment .............................................................................. 428 
 9 2 4 Financial circumstances of the parties ................................ 429 
 9 2 5 Consent of minor parent to adoption ................................... 431 
 9 2 6 Child’s consent to adoption .................................................. 432 
 9 2 7 Assessment and counselling ................................................ 434 
 9 2 8 Adoption contact .................................................................... 436 
 
9 3 CULTURE............................................................................................... 439 
  9 3 1 Introduction ............................................................................. 439 
 9 3 2 How important is culture in the adoption process? ........... 441 
 9 3 3 Least detrimental alternative?............................................... 443 
 9 3 4 Culture and the views of all parties ...................................... 445 
 9 3 5 Cultural awareness ................................................................. 446 
 
9 4 CUSTOMARY LAW AND ADOPTION .................................................. 450 
 
9 5 CONCLUSION........................................................................................ 454 
 
 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 420
9 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether adoption, specifically intercultural 
adoption, is in the best interests of the child. In my opinion, the research in the 
preceding chapters highlights six main considerations in this regard. 
 
• The best interests of the child are the most important issue in any matter 
concerning the child. This is in line with the Constitution,1 international 
instruments2 and the Children’s Act.3  
 
• It is in the best interests of the child to grow up in a family environment.4 
Adoption is a form of alternative care that provides a child with the 
opportunity to experience parental care and to benefit from growing up in 
a family environment.5  
 
• Attachment between a child and a parent-figure/caregiver is extremely 
important in a child’s life, and the younger the child is when such 
attachment is formed, the better it is for the child.6 Adoption can provide a 
                                                 
1  S 28(2). 
2  Art 3(1) of the Convention and art 4 of the Charter. 
3  S 9 of the Children’s Act of 2005. 
4  See “3 2 FAMILY CARE, PARENTAL CARE AND APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE CARE”. 
5  See “3 2 3 6 Alternative care and adoption”. 
6  See “4 3 ATTACHMENT”, specifically “3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?”. 
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child with the opportunity to experience parental care and the family 
environment, no matter what the age of the child when he/she is adopted.7  
 
• When an adoption is considered, race is not a factor that should play any 
role whatsoever, and culture should not be considered more important 
than any other relevant factor in the adoption process.8 Whether the 
adoption is within the child’s own race/culture or not, does not determine 
whether the adoption is in the child’s best interests.9 The entire issue of 
culture10 has to be judged in the context of the best interests of the child, 
viewed holistically.  
 
• An intercultural adoption is not only more in line with the best interests of 
the child than no adoption at all, but it is also preferable to an intercountry 
adoption. The domestic adoption of a child by suitable adoptive parents 
(whether of the same race or culture of the child or not) is generally 
preferable to intercountry adoption.11 
 
• A dual system of adoption, such as is found in South Africa and 
Botswana,12 is not in the best interests of the child. In the first place, the 
focus of the two systems in South Africa is different. Whereas the focus of 
                                                 
7  See “3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?”. 
8  Race and culture and their respective roles in the adoption process are discussed under “RACE 
VERSUS CULTURE”. 
9  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
10  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
11  See “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”. 
12  In both these countries statutory adoption and customary adoption co-exist. 
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customary adoption is the needs of the family head,13 the aim of statutory 
adoption is to act in the best interests of the child.14   
 
In light of the research done in the preceding chapters, I shall make certain 
recommendations to address the relevant issues and objections with regard to 
adoption in general, and specifically with regard to intercultural adoption.  
 
 
9 2 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 
9 2 1 Introduction 
 
The concept “best interests of the child” has been part of South African law 
relating to children for a long time.15 Over time, a shift has occurred in the focus 
of children’s interests. Whereas initially the focus in the parent-child relationship 
was on the rights of the parents, it later changed to emphasise the interests of 
the child. Instead of parental rights, parental responsibilities became important.16 
This shift confirms the paramountcy of the best interests of the child as provided 
for in the Constitution.17 
 
                                                 
13  See “6 8 CUSTOMARY LAW, ADOPTION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
14  See “4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”. 
15  See “4 2 1 Historical development and application in South Africa”. 
16  Van Heerden “Parental power” in Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 
657-658; Clark 2002 CILSA 216-219. 
17  S 28(2) of the Constitution. Also see “4 2 4 Primacy and paramountcy”. 
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The two major stumbling blocks in reaching a decision about a child’s best 
interests are the inability to predict the consequences of alternative outcomes, 
and the lack of consensus on what criteria to use to evaluate the alternatives.18 It 
is up to those responsible for decisions about children and their future to make a 
decision that, in their opinion, will be in the best interests of the child. A few 
general suggestions and remarks about the best interests of the child and 
adoption will be made, after which some specific recommendations will follow.  
 
• The best interests of the child, as provided for in section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, are always paramount when considering adoption. The focus 
must thus be on the needs of the child, not on the needs of the 
parent(s)/family. There are many factors that make up the best interests of 
the child. These factors have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
As is emphasised under “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered 
approach”,19 the best interests of the child demand that the views of all 
parties to the adoption process have to be considered before a decision 
could be made that will serve the best interests of the child. 
 
• Care must be taken not to over-emphasise one aspect of the child’s best 
interests at the expense of others. All relevant aspects/factors have to be 
                                                 
18  Clark 2000 Stell LR 18. 
19  See the discussion about the subjective approach versus the objective approach to determining the 
best interests of the child under “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach”. 
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considered to determine the best interests of the child in an adoption.20 
The best interests of the child thus have to be viewed holistically. A 
hierarchy of factors should never be created.  
 
• Section 7 of the Children’s Act of 2005 has gone a long way to assist with 
the determination of the best interests of the child, by providing a list of 14 
factors that have to be considered when determining the best interests of 
the child.21 Unfortunately, this list makes no provision for any factors other 
than those specifically mentioned in the list to be considered to determine 
the best interests of the child. I believe that the way in which the list is 
compiled22 could be detrimental to the best interests of the child. Even 
though Davel has a valid, realistic suggestion to overcome this problem,23 
it is hoped that the legislature will soon realise that there can never be an 
all-encompassing list that makes provision for all factors that could 
determine the best interests of the child, and amend the section to include 
as part of section 7 the possibility that the court may consider any factor 
which may in the specific adoption be relevant to determine the best 
interests of the child. 
 
                                                 
20  In the New Zealand case B v G [2002] NZFLR 961 it was held that the court is not limited in its 
consideration of matters that can be taken into account to determine the welfare and interests of 
the child. 
21  See “6 3 3 1 General”. 
22  In other words, the list is not open-ended. 
23  See “6 3 3 1 General”. 
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• A trained social worker should be part of the adoption process, from the 
time the child is considered for an adoption until the adoption has been 
finalised and even thereafter. Training of those responsible for placements 
in the adoption process is essential. The only way to ensure the 
placement of a child with suitable adoptive parents is, I believe, to provide 
extensive, organised training to the persons responsible for these 
placements, so as to improve cultural awareness and sensitivity, but 
certainly not by limiting the options available to children in need of care to 
become part of a family. Even though placing more financial 
responsibilities on the government in the adoption process is probably an 
important concern, I believe that the necessary training could be given to 
the social workers who are involved in the adoption process by the South 
African Council for Child Welfare. 
 
The properly trained social worker who will be able to make a huge 
contribution to a successful adoption by doing everything possible to 
ensure that an adoption is in the best interests of the child, is a vital part of 
the adoption process. He/she has to assess and counsel all parties to an 
adoption about the decision to make the child available for adoption,24 
monitor the adoption process,25 and determine whether the child in the 
adoption process is of an age and maturity to be able to give consent to 
                                                 
24  See “6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family environment”. Also see “9 2 7 
Assessment and counselling”. 
25  See “6 2 3 The Children’s Act and growing up in a family environment”. 
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an adoption.26 The social worker furthermore has to assist with contact 
between the child and his/her biological parents/family.27 In this regard 
post-adoption agreements could play an important role,28 and the social 
worker has to assist parties with these post-adoption agreements and 
counsel them on the implications of such agreements.29 
 
To be able to properly fulfil his/her role, the social worker should have 
knowledge of the background, biological culture and circumstances of the 
specific child. He/she needs to have a clear understanding of all the 
issues involved in an adoption.  
 
Wait suggests that a team approach must be adopted and that the social 
worker should work closely with a clinical psychologist in permanency 
planning with regard to children, because children who are neglected, 
abused, etcetera, often experience not only social problems but also 
psychological problems.30 Although the principle of involving a 
psychologist in the adoption process is supported, the reality is that there 
are probably not enough financial resources available in South Africa to 
follow this route for every adoption. Only when there are definite 
psychological problems should a psychologist be involved. In the majority 
of cases the presence and involvement of a trained social worker in the 
                                                 
26  See “6 5 2 The consent of the child”. Also see “9 2 6 Child’s consent to adoption”. 
27  See “4 4 2 2 Benefits of open adoption”. 
28  See “9 2 8 Adoption contact”. 
29  See “6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements”. 
30  Wait 1989 Welfare Focus 53. 
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adoption process should be sufficient to protect the best interests of the 
child. 
 
9 2 2 Growing up in a family environment 
 
Every child has the right to “family care or parental care, or to appropriate 
alternative care when removed from the family environment”.31 The benefit for a 
child of growing up in a family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love 
and understanding,32 and experiencing parental care, is emphasised throughout 
this thesis. There can be no doubt about the importance of providing a child with 
a family environment,33 even at the expense of the child’s biological culture.34 
The opportunity for a child of growing up in a family environment and 
experiencing parental care can be provided through adoption.35 Adoption, 
including intercultural adoption, is preferable to keeping a child in an institution.36 
A similar argument was made by the New Zealand Law Commission that looked 
into the necessity or not of reviewing their adoption legislation.37  
 
The following recommendations are made:  
 
                                                 
31  S 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
32  Preamble of the Children’s Act of 2005. 
33  This is established in “3 THE CHILD AND THE FAMILY”. 
34  See “5 5 4 Conclusion”. 
35  See “3 2 3 Appropriate alternative care”. 
36  See “5 4 3 4 The child’s competing rights” and “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”. 
37  See “7 5 2 Reform proposals”. 
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• The benefit for a child of growing up in a family environment and 
experiencing parental care must not be underestimated. Every effort has 
to be made to allow a child to experience family life. 
 
• Cultural differences must not stand in the way of the adoption of a child. 
Culture usually has to be subordinate to the benefit that the child obtains 
by growing up in a family environment.38 
 
9 2 3 Attachment 
 
A child who has formed an attachment with another person feels secure.39 The 
younger the child is when he/she is adopted, the easier it will be for the child to 
form an attachment with the adoptive parent and the better the child will adapt.40 I 
have the following suggestions:  
 
• An adoption may under no circumstances be delayed for any reason 
other than that the best interests of the child require the adoption not to 
proceed. Aldridge41 says that the responsibility of those involved in the 
adoption process is to make sure that the child is placed speedily with the 
most appropriate family available — a process that demands open minds 
                                                 
38  There may be cases where culture has to be considered. See “9 3 4 Culture and the views of the 
parties”. 
39  See “3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?”. 
40  See “3 3 2 3 When are attachments formed?”. 
41  Aldridge in Gaber & Aldridge In the Best Interests of the Child 200. 
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to ensure an open door to the child’s future. I definitely agree with this 
point of view.  
 
• Because it is in the best interests of the child to form attachments as early 
as possible, it serves the best interests of the child better to be adopted 
interculturally than to be kept in an institution (or on the streets) until 
suitable same-race adoptive parents are available to adopt him/her. 
 
9 2 4 Financial circumstances of the parties 
 
The Children’s Act of 2005 has done away with the financial ability of an 
applicant to an adoption as a requirement before an adoption order may be 
granted,42 and now provides for means-tested social assistance for adoptive 
parents where applicable.43 The removal of the financial circumstances of the 
prospective adoptive parent(s) as a requirement is supported, but the reality is 
that a child has certain needs, both physical and psychological, that have to be 
met if the best interests of the child are to be served.44 If the needs of the child 
are not taken into account, it may be detrimental to the best interests of the child. 
The child needs to be fed, clothed and educated, and might even need 
counselling related to the adoption, especially if the adoption is an intercultural 
                                                 
42  In terms of s 231(2)(b) of the Children’s Act of 2005, the financial ability of a prospective 
adoptive parent is no longer relevant, and in terms of s 231(4) of the Act a person may not be 
disqualified from adopting a child by virtue of his or her financial status. 
43  S 231(5). Although an adoption grant was considered during the preliminary stages of the 
Children’s Act of 2005, such a grant did not materialise – see “6 4 2 2 The Children’s Act and the 
financial means of the applicant(s)”. 
44  See “6 4 2 2 The Children’s Act and the financial means of the applicant(s)”. 
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one where the child has to deal with issues such as a different culture and maybe 
parents of a different race to him/herself.45 The child also needs to maintain 
contact with his/her biological parents/family where contact is in the best interests 
of the child. Such contact also frequently has financial implications, and financial 
constraints could restrict options for contact. Where, for example, there is no 
money for a train journey, there is no money to purchase a computer for e-
mailing or no money to make a telephone call, contact between the child and the 
biological parents/family may be a problem. 
 
Because so many people in South Africa are poor, government assistance where 
an adoption has taken place may be crucial. Section 231(5) of the Children’s Act 
of 2005 makes provision for financial assistance by the government for a person 
who adopts a child. How this assistance will be applied though is not clear at this 
stage,46 and whether the government will be able to afford such financial 
assistance, is also unsure. I have the following suggestion: 
 
• Government assistance to provide for the basic physical and possibly 
psychological needs of the child for some adoptive families will be 
essential, but such assistance does not have to be in the form of money. 
In fact, it is suggested that assistance should preferably not be in the form 
of money. If money is given, the system might be abused and the money 
might be applied for things other than the best interests of the child. It is 
                                                 
45  Counselling will be discussed under the next heading. 
46  See “6 4 2 2 The Children’s Act and the financial means of the applicant(s)”. 
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suggested that government assistance to the adoptive parents should be 
in the form of free services, such as free medical services and free 
education, as well as vouchers/coupons, such as food vouchers and 
transport vouchers. The assistance to the biological parents/family should 
be in the form of free telephone calls, free transport for biological parents 
and children to visit each other, free postage, contact by social workers to 
obtain and/or deliver photographs, letters, gifts, etcetera. Of course strict 
control will be important to avoid abuse of the system.47 
 
9 2 5 Consent of minor parent to adoption 
 
In terms of section 233(1)(a) of the Children’s Act of 2005 the minor parent of a 
child who is to be adopted has to be assisted by his/her guardian before consent 
may be given by such a parent to the adoption.48 However, the Act does not 
make provision for circumstances where such assistance by the guardian may be 
dispensed with because the assistance is not possible or appropriate. This 
situation could be detrimental to the best interests of the child. If it is in the best 
interests of a child to be adopted, but it is not possible for the minor biological 
parent to obtain the assistance of his/her guardian to give consent to such an 
adoption, the adoption cannot proceed. If that happens, the best interests of the 
child may clearly suffer. The reality is that there are circumstances where the 
assistance of the guardian needs to be dispensed with and, in my opinion, 
                                                 
47  This is also discussed under “4 4 2 2 Benefits of adoption contact”. 
48  See “6 5 1 2 The Children’s Act and the consent of the parent”. 
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section 233(1)(a) should be amended to make provision for such a situation by 
providing as follows: 
 
• A child may be adopted only if consent has been given by each parent of 
the child, regardless of whether the parent is a minor or not, provided that 
if the parent is a minor, that parent is assisted by his/her guardian, or, 
where such assistance is not possible or not appropriate, he/she is 
counselled by the trained adoption social worker about, and understands 
the implications of, consent in the specific circumstances. 
 
9 2 6 Child’s consent to adoption 
 
Section 233(1)(c) of the Children’s Act of 2005 provides for child participation in 
the adoption process. It requires the consent of a child over the age of ten years 
to an adoption, and the consent of a child under the age of ten years who is of an 
age, maturity and stage of development to understand the implications of such 
consent, failing which the adoption may not proceed.49 The involvement of the 
child in the adoption process is supported and is clearly in the child’s best 
interests, but it is my opinion that the section as it currently reads is not in the 
best interests of the child. The following suggestions are made: 
 
• Consent of a child to an adoption should not be linked to a specific age 
per se, but rather to age, together with maturity and stage of development. 
                                                 
49  See “6 5 The consent of the child”. 
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The draft Children’s Bill of Botswana recognises the fact that consent by a 
child to an adoption should not be linked to a specific age, but rather to a 
combination of the child’s age, maturity and stage of development.50 This 
will ensure that the consent of the child is meaningful, and further that an 
adoption may proceed even where consent of the child is not possible or 
not appropriate.  
 
• The Children’s Act of 2005 should provide for circumstances where the 
consent of the child may be dispensed with, even if he/she is of an age, 
maturity and stage of development to understand the implications of such 
consent. 
 
• The trained adoption social worker should ensure that the child 
understands the meaning of giving consent to the specific adoption, and 
not just to adoption in general. This is particularly important where the 
adoption is intercultural, as such an adoption has added dimensions, such 
as the exposure of the child to a different culture than his/her biological 
culture, and even possibly the exposure of the child to parents of a 
different race to the child. Although I have argued that race should not be 
an issue when an adoption is considered,51 it is necessary that the child 
understands that any racial difference between him/her and the adoptive 
parents could have other implications, such as cultural differences. 
                                                 
50  See “8 6 2 Reform proposals”. 
51  See “5 RACE VERSUS CULTURE”. 
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9 2 7 Assessment and counselling 
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that adoption provides a child with the 
opportunity to experience parental care and to grow up in a family environment, 
which is in the best interests of the child. A key element of successful adoption 
though, is the assessment and counselling of all parties involved in the adoption 
process.52 Assessment and counselling will prepare them for the adoption and 
also help them with and through the entire process. It is important that all parties 
to the adoption are realistic about what the specific adoption entails and how it 
will impact on the lives of all concerned. If the adoption is intercultural, this 
assessment and counselling becomes even more important, as the parties need 
to understand that the difference in culture (and maybe even race) adds a further 
dimension to the adoption, with which they have to be able to deal.53 My 
recommendations are as follows: 
 
• Before an adoption is considered at all, it is important that all the parties to 
the process, in other words the child, the biological parents and the 
prospective adoptive parents, are assessed. The aim of this assessment 
should be to determine whether all the parties are suitable candidates and 
understand the impact and consequences of an adoption on them and on 
                                                 
52  Counselling links up with the suggestion made above, under “9 2 4 Financial circumstances of the 
parties”. In New Zealand the Law Commission also emphasised the need for assessment and 
counselling in the adoption process. 
53  Throughout the Children’s Act, provision is made for assessment and counselling in the adoption 
process. 
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the other parties to the adoption process. If the adoption is intercultural, it 
has to be established whether the parties are prepared for the additional 
issues that may result, such as the responsibility of the adoptive parents to 
educate the child about his/her biological culture. If the assessment is 
done properly, it could to a large extent exclude problems that could arise 
as a result of ignorance and misconceptions of the parties to the adoption. 
The trained social worker has to be tasked with this responsibility. 
 
• Once the assessment of the parties to the adoption has been completed 
successfully, the adoption process can begin. Counselling of the biological 
parents/family, prospective adoptive parents and the child involved in the 
adoption process by the social worker has to be done before, during and 
after the adoption process and needs to carry on for as long as the 
situation and circumstances and the best interests of the particular child 
require the counselling to continue. The New Zealand Law Commission54 
proposed mandatory pre-adoption counselling and post-adoption 
counselling. This recommendation is strongly supported. 
 
• If the adoption is intercultural, the counselor needs to pay specific 
attention to this fact and prepare all parties for the consequences and 
impact of such an adoption. Government assistance in this process will 
                                                 
54  See NZLC Report 65, as discussed under “7 5 2 Reform proposals”. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 436
often be indispensable, and, where needed, such counselling has to be 
provided by the government free of charge.55  
 
• Where possible, the social worker should have a similar cultural 
background to the child involved in the process. This recommendation by 
the New Zealand Law Commission with regard to possible amendments to 
their adoption legislation is supported.56  
 
9 2 8 Adoption contact 
 
When a child is adopted, a whole “new” set of relatives is added to his/her life. An 
adopted child will always have two sets of parents/family, the biological 
parents/family and the adoptive parents/family. It is important that both sides 
understand that they are not competitors. They have to realise that the role of 
both is to act in the best interests of the child, but they also have to know that the 
relationships of the adopted child with both these sets of parents/family are not 
the same. Where the child is adopted, the adoptive parents have the 
responsibility of raising the child to the best of their ability. The biological 
parents/family have a different responsibility towards the child. In my opinion they 
have the duty to maintain contact with the child and keep him/her informed of 
his/her biological background and culture. The relationship between all three 
                                                 
55  The NZLC Report 65 also made the recommendation that counselling services should be state 
funded – see “7 5 2 Reform proposals”. Also see “9 2 4 Financial circumstances of the parties”, 
where government assistance is discussed. 
56  See NZLC Report 65, as discussed under “7 5 2 Reform proposals”. 
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parties needs to be monitored carefully. The following suggestions could assist in 
this regard: 
 
• The child, the adoptive parents and the biological parents/family need to 
be prepared for the adoption. They should be informed of the implications 
and consequences of adoption in general, and should also be educated 
about the need for contact between the child and the biological 
parents/family after the adoption. Contact between the child and the 
biological parents/family is in the best interests of the adopted child.57 The 
importance of contact between the adopted child and his/her biological 
family is emphasised in the CYPF Act of New Zealand.58 Although South 
Africa does not have similar legislation, it does not detract from the 
importance of this contact. Where a biological parent is secure in the 
knowledge that he/she could still be a part of the child’s life, he/she may 
also find it easier to come to terms with and consent to an adoption that 
will be in the best interests of the child.  
 
• Post-adoption agreements, which are provided for in the Children’s Act of 
2005,59 could play an important part in adoption contact. Where a post-
adoption agreement is entered into by the parties to an adoption, assisted 
by the trained social worker, the interests of all the parties to the adoption 
                                                 
57  See “4 4 2 Open adoption”. Of course there are cases where such contact is not in the best interests 
of the child. 
58  See “7 2 6 Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 24 of 1989”. 
59  S 234. Such an agreement may be especially useful where the adoption is intercultural.  
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can be protected, and the adoption social worker can ensure that any 
contact between the child and his/her biological parents/family is in the 
best interests of the child.60 In New Zealand adoption contact also exists. 
The difference there is that this contact, known as a contact agreement, is 
not controlled by legislation, but is a choice between all relevant parties to 
the adoption. The consequence of this is that it is very hard to protect the 
interests of the parties to an adoption if there is no legislative control.61 
The inclusion of adoption contact in the Children’s Act of 2005 is 
supported, but I do have reservations about the use of post-adoption 
contact agreements. There should be no pressure on any party to an 
adoption to enter into a post-adoption agreement. These agreements are 
not compulsory in terms of the Children’s Act of 2005, and no party to an 
adoption should be allowed to abuse post-adoption agreements. The 
adoption social worker has to ensure that any party entering into a post-
adoption agreement does so because he/she believes it is in the best 
interests of the child, not for any other reason or because he/she feels 
pressured into it.62 
 
• In New Zealand the child usually participates in making decisions about 
the type and frequency of contact as he/she grows older.63 This is 
something that should be considered in South Africa, but obviously subject 
                                                 
60  See “6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements”.  
61  See “7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption”. 
62  See “6 6 3 Post-adoption agreements”, where I air my views about possible pressure for a party to 
an adoption to enter into such an agreement. 
63  See “7 4 3 Open versus closed adoption”. 
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to the input and control of the social worker, who has to counsel the child 
in this regard.  
 
• In customary adoption there is usually ongoing contact between the 
adopted child and the biological parents/family. This is similar to the 
situation in New Zealand64 and Botswana.65 The principles of customary 
adoption could be applied to aid with contact that is in the best interests of 
the child. I do believe, though, that there should be more control with 
regard to contact between the child and the adoptive parents, which is 
why the role of the social worker is so important. 
 
 
9 3 CULTURE 
 
9 3 1 Introduction 
 
The first point that should be made is that race and culture are not the same, as 
already indicated.66 Furthermore, it is important to emphasise again that race is 
irrelevant when a decision about the best interests of the child and a possible 
adoption has to be made. Race as a factor in an adoption was removed when 
section 40(b) of the Child Care Act was repealed in 1991.67 
                                                 
64  See “7 2 5 Adoption Act 93 of 1955”. 
65  See “8 2 2 Adoption in terms of customary law”. 
66  See “5 3 RACE AND CULTURE — IS THERE A DIFFERENCE?”. 
67  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
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Although intercultural adoption is not prohibited by law, legislation dealing with 
adoption does put some emphasis on culture in the adoption process,68 and 
there has been much debate about the desirability or not of intercultural 
adoption.69 Adoption legislation in Botswana contains no reference to culture, 
with the result that culture is not elevated above any of the other factors that are 
relevant in an adoption.70 The point is that the best interests of the child demand 
that a child should have the opportunity of being adopted by any suitable 
parents and that culture on its own, although important to the child, should never 
stand in the way of an adoption that is in the best interests of the child.  
 
Culture is part of who we are. This is true for all people. However, it is not always 
easy to determine to which culture the child belongs. The parents of the child 
may not necessarily share the same cultural background. Furthermore, it is my 
belief that, in time, the role of culture in our lives will become less significant. I am 
not trying to deny the importance of culture, but I believe that the divisions 
between different cultures over time will become blurred and as a result culture 
will become less defined. This, in my opinion, will happen because of various 
factors, such as people of different cultures living in the same areas and 
                                                 
68  See “6 7 CULTURAL ASPECTS”, where the role of culture in adoption legislation is pointed out. 
69  Intercultural adoption is usually also interracial. Interracial adoption is also not prohibited by law, 
but it has to be emphasised again that race is not the issue. See “5 6 2 Arguments against 
intercultural adoption” and “5 6 3 Arguments in favour of intercultural adoption”. 
70  See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act” and “8 4 2 Culture and statutory adoption”. 
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attending the same schools, marriage between people from different cultural 
backgrounds, world travel, etcetera.71 
 
9 3 2 How important is culture in the adoption process? 
 
Even though I recognise the value of culture, and even though it should be 
considered as a factor in respect of the best interests of the child viewed 
holistically, culture is not more important than any other factor that determines 
the best interests of the child and should not be emphasised more than, or at the 
expense of, the other factors.72 It has to be balanced with all other relevant 
factors.73 A child’s cultural background should not stand in the way of his/her best 
interests. Just because a child is born as a member of a specific culture, it does 
not mean the child “belongs” to that group of society, or that he/she will 
necessarily remain part of that culture. As the child grows up he/she may form 
ties with another culture altogether. The importance of culture cannot be denied, 
but should also not be over-emphasised. There are various factors that are 
relevant with regard to the best interests of a child in the adoption process. 
Culture is one of them. With regard to the role of culture in the adoption process, 
I have the following suggestions: 
 
                                                 
71  See “5 7 CONCLUSION”. A similar situation is found in New Zealand, where inter-marriage of 
Maoris and Pakeha happens on a large scale. 
72  A similar conclusion has been reached by the courts in New Zealand – see “7 3 RACE AND 
CULTURE IN NEW ZEALAND ADOPTION LAW”. 
73  This argument finds support in New Zealand legislation – see “7 4 2 2 Factors to be taken into 
account”. 
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• Creating a hierarchy of factors that are important for the child in the 
adoption process, as is suggested by specifically mentioning culture and 
religion in the adoption process,74 creates the impression that religion and 
culture deserve more emphasis than other factors in the adoption process. 
Here the South African legislature can learn from adoption legislation in 
Botswana, where no reference is made to culture at all.75 Section 
240(1)(a) of the Children’s Act of 2005, which highlights religion and 
culture in the adoption process, should be amended, as it would be more 
in line with the best interests of the child in the adoption process if section 
240(1)(a) stated that the court, when considering an application for the 
adoption of a child, must take into account all relevant factors, without 
specifically emphasising any one particular factor. 
 
Although culture on its own may not be considered more important than other 
issues which make up the best interests of the child, I pointed out in a 
previous chapter76 that it is my opinion that if there are suitable same-culture 
adoptive parents available to adopt the child, these parents should receive 
preference over suitable adoptive parents of a different culture to the child 
when a decision has to be made about the adoption of the child.77 This mild 
                                                 
74  In terms of s 240(1)(a) of the Children’s Act of 2005 the court, when considering an application 
for the adoption of a child, has to take into account all relevant factors, including religious and 
cultural background. See “6 7 2 The Children’s Act, adoption and culture”. 
75  See “8 3 2 Adoption of Children Act” and “8 4 2 Culture and statutory adoption”. 
76  See “5 3 2 Making a distinction”. 
77  The Law Commission in New Zealand which was tasked with reviewing the legal framework for 
adoption and recommending whether it should be modified, similarly recommended that, where 
practicable, a child should be placed within a family of the same culture as the child – see 7 5 2 
Reform proposals”. 
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preference, if applied properly, might be in the child’s best interests. Care 
should be taken though to ensure that it does not lead to culture matching or, 
even worse, race matching, at the expense of the best interests of the child.  
 
9 3 3 Least detrimental alternative? 
 
The standard of the best interests of the child is firmly rooted in our law. This 
standard has been applied for a long time, and there are various manifestations 
of it. Goldstein et al believe that “the least detrimental available alternative for 
safeguarding the child’s growth and development” should be the standard used 
to determine placements of children, instead of the best interests of the child.78 
They argue that the child is already a victim of his/her environmental 
circumstances, is greatly at risk and that speedy action is necessary to avoid 
further harm being done to his/her chances of healthy psychological 
development.79 Zaal has a similar view.80 He believes that interracial adoption81 
is often “the least detrimental alternative” that is available and the only alternative 
to long-term institutionalisation, even if such placement is not ideal. I have 
explained that interracial adoption and intercultural adoption are closely linked. 
An intercultural adoption is often also interracial, and an interracial adoption is 
usually also intercultural. As a result, it makes sense that Zaal’s view about 
interracial adoption may also be applied to intercultural adoption. I agree with 
                                                 
78  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 53-64. Also see the discussion under “5 6 3 1 Cultural 
issues as a factor”. 
79  Goldstein et al Beyond the Best Interests 54.  
80  Zaal 1992 Journal of SA Studies 403. 
81  This is usually also intercultural. 
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Zaal’s statement, and I believe that an intercultural adoption, even when it is not 
necessarily the ideal solution, may actually be more beneficial to the child than 
no adoption, which might leave the child entirely without the opportunity to 
experience parental care or a family environment. In this regard, the statement 
by the New Zealand court in Hamlin v Rutherford,82 where it was said the 
undoubted, but uncertain, future advantages to a child of having access to her 
cultural heritage could not be allowed to predominate over her immediate 
security which is served best by her being adopted, is relevant. However, the use 
of the term “least detrimental alternative” to my mind suggests that the option of 
an intercultural adoption is detrimental to the child. I have the following 
suggestion instead: 
 
• When an intercultural adoption is considered, the point of departure 
should not be what the least detrimental alternative is, but rather what the 
best alternative is under the specific circumstances. Making the mind shift 
from “least detrimental” to “best under the circumstances” means that the 
decision-maker focuses on the positives rather than on the negatives of 
the situation. This, I believe, is more in line with the best interests of the 
child. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82  (1989) 5 NZFLR 426 at 433. 
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9 3 4 Culture and the views of all parties 
 
The equality clause in the Constitution83 stresses the importance of equal 
protection and benefit of the law. This means that all parties to an adoption have 
to be treated the same, and that all prospective adoptive parents have to be 
treated equally and screened in the same manner. Failure to do so would be 
unconstitutional. The Constitution further demands that the state may not 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on the grounds of inter alia race, 
culture or ethnic origin.84 Discrimination based on race, culture or ethnic origin is 
presumed to be unfair. There must thus be no unjustified differentiation between 
different racial groups with regard to adoption procedures, etcetera. Having said 
that, it is of the utmost importance though that the viewpoints and beliefs of all 
the parties to an adoption regarding intercultural adoption are taken into account. 
With regard to the viewpoints of the parties involved in the adoption process, the 
following is suggested: 
 
• The viewpoints of the biological parents/family with regard to the role of 
culture in the adoption process have to be considered. The preference of 
the biological parents regarding an intra- or intercultural adoption is also a 
factor that is relevant, just like all other relevant factors.85 The CYPF Act of 
New Zealand warns against taking too much account of the views of the 
biological family, as this can lead to attention being focused on the needs 
                                                 
83  S 9 of the Constitution.  
84  See “5 4 1 3 Culture and equality”. 
85  Also see “5 6 3 1 Cultural issues as a factor”. 
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and wishes of the adults instead of the needs and wishes of the child.86 
This is an important warning, as neither the preferences of the biological 
parents/family nor the viewpoints of the biological parents/family should be 
given more weight than other relevant factors.  
 
• An intercultural adoption that would, ordinarily, be in the best interests of 
the child may under no circumstances take place if the child or the 
prospective adoptive parent is not willing to accept such intercultural 
adoption. Counselling might resolve any ambivalent feelings but, if not, 
such an adoption would not be in the best interests of the child because 
both the child and the adoptive parent have to be comfortable with an 
intercultural adoption. 
 
9 3 5 Cultural awareness 
 
Simon and Altstein87 come to the conclusion that interracially adopted children 
(which of course include interculturally adopted children) feel loved, secure, 
committed to their adopted families and comfortable with their racial/ethnic 
identities. They add, however, that love is not enough, in other words the families 
have to adjust and expand their lifestyles to include learning about and making 
contact with their adoptive children’s cultural and racial/ethnic history and 
heritage, in order to rear emotionally healthy, stable and secure children. The 
                                                 
86  See “7 2 6 Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 24 of 1989”. 
87  Simon & Altstein Adoption across Borders 141. 
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adoptive parents have to make any and all attempts for the child to have 
knowledge of and exposure to his/her biological culture. The following 
suggestions should be helpful with regard to the maintenance of the child’s 
biological culture:  
 
• The adoptive parents should be honest about the biological culture of the 
child and discuss it openly. 
 
• The nonverbal messages that are sent out by the adoptive parents are 
extremely important. Parents thus have to go beyond their comfort zone to 
create intercultural relationships within their community and form 
friendships with people from the same cultural background as the child. 
This also includes maintaining ongoing contact with the biological 
parents/family.88 Where the parents are comfortable with the child’s 
biological background and includes it as part of their everyday life, I 
believe that the child will also be comfortable with the situation and the 
fact that he/she has more than one culture. 
 
• The child should attend a culturally integrated school. Even if no one from 
that school has a culture similar to the child’s biological culture, being 
exposed to an environment where different cultures coexist, will help the 
child to understand such a situation and deal with it better at home. 
                                                 
88  Ramos Children’s home society at 
www.chswpirc.org/scripts/northwest/paper/article.asp?articleID=354. Also see “9 2 8 Adoption 
contact”. 
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• The child should read literature relating to his/her biological culture or, if 
he/she is too young, the adoptive parent should read literature to him/her 
or tell him/her stories about his/her biological culture. 
 
• The family should reside in an environment where the adopted child has 
contact with people from his/her biological culture or where he/she is 
exposed to aspects of his/her biological culture.89  
 
• The focus on the biological culture of the child should be for the benefit of 
the child as well as for the benefit of the family. If cultural education is 
focused on the child alone, it may actually have a negative effect, as the 
child may feel different, but if all family members receive an education in 
the culture of the adopted child’s biological parent(s)/family, the child feels 
part of the family.90 I consider this recommendation to be very important. 
The child is part of the adoptive family and will feel part of the family if 
he/she is not treated differently, as will be the case if cultural education is 
only provided to him/her. The family has to learn the language of the 
child’s biological parents/family and ensure that the child learns the 
language. They should also do research about his/her heritage.  
 
                                                 
89  Garrett Adoptive parents magazine at www.nysccc.org/T-Rarts/Articles/commonmistakes.htm 
suggests that the family should be bicultural and practice some of the child’s heritage. 
90  Garrett Adoptive parents magazine at www.nysccc.org/T-Rarts/Articles/commonmistakes.htm. 
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• Parents must balance their acknowledgement of the differences between 
them and the child with their recognition of similarities.91 This, I believe, is 
an important point that is often overlooked, and is very valuable with 
regard to culture. There are many values that are important for everyone, 
regardless of their cultural background. Examples are integrity, family 
values, and respect. There are also specific issues which could be 
focused on, such as a common interest in sport or religion.92 Garrett says, 
quite correctly, that bonding between a parent and a child is reinforced by 
similarities.93 
 
• The adoptive parents should seek out activities for the child that represent 
his/her biological culture, such as sport or music where other members of 
the child’s biological cultural group participate. A good suggestion by 
Ramos is to offer culture camps to prospective adoptive parents. She 
does warn though, that these camps on their own are not enough for 
identity development.94 In my opinion, one of the best ways to learn about 
something is by making the process fun. If the child shows an interest in a 
specific activity, his/her exposure to persons with a similar or the same 
cultural background as his/her own biological culture in such an 
environment is advised.  
 
                                                 
91  Garrett Adoptive parents magazine at www.nysccc.org/T-Rarts/Articles/commonmistakes.htm. 
92  This recommendation also links up with the next suggestion. 
93  Garrett Adoptive parents magazine at www.nysccc.org/T-Rarts/Articles/commonmistakes.htm. 
94 Ramos Children’s home society at 
www.chswpirc.org/scripts/northwest/paper/article.asp?articleID=354. 
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• My view is that it is often the prejudices of people that cause problems 
with intercultural adoption, and that the general public needs to be 
educated in this regard.95 Ultimately, any decision about the desirability or 
not of an intercultural adoption has to be made with the best interests of 
the child in mind. A campaign should be launched to eliminate social 
prejudices, and to make people more aware of intercultural adoption. 
Although the following statement relates to interracial adoption, I believe it 
applies equally to intercultural adoption: 
 
The debates around transracial and ‘same-race’ placements will continue as long 
as society remains racially divided. The importance of security, stability and 
psychological well-being of children must be given precedence over political and 
ideological thinking about the best way to achieve racial harmony in society.96 
 
 
9 4 CUSTOMARY LAW AND ADOPTION 
 
Statutory adoption and adoption in customary law are not the same thing. The 
aim of customary adoption97 is different to that of statutory adoption,98 but the 
reality is that the two systems of adoption co-exist in South Africa.  
 
                                                 
95  See “5 6 2 Arguments against intercultural adoption”. 
96  Barn in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 123. 
97  To provide a man with an heir. 
98  To serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with a loving, suitable family. 
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Bennett believes, and I agree with him, that the institution of an heir by a family 
head who has no male progeny of his own, as is found in customary law, is not 
conceived to be in the best interests of the child,99 and that this system must be 
adapted to put the child’s interests first.100 Adoption in customary law is adult-
centered.101 The aim is to provide a man with an heir, and it is irrelevant in this 
process whether the child has biological parents who are suitable to raise 
him/her. In my opinion, it is not in the best interests of a child to be adopted 
where he/she has biological parents, unless there is a valid reason why those 
biological parents should not raise him/her, such as abuse or abandonment.102  
 
The reality is that customary law is a very important part of the South African 
culture. In fact, in South Africa, the majority of people are subject to customary 
law.103 The problem is that the statutory system of adoption and customary 
adoption are too far apart. The two systems should be brought together in a 
                                                 
99  Bennett actually believes that this practice is not adoption at all. 
100  Bennett Human Rights 107. Customary law, also called “living” law, is not a fixed body of 
formally classified and easily ascertainable rules —Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 
2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 479. It is thus not always easy to establish — Shilubana v Nwamitwa 
2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) at 81 (also reported in 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC)). What makes it difficult to 
know what customary law is, is that it evolves and develops to meet the changing needs of the 
community — Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 479-480; 
Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) at 81 (also reported in 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC)). 
There are various sources of authority that show us that customary law needs to be adapted to put 
the child’s needs first. They are the Child Care Act, the Convention, public policy, the 
Constitution and the Children’s Act of 2005. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
(Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 954 (also reported in 
2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC)) the court held that s 39(2) of the Constitution imposes an obligation on 
courts to consider whether there is a need to develop the common law to bring it in line with the 
Constitution and to develop it if so. In Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) at 82 (also 
reported in 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC)) Judge Van der Westhuizen held that the same is true of 
customary law. 
101  See “4 2 6 Parent-centered versus child-centered approach”. Also see “8 2 2 Adoption in terms of 
customary law”. 
102  Also see the discussion under “4 4 1 Introduction”, specifically n 262. 
103  In New Zealand, where a similar dual system of legislation and customary law, exists, Maoris are 
in the minority. 
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relationship of equality through a process of harmonisation, accommodating the 
needs of all sectors of society.104 Customary adoption does not form a central 
part of the research for this thesis, so my remarks/suggestions are limited to the 
following: 
 
• There should be only one adoption procedure that is valid and acceptable 
to all who live in South Africa. The most important issue is that such 
procedure should have as a point of departure the best interests of the 
child. In other words, the legislature needs to take into account the 
circumstances and culture of all people and combine these to find a 
procedure that will be acceptable to all peoples in South Africa. What I am 
advocating is that the legislature should attempt to find the positives in 
both systems and apply those to adoption. This idea might be criticised as 
resulting in a situation where one group of people will have to give up far 
more of their cultural heritage than the other. In New Zealand it was 
argued that the passing of legislation which resulted in a single system 
regulating adoption in New Zealand created much greater changes for 
Maoris than for Pakeha.105 The problem with the Adoption Act of 1955 is 
that it is not sensitive to all peoples in New Zealand. South Africa should 
learn from the New Zealand experiences and take care that such a 
situation does not occur in South Africa. The legislature has to ensure that 
                                                 
104  Van Niekerk in Bekker et al Legal Pluralism 14. 
105  See “7 2 4 Maori Land Act 15 of 1909 and the Maori Affairs Act 94 of 1953” and “7 2 5 Adoption 
Act 93 of 1955”. 
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any uniform system of adoption takes into account the positive aspects of 
all cultures.106  
 
• In my opinion, one system does not have to replace the other. The aim of 
customary adoption, as we have established, is different to that of 
statutory adoption. Statutory adoption, which is aimed at serving the best 
interests of the child, should be retained, with those customary adoption 
practices that could enhance the best interest of the child being included 
to make statutory adoption more in line with customary law principles. On 
the other hand customary adoption, which is aimed at serving the needs of 
adults whereby a child is “adopted” to provide a man with an heir could 
continue, not as adoption, but rather in some other form.107 In customary 
law in Botswana, a similar system exists where children are sent to live 
with a relative, but the biological parents remain the guardians of the child. 
In respect of Botswana I make the suggestion that this situation should not 
be referred to as adoption, but rather as some form of foster care.108 The 
value of the relationship that is created by “adoption” in terms of 
customary law cannot be denied, but I believe that it will be in the best 
interests of the child if this relationship is not called adoption. 
 
 
 
                                                 
106  A similar dual system of adoption to that in South Africa is found in Botswana.  
107  This does not form part of the research, and will not be elaborated upon. 
108  See “8 2 2 Adoption in terms of customary law”. 
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9 5 CONCLUSION 
 
I have explained that there are many factors that determine the best interests of 
the child,109 and that there are furthermore various factors that have to be taken 
into account when a decision about the adoption of a child has to be made.110 
The circumstances in South Africa are different to those that are found in many 
other countries around the world. Poverty, famine and HIV/AIDS are some of the 
issues that make the children in this country extremely vulnerable. Adoption, 
including intercultural adoption, is a viable option that could be in the best 
interests of all children in need of parental care. An adopted child puts the 
relationships that exist as well as the impact of adoption into perspective:  
 
Finding her [the birthmother] has taught me the difference between origin and roots. I’m 
here because of biology, but I am who I am because of love… It’s not blood that makes a 
family, it’s love.111 
 
Adoption is a very successful institution. Most adoptees, no matter what their 
background, develop into well-adjusted and well-functioning adults.112 The kind of 
research that is done on adopted children does not happen for children who are 
raised by their biological parents/family. If it were done, I have no doubt that 
similar issues to those that are identified for adopted children, both positive and 
                                                 
109  See 4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”, specifically “4 2 7 Factors that determine the 
best interests of the child”. 
110  This is seen throughout the preceding chapters. 
111  Zeelie in Kahn Thicker than Water 123. 
112  Katz in Treacher & Katz Dynamics of Adoption 227. 
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negative issues, would be found to be present. Schneider says the differences 
among us are real, but that our similarities are numerous and strong enough to 
make possible a society of mutual concern, a society which recognises the 
elements of common humanity that bind and oblige us to each other.113  
 
 Move the thousands of children who are available for adoption out of the institutions and 
out of their temporary foster placements, and into permanent homes! Apply the standard 
best interest of the child as the first and foremost criterion in child placement! Make the 
move without regard to race [or culture, I might add]!114 
                                                 
113  Schneider 2003 Law Quadrangle Notes 80. 
114  Simon et al The Case for Transracial Adoption 116. 
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